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FORENSIC SCIENCE AND BEYOND: 
AUTHENTICITY, PROVENANCE  
AND ASSURANCE 
EVIDENCE AND CASE STUDIES
Annual Report of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser 2015
Forensic Science and Beyond: Authenticity, Provenance and Assurance
Evidence and Case Studies
This volume comprises chapters which form the evidence for the Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s 
Annual Report 2015, together with illustrative case studies. It should be cited as:
Annual Report of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser 2015: Forensic Science and Beyond: Authenticity, 
Provenance and Assurance. Evidence and Case Studies.
The Government Office for Science would like to thank the authors who contributed evidence chapters, 
case studies and their time towards this report and gave it freely.
This report is intended for:
Policymakers, legislators, and a wide range of business people, professionals, researchers and other 
individuals whose interests include the use of forensic analysis within the Criminal Justice System through to 
authenticity, provenance and assurance in the provision of goods and services.
The report project team was Martin Glasspool, Richard Meadows, Lindsay Taylor,  Adam Trigg and Jenny 
Wooldridge.
This report consists of contributions received from academia and industry and others outside of 
government. The views expressed do not represent policy of any government or organisation.
This report is presented in two parts. The first is the summary report of the Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser. This was developed as a result of seminars and the advice of the experts who provided the source 
of the evidence. The second part, the evidence, has been gathered from and written by a distinguished 
group of experts. The evidence takes two forms: chapters that consider a major aspect of the forensic 
landscape; and individual case studies that illuminate points of detail and principle. The evidence section 
provides the views of the experts themselves, who met on several occasions during the preparation of the 
report and had the opportunity to help to develop the narrative and to comment on each other’s 
contributions. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser is responsible and accountable for the summary 
report, and the experts for their individual contributions to the evidence papers and case studies. Neither 
should be blamed for the sins and omissions of the other!
FOREWORD
My second annual report explores new and emerging forensic techniques so that policy 
makers can ensure they are developed and used for the beneﬁ t of the UK.
It covers four main areas:
● An overview of the UK’s forensic science landscape from the perspective of its users
● The changing nature of crime (including cybercrime), examining how forensic science can predict,  
   deter and overtake it
● The forensic application of analytical science beyond the court system
● The steps required to secure the UK’s forensic science sector for the long term, with particular  
   attention to innovation and new market opportunities. 
In producing the report, I have drawn on the knowledge of a range of experts and academics.  They 
have provided a clear evidence base for each of these four areas. This volume presents that body of 
evidence, as well as illustrative case studies. 
The chapters and case studies herein represent the authors’ personal views rather than those of the 
Government Ofﬁ ce for Science, but their insights – for which I am greatly indebted – have 
fundamentally informed the messages and questions raised in my report.
 
Sir Mark Walport
Government Chief Scientiﬁ c Adviser
December 2015
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THE FORENSIC SCIENCE  
LANDSCAPE
The interaction between criminal investigation, 
justice and science is complex,  but offers 
one of the strongest safeguards against false 
allegation and wrongful conviction. Digital forensics 
can recover, analyse and compare 
vast amounts of information from 
mobile phones, tablets, PCs, CCTV 
and satellite data. Traditional types of forensics
DNA Drugs Toxicology
Footwear Patterns FingerprintsFirearms
Fire InvestigationFibresBlood Spatter
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In the UK we 
identify approximately 
50,000 
offenders 
from crime scenes using 
fingerprints each year
The National DNA Database produces over
 2,000 DNA matches a month 
and has a match rate of over 60% with a 
DNA profiles obtained from samples taken 
from a crime scene or victim 
There are
25,000  
DNA 
matches 
between crime scenes 
and offenders 
each year
Cognitive and human factors
underpin many aspects of
forensic work, from the initial
collection and evaluation of data 
at the crime scene, throughout 
work in the laboratory where 
evidence is interpreted, to 
presentation in court. 
The complexity of forensic 
science is increasing rapidly. 
Policymakers and practitioners 
need to work towards 
consistency, collaboration, 
clarity and common standards.
THE FORENSIC SCIENCE LANDSCAPE
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I
account of all stakeholders, n
n reality there may be no such thi
as ‘Forensic Science’. Perhaps inst
a multiplicity of sciences and scien
methodologies, old and new, whe
to legal questions, become the disciplin
forensic science.  These questions are u
associated with the prosecution of cri
ot just the 
CHAPTER 1
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
CONTEXT
ANGELA GALLOP, 
Axiom 
International Ltd, 
KAREN 
SQUIBB-WILLIAMS, 
Acorn Chambers
The privatisation of forensic science services in England and Wales has 
been a resounding success, in some ways: it has saved costs, reduced 
case turnaround times, maintained quality and, to some extent, inspired 
innovation. But the way services are procured has become increasingly 
fragmented, threatening future innovation and potentially undermining 
public confidence in the criminal justice process.  The UK urgently needs 
a national strategy covering all aspects of forensic science that takes 
police. 
ng 
ead, 
tific 
n applied 
e of 
sually 
me, but 
they also cover consumer and environmental 
protection, health and safety, and civil proceedings 
such as breach of contract and negligence.  The 
sheer variety of scientific disciplines involved in 
forensic science can potentially distract focus from 
the formation of a coherent strategy for their use 
within the justice system.
Forensic science is a term that has come to 
be used over the past century and a half to 
describe an increasing number of practices.  These 
began with the observations that fingertips 
feature different patterns, and that people write 
in different, distinguishable ways; that chemistry 
could help to identify poisons; that the blood shed 
from different types of injury formed distinctive 
patterns; and that different chemical groups 
could be used to distinguish blood from different 
people. All these were used to clear up mysteries 
and help get to the bottom of matters in dispute.
As analytical techniques and methodologies 
developed and experience broadened, it became 
possible to determine the composition of 
everyday items such as plastic bags and tracksuit 
trousers; the trajectory of a knife or a bullet; the 
precise nature of arson and ballistics residues; 
the meaning of bone damage; how old a bruise 
might be; narcotic traces on bank notes; individual 
characteristics of hair, nails, and teeth and bite 
marks; the interpretation of simple binary data; 
tread patterns on shoes and feet marks inside 
them; differences between voices; paint and glass 
fragments on tools; the life cycle of flies; and 
assemblages of pollen grains. 
Most recently, forensic science has been further 
transformed by our ability to detect and analyse 
tiny amounts of DNA, found to varying extents 
in every part of the human body and in animals 
and plants too (see case study p17). And it can 
now recover, analyse and compare vast amounts 
of information stored on mobile phones, tablets 
and PCs, in CCTV footage and other imagery, 
as well as incalculable quantities of satellite data.  
This seemingly endless list of capabilities also 
includes the statistical analysis of the likelihood of 
a probability, which can generate confusion that 
potentially weakens the contribution of scientific 
evidence (see Chapter 4).
Nevertheless, forensic science has led to a 
much more reliable understanding – and indeed 
hard physical evidence of – where, when, how 
and by whom crimes have been committed. 
It can uncover the nature and likely origin of a 
wide range of objects and substances; which of 
two competing accounts is more likely to be 
right; the extent of an individual’s criminality; as 
well as the nature of drugs and firearms supply 
chains, and who is involved in them. Increasingly, 
forensic science is also being used to predict 
when crimes are likely to be committed so they 
can be pre-empted and disrupted, and it answers 
innumerable other questions across endeavours 
in all sections of society.  To this extent, it makes 
an invaluable contribution to our justice and 
security systems and thereby to our economic 
and social stability. 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CONTEXT
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THE IMPACTS OF FORENSIC 
SCIENCE
Forensic science impacts on government, 
law enforcement, academia, lawyers, judges, 
scientists and technicians, insurers, regulators, 
journalists and the public. All of these different 
sections of society, as well as different specialist
within forensic science, will have different 
perspectives and interpretations about what 
forensic science is, and what it can and cannot 
do.These perspectives go to the heart of our 
justice system. For instance, prosecution lawyer
are statutorily obliged to exercise their own 
view of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
scientific evidence before deciding whether an 
investigation can progress to the prosecution 
process – this ‘gatekeeping’ decision takes place
long before a judge is involved in the matter. 
Legal defence teams need to know whether 
any specific aspects of scientific evidence might
usefully be subjected to challenge. How are any
of them to make such assessments without a 
reasonable grasp of the science and scientific 
methodology? It follows that where discussion 
and formulation of policy regarding the social 
utility of the sciences takes place, a very clear 
common language is necessary; this remains an 
essential, yet arguably elusive, aim.
How then are forensic science providers 
and those who use their services and products,
particularly law enforcement personnel 
and lawyers, best able to understand and 
maximise the opportunities available to them? 
Scientific excellence, commercial success 
and just outcomes depend on the consistent 
understanding, integration and utility of high-
quality scientific processes and practices, 
grounded in a fertile, confident environment 
that is supported by a consistent government 
strategy which includes sufficient funding and 
open, defragmented communication (see case 
study p20). 
While this is a relatively straightforward 
concept, the reality is far more complex.  There
are many different forensic science providers, 
reflecting the sheer scope and scale of forensic
activity.  They range from organisations that 
specialise in forensic science to the exclusion of
everything else, to those who do it as a side lin
from large-scale operations to niche suppliers 
of specialist services; from those who are both 
customers and providers of forensic services; 
s 
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e; 
and from those whose focus is solely in the 
UK to those who also operate internationally. 
Indeed, some UK forensic providers are foreign 
owned.  They include private companies, 
public organisations, academic institutions, and 
commercial and industrial operations.
Their customers are just as varied.  The 
43 police services in England and Wales, and 
associated investigative and law enforcement 
bodies (e.g. the National Crime Agency), are 
the largest cohort of customers, and much of 
what follows in this chapter will inevitably focus 
on this area. Prosecution lawyers throughout 
the UK also represent a large body of users, 
despite rarely having any contractual or direct 
contact with the scientists. But there are many 
other organisations that also use forensic science 
including, for example, lawyers representing 
people accused of crime or acting for one 
side or the other in civil matters; regulatory 
bodies; manufacturers whose products are 
alleged to be faulty, contaminated or fraudulent; 
private individuals and their professional bodies 
conducting investigations of their own; and 
insurers (and their loss adjusters) challenging 
claims. Rightly, of course, there is no limit 
globally on how the sciences are used, or by 
whom; consequently, those with criminal intent 
and terrorists also make full use of scientific 
opportunity. In response, the UK must have 
the capability to monitor and analyse such use 
overtly and, where appropriate, covertly.
FORENSIC SCIENCE HAS LED 
TO A MUCH MORE RELIABLE 
UNDERSTANDING – AND INDEED 
HARD PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF – 
WHERE, WHEN, HOW AND BY WHOM
CRIMES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED
 
A STRATEGY FOR FORENSIC 
SCIENCE
As we write this chapter, the government is 
currently in the process of developing a national 
strategy for forensic science. It is clearly critical 
that the true views and experiences of forensic 
suppliers are captured during this process.  This 
is not always easy, owing to significant sensitivities 
THE FORENSIC SCIENCE LANDSCAPE
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about investigative customer perceptions of 
individual firms, which often limit what these 
firms are prepared to say openly. 
There are different ways in which forensic 
providers interact with their customers, ranging 
from contracts covering routine testing, to one-off 
investigations requiring specific strategies which 
need continual refinement as work progresses.  
The greatest change in recent times has been in 
relation to work commissioned by the police (see 
Chapter 2).  This reflected the shift from public 
to private providers on cost and effectiveness 
grounds, and the desire by police services to be 
able to compare products and services of one 
provider with another on an ‘apples with apples’ 
basis.  To assist with this, a system was devised 
which effectively broke down forensic services 
into their smallest component parts, which 
could then be bought and sold as commodities 
through a national streamlined procurement 
process. At the same time, and in an effort to 
further control and reduce costs, police services 
started in-sourcing increasing amounts of the 
work themselves, mainly in connection with the 
initial examination of items for evidential traces. 
Such traces – often on swabs, in scrapings, or on 
snippets of fabric – are then submitted for more 
detailed analysis to one or more external forensic 
science laboratories.
The leading forensic suppliers complain 
consistently about the difficulties of continuing to 
provide services to the various standards required 
while remaining competitive.  They do this in 
private for fear of creating concern amongst 
their customers about their resilience and ability 
to cope with new procurement awards.  This 
inevitably means that funding for activities such as 
research and development suffers, and projects 
tend to be skewed towards those more directly 
related to saving operational costs. 
It is in the very nature of science that new 
technologies and methodologies constantly 
emerge from the wider scientific community. 
It is clearly critical that those with potentially 
important forensic application are tested, and 
where appropriate, validated and incorporated 
into operational use as quickly and effectively as 
possible. But identifying which these might be, 
and conducting the necessary tests for relevance, 
reliability and robustness is a costly and time-
consuming business (see Chapter 3). 
Gone are the days when providers might 
expect to earn sufficient profits from their work 
to fund all of this R&D themselves. It is difficult 
for them to compete effectively for external 
funding from research councils and other funding 
institutions because historically this has not been 
a core skill, and besides, there are few such funds 
with a forensic science focus – most are targeted 
towards the ‘pure’ sciences (see Chapter 16). 
Gone too is the Forensic Science Service (FSS), 
which benefitted from additional direct support 
from government for this purpose. Recognising 
these difficulties, the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee commented in its 
2011 report1:  “Forensic R&D in the UK is not 
healthy, and we call on the Home Office and 
Research Councils to develop a new national 
research budget for forensic science”. In its 2013 
report2, the committee wrote that “it remains as 
difficult as ever for forensic researchers to obtain 
funding”. While some funds are available from the 
government’s Innovate UK agency, which works 
closely with the Home Office’s Centre for Applied 
Science and Technology (CAST) and other bodies 
in administering them, the process is fairly opaque 
and we know from experience that providers’ 
access to such funds remains very problematic.  
As the mother of invention, adversity has 
inspired some imaginative partnerships between 
different types of organisation – most notably 
police services, forensic suppliers and academic 
institutions, which have added to the richness 
of projects. But a properly developed national 
strategy with universal buy-in is required to 
provide focus and impetus for research, along 
withthe necessary funds to ensure the timeliness, 
safety and reliability of emerging forensic 
technologies.
In formulating such a strategy, we need to look 
deeper into the way we deploy forensic science. 
A good place to start would be with the attrition 
rate in criminal cases in England and Wales: 
specifically, those cases where forensic evidence 
was sought during the initial investigation, then 
AS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION, 
ADVERSITY HAS INSPIRED SOME 
IMAGINATIVE PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF ORGANISATION
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passed to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), 
but which fail to continue to court. Since the early 
2000s, the authors have been told by a number of 
Chief Constables and other investigators that only 
around 10% of cases involving forensic science 
evidence ever reach a courtroom. Is there really 
a 90% attrition rate? And if there is, what are 
the reasons for it? Is this acceptable, for instance 
through a case ending satisfactorily before reaching 
court, or does it potentially represent a waste 
of public funds? And why does our experience 
suggest that public policymakers do not always 
seem to be fully aware of these operational issues? 
Answering these questions would offer valuable 
information for strategic forward planning. In 
the interests of justice and in the public interest, 
therefore, it is worth considering a different 
approach to investigating crimes using forensic 
evidence (and necessarily expert evidence) and 
preparing cases specifically for the CPS (rather 
than the perpetual focus of preparation for the 
court room).
HOW USEFUL IS FORENSIC SCIENCE?
It is notable that academic, investigative, political 
and media attention on forensic science has 
focused almost exclusively on crime scene 
investigative input and prosecution process 
outcomes in the courtroom (i.e. reported 
cases). But this only addresses the outcomes of 
about 10% of investigative activity, potentially 
significantly skewing any analysis. Indeed, if the 
effectiveness of police investigations, and the utility 
of forensic evidence, are to be measured by way 
of appearances in the courtroom this may lead 
to ignoring the 90% of investigations that, hidden 
from view in the manner hypothesised above, fall 
by the wayside post-investigation and pre-trial. 
Such a lack of reliable, evidence-based information 
about what has occurred in the significant majority 
of cases could suggest that what is ‘known’ about 
police investigative and forensic practice is just the 
tip of an iceberg, and any conclusions based upon 
such limited knowledge thus remain conjecture. 
No scientific methodology would recommend 
extrapolating findings from just 10% of their 
experiments; and yet, if this attrition rate is in 
any way accurate, police officers, criminologists, 
forensic scientists, lawyers and judges have been 
at risk of doing just that.  It may be shown in the 
future that this is not the definitive percentage, 
but the figure is less important than the need to 
explore more rigorously what the value of forensic 
science and forensic analysis is to the criminal 
justice system as a whole.  
The cost of obtaining forensic evidence and 
using expert witnesses is loosely said among senior 
police to be second only to salary costs within 
some law enforcement agencies (there is no 
reliable and comprehensive data). Consequently, 
exploring and seeking to reduce this significant 
and potentially unjust attrition rate should now be 
placed alongside all the other key considerations of 
forensic science and related strategic policy making. 
Effective public policy can only be achieved 
through identifying and understanding the real 
challenges of involving forensic science and 
scientific methodologies in the criminal justice 
landscape. In this regard, perhaps much is to be 
learnt by moving the focus away from the intense, 
‘sexy’ work of police, crime scene investigators 
(CSIs) and forensic scientists, or the dramatic 
and charismatic nature of the courtroom; and 
instead shift it to the ‘backroom’ dynamics and 
comparatively dry mechanics of the prosecution 
process.  This is the critical decision-making point 
where cases either proceed to court, or are filed 
away with numbers of others that have reached 
the end of the criminal justice road.
Although a body of research exists into attrition 
rates of particular crime types, especially domestic 
violence and rape cases3, there is a dearth of 
research in relation to attrition rates associated 
with particular scientific evidence types (save 
perhaps for the US National Academy of Sciences 
Report on Forensic Sciences – see below). 
While the UK has seen myriad reports on police 
investigations, and the use of forensic science, these 
have almost always based their conclusions upon 
those rarefied cases that end up in court, which 
are then available for academic and public scrutiny 
and comment. Even when directly informed 
by operational police or forensic scientists, 
these commentators are sometimes at risk of 
commenting from behind a veil of ignorance of 
why cases have been ‘dropped’ by the CPS. 
So why might the attrition rate be so high? Law 
enforcement investigation files are subjected to 
a seven-stage filtering process, defined by the 
statutory function of the CPS as cases leave the 
investigative field and enter into the gateway 
of the prosecution process.  The application 
of these filters appears to have the effect of 
reducing the strength of the forensic evidence, 
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particularly when subjected to the “evidential 
stage” of the Test set out in the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors (7th Edition), which Crown 
Prosecutors are statutorily obliged to apply in 
order to determine whether a case proceeds 
into the prosecution process.  These seven filters 
can be broadly defined as follows:
1  Applicable statute and case law in the 
jurisdiction of England & Wales
2  The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 7th Edition
3  The CPS Core Quality Standards
4  The Criminal Procedure Rules
5  The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 
1996
6  The more contemporary4 principles of 
streamlining Forensic Case Management and 
proportionate prosecutions
7  The absence of a contractual relationship 
between forensic science providers and end-
users, namely the CPS and the court
The second stage of this filtration process, in 
particular, calls for attention because it deals 
with the status of evidence itself – a question 
which probes the core of the place of science 
within the development of the modern nation 
state, and one taken up in the work of major 
philosophers of science Karl Popper, Thomas 
Kuhn, and Paul Feyerabend5. According to the 
description of the evidential stage in the CPS’s 
Code for Crown Prosecutors, for evidence to be 
used in court, the prosecutor must be satisfied 
that it is reliable, credible, and admissible. It 
could be that it is in the face of these questions 
that the findings and methodologies of forensic 
science encounter significant resistance. 
Importantly, it may also help to consider 
whether the ability of the 43 police services of 
England and Wales to individually source their 
forensic science needs – rather than acting 
together as a nationwide ‘super user’ – may have 
fed a tendency for each police service to use 
their scientific and technological capability in a 
‘siloed’ manner to excel in achieving individual 
police service performance indicator targets. 
Such targets are potentially counter-productive 
to a national cohesive knowledge sharing 
approach. Looking wider than forensic science, 
the Soham murders are perhaps an example 
of the price paid by the public interest for the 
past lack of unified action and communication 
by  some police services.  The Bichard Report 
on the murders found that if processes to share 
information between between forces were 
followed and adequate checks were conducted 
by the school and the police then Ian Huntley 
would not have been able to gain employment 
as a school caretaker.
In addition, law enforcement agencies – and 
the politicians responsible for them – rely heavily 
on the positive public perception of their role 
to achieve co-operation (‘policing by consent’).  
This requires favourable media coverage, and 
they are potentially drawn into a public-relations 
approach which accentuates ‘success’ at tackling 
crime, and detecting and convicting offenders. 
The increase in forensic laboratories and the 
diversification of forensic techniques over the 
past thirty years, propelled especially by DNA 
testing, has occurred without a corresponding 
efflorescence of published research on the 
efficacy of such techniques on solving crime 
and actually convicting criminals6. Studies7, 8 
have shown that forensic evidence did impact 
on prosecution rates, though not uniformly 
– for example, by increasing sentences and 
incarceration, though not actually affecting 
whether or not a defendant was convicted in the 
first place.
Joseph Peterson and Ira Sommers have 
shown that the impact of forensic evidence 
varied between different kinds of cases. Forensic 
evidence has a strong impact on the rate of 
arrest, charging, and conviction for aggravated 
assault, burglary and robbery, and rape, in 
particular6.  The same study found that in only 
“~2% of all cases, 6% of cases with crime scene 
evidence, and 12% of cases with examined 
evidence” did forensic evidence link a suspect to 
a crime scene or a victim. However, it should be 
acknowledged that this conclusion may, to some 
extent, depend on the particular methodology 
used, as with all research.
Kelly Pyrek has represented forensic science 
as a mêlée in which “the numerous stakeholders 
in the criminal justice system extract from 
forensic science what they need to perpetuate 
their positions”9. Further recent research has 
highlighted the conflicted agendas in which 
forensic science is caught. According to Kevin 
Strom and Matthew Hickman, “compared 
with reducing crime rates, maximizing case 
solution, conviction, and sentencing rates may 
not command the same attention”10.  Though 
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DNA ANALYSIS
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beside the body. Investigators swab the handle 
of the knife and take samples from the tissue, in 
order to recover DNA from skin cells deposited 
by people who have touched them. 
Standard DNA tests analyse genetic markers 
in areas of DNA called short tandem repeats 
(STRs) that vary greatly between people. By 
testing cells on the tissue, investigators produce 
a full DNA profile that appears to be from a 
single person.  This result can be searched against 
the profiles of (a) people and (b) other crimes 
held on the National DNA Database. Police are 
notified if the profile matches a named person, 
who can then be interviewed. Intelligence 
information can be obtained if the profile 
matches samples from other crimes. At the same 
time, individuals that do not match the profile 
are eliminated from enquiries.
If no matches are obtained in the UK, the 
police may consider searching international DNA 
databases.  The standard test contains all of the 
DNA markers needed for searches of European 
DNA databases, for example. DNA tests are 
currently available that analyse more than 24 
STR areas of DNA, including all of those present 
in both the European Standard Set and the US 
CODIS system, enabling wider international 
searches.  These are not performed routinely in 
England and Wales or Northern Ireland, but are 
used in Scotland.
If no matches to named individuals are 
obtained then familial searches for relatives such 
as parent, child or sibling can be performed for 
intelligence purposes. Familial leads for male 
samples can be followed up by testing markers 
(called Y STRs) on the Y chromosome, which is 
inherited through the male line.  This means that 
one person’s Y profile can be used to include 
or exclude all of the male blood relatives of the 
person tested, so the number of people profiled 
can be limited. Mitochondrial DNA, inherited 
through the female line, can provide further 
familial leads. 
If the profile obtained from cells on the knife 
handle shows a mixture of DNA from multiple 
donors, then the direct DNA database searches 
for that result may be more limited and its 
intelligence value is decreased. However, once a 
named individual is compared with the mixture 
then standard methods for evaluating the 
significance can be performed on many mixtures, 
with an increasing range of specialist statistical 
analysis available for complex mixtures.
Specialist investigative tests analyse markers 
for physical appearance including eye, hair and 
skin colour.  These may provide intelligence leads 
about the general appearance of the offender 
in cases where a DNA profile from a crime 
stain has not produced any matches on DNA 
database searches and there is no eyewitness 
evidence to describe the offender.
In the short term, the police are testing rapid 
DNA devices that can analyse reference and 
crime samples in two hours, producing profiles 
suitable for DNA database searches.  This would 
provide reference and crime profiles and allow 
a suspect to be included or eliminated from an 
investigation within custody time limits.
Longer-term research is currently directed 
towards Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) 
systems, which combine and extend all of the 
applications listed so far. A single test will not 
only analyse many more STRs, but it will do 
so at a greater level of discrimination. It will 
also include Y chromosome markers, physical 
markers and ancestry informative tests.  These 
are already being used for medical applications, 
and similar systems useful for forensic work are 
being evaluated for future implementation, once 
suitable DNA databases and methods have been 
produced, evaluated and validated.
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they may be important from a justice system 
perspective, they may command less attention 
from the police executive which has more 
influence over funding. 
The authors of a 2005 UK Home Office 
research study on attrition in volume crime 
presented an optimistic picture about the 
contribution of forensic science in ensuring 
conviction in such crimes11.  They cited the 
science’s ability to create strong “first links” 
between suspects and offences, as well as the 
“principal information needed to make a case 
against a suspect”, and that this had changed 
from a previous situation in which forensic 
evidence was merely used for corroboration. 
Most importantly, though, they found that 
forensic science did not improve the generally 
high attrition rate within volume crime.  This 
is because forensic evidence was either not 
collected in efficient ways – in household 
burglary cases, for example, it may be collected 
as a way to reassure the victim, rather than 
because of its likely efficacy – or that it was not 
collected at all from those crime scenes (such as 
vehicle crimes) where it would be more likely to 
prevent attrition11.
From recent literature on forensic science, 
attrition, and the Criminal Justice System, it may 
be suggested that while the growth of forensic 
science methods and applications has given 
cause for optimism, significant discrepancies 
exist in the effective management of the science 
and its resources.  Though the findings of the 
studies cited here have served to circumscribe 
this problem, none of them have dealt with it to 
the extent of offering detailed remedial policy 
recommendations.  The following chapters of this
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report will help to set out the foundations upo
which future government strategy can be built 
by the integration of well-informed, cohesive an
collaborative policy making.
In addition, Northumbria University is now 
funding a research project to explore precisely 
the areas of potentially significant attrition 
described in this chapter.  The programme, 
led by Karen Squibb-Williams, will explicitly 
concern itself with the passage of cases involving 
forensic science and scientific methodologies, 
from the criminal investigation phase through 
to the prosecution process, as well as ‘case 
management’ (which means different things to 
different organisations). A key aim is to establish 
whether there is any evidential basis for the 
anecdotal 90% attrition rate, and if so to set out 
the cause and effect landscape with the clear aim 
of supporting future strategic forensic policy in 
the justice system.
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCE
The ethical status of forensic science has seen 
dramatic changes over recent years. We have 
come a long way from the miscarriages of justice 
of the 1970s and 1980s (John Preece, and the 
Birmingham Six, for example) which highlighted 
shortcomings in laboratory systems and processes 
and heralded the introduction of formal quality 
management.  These days there is a requirement 
for internationally-accredited quality systems 
in most forensic laboratories (see Chapter 3), 
except in the newer disciplines such as digital 
forensics (see Chapter 7), and fingerprints (with 
its very different origin in the police service), 
where these are still being developed. A Forensic 
Regulator (currently non-statutory) has been 
introduced to develop and oversee standards 
and codes of conduct and practice; although it 
should be noted that this superintendence only 
applies to forensic providers to the prosecution. 
Scientists have also been required to interpret the 
significance of their findings in a more ‘scientific’ 
way, using statistical approaches to support their 
otherwise almost entirely subjective assessments, 
and to set out the basis of their opinion in their 
witness statements so that this can be more 
effectively assessed by others (see Chapter 4).
One interesting development is the increase 
in forensic work being conducted within police 
rvices. Many police services have established 
 extended their own forensic screening units 
hich undertake initial examinations of items 
 varying extents. As a consequence of this, 
external suppliers receive significantly fewer 
items for examination or review, and sometimes 
receive only samples taken from such items.  This 
equates to a substantial shift in some of the work 
from external to in-house police facilities. At the 
extreme end of the scale is the Metropolitan 
Police Laboratory, re-created after the closure of 
the FSS.  This now provides the vast majority of 
forensic laboratory services for what is by far the 
largest police service in England and Wales. Use of 
digital forensics is rising rapidly, reflecting trends in 
modern life, and much of this work is also being 
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provided from within police services themselves.
This development puts police services in a 
position of both hunting criminals, and being 
responsible for directing and presenting impartial 
scientific evidence to the prosecution process 
and courts of law.  The very act of selecting which 
items should be examined for what – irrespective 
of who actually does the testing – can have 
an impact on the outcome of an investigation. 
(See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the range of 
other factors). Of course, there may be nothing 
wrong with any of this, but it certainly seems to 
be something worthy of public awareness and 
debate before it becomes an accepted norm. 
Forensic input is also now sensibly 
commissioned in stages to avoid any unnecessary 
work. Individual tests are selected in the order in 
which they are most likely to yield information 
of use to an investigation (though it should be 
noted that prosecuting lawyers are very rarely 
involved in this selection process). Where this 
prompts a guilty plea, no further work needs to 
be undertaken. Wherever possible, the results of 
such tests are reported by way of Streamlined 
Forensic Reports (SFRs) that merely contain the 
facts of a test; as opposed to an expert witness 
statement, which considers the results in the 
context of the case and includes a scientist’s 
full expert opinion of what they are likely to 
mean.  At the lowest level, for example, SFRs that 
report a ‘hit’ on the National DNA Database 
are prepared by police officers. At the next level 
up – for instance, if a reference sample profile is 
compared with a crime stain profile – a scientist 
will be involved,although the output will still be a 
purely factual SFR. 
It is obvious to many practitioners in the 
field that these changes have been successful in 
dramatically reducing police spending on external 
forensics. But they have also had a number of 
unintended consequences that pose a risk of 
miscarriage of justice.  These were highlighted 
in the 2014 report of the Independent Police 
Commission12, and Angela Gallop and Jennifer 
Brown in their 2014 paper entitled ‘The Market 
Future for Forensic Science Services in England 
and Wales’13.  They include, for instance: 
• Danger s from the mere selection of which 
items are to be examined, and for which 
types of evidential traces.  To minimise costs, 
it is clearly critical to test as few items as is 
necessary. But it is equally critical that items 
should not be restricted to just those likely to 
support the prosecution’s case, as this may limit 
and bias interpretations of what the evidence is 
likely to mean
•  Work on the same case may be fragmented 
between different organisations. For example, 
a police screening unit may examine the items, 
before one or more external laboratories 
analyse different samples selected from them.  
This means that no one person is likely to 
have a full picture of the evidence, which is 
vital to interpret its likely significance in the 
wider context of the case. (See chapter 4 for 
a discussion on how separation of parts of the 
forensic process can help to counter cognitive 
bias).  This can also lead to the application of the 
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Code for Crown Prosecutors and subsequen
presentation of the evidence at court becom
far more complex than it could be
•  Reducing the scope of scientific input to a 
series of tests chosen by others, with no time
or opportunity for scientists to advise on the
testing strategy, risks narrowing their skill and 
knowledge base 
•  Focusing on increasingly fewer types of test –
such as DNA, fingerprints and digital forensic
– may be inevitable to some extent; but it is 
also effectively de-skilling scientists.  This risks 
prospect that critical knowledge and practical
skills will diminish, and not be there when they 
are needed
Additionally, in the authors’ experience there 
is an extended use of factual SFRs as evidence 
in contested cases, rather than their originally-
intended purpose as the staged form of 
evidence or advisory documents (as per the 
Criminal Procedure Rules).
As we engage with these challenges, a 
reduction in funding for legal defence teams 
THE ETHICAL STATUS OF FORENSIC 
SCIENCE HAS SEEN DRAMATIC 
CHANGES OVER RECENT YEARS. 
WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY 
FROM THE MISCARRIAGES OF 
JUSTICE OF THE 1970s AND 1980s
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CASE STUDY
A PARADIGM SHIFT IN  
UK FORENSIC SCIENCE
NIAMH NIC DAEID, Centre for Anatomy and Human Identification, University of Dundee
n 2009, the US National Academy of Sciences 
produced a report – ‘Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward’1 
– that provided a robust critique of many of 
the techniques used within forensic science.  The 
NAS report (as it has become known) essentially 
exposed the stark reality that much of the forensic 
evidence currently presented in our courts had 
little, if any, scientific underpinning.
To catalyse a long overdue disruption to the 
forensic science ecosystem, Sue Black and Niamh 
Nic Daeid from the University of Dundee secured 
funds from the Royal Society to host a 4-day 
international event in February 2015.  The first 2 
days were an open scientific conference2 where 
expert forensic scientists from around the world 
and senior members of the judiciary discussed 
the current health of the community and why the 
warnings of the NAS report appeared to have 
been largely ignored.  The output from this event 
was an anniversary edition of the Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B3.  The meeting 
was attended by representatives of one-third of 
all police forces in the UK, the UK forensic science 
providers, government agencies, professional bodies, 
45 universities and a range of industrial partners.
A further 2-day closed event4 then followed 
for selected participants and invited guests.  This 
was an extraordinary meeting, facilitated through 
a business modeling approach that generated 
a ‘strategic conversation’. In our experience, 
research scientists, forensic practitioners and the 
most senior judiciary had never before spoken 
so freely and openly about the type and nature 
of scientific evidence being used in courts and 
their shared concerns about the scientific frailty 
of some of that evidence. What followed was a 
crumbling of the barriers across the discipline-
specific silos within the forensic science ecosystem 
– a genuine effort to see things from the 
perspective of others, and to derive a common 
understanding and direction.
There were two principal outcomes from the 
second Royal Society event.  The first was borne 
out of a drive initiated by the Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales, supported by the senior 
judiciary from across the UK, that the scientific 
community should engage more effectively and 
efficiently in the communication of science to 
the judiciary and the public (who form the jury).  
This project is now under active discussion in 
a partnership between Niamh Nic Daeid and 
Sue Black, the Royal Society, the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh, the Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales and other partners, with the objective 
to develop scientific primers for use within the 
courtroom.
The second outcome from the Royal Society 
event was the unanimous agreement to source an 
urgent solution to halt the decline in confidence 
attributed to the poor or inadequate scientific 
foundations of some forensic science. Participants 
identified different types of forensic evidence, 
in current use in the court, which caused 
them concern regarding the robustness of the 
underpinning science.  This resulted in a list of 40 
evidence types ranging from interpretation of 
complex DNA profiles through to gait analysis. 
Participants ranked these in order according to 
value to the court, and used a novel Research 
Gap Analysis Tool (RGAT) to further interrogate 
the top 10 evidence types according to five pillars 
of assessment: detection, recognition, comparison, 
interpretation/evaluation and communication.  
This highlighted that in almost every case, 
deficiencies were most evident in the comparison, 
interpretation/evaluation and communication 
aspects of evidence delivery.  This has provided 
an agreed launch pad for the development of 
a novel, disruptive and visionary pathway for 
forensic science research requiring strong research 
leadership to ensure delivery and sustainability.
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to commission checks of the prosecution’s 
scientific evidence means that the safety net of 
proper independent peer review risks growing 
increasingly thin. 
Adding to the risks is the fact that there is 
currently no requirement for forensic scientists 
to be individually accredited. It is still perfectly 
possible for a scientist with an impressive 
academic or industrial pedigree to present 
themselves as an expert without a proper 
understanding of operational facts of life, 
and how context can turn scientific findings 
on their head. An attempt to establish such 
an accreditation body – the Council for the 
Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) – 
was abandoned when it became apparent that 
it was unlikely ever to be self-funding. Other 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands) have accepted 
that such funding is a state responsibility. But 
the UK relies instead on aspects of the quality 
systems in place in some laboratories, and 
voluntary adherence to codes of conduct and 
practice.  This is unlikely to be sufficient to 
allay concerns about scientists caught up in the 
prosecution ‘machine’, and experts ‘for hire’ by 
the defence.
Much has been learned in recent years 
particularly from the work of Itiel Dror about 
the consequences of a range of cognitive biases, 
or the risk of confirmatory interpretation of 
scientific evidence (see Chapter 4). Important 
experiments have been conducted with both 
fingerprint and more recently DNA experts, 
which show that their conclusions can be 
influenced by the information with which they 
were initially supplied. We need to work hard 
on developing a better understanding of this 
risk, and finding cost-efficient ways to ensure 
any potential bias is filtered out – in relation to 
experts for both the prosecution and defence.
CONCLUSIONS
The UK has a proud and illustrious history in 
forensic science. It has shown that it can take 
bold and imaginative steps and make them 
work. It is still the only country (in England 
and Wales at least) to have privatised all of 
its forensic science services for the Criminal 
Justice System (apart from fingerprints, for 
historical reasons, and the recent trend 
towards law enforcement in-sourcing). 
Privatisation has been a resounding success, 
in terms of driving down the cost of services, 
reducing case turnaround times, maintaining 
quality and inspiring innovation, through market 
competition and professional variety. Without 
this, police spend on forensics would have been 
much higher, and it is arguable whether some 
of the most complex, high-profile cases would 
have been solved (including, for example, 
those of Damilola Taylor, Rachel Nickell and 
Stephen Lawrence). But the market remains 
fragile in areas (see Chapter 2 case study p29). 
Providers are engaged in what some of them 
privately describe as ‘a race to the bottom’ 
commercially (i.e. that the market is becoming 
overly competitive, with the dangers that 
standards will slip or that firms will withdraw 
from the market). And the provision of forensic 
science to the criminal justice process is 
increasingly fragmented, having been allowed 
to evolve with insufficient strategic focus or 
direction, and without effective consultation of 
all relevant stakeholders. 
The closure of the FSS in 2012 could be 
regarded as an early example of, amongst 
other things, the harshness of the forensic 
science market.  The House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee report1 
on the Forensic Science Service in 2011 
concluded that its “dire financial position 
appears to have arisen from a complex 
combination of factors, principally the shrinking 
forensics market, driven by increasing police 
in-sourcing of forensic science services, and 
a forensic procurement framework that has 
driven down prices and does not adequately 
recognise the value of complex forensic 
services”. When the FSS closed, there was 
apparently little that could be ‘saved’ of 
the organisation which had hitherto been 
servicing approximately 60% of the external 
forensic requirement. We are aware of other 
casualties in the market, and of concern about 
the wisdom of investing in it at the current 
time – as predicted by the 2013 report on 
forensic science by the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee, in which it 
commented that “there is great concern about 
the future of the forensics market and that 
forensic science providers may not be willing 
to invest further in a shrinking market”2.
In our view, the UK urgently needs a national 
strategy covering all aspects of forensic science 
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to ensure that it is:
•  Reliable and unbiased
•  Used in the most efficient and cost effective 
way
•  Makes the most of new developments in 
techniques and methodology
•  Reflective of the needs and purposes of all 
stakeholders
•  Properly funded for the job it has to do
Unity will be a key element in building the best 
environment for the continuing success and 
value of science and scientific methodology, 
namely via the following qualities across all the 
relevant sectors of forensic science:
•  Communication
•  Consistency
•  Collaboration
•  Clarity
•  Common standards
The factors that work against achieving 
this unity include: the different investigative 
techniques used across 43 police services; the 
different applications of the law (prosecutors, 
Counsel and Judges); the very wide range 
of understanding of forensic science among 
ministers and their advisers; and the media’s 
role in explaining forensic science and its 
implications to the public.
One approach could be to defragment the 
forensic science community itself.  This would 
enable more cost-effective training mechanisms 
for all applicable agencies, particularly for 
law enforcement officers and prosecution 
lawyers; more commercially effective business 
planning (within a free-market model); and, 
most significantly, it could lead to a coherent 
streamlined UK-wide strategy for research 
and development to future-proof the use 
of forensic science.  This would support the 
continuation of three vital objectives:
•  Re-positioning the UK at the forefront of 
(forensic) scientific development
•  Enabling the best use of scientific innovation 
and scientific methodologies in the future
•  Preserving confidence in the legal system and 
the Rule of Law.
To achieve this, we must learn the lessons 
from the past, from other people who have 
considered the same issues at length. Perhaps 
one of the most important here is the US 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) whose 
2009 report commented on precisely the 
same sorts of concerns that we have described 
here14.  The report made 13 recommendations, 
which can usefully be summarised as follows:
1 Create a na tional institute for forensic 
sciences 
2 Standardise  terminology and reporting 
practices 
3 Expand rese arch on the accuracy, reliability, 
and validity of forensic sciences 
4 Remo ve forensic science from administrative 
control by police or prosecution 
5 Suppor t forensic research on human 
observer bias and sources of human error 
6 Dev elop tools for advancing measurement, 
validation, reliability, information sharing, and 
proficiency testing, and establish protocols for 
examinations, methods and practices 
7 Require mandator y accreditation of all 
forensic laboratories and certification of all 
forensic practitioners 
8 Labor atories should establish routine quality 
assurance and quality control procedures 
9 Estab lish a national code of ethics with a 
mechanism for enforcement 
10 Suppor t higher education in forensic 
graduate programs to include scholarships 
and fellowships 
11 Impro ve the medico-legal death-investigation 
system 
12 Suppor t Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (AFIS) interoperability through 
development of standards 
13 Suppor t the use of forensic science in 
homeland security
The impact of science on society is profound: 
transport, communications, nutrition, housing, 
energy and security could not be what they are 
without generations of dedicated scientists and 
support from those who believed in, and funded, 
their innovations.
The diversity, utility and powerful impact on 
society that forensic science now offers must 
come with a corollary duty to ensure that it 
is properly used, properly understood and 
properly funded well into the future. At the very 
least, a just society depends on good science 
being used for the benefit of all.
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CHAPTER 2
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN PRACTICE
GARY PUGH, Director 
of Forensic Services 
at the Metropolitan 
Police Service
Forensic science is highly successful at solving crimes, eliminating the innocent from 
investigations, and bringing offenders to justice. But there is a growing need for ‘real-
time forensics’, providing accurate and reliable evidence in minutes rather than days.  
The underlying technology is already emerging, but bringing that vision to fruition will 
require better coordination between research organisations, forensic service providers, 
law enforcement officials and the Criminal Justice System, underpinned by a robust and 
deliverable forensic science strategy.
orensic science is one of the most widely 
known and least understood areas of 
scientific endeavour.  The interaction 
between criminal investigation, justice 
and science is a complex dynamic with its own 
unique set of challenges, but it offers one of the 
strongest safeguards in the Criminal Justice System 
against false allegation and wrongful conviction. 
Although the end user of forensic science in the 
Criminal Justice System is ultimately the courts – 
or indeed the jury – the vast majority of forensic 
science activity takes place much earlier in the 
criminal investigation process.
From the initial report or allegation of a crime, 
forensic practitioners are engaged in gathering 
evidence and establishing whether a crime has 
been committed.  Throughout an investigation, 
forensic science will be used to establish the 
sequence of events, validate the accounts of 
witnesses and victims, eliminate and identify 
potential suspects and provide the basis for a 
criminal charge. Once an individual has been 
charged with a criminal offence, the forensic 
practitioner will consider alternative scenarios, 
and will also be the subject of close scrutiny and 
challenge within our adversarial criminal justice 
system.  There are, of course, a large number of 
crimes in which forensic science does not feature 
(such as minor theft). But crimes where there 
is a significant physical interaction between the 
suspect and the crime scene or victim can provide 
the greatest opportunity for forensic science 
to solve the crime, eliminate the innocent from 
investigations, and bring offenders to justice.
In cases involving serious violence, sexually-
motivated crimes, and acquisitive crime such as 
burglary or vehicle crime, forensic science has 
made a long-standing and significant contribution.  
The introduction of forensic databases of 
fingerprints and DNA profiles has enhanced this 
contribution, allowing forensic science to play a 
significant role in identifying potential suspects 
where there are no investigative leads has a match 
rate of over 60% with DNA profiles obtained from 
samples taken from a crime scene or victim1. With 
a shift to cybercrime and the dramatic proliferation 
of digital devices, the relatively new area of digital 
forensics is now becoming an integral part of many 
investigations and prosecutions (see Chapter 7). 
However, the core forensic process of assessment, 
retrieval, analysis, interpretation and presentation of 
expert evidence is essentially the same for digital 
forensics as it is for traditional forensics. If there is 
one constant in the practice of forensic science, 
it is that it is changing and evolving in response to 
different challenges and opportunities.  These are 
examined in more detail in three case studies in 
this chapter, which outline the different perspectives 
of commercial forensic service providers (see p29), 
academia (see p30) and policymakers (see p27).
CHALLENGES IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
Some branches of forensic science – such as the 
identification of illegal drugs or the classification 
of a firearm – are obligatory, and limited law 
enforcement activity could occur without 
them. Moreover, the information gathered from 
identifying illegal firearms and drugs has an 
important role in informing our understanding of 
this criminality, helping to frame legislation aimed 
at deterring or reducing crime and minimising 
its impact on society.  The challenge for law 
enforcement is to ensure that forensic science is 
focused on those crimes and opportunities for 
detection that will provide a useful outcome, given 
the current climate of limited and reducing funding. 
As powerful as DNA profiling has become in its 
sensitivity and power to discriminate individuals, 
the major challenge today is to identify the DNA 
of the criminal against a background of DNA from 
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the victim, or a range of other individuals who may 
have visited the location of the crime. If the DNA 
cannot be associated with a particular body fluid 
or cell type, or cannot be related to a particular 
activity, then the best DNA science in the world 
will have little relevance to the investigation of a 
crime by law enforcement agencies. 
As well as providing a useful outcome for law 
enforcement, the challenge for forensic science 
practitioners is to produce results in minutes and 
hours, rather than days or weeks.  The sooner 
an offender is identified and apprehended, the 
less opportunity they have to commit more 
crime; earlier intervention may also reduce future 
offending or divert individuals from a career of 
crime.  The most recent advances in Automated 
Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), rapid 
DNA profiling devices, drugs analysers and digital-
device data-recovery kiosks provide the prospect 
of ‘real-time forensics’ that will change not only 
the forensic operating model but the policing and 
investigative models.
COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The UK is the only country in the world to have 
introduced the commercial provision of forensic 
science.  This can be traced back to April 1991, 
when two keys changes were made: the formation 
of the Forensic Science Service as an executive 
agency of the Home Office, combining the six 
Home Office Forensic Science Laboratories and a 
Home Office Central Research Establishment into 
one organisation; and the introduction of direct 
charging for forensic science services. 
The advent of direct charging followed a period 
of crisis in the late 1980s where staff shortages 
and backlogs led to forensic examinations taking 
many months to complete. Prior to being given 
agency status, forensic science was funded on the 
basis of capitation i.e. the number of police officers 
or establishment.  The move to direct charging 
was not to introduce a market, but to change the 
basis of funding so that police forces would be free 
to spend more on forensic science, allowing for 
capacity to increase.
So the commercialisation of forensic science was 
by accident rather than design, and the formation 
of a stable and sustainable commercial forensic 
provision is not an end in itself. While commercial 
companies will have an important role to play in 
forensic science delivery and improvement, there 
needs to be a clear purpose for the commercial 
provision of forensic science within a wider strategy. 
This is needed not only to manage risk, but to 
exploit the agility and access to innovation that 
is available from the private sector. However, the 
commercial relationships between police forces 
and commercial providers are not mature, and 
are based on transaction rather than partnership.  
This is the result of a procurement framework 
based on standardised products that do not allow 
for innovation or integration between public and 
private providers.  To ensure a sustainable forensic 
science provision, it is important that commercial 
providers are viable and successful businesses: 
consequently, the commercial sector needs to have 
long-term clarity about the demand and capabilities 
required by the police service and Criminal Justice 
System in order to make investment decisions.
Real-time forensics will require close 
collaboration with commercial companies 
and relationships that are based on long-term 
partnerships.  The current provider base will need 
to change fundamentally, reducing its reliance on 
conventional DNA profiling as a revenue stream 
in favour of a different business model based on 
service integration and on-site or remote testing 
and analysis.  This change will need to be managed 
with the commercial sector as partners, but with 
a clearly-defined role and purpose that allows for 
major structural change within forensic science to 
realise the benefits and reduce costs.
EXPERT EVIDENCE
There has been keen interest from senior judges 
in the progress of forensic science, not least from 
the Lord Chief Justice; the admissibility of expert 
evidence was the subject of a very thorough and 
detailed review by the Law Commission2 .  The 
judiciary and forensic practitioners have a common 
purpose in delivering accurate and reliable expert 
evidence, with quality being non-negotiable.  The 
establishment of an independent Forensic Science 
Regulator in the UK – the first in the world – is a 
IF THERE IS ONE CONSTANT IN THE 
PRACTICE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, 
IT IS THAT IT IS CHANGING AND 
EVOLVING IN RESPONSE TO DIFFERENT 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES.
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strong signal of commitment to ensure the accuracy 
and reliability of expert forensic evidence.  The 
Forensic Science Regulator has developed the 
Codes of Practice and Conduct3, which provide 
the quality-standards framework for the delivery 
of forensic services to the Criminal Justice System 
– these apply to all individuals and organisations 
who undertake forensic examinations.  The 
regulatory framework is important because it puts 
responsibilities on organisations as well as individuals.  
This is a significant and far-reaching change because 
it introduces accountability on senior leaders 
(Directors and Chief Officers) to ensure that 
accurate and reliable expert forensic evidence is put 
before the courts.
Alongside the development of the forensic 
regulatory framework, the criminal justice system 
has defined the duty of an expert witness and 
how expert evidence should be provided to 
the courts as set out in Rule 19 of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules3. An expert must help the court to 
achieve the overriding objective of justice by giving 
an opinion that is objective and unbiased. Justice 
includes acquitting the innocent and convicting the 
guilty: it is not the role of forensic staff to support 
the prosecution or the defence. Rule 19 has been 
further supported and enhanced by the Criminal 
Practice Direction5, published in July 2014, which 
incorporates many of the recommendations of 
the Law Commission review on the admissibility of 
expert evidence in criminal proceedings. 
While considerable thought and effort has gone 
into developing the forensic regulatory framework 
and the provision of expert evidence, these two 
important frameworks for ensuring the accuracy and 
reliability of forensic evidence have been developed 
in isolation of each other.  There needs to be some 
acknowledgement within the Criminal Procedure 
Rules of the forensic regulatory framework; of 
organisational responsibilities; and of the need to 
achieve accreditation. Accreditation demonstrates 
a level of control, commitment and rigour in the 
provision of forensic expert evidence. Organisations 
cannot give evidence, but they do provide the 
framework within which expert evidence is 
delivered in most areas of forensic science.
COMMUNICATING FORENSIC 
RESULTS
Despite these frameworks, there still remains the 
challenge of evaluating and communicating the 
significance of forensic results, particularly where 
they are the product of statistical or probabilistic 
interpretation (see Chapter 4 case study p50). 
Over the past twenty years, much thought 
has been given to the evaluation of forensic 
evidence, drawing on the Bayesian inference (see 
Annexe 1) and seeking to ensure that expert 
opinion is robust, logical, objective and based 
on sound reasoning.  The introduction of a 
probabilistic approach to DNA expert evidence, 
using match probabilities such as ‘1 in a billion’, 
has caused some difficulty in the courts. In a 
landmark ruling in 1997 in Regina v Doheny & 
Adams the judge stated6:
“… to introduce Bayes’ Theorem, or any similar 
method, into a criminal trial plunges the jury into 
inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory 
and complexity deflecting them from their 
proper task”
Forensic practitioners and lawyers have a long 
way to go to reach a common understanding and 
a unified approach to the evaluation of forensic 
evidence. After all, what does the average jury 
member understand by the difference between 1 
in a million and 1 in a billion?
The UK was at the forefront of developing 
a framework for evaluative reporting of the 
results of forensic examination, analysis and 
interpretation.  This is based on the principles of 
balance, logic, robustness and transparency, as set 
out in the recently published European Network 
of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) Guideline 
for Evaluative Reporting in Forensic Science7.  
This framework is based on identifying at least 
two competing propositions, representing the 
prosecution and defence positions.  The forensic 
practitioner evaluates the forensic results at 
source and activity level. 
•  Source level would apply to the results of DNA 
profiling or a fingerprint comparison, and relate 
to propositions such as the claim that a person 
was not inside a premises.  The competing 
propositions could be that “the bloodstain came 
THE JUDICIARY AND FORENSIC 
PRACTITIONERS HAVE A COMMON 
PURPOSE IN DELIVERING ACCURATE 
AND RELIABLE EXPERT EVIDENCE, WITH 
QUALITY BEING NON-NEGOTIABLE.
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CASE STUDY
THE POLICYMAKER’S  
PERSPECTIVE
T
AMANDA COOPER, SRO Digital Policing and Science, Home Office
he Home Office is responsible for 
policymaking and legislation for 
the use of forensic science in law 
enforcement. We advise ministers 
of the risks and opportunities in this area, as well as
running the national DNA and fingerprint databas-
es. In that context, we see our role as setting the 
strategic direction rather than influencing operatio
al policing directly.   
For example, we support and encourage police 
to make the most of the opportunities offered 
by the Police Innovation Fund (PIF). Worth £70 
million for 2015/16, the PIF is designed to incentivis
collaboration, support improved police ICT and 
digital working and enable Police and Crime 
Commissioners to invest in other innovative deliver
approaches with the potential to improve policing 
and deliver further efficiency in the future.
All bids are subject to a robust and objective 
assessment against the published criteria.  This 
involves an initial panel assessment, followed 
by further consideration by a senior oversight 
group that provides advice to ministers. All of 
the successful bids have the potential to improve 
efficiency and contribute to improved value for 
money for the taxpayer. 
For example, Lancashire Constabulary was 
successful in its bid for innovation funding to pilot 
RapidHIT® DNA profiling.  This technology can 
deliver a DNA profile within 2 hours, which is then 
speculatively searched against the National DNA 
Database. If a match is obtained, it is verified by 
conventional DNA profiling of a duplicate sample. 
Lancashire Constabulary is currently in year 2 of 
their pilot and is using it to process blood stains fro
crime scenes in cases such as burglary and vehicle 
crime.  There have been a number of successful 
outcomes using this technology. For example, 
RapidHIT® played a pivotal role in the case of a 
recent residential burglary.  The resident had been 
asleep but was awoken by the sound of breaking 
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glass. A kitchen window and an internal glass door had 
been broken and computer equipment and phones 
stolen, along with the keys to the family car. When a 
crime scene investigator (CSI) attended the scene 
they identified that the offender had cut themselves 
and left blood on the internal door.
The blood from the internal door was deemed 
suitable for processing using RapidHIT® and a result 
was obtained from a speculative search of the DNA 
Database within a few hours.  The search matched 
with a suspect already being held in custody, but who 
was denying any involvement in the crime. Once the 
potential forensic evidence obtained from RapidHIT® 
was put to the suspect he admitted to the burglary. 
As a result of this, the police were able to recover the 
majority of the stolen property and return it to the 
rightful owner. 
The rapid result enabled the offender to be 
charged and remanded to court the next day, 
therefore reducing the officer’s investigative time and 
costs, and avoiding the costs of any bail. Overall, the 
time from a CSI attending the scene to charging an 
individual was approximately 48 hours.  
Alongside ensuring that a new piece of technology 
can be effectively used in the investigation of crimes, 
the role for policy is to ensure the wider consideration 
of areas such as legislation, market impact, regulation, 
and Criminal Justice System (CJS) efficiency and 
reforms. All of these areas need appropriate handling, 
and any changes to methodologies across the supply 
chain of investigations must be considered in the 
context of systems thinking. 
Addressing how aspects of forensic science in the 
CJS are governed and organised is a core element of 
current work on the Home Office Forensic Strategy, 
particularly the regulation of activities, the early 
support on experimentation and the introduction of 
new technologies and applications. Achieving this in a 
way that keeps pace with technology development 
and with changing crime types and crime modus 
operandi is a key objective.
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from the defendant” or “the blood stain came 
from an unrelated individual”. 
•  At activity level, the forensic practitioner 
addresses more complex interpretative issues 
about the actions of individuals in committing 
or being the victim of a crime.  This will require 
knowledge and understanding of persistence, 
transfer and background levels of forensic contact 
traces such as body fluids or gun shot residues.  
This knowledge can be used to evaluate the 
evidence, by assigning probabilities to the findings 
(given each of the competing propositions) to 
produce a Likelihood Ratio.  This is of greater 
value to the courts, but the forensic practitioner 
needs to have a full understanding of the context 
of the case, and what is alleged by the parties 
involved.  To bring some consistency to the 
evaluation and expression of the value or weight 
of the forensic evidence, forensic experts can use 
a verbal scale that is based on a Likelihood Ratios 
and ranges from “no support”, to “moderate 
support” through to “extremely strong support” 
for one proposition over the alternative. It will 
take some time for the courts to fully embrace 
this approach but in my experience there is 
wide acceptance and support for this across the 
forensic profession.
CONCLUSION
Forensic science constitutes a relatively small part 
of the overall scientific effort in the UK. As such, it 
has never sustained a substantial academic research 
base, instead relying on innovation in other fields (e.g. 
medical, pharmaceutical or semiconductor sectors) 
and then adopting new technologies as they emerge. 
However, this situation has reached a low point 
in the last five years, with a small and fragmented 
research base in forensic science that does not allow 
for the effective development and implementation 
of large-scale innovation and the application of 
new science8.  There is no central government 
organisation that has a track record in delivering 
innovation in forensic science and expert evidence 
to the Criminal Justice System. 
Given the range of scientific and technical 
developments in other fields, the focus for innovation 
in forensic science should be to take advantage of 
science and technology that already exists or to 
develop science that is well advanced (see Chapters 
16 and 17). What is lacking is an organisation or 
structure that will translate this to forensic science 
and bring about the transformational change in 
operational and business models that is needed to 
deliver significant improvements. 
There have been major technical advances 
in fingerprint search algorithms, next-generation 
sequencing, facial identification and digital 
forensics.  To harness and coordinate research and 
development of these technologies, and to develop 
the real-time forensics capability, there needs to 
be an academic effort that draws together and 
coordinates universities and research organisations. 
We could also look to international collaboration: for 
example, the EU 2020 Horizon programme offers 
the opportunity to work with European forensic 
agencies. 
For policymakers in government, the goal 
must be to come forward with a coherent 
strategy – or at least a strategic framework – for 
the development of forensic science in the UK, 
recognising all of its complexities and challenges. 
Central to this is the next generation of science 
and technology that will deliver rapid results and 
offer a wealth of information about criminals 
from the contact traces they leave on the victim 
or at the crime scene.  This will also bring to the 
fore the importance of ethical and human rights 
considerations to the forensic arena (see Chapter 
9 case study p100).  The growth of cybercrime 
will also see radical changes in the role of forensic 
science and the need to develop new tools and 
technologies to apply the traditional forensic 
process to the virtual environment (see Chapter 7). 
The common theme for policymakers who are 
developing a strategy for forensic science is the 
need for a consistent and corporate approach to 
delivery, development and governance across the 
forensic science sector.  This does not necessarily 
mean a single organisation, but it does argue 
strongly for a means of engaging all of the partners 
within a governance and strategic framework 
that allows for the delivery and development of 
forensic science in a way that sustains the current 
capability, improves performance and knowledge 
sharing, and reduces cost.  This will require a much 
greater degree of government coordination and 
collaboration between professions to deliver 
stability, innovation and change.  The benefits are 
substantial and achievable – but the risks of failure, 
resulting in the degradation of forensic capability in 
England and Wales, are equally substantial and will 
be much more costly.
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CASE STUDY
THE COMMERCIAL  
PROVIDERS’ PERSPECTIVE
Access
t is difficult to accurately determine the 
revenue generated by the UK commercial 
forensic services industry. As awareness 
of the relevance of forensic skills in other 
industries increases, and technology develops, there 
is undoubtedly a broader range of customers.  
This might be expected to result in an increasingly 
buoyant UK commercial forensic market.
In some areas that is certainly the case. However, 
the largest influence on the market is inevitably 
exerted by its largest customer: the police service. 
Following the closure of the Forensic Science Service
in 2012, the police rapidly accelerated its in-sourced 
forensics capability and reduced its out-sourced 
capability1, and it seems likely that this trend will 
continue.   
This decision, together with a reduction in 
recorded crime and further cuts in forensic 
spending, has contributed to an increasingly fragile 
commercial market. In 2013, this was recognised 
as a significant risk by the House of Commons 
Science & Technology Committee2, and in my view 
nothing has happened to change this since then. 
While venture capitalists consider their options as 
the UK commercial market continues to decline, 
those remaining companies in the UK market are 
now chasing overseas business to remain profitable. 
Indeed, the Science and Technology Committee2 
and commercial forensic-service providers are asking 
questions about whether the UK market will survive.
The reduction in market size2 has been 
accompanied by a shift in emphasis between 
different forensic disciplines.  Traditional areas such 
fires, firearms and trace evidence (such as paint, glass 
and textile fibres) have dramatically decreased in 
favour of DNA and fingerprints, and the exponential 
growth of digital forensics. Consequently, not only 
is the market much less attractive to potential 
investors, but it may be more difficult to put together
the elegant scientific investigation strategies that 
helped to solve some of the UK’s most high profile 
cases. It also raises significant concerns about a 
growth of unsolved cases in the future.
There are also growing questions about how 
much responsibility the police should have for 
providing independent, unbiased and objective 
scientific evidence.  The US National Academy of 
Sciences’ report ‘Strengthening Forensic Science in 
the United States: A Path Forward’3 recognised this 
as a problem back in 2009. As I write this case study, 
the UK government is currently drawing up a much-
needed strategy for forensic science provision over 
 the next 5 years.
Meanwhile, the profession remains determined 
to overcome the current difficulties.  The financial 
cuts have prompted a sense of urgency for research 
and implementation of new technologies. It 
remains extremely difficult to get funding for basic 
research into forensic science projects, but this has 
encouraged collaboration between commercial 
providers, industrial and academic partners. Apart 
from improving services through competition, the 
commercial providers have also formed associations 
such as the Association of Forensic Science Providers 
and now work in unison on certain projects.
Markets inevitably change over time, with 
provision of services dictated largely by customer 
demands. Commercial providers have to respond 
increasingly quickly to meet the changing trends 
in crime and counteract new tools used by the 
criminal fraternity. At a time when we have so much 
new technology to bring to forensic science, we 
need to remember the importance of a holistic 
approach that helps to ensure that we use the right 
techniques at the right time in the right sequence 
to ensure reliability, robustness and value for money 
from forensics. If these are lost, it would damage our 
Criminal Justice System and public confidence in it.
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FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION
GERALDINE FAHY,  University of Kent
he Quality Assurance Agency for 
Higher Education (QAA) defines 
forensic science as “the application 
of science to serve the purposes 
of the law”1. Rapid changes in forensic science 
– stemming from policy responses, increased
commercialisation and the advancement of  
scientific techniques2 – have led to an increase in 
undergraduate and graduate courses in  
forensic science at UK universities. But these 
courses suffer from a mismatch between what 
is taught and what the industry actually requires, 
which urgently needs to be addressed. Given 
that tomorrow’s forensic scientists are those we 
train today, it is paramount that we get these 
academic courses right.
Universities are businesses, and often use 
a degree in forensic science as a selling point 
to help feed the constant demand to increase 
student numbers. Courses with a ‘forensic’ prefix 
appear more attractive and are often easier 
to market than chemistry or biology courses. 
At undergraduate level, these courses offer an 
overview of a wide range of laboratory and 
field techniques such as microscopy, analytical 
chemistry, DNA analysis, ballistics, fire and 
explosives, trace evidence, incident investigation 
and expert witness training. Some undergraduate 
courses, and many postgraduate courses, also 
provide an opportunity to learn more specialised 
disciplines such as forensic anthropology, 
archaeology, botany, entomology, odontology, 
podiatry, digital forensics, and so on. 
Yet there are currently no requirements 
for both A-level biology and chemistry for the 
majority of UK forensic science undergraduate 
courses. Consequently, a large amount of the 
first year at university is spent training students 
in basic laboratory skills. QAA benchmark 
standards for forensic science education at 
undergraduate and graduate levels essentially 
consist of two groups: generic standards and 
area-specific standards3.  The problem is that 
myriad disciplines can combine with the term 
‘forensic’, making it extremely difficult to teach 
‘forensic science’ in a university setting. In reality, 
there is no single subject called ‘forensic science’, 
and attempting to educate students under this 
umbrella term produces a lot of people with 
overview knowledge of different subjects, but 
with insufficient detailed practical experience in 
any of them. 
For example, the only career path that 
utilises the majority of focus areas covered in an 
undergraduate forensic science course is that 
of a Scene of Crime Officer (SOCO). However, 
even this job requires further training that is 
specific to the police force you work for, and 
in some cases a degree may not be necessary 
to get a SOCO position. As a result, most 
universities try to ensure that their graduates 
have learned transferable skills that increase their 
chances of gaining employment, often outside 
forensic science. 
The rapid rise in forensic science 
undergraduate courses across the UK means 
that increased learning and teaching quality 
is vital, particularly at a time when so much 
attention is paid to accountability in teaching 
across UK universities3. Courses already need 
to be accredited by The Chartered Society of 
Forensic Sciences (CSFS), using standards that 
cover the main aspects of incident investigation 
and digital forensics4. However, the applicability of 
these standards and their correspondence with 
the QAA forensic science benchmark criteria are 
not always clear-cut. For example, while digital 
forensics is an area that has grown rapidly in 
recent years, and is itself an area of accreditation 
under the CSFS, it is only touched upon briefly 
in the QAA guidelines and remains a small part 
of most general forensic science undergraduate 
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courses.  That makes it virtually impossible for 
an undergraduate student on a forensic science 
course to fully grasp this technologically complex 
sub-discipline without completing a specific 
digital forensics course. 
At the heart of the problem with forensic 
science courses is a distinct lack of understanding 
between educators and course developers, and 
the forensic science industry. While more and 
more universities and programme convenors 
have links to industry, and ask for input towards 
course design, many develop courses based 
on programme outlines of similar courses in 
other universities, or using the QAA Forensic 
Science benchmark standards, none of which 
address real-life needs of forensic science 
providers. Additionally, resources and course 
learning outcomes required by universities 
can sometimes limit the amount of practical 
training that undergraduates receive.  The ethos 
of forensic science is that no two scenes or 
incidents are the same and should be viewed 
without preconception. However, many forensic 
science role-play activities in universities concern 
standard ‘common’ scenes and incidents. 
There are two ways forward. Firstly, if the 
content of forensic science undergraduate 
courses remains the same then a year in 
professional practice must be included as a 
standard component. However, given the distinct 
lack of job opportunities (even unpaid) and 
the associated high cost to either a student or 
a university, this is unlikely to be feasible.  The 
second option is to do away with courses 
with the generic title ‘forensic science’ and 
focus more on subject-specific forensics at 
undergraduate level: forensic DNA analysis, 
forensic anthropology, forensic toxicology, and so 
on. Retaining the ‘forensic’ prefix should ensure 
that courses remain attractive, but offer a much 
greater depth of training and experience. 
COURSES SUFFER FROM A MISMATCH BETWEEN WHAT 
IS TAUGHT AND WHAT THE INDUSTRY ACTUALLY 
REQUIRES, WHICH URGENTLY NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. 
GIVEN THAT TOMORROW’S FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 
ARE THOSE WE TRAIN TODAY, IT IS PARAMOUNT 
THAT WE GET THESE ACADEMIC COURSES RIGHT.
THE FORENSIC SCIENCE LANDSCAPE
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CHAPTER 3
ASSURANCE –  
STANDARDS, VALIDATION  
AND ACCREDITATION
 JOSEPHINE BUNCH, 
National Physical 
Laboratory
Quality assurance (QA) demonstrates that methods are fit for purpose before they are 
implemented, and ensures that they remain so during use.  This is underpinned by an 
increasingly well-defined quality system, overseen by the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR). 
Additional confidence could be realised by awarding statutory powers to the FSR, as well as 
implementing further regulation to assure the skills of practitioners and providers.
uality assurance (QA) refers to 
the range of practices employed 
to ensure that measurements 
and evidence are reliable, 
including internal and external quality control. 
QA demonstrates that analytical methods are 
fit for purpose before they are implemented – 
this involves an assessment of the equipment, 
standard operating procedures and the provision 
of trained staff who make judgements about 
their findings. QA also provides ongoing 
evidence that the methods remain fit for 
purpose. 
For all laboratory-based methods, assurance 
procedures should be based on a system of 
standards, validation and accreditation. Where 
required, measurement traceability ensures that 
all steps in a procedure can be queried and 
validated by reference to documented results, 
calibrations and standards, through an unbroken 
chain of comparisons that all have stated 
measurement uncertainties. Forensic science 
laboratories or providers have a significant 
role in providing reliable and credible evidence 
that may be presented as part of a criminal 
investigation or a trial. 
Forensic science providers may be private 
companies, government agencies, public 
organisations, academic research departments 
and law enforcement agencies, based in the 
UK or internationally.  The majority of expert 
witnesses for forensic science are engaged by the 
police at the investigative stage of a criminal case. 
However guidance from the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) also provides prosecutors with 
practical guidelines on issues relating to the 
selection, instruction and use of experts. Recent 
updates to the criminal justice procedure rules 
provide guidance around the validation of 
methods used by witnesses1. 
The importance of quality assurance 
procedures in forensic science is now well 
recognised, and confidence in forensic science 
and forensic science providers is underpinned 
via an increasingly well-defined quality system, 
overseen by the Forensic Science Regulator 
(FSR). Forensic quality standards in the UK 
comprise two international standards (ISO17025 
for accreditation of laboratory activities2 and 
ISO17020 for scene of crime analysis3) and 
the FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct, which 
detail the requirements of forensic service 
providers at organisational, technical and 
practitioner levels. Expert witnesses are bound 
by the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal 
Practice Directions4, which work alongside the 
FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct to increase 
the overall assurance of forensic science quality.  
This framework provides a mechanism to 
objectively demonstrate the reliability, accuracy 
and limitations of methods, and the competence 
of the organisations supplying forensic science. 
THE FORENSIC SCIENCE 
REGULATOR 
The post of FSR was established in 2007 and is 
currently held by Dr Gillian Tully.  The Regulator 
is a public appointee, sponsored by the Home 
Office, who ensures that the provision of 
forensic science services across the Criminal 
Justice System (CJS) is subject to an appropriate 
regime of scientific quality standards.  The 
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Regulator has jurisdiction throughout England 
and Wales; the Scottish and Northern Irish 
authorities follow the Regulator’s standards on 
a voluntary basis5.  The Regulator does not have 
statutory powers to enforce compliance, and the 
government has undertaken a consultation on 
whether this should be the case6. 
The Regulator’s priorities and aims5 are to 
see that forensic science services are delivered 
to appropriate standards and that they are 
tailored to meet the needs of the CJS.  To 
achieve this, the FSR recommends certain 
aspects of quality and working practice, typically 
by requiring providers to work in accordance 
with internationally recognised quality standards. 
Forensic service providers are then subject to 
independent assessments to ensure that these 
requirements are met.  The FSR collaborates 
with the authorities in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland to achieve UK-wide quality standards. An 
important role of the FSR is to represent the UK 
in European and international quality initiatives.  
The Forensic Science Advisory Council (FSAC)7 
advises and supports the regulator, giving advice 
on many issues, including monitoring compliance 
with laboratory quality standards, standards 
relating to national databases, and validation of 
new technologies.
The Regulator requires that forensic science 
providers (FSPs), whether in the private sector or 
within policing, academia or public sector, operate 
under accreditation to a suitable international 
standard; and that their laboratory activities 
comply with the Regulator’s Codes of Practice 
and Conduct by October 2017.  The ‘Codes 
of Practice and Conduct for forensic science 
providers and practitioners in the Criminal Justice 
System’8 outlines the quality requirements for 
providers of forensic science services into the 
CJS. It is a firm requirement within the codes 
that all providers of accredited services shall be 
compliant with ISO/IEC 17025:2005 (ref. 2), and 
for scene work to ISO/IEC 17020:2012 (ref. 3). 
However, accreditation rules are not consistent 
across all areas of forensic science. Some 
disciplines have stand-alone codes of practice, 
and pathologists, for example, are regulated 
through a different system.
Accreditation is also approached on a 
voluntary basis with respect to EU regulations9.  
The EU Framework Decision on the 
accreditation of forensic service providers 
carrying out laboratory activities mandated that 
FSPs hold ISO 17025 accreditation with respect 
to all DNA profiling and fingerprint enhancement 
work.  The UK opted out of these EU criminal 
justice measures, removing the legal obligation to 
comply with the ISO standards. However, national 
policing leads have independently agreed that all 
police facilities undertaking these services would, 
in fact, comply with the stated requirements on a 
voluntary basis.
ISO STANDARDS AND FORENSIC 
SCIENCE
ISO is the world’s largest developer of voluntary 
international standards, providing specifications 
for products, services and good practice, with 
the aim of helping to make industry more 
efficient and effective10. ISO standards are 
developed through an international consensus 
and can be can be normative (specifying what 
must be done e.g. a particular test method) or 
informative (providing information). Standards 
help to ensure that technology and methods 
are developed and made available for use by 
practitioners in an open and robust manner. 
The ISO/IEC 17025:2005 standard2 specifies 
general requirements for the competence of 
testing and calibration laboratories.  The ISO 
accreditation document covers the provision of 
opinions and interpretation of evidence, while 
the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) provides 
additional guidance on the assessment of 
evidence11. 
ISO/IEC 17025 is most easily applied to 
objective tests: for example, the determination 
of drug concentration or blood alcohol level. 
In these cases, the measurement method 
employed is documented and validated such 
that all appropriately trained staff will obtain 
results with the same stated uncertainties within 
defined, numerical limits. Equipment used to 
make the measurements must be maintained 
and calibrated. Visual inspection, qualitative 
CONFIDENCE IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 
AND FORENSIC SCIENCE PROVIDERS IS 
UNDERPINNED VIA AN INCREASINGLY 
WELL-DEFINED QUALITY SYSTEM.
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CASE STUDY
UKAS ACCREDITATION:  
PROVIDING CONFIDENCE IN 
FORENSIC SCIENCE
MALCOLM HYND, External Affairs Manager, UK Accreditation Service
orensic science plays an essential 
role in the effectiveness of the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS).  To 
sustain confidence in that forensic 
information, it is important to consider how it 
is produced: not only in terms of its scientific 
accuracy, but also to show that samples are 
handled appropriately to avoid contamination, 
and to demonstrate the impartiality and in-
tegrity of the staff undertaking the work.  This 
assessment of organisations offering forensic 
science services is known as accreditation.
However, the term ‘forensic science’ covers 
a multitude of different fields, ranging from 
the conventional analytical techniques used in 
the identification of drugs through to more 
interpretive examinations of handwriting or 
blood pattern analysis. It also covers new and 
constantly developing areas such as digital 
forensics and cybercrime.  The challenge for 
those involved in accreditation is to define the 
expectations that must be met by such diverse 
and evolving areas, while offering the same 
confidence in the delivered outcome.
As the UK’s sole national accreditation body, 
the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) visits 
organisations that undertake forensic work to 
assess and evaluate their compliance against 
the internationally recognised standards ISO/
SO/IEC 17025 for laboratories1, and ISO/IEC 
17020 for scene of crime2.  These standards 
include requirements to implement an 
appropriate management system, including 
policies and procedures for internal auditing, 
control of documents, management of 
complaints and the definition of key roles and 
responsibilities.  They also include technical 
requirements relating to the competence 
of staff, the validity of the techniques used, 
the suitability of the equipment and the 
appropriateness of the environment where 
examinations are performed. 
These standards are not used exclusively for 
forensic science, so UKAS uses an additional 
guidance document3 (ILAC G19) that details 
fur ther expectations in the forensics area. If 
the organisation demonstrates that it meets 
all the relevant criteria then it will be granted 
accreditation for specific activities. However, 
accreditation is an on-going process that 
requires annual surveillance visits and a full 
reassessment every four years.
UKAS is a signatory to international mutual 
recognition agreements with accreditation 
bodies in other countries, so there is assurance 
that the forensic science services delivered 
by UK-accredited organisations would also 
be recognised overseas. In the same way, 
accreditation bodies in other economies use 
the same standards and guidance documents, 
so the results provided by laboratories 
accredited by them can be equally well-trusted 
here.  This becomes ever more important 
as crime, particularly cybercrime, transcends 
international boundaries.
Indeed, the fast-moving developments in 
cybercrime present particular challenges for 
forensic laboratories and accreditation. For 
the laboratories, data that can be stored 
anywhere in the world is increasingly difficult 
to identify and access, and ever more complex 
encryption methods need to be circumvented. 
Accreditation assessments similarly need to 
keep up with technological developments, and 
suitable technical expertise secured, to ensure 
that assessments can be carried out from a 
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position of knowledge. 
In the UK, a mixture of private and 
public sector organisations provide forensic 
science services. As such, the government 
appointed a Forensic Science Regulator 
(FSR) to ensure that all these services 
were subject to an appropriate regime of 
quality standards.  The FSR has, through 
their Codes of Practice and Conduct4, 
identified accreditation as a mechanism to 
demonstrate the application of appropriate 
quality standards and has defined clear 
expectations with respect to accreditation 
for all organisations providing forensic 
services to the Criminal Justice System.  
These expectations include deadlines 
for gaining accreditation against the core 
forensic disciplines, including body fluid 
recovery, fingerprint enhancement, digital 
forensics, fingerprint comparison, and crime 
scene examination. 
Accreditation provides an effective 
framework for providers of forensic 
science services to develop and improve 
their systems – this results in greater 
consistency, both internally and with 
their peers.  The ongoing assessment by 
UKAS provides independent confirmation 
of continued compliance, and has also 
promoted greater transparency by 
encouraging organisations to report any 
quality issues.  This prompts demonstrable 
and appropriate actions to deliver fur ther 
improvements in their services.
examinations and computer simulations are 
included in the definition of an objective test12. 
However the standard may also be employed in 
more subjective analyses, such as the verification 
of practitioner skill in fingerprint or footwear 
mark comparison.  These activities, while largely 
subjective in nature, can (with the right training 
and assessment) produce consistent outcomes 
between different forensic practitioners. 
Guidance on evaluative interpretation of scientific 
evidence is also in preparation by the FSR.
The FSR’s supplementary information in 
the Codes of Practice and Conduct provides 
additional relevance and significantly extends 
the usefulness and scope of ISO standards 
for use in forensic sciences. Nonetheless, the 
standard covers many important aspects of 
assurance, including validating the method is fit 
for purpose; evaluating the qualifications, training 
and experience of the staff; maintenance and 
calibration of equipment; sampling practices; 
testing procedures; traceability of measurements; 
and accurate reporting. As such, it is clearly an 
important quality standard for many forensic 
assessments. 
A traceable calibration is an unbroken chain 
of calibration back to a national measurement 
lab and the International System of Units (SI 
units) of measurement.  Through reference 
to the internationally-agreed definition of 
an SI unit, traceable measurements establish 
confidence in measurement data by ensuring 
consistency of measurements.  They also enable 
meaningful comparison with other instruments 
or measurement methods, and are essential 
requirements of quality assurance procedures 
for the highest-level assurance of methods within 
the ISO/IEC 17025:2005 standard. 
While traceable calibration is important for 
a range of analytical methods (e.g. analysis of 
drugs, measurement of sample toxicity and 
DNA analysis), many forensic science activities 
STANDARDS HELP TO ENSURE THAT 
TECHNOLOGY AND METHODS ARE 
DEVELOPED AND MADE AVAILABLE 
FOR USE BY PRACTITIONERS IN AN 
OPEN AND ROBUST MANNER. 
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rely on reference data produced internally to 
the forensic laboratory or within the forensic 
community.  These may include comparison 
against reference samples, or determination of 
inherent physical properties, for example.  The 
validation and traceability of data contained 
within these databases is of critical importance 
if they are to be used successfully by experts 
within a court of law in assessing the significance 
of forensic evidence.  To this end, more could be 
done to promote open data policies, increase 
data transparency between organisations, and 
enable knowledge sharing. In promoting this 
activity, it is important to develop and enforce 
clear standards for the format of data within 
forensic databases, including definitions of 
measured quantities, declaration of measurement 
units, and standardisation of any required 
metadata (i.e. those data describing the 
conditions of measurement).
ISO/IEC17025:2005 requires that “testing 
laboratories shall have and apply procedures for 
estimating uncertainty of measurement” when 
carrying out analytical measurements.  The UKAS 
publication M3003 (2012)13 recognises “the 
present state of development and application 
of uncertainties in testing activities is not as 
comprehensive as in the calibration fields”. 
However, it states that the “laboratory should 
use documented procedures for the evaluation, 
treatment and reporting of the uncertainty”. 
Additional commentary on the uncertainty of 
measurement is provided within guidance from 
the FSR (Laboratory accreditation (FSR-G-201 
Guidance: Validation (2014)14). 
Assessing measurement uncertainty is an 
integral part of laboratory quality valuation 
because every measurement is subject to 
some uncertainty, which should be expressed 
as the quantified doubt about the result of 
a measurement.  There are many possible 
sources of uncertainty, including the measuring 
instrument (e.g. bias, drift, noise), ‘imported’ 
uncertainties (e.g. calibration uncertainty, 
operator skill, sampling issues) and the 
laboratory environment (e.g. temperature 
and air pressure). Methods for evaluating 
uncertainty from individual components include 
uncertainty estimates using statistics (usually 
from repeated readings), and uncertainty 
estimates from any other information (e.g. 
from past experience of the measurements, 
from calibration certificates, manufacturer’s 
specifications, from calculations or from 
published information).
When it is not possible to fully quantify 
measurement uncertainty, ISO17025 allows 
for the identification of sources of uncertainty, 
while requiring efforts to minimise these effects.  
The resulting limitations of measurement must 
then be disclosed to the customer; effective 
communication within this matter is crucial 
to promote good public understanding of 
the probabilities and uncertainties of forensic 
measurement, and how the presented 
measurements translate into a reliable verdict 
when considered with all other evidence. 
The majority of international accreditation 
bodies have now adopted ISO/IEC 17025 as 
the basis for accrediting testing and calibration 
laboratories.  This international adoption 
allows countries to establish agreements 
among themselves.  These Mutual Recognition 
Arrangements (MRAs) are crucial in enabling test 
data to be accepted between these countries 
and vital to transnational working within an 
accredited framework. Of particular importance 
is a multi-lateral mutual recognition arrangement 
called the International Laboratory Accreditation 
Cooperation (ILAC) Arrangement. ILAC is the 
primary international authority on laboratory 
accreditation and has produced comprehensive 
guidelines for forensic science laboratories15. 
In recognition of the interdependence of 
accreditation and metrology, and a need to 
coordinate the actions of the Bureau International 
des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) and ILAC in tasks 
relating to national and international measurement 
infrastructure, the International Committee for 
Weights and Measures (CIPM) and ILAC signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 
November 2001 (reaffirmed in 2012)16. A Joint 
CIPM/ILAC17 Working Group consisting of BIPM 
and ILAC members was established in view of the 
CIPM-ILAC MoU. 
ISO/IEC 17020:2012 (ref. 3), the 
international standard relating to crime scene 
examinations, should be read in conjunction 
with ‘IAF/ILAC-A4:2004 Guidance on the 
Application of ISO/IEC 17020’ (ref. 15) and 
‘EA-5/03 Guidance for the Implementation 
of ISO/IEC 17020 in the field of crime scene 
investigation’18. Several other ISO documents 
contain relevant guidance for aspects of digital 
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forensics, such as ISO/IEC 27037:2012 (ref. 19), 
which provides guidelines for specific activities 
in the identification, collection, acquisition and 
preservation of potential digital evidence. It 
should be noted that this is only a guidance 
document and not an accreditation standard. A 
Digital Forensics Validation Guidance document 
is in preparation by the FSR, due for release 
this year.
VALIDATION AND REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE CROWN PROSECUTION 
SERVICE
The FSR requires FSPs to ensure that 
all methods routinely employed within 
the Criminal Justice System, whether for 
intelligence or evidential use, will be validated 
prior to each use on live casework material. 
Validation is a critical aspect of quality 
assurance, and is defined by the FSR as 
“confirmation, through the assessment 
of existing objective evidence or through 
experiment that a method, process or device 
is fit (or remains fit) for the specific purpose 
intended.  The provider must demonstrate the 
reliability of the procedure in-house against 
any documented performance characteristics 
of that procedure”. Establishing the intended 
use and limitations of a developed method are
important aspects of validation. A validation 
exercise should establish key performance 
indicators such as accuracy, precision and 
limitation (see Figure 1). 
The responsibility for validation rests with 
the forensic science provider, not the FSR, and 
will be reviewed as part of any accreditation 
assessment by the accreditation body, normally 
UKAS24 (see case study p34).  The Regulator 
should only be informed of the intention to 
implement a new method if the introduction 
of a scientific method has not previously been 
employed within forensic science in the UK, or 
where analysis of the impact to the Criminal 
Justice System suggests a significant change in 
capabilities. 
Additional quality assurance is provided by 
the CPS, which requires compliance with the 
FSR’s Codes of Practice and with international 
standards.  The CPS has provided a paper 
outlining the core foundation principles that 
must inform any providers of forensic science 
analysis for use in the Criminal Justice System25.  
 
The five key requirements are:
1  To comply with the Codes of Conduct and 
Practice set down by the independent Forensic 
Science Regulator
2 T o ensure that Quality Standards and 
Assurance processes are applied, which are 
nationally consistent and compliant with 
appropriate ISO standards, UKAS accreditation, 
EU directives and clear development and 
validation processes
3 T o provide clear communication and 
interpretation of scientific processes, 
procedures, strengths, weaknesses and meaning
4 T o engage with Streamlined Forensic 
Reporting (SFR) process associated with 
proportionate prosecution requirements
5 T o be fully aware and compliant with Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act Disclosure 
and Expert Witness obligations, including 
the disclosure of details or algorithms and 
statistical analysis.
ASSURANCE IN R&D AND 
INNOVATION IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE
Future progress in academic and commercial 
research, and the development of new methods 
for forensic science applications, will require 
new standards to be developed. It is the FSR’s 
role to assist with these activities.  The typical 
development of new ISO standards involves:
1 Research leading to peer review ed publication
2 Exper imental validation via international inter-
laboratory studies to establish (i) Repeatability 
of measurements made by the same method, 
by the same laboratory, by the same operator, 
on the same equipment within a short 
period using identical test material and (ii) 
Reproducibility of measurements made by 
the same method, but carried out by different 
laboratories, different operators and different 
equipment, using identical test material. Inter-
laboratory studies are used to develop a 
protocol, which forms the basis of the new 
standard
3 Submission of new w ork item proposal to ISO
4 V arious ballots in ISO, development of an 
international consensus and progression of 
draft to published standard
Accreditation of new methodologies can 
be a long and expensive process.  The 
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Figure 1: Outline of the validation process for forensic science methods
Multi-
agency 
review
Determine end-user requirements and specification
Undertake risk assesment of method
Set agreed specification and measurable acceptance criteria
Generate validation plan
Perform validation exercises & establish reliability of the method
Production of validation report and record of approval
Issue statement of validation completion
Pilot testing
Live use on casework material
                       First CPS case management test
                                    First court case
Assessment of acceptance criteria compliance
2011 Home Office ‘Report on Research 
and Development in Forensic Science’20 
identified the forensic research landscape as 
fragmented, and recommended increases in 
linkage and communication between forensics 
R&D stakeholders, in order to drive forward 
innovation more effectively.  The Forensic Science 
Special Interest Group (SiG) at Innovate UK 
has identified a series of sector challenges, and 
has set up a Forensic Science UK Innovation 
Database21 to encourage “collaboration to 
overcome these challenges by bringing together 
those with potential solutions and those who 
have identified the challenges”. In setting up 
formal collaborative activity, the SiG is helping 
address traditional innovation challenges such as 
ownership of intellectual property. 
Changes to existing governance processes in 
forensic service procurement might also help 
to standardise the approaches undertaken by 
different FSPs, and bring new techniques to 
market.  The Forensic Market Management 
ASSURANCE – STANDARDS,  VALIDATION AND ACCREDITATION
39
Team (FMMT) within the Home Office runs 
the National Forensics Framework, which allows 
the police to purchase forensic services from 
private sector suppliers22. Forensic services 
are categorised into 13 product types (e.g. 
DNA, drugs, footwear, and toxicology) and sold 
with details on the precise nature and level of 
service required, timescales for delivery, and the 
quality and reporting standards to be met.  The 
introduction of the FMMT procurement process 
resulted in substantial reductions in the price of 
services23. 
In addition, due to the non-statutory nature of 
the Regulator, in-house forensic services within 
individual police services do not have to follow 
the same procurement framework as private-
sector FSPs. Private sector FSPs have raised a 
concern that this may result in some in-house 
laboratories being able to offer cheaper services 
by delaying the significant investments required 
to meet and maintain the relevant ISO standards, 
as it is seen as a cost burden to comply22. If found 
to be the case, the net result would be market 
distortion unfavourable to the private-sector FSPs, 
who would have to squeeze margins to compete 
on price terms, resulting in a loss of profit available 
to channel back into research and development.
Research and development is a necessarily 
risky endeavour; the presence of large fixed 
costs around accreditation of new technologies 
can therefore be a barrier to innovation. Forensic 
science has parallels to other sectors, such as 
aerospace and pharmaceutical development, 
where simple deregulation is not an option due 
to safety concerns. In an increasingly litigious and 
risk-averse society, the regulations in these areas 
tend to become more stringent. At the same 
time, this must be balanced by need to drive 
technological change for better social outcomes 
in these sectors, which requires streamlining 
of regulation. In forensic science, it is the goal 
of ensuring that justice is served, rather than 
maintaining physical safety, that drives the need 
for accurate and fail-safe process. 
Regardless, there may be significant 
opportunities for the forensic science community 
in looking to other sectors that have similar 
high-cost-of-failure markets, to analyse their 
approach to quality and assurance in order to 
share best practice. For instance, accreditation 
need not necessarily be a binary factor: one could 
envisage an operating spectrum of assurance with 
varying degrees of conformity depending on the 
requirements of the end user (the CJS at one end, 
and perhaps consumer protection at the other).
CONCLUSION
The five requirements from the CPS, together 
with the FSR’s Codes of Practice and insistence 
that providers adhere to internationally 
recognised standards, form the basis of an 
increasingly well-developed forensic quality 
system in the UK. International mutual 
recognition agreements between international 
bodies of accreditation and measurement 
committees help to ensure that this quality 
infrastructure is fit for purpose on a global scale. 
The forensics landscape is clearly challenging 
from the perspective of assurance, requiring 
guidance for objective and subjective 
assessments, delivered to wide ranging end-
users. An additional layer of confidence in this 
framework will likely be realised through the 
award of statutory powers to the FSR, essential 
if the FSR is to effectively force providers to 
comply with expected quality standards. 
Further regulation is also required to 
improve the assurance of the quality of skills of 
practitioners and providers.  The UK and Ireland 
Association of Forensic Toxicologists (UKIAFT) 
recommends roles and responsibilities that 
should be covered by personnel within a forensic 
science laboratory, and provides some suggested 
guideline about the qualifications and experience 
they would expect for staff at different levels, 
but minimum requirements should also be 
demanded by the FSR. Several organisations 
offer staff development opportunities: a series 
of qualifications, as well as other continuing 
professional development (CPD) opportunities, 
are provided regularly by The Chartered Society 
of Forensic Sciences, and The Forensic Science 
Society has recently developed a number of 
Certificates of Competence26. 
These provide a mechanism by which 
individuals can demonstrate their competency, 
but to date these have not been widely adopted 
or required by the regulator.  Transparent 
recommendation from the FSR of the minimum 
expected formal qualifications, training and 
experience of staff within FSPs, and accredited 
programmes of training and development, will 
help further improve the quality of forensic 
sciences in the UK.
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CHAPTER 4
COGNITIVE AND  
HUMAN FACTORS
 ITIEL DROR, University 
College London (UCL) 
& Cognitive Consultants 
International (CCI-HQ)
Even with major advances in forensic science, the human examiner will 
continue to play an important role in most forensic decision-making. 
Forensic work often involves interpretation and subjectivity, and hence 
cognitive and human factors are important to ensure high-quality 
forensic decisions.  To maximise objectivity and decision quality, forensic 
examiners should receive cognitive bias training and should evaluate only 
contextually relevant information.
he human examiner plays a critical 
role in many forensic domains 
(often it is the human examiner 
who is the ‘instrument of analysis’). 
Forensic work often involves human perception, 
interpretation, evaluation, judgment and decision-
making.  Therefore forensic work is shaped by, and 
depends on, cognitive and human factors.  These 
underpin most aspects of forensic work: from 
the initial collection and evaluation of data (e.g. at 
the crime scene, in determining where and what 
to look for, and whether the data is of sufficient 
value to send to the laboratory); throughout the 
work in the forensic laboratory, where evidence 
is interpreted and conclusions are reached; to 
the presentation in court and to other end users 
who are the customers of forensic work (e.g. how 
they understand and integrate the information). 
Maximising the use and benefit of forensic 
science, while minimising cognitive bias within 
forensic work, requires educating practitioners 
and implementing cognitive best practices. 
HUMAN COGNITION
The cognitive system underpins much of what 
we do. How information is perceived, mentally 
represented, compared, evaluated, and how we 
reach decisions are just a few of the cognitive 
operations carried out in the brain. One of the 
fundamentals in human cognition is that our 
brain and cognitive system has limited resources. 
In simple terms, the amount of information 
input for processing exceeds the computational 
recourses of the brain. 
The brain and cognitive system have adapted 
to this challenge by developing a variety of 
mechanisms, including:
•  Selective attention is a fundamental cognitive 
mechanism that allows the brain to focus on 
some information while ignoring the rest 
•  Chunking information together reduces the 
cognitive load by changing how information is 
encoded and represented
•  The brain is active in processing information: 
it is not only driven by the data, but uses 
conceptually-driven information processing. In 
cognitive terms, ‘bottom up’ information (what 
comes in from the world) is driven by ‘top 
down’ information (what is already in the brain). 
Top-down information, such as past experience 
and expectations, governs what information is 
processed and how it is processed. 
These, and many other cognitive processes1,2, 
enable the brain to function efficiently and 
effectively even though it has limited resources.  
The use of such cognitive processes is a 
characteristic of human intelligence and develops 
with experience and expertise. 
The implications of how the brain processes 
information are far reaching. We do not ‘see’ 
the world as it is (naïve realism): instead, it is 
mediated by how the brain processes it, which 
is a function of complex cognitive architecture.  
Take, for example, Figure 1 – count how many 
‘F’s are in the box (try it).
This illustrates that the human mind is 
not a camera: it does not passively process 
information, it uses past experiences and 
expectations to guide information processing. In 
other words, it is intelligent. As we learn more 
and have more experience – as we become 
experts – we develop, use and rely more 
and more on such processes4 (e.g. selective 
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FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE 
SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTI 
FIC STUDY COMBINED WITH 
THE EXPERIENCE OF YEARS…
Figure 1: Count how many ‘F’s are in the box 
above (please try before continuing). Most people 
see 3 or 4, some 5, but people rarely see all of the 
Fs: there are actually 6 of them.  The reason that 
many people miss some of the Fs is because we are 
experts in reading. Our base-rate experience tells 
us (via our unconscious brain) that words such as 
‘of’, ‘the’, and ‘a’ do not carry much meaning and 
weight, and therefore, based on our expectation, 
we tend to automatically ignore them3.
attention, chunking information and reliance on 
top-down information). It is important to note 
that these processes occur without awareness: it 
is a cognitive bias, not an intentional bias. 
Although such cognitive processes are effective 
and efficient, they also can lead us astray. By relying 
on shortcuts, such as using our expectations 
and past experiences to selectively attend to 
some information while ignoring the rest, we are 
cognitively biased5.  These biases are widespread 
and have many forms5, and only increase with 
expertise4: as we have more experience, we are 
more driven by top-down, conceptually-driven 
cognitive processes.  These processes and biases 
are especially powerful when subjective decisions 
are involved or when the data is low quality, 
ambiguous, and difficult to determine (as is often 
the case in forensic evidence). 
Another example of bias is base-rate 
expectation. When experience provides a clear 
expectation of the outcome, then that base-
rate expectancy drives our conclusion, even in 
the face of contradictory data. If X-ray security 
screeners in airports do not encounter bombs, 
then they develop an expectation to not find 
bombs, and are therefore more likely not to find 
a bomb even when it is present in the X-ray. 
Similarly, when medical monitors in intensive 
care units (ICU) sound false alarms very often, 
then the medical staff are likely to ignore 
them6.  The reason for these biases is that, with 
experience, the brain has picked up regularities 
in the information it receives and then uses them 
to guide future information processing.  This is 
effective, but it biases how new information is 
processed.
FORENSIC SCIENCE
Forensic science consists of many different 
domains that utilise different types of evidence. 
However, in many forensic domains it is the human 
examiner that is central to the forensic work (this 
is true in the UK, the US, as well as anywhere 
else that forensic work is carried out).  The main 
reason for this is that there are many subjective 
judgements that underpin forensic work. 
During initial evidence gathering at the crime 
scene, the crime scene investigation (CSI) examiner 
is required to make many decisions, most of which 
are subjective. First, they need to decide where to 
look for evidence, and what kind of evidence they 
will look for.  The CSI is guided by their experience 
and expectation. Second, as they look for evidence, 
they need to determine whether what they have 
found is actual data (a ‘signal’ such as blood) or just 
an artefact (‘noise’ such as dirt).  Third, if what they 
find is actual data, then they need to subjectively 
assess the quality and quantity of the evidence 
to determine if there is sufficient information to 
warrant its collection and sending it to the forensic 
laboratory (e.g. shoe prints found at the crime 
scene can be of such low quality and quantity 
of information that they do not merit collection, 
documentation, and having the forensic laboratory 
examine them further). Such decisions are critical, 
as evidence not collected and sent to the forensic 
laboratory is often lost forever. 
Once evidence is received in the forensic 
laboratory, then examiners have to analyse it. 
Often that process is subjective. Fingerprints, 
for example, are defined mainly by their minutia 
– the characteristics in the flow of the friction 
ridge (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Different characteristics (minutia) 
present in the friction ridge of fingerprints (e.g. 
when a ridge divides or ends). 
Ridge Ending
Enclosure
Bifurcation
Island
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Table 1: The inter-reliability of fingerprinting. Different latent fingerprint examiners looking at the same fingerprints  
(A to J) lack consistency in the number of minutia they observe7. 
Latent Fingerprint
A B C D E F G H I J
Examiner 1 22 9 15 8 9 3 22 11 7 10
Examiner 2 21 11 25 7 10 9 9 10 6 5
Examiner 3 19 9 18 10 7 9 15 19 6 6
Examiner 4 21 21 29 14 12 9 8 9 4 8
Examiner 5 17 16 15 11 16 9 7 12 5 5
Examiner 6 20 14 22 9 10 7 13 18 7 9
Examiner 7 22 17 15 10 10 8 11 24 8 11
Examiner 8 9 9 19 6 9 8 18 16 9 10
Examiner 9 30 15 25 10 12 12 19 22 12 17
Examiner 10 25 13 18 13 12 10 13 15 7 10
MIN 9 9 15 6 7 3 7 9 4 5
MAX 30 21 29 14 16 12 19 24 12 17
SD 5.49 4.01 4.93 2.49 2.45 2.32 4.25 5.15 2.23 3.54
range 21 12 14 8 9 9 12 15 8 12
These minutiae play a critical role in forensic 
fingerprinting. However, their presence is 
subjectively determined.  This is evident by 
the lack of reliability and consistency among 
fingerprint examiners (see Table 1)7.
The subjectivity in determining the 
fingerprint characteristic is further apparent 
when examining the lack of consistency of 
expert’s judgements with themselves, i.e. their 
intra-reliability. Not only are examiners not 
consistent with one another, but the same 
forensic fingerprint examiner looking at the 
same print is not always consistent with their 
own judgment (see Table 2)7. 
The subjectivity underpinning forensic 
work is not limited to the perception of 
the evidence, but also to the actual forensic 
conclusions. In many forensic domains, forensic 
examiners need to decide whether two 
patterns are ‘sufficiently similar’ to conclude 
that they originate from the same source8: for 
example, whether two handwriting patterns 
are ‘sufficiently similar’ to conclude that they 
were written by the same person, or whether 
two bullet cartridges are ‘sufficiently similar’ to 
conclude that they were fired from the same 
gun, or whether two fingerprints are ‘sufficiently 
similar’ to conclude that they are from the 
same person, etc.  The subjective nature of such 
forensic decisions arises from the lack of criteria 
or definition of what constitutes ‘sufficiently 
similar’.
With such subjective decision-making, it is 
not surprising that different forensic examiners 
can reach different conclusions.  This pertains to 
many forensic domains, including mixture DNA 
(even when identical procedures are used)9, 
and even when statistical tools are used10. 
In fact, in about 10% of the time, the same 
fingerprint expert, examining the same pair of 
fingerprints, will reach different conclusions11.  
Subjective decisions do not only underpin 
the comparative forensic domains (where 
evidence from the crime scene is compared 
to a suspect), but also include many forensic 
domains, such as blood spatter analysis, forensic 
anthropology and fire investigations.  The 
subjective decision-making even sometimes 
pertains to domains such as drug analysis 
(when one needs to determine if a new 
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designer drug is ‘sufficiently similar’ to an 
established illegal drug).
Table 2: The intra-reliability of fingerprinting.  The table presents the difference between the number of minutia that each 
expert observes while examining the same fingerprint (A to J) on two separate occasions, i.e. zero indicates consistency7. 
Latent Fingerprint
A B C D E F G H I J
Examiner 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 3 2 0 1
Examiner 2 8 3 5 1 1 2 2 5 2 2
Examiner 3 1 3 3 3 6 4 9 9 1 2
Examiner 4 2 3 2 5 0 1 1 0 0 1
Examiner 5 6 2 2 3 4 1 3 3 0 3
Examiner 6 9 4 2 1 4 6 0 5 1 1
Examiner 7 0 4 5 2 4 3 3 7 0 0
Examiner 8 3 1 4 0 6 2 1 4 2 0
Examiner 9 4 3 9 0 4 4 3 1 1 3
Examiner 10 1 0 0 1 4 1 4 1 0 0
Mean 3.5 2.4 3.6 1.7 3.4 2.6 2.9 3.7 0.7 1.3
A PROBLEMATIC CONCOCTION
Taken together, the natures of human cognition 
and of forensic work produce a problematic 
concoction. Humans are prone to cognitive 
bias, and that is especially pronounced when 
information is of low quality and open to 
different interpretations (as is often the 
case in forensic evidence) and even more 
so when subjectivity is involved.  That makes 
cognitive bias a real issue in forensic science, 
as outlined in a recent briefing to the Houses 
of Parliament12. It is important to note that this
relates to cognitive biases that occur without 
intention or awareness, and that these issues 
pertain to most aspects involved in forensic 
work13. Below I discuss the potential of biases 
to affect different aspects and stages of forensi
work. 
 
c 
1. At the crime scene
Before the CSI even arrives at the crime scene, 
before they actually see any evidence, they 
are briefed.  This biases their examination and 
decisions at the crime scene.  Take, for example, 
a CSI who arrives at a crime scene and has 
to determine the source of a blood pattern, a 
highly complex and subjective cognitive process. 
A briefing that it was caused by a gunshot, or a 
briefing that it was caused by a knife stabbing, 
influences how they perceive and evaluate 
the blood spatter. Similarly, if they come to a 
crime scene expecting it to be a real burglary, 
or expecting it to be an attempt at insurance 
fraud, also affects what evidence is collected 
and how. 
2. At the forensic laboratory
The human examiner at the forensic laboratory, 
making subjective evaluations and decisions, is 
often aware of potentially biasing contextual 
irrelevant information (such as whether the 
suspect confessed to the crime, if eyewitnesses 
identified the suspect, whether the detective 
believes the suspect is guilty etc). Such 
information is irrelevant to the actual forensic 
work, but it is nevertheless highly biasing. 
The cognitive biases at the forensic 
laboratory also arise in many forensic 
procedures, such as verification. Often forensic 
conclusions are verified, but they suffer from 
a number of cognitive weaknesses. First, the 
verifications are not blind: the verifier often 
knows who did the initial examination, what 
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they decided and why. Second, identification 
decisions are almost always verified, and hence 
introduce a base-rate bias (see above). 
3. At court 
The presentation of evidence in an adversarial 
legal system is inherently problematic. Although 
the court wants to rely on and use science, 
science is often misused and abused in the 
court. Science within the adversarial system 
is used by the prosecution to make a case 
that the suspect is guilty, and by the defence 
to make the case that the suspect is innocent. 
Although prosecutors’ duty is to do justice, not 
merely to obtain a conviction (see, for example, 
the US Supreme Court)14, “There is reason 
to doubt that prosecutors comply with these 
obligations fully” (this statement was made 
by a US federal appellate judge on the Ninth 
Circuit15),  The forensic examiners are often 
recruited to help make these cases, and that 
biases the presentation of the evidence. 16,17 
The implications for court and the criminal 
justice system (regardless if it is in the UK, 
US, or any other country) are that the 
forensic evidence may be overstated, and 
its uncertainties and limitations concealed. 
Although this should come out in cross-
examination, in my view that rarely occurs. 
First, both sides are rarely equal, because the 
prosecution often has far more resources than 
the defence, as well as has better access to the 
investigative team. Second, many cases enter a 
plea-bargain or a situation whereby suspects 
confess to the crime and enter an early guilty 
plea, and hence the forensic (and other) 
evidence is never really questioned. 
The implications of this bias are corrosive 
and affect prosecution decisions, plea-
bargaining, the actual trial, as well as 
subsequent appeals18. Furthermore, at court, 
there are cognitive issues that affect how the 
juries understand the forensic evidence, and 
how they integrate it within other lines of 
evidence (see case study, p50). 
RESEARCH ABOUT COGNITIVE 
BIAS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
Until about a decade ago, there was very 
little research into the performance of human 
forensic examiners.  The issue of whether they 
can be biased by irrelevant context, as well as 
their inter – and intra-reliability, had basically 
not been studied in any depth. However, 
in the past few years we have seen a big 
increase in researching this area (both within 
forensic science as well as in other scientific  
domains19). 
The growing literature includes meta-
analytically quantifying the reliability and 
biasability of forensic experts20, as well 
as specific research studies showing that 
irrelevant contextual information can 
bias forensic examination most often.  
This research includes areas such as face 
comparisons21, forensic anthropology22, 
bite-marks23, shoe prints24, firearms25, 
fingerprinting26, DNA9, blood spatter analysis27, 
and fire investigations28.  There has even been 
research into forensic bias in the courtroom, 
showing an ‘allegiance effect’ whereby forensic 
experts’ conclusions depend on which side 
hired them29.
It is worth noting that the research 
on cognitive bias is complex. First, when 
participants in the studies are aware that they 
are taking part in research and that this is not 
real casework, then the contrived contextual 
information is not as powerful as when they 
really believe it. Second, when participating 
forensic experts think it is real casework, 
then it is not practically possible to run many 
examiners on a fully-controlled study with all 
conditions counterbalanced and good control 
groups.  Third, fully-controlled studies are 
possible, but then they are mostly done with 
students. Fourth, contextual information affects 
perception and cognitive processing, but it 
does not necessarily determine the decision 
outcome.  This is dependent on the difficulty of 
the decision (i.e. how close it is to the decision 
threshold), and the strength and direction of 
the bias. Only when the decision is within the 
‘bias danger zone’3 can bias shift the decision 
across the threshold and actually determine 
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the decision outcome. Fifth, a null finding that 
no bias was found does not mean that bias 
was not there – it could have been there 
but was not detected, or it may have been 
absent because of ineffective experimental bias 
manipulations. 
Therefore, although the research literature 
most often finds biasing effects in studies 
across the different forensic domains, the 
effects are not always straightforward and 
present in terms of decision outcomes. It is not 
an easy area to study, and there are a number 
of inherent obstacles in researching it. 
Research in this area has also investigated 
the effects of using technology in forensic 
science. It has shown that technology does not 
necessarily solve bias, and may even introduce 
new forms of biases. For example, the use 
of computerised fingerprint databases has 
introduced clear base-rate expectations about 
a match30.  This base-rate biasing expectation 
affects forensic examiners in a number of 
ways. First, they tend to spend less time 
comparing suspects that they do not expect 
to match. Second, they are more likely to 
make false-positive decisions (i.e. erroneous 
identifications) when they expect a suspect to 
match. And third, they are more likely to make 
false-negative decisions (i.e. not make correct 
identifications) when they expect a suspect not 
to match31.
COGNITIVE BIAS IN FORENSIC 
CASEWORK
Do these theoretical analyses and research 
findings apply to actual forensic casework? 
The answer is clearly yes, as revealed by 
cases with erroneous forensic identifications 
and miscarriages of justice. For example, in 
the US Brandon Mayfield was linked with 
the 2004 Madrid train bombings after being 
misidentified by a number of independent 
forensic examiners, who all concluded with 
100% certainty that he was the match. 
However, because of unusual circumstances 
the erroneous identification was revealed and 
prompted an investigation that concluded that 
confirmation bias was a factor in the mistake32.  
The biasing effects on forensic casework 
were also revealed in the UK by the public 
judicial inquiry by the Rt Hon Sir Anthony 
Campbell, who examined the Shirely McKie 
case33. Other cases include the UK High 
Court of Justice Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) quashing a conviction that was based 
on biasing forensic work34. In this case, the 
forensic expert initially examining the evidence 
“concluded that there was insufficient detail to 
be able to make a meaningful comparison”, but 
after a suspect had been charged the expert 
made a comparison and an identification.  This 
type of bias is derived from backward and 
circular reasoning, whereby the forensic expert 
is biased by the known reference material (i.e. 
the suspect who is the target for comparison). 
Working backwards from the suspect to the 
evidence in this way is a problem that can be 
addresses by the Linear Sequential Unmasking 
method (see below). 
We must remember that forensic evidence 
is not always challenged in court because of 
the limited resources of the defence as well 
as the prevalent use of plea-bargaining and 
early guilty pleas. Furthermore, because we 
never know the ground truth in casework, it 
is hard to determine the extent of forensic 
error. Nevertheless, there is sufficient data to 
show that forensic bias and error do occur 
within the criminal justice system. From known 
miscarriages of justice in the US, 60% included 
flawed forensic evidence35.
SOURCES OF CONTEXTUAL 
BIASING INFORMATION 
Bias comes in many forms and guises5, and 
it can derive from very different sources. 
It is important to classify the different 
sources of contextual biasing information, 
as this will enable a better understanding 
of bias in forensic work as well as help to 
Figure 3: A taxonomy of the different levels at which task-
irrelevant and potentially biasing contextual information may reach 
a forensic scientist13, 36.
Level 5: Organizational  & Cultural  factors
Level 4: ‘Base rate’ expectations
Level 3: Case information
Level 2: Reference materials
Level 1: Trace evidence
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devise solutions. Clearly, some context and 
information is needed for forensic examiners 
to do their job, but other contextual 
information is extraneous and irrelevant to 
their forensic work. 
I organise the different sources into a 5-level 
taxonomy13, 36 (see Figure 3). First is the actual 
evidence, which may include irrelevant biasing 
context. For example, handwriting analysis may 
involve text that includes irrelevant biasing 
information, voice recognition may include 
tone and content that includes irrelevant 
biasing information, and bite-marks may reveal 
irrelevant information about the nature of the 
crime. 
The second level is the reference material, 
the known ‘target’ that the evidence from 
the crime scene is compared against.  This 
information is relevant and essential: the 
forensic examiners cannot do their work 
without it. However, it may cause backward 
and circular reasoning that can bias the 
perception and evaluation of the actual 
evidence.  This often occurs when the forensic 
examiner works from the target suspect to 
the evidence, rather than from the evidence 
to the suspect. When examining and analysing 
the evidence from the crime scene, the target 
suspect is irrelevant. 
The third level is the case information.  
There is a whole array of case information 
that is not relevant to the forensic examination 
in question, but can bias perception, 
interpretation, judgement and decision-making. 
Knowing whether eyewitnesses identified the 
suspect, whether the suspect has previous 
convictions, and whether the detective believes 
the suspect is guilty, are all examples of case 
information that is irrelevant to any forensic 
examination. 
Level four pertains to the base-rate 
expectations derived from previous work.  
 The forensic examiner has an expectation of 
what they will find and what they will conclude 
before they even see or examine the actual 
evidence – a clear source of bias. Finally, the 
fifth level relates to larger contextual sources 
of bias: the organisational and cultural factors, 
such as the adversarial legal system and being 
part of the police service (see the allegiance 
effect discussed earlier). 
SOLUTIONS
Many of the solutions to the problems raised 
in this chapter do not require additional funds 
and are practical. In fact, some solutions will 
enhance forensic decision quality and increase 
efficiency at the same time.  This is because 
the solutions are derived from understanding 
human cognition as it applies to forensic work.  
These solutions are detailed in a number of 
publications3, 36-38, and many are included in 
the Forensic Regulator Codes of Practice and 
Conduct guidance on “Cognitive bias effects 
relevant to forensic science examinations”39. 
The solutions all share a common goal: to 
increase the independence of mind of the 
forensic examiners, so that they can do their 
work without interference and bias, and thus 
achieve the highest possible quality decisions. 
1. Context management
Many of the solutions focus on how to 
manage context, providing what I often call the 
“Context Management Toolbox”36.  These tools 
and procedures consider what the forensic 
examiner needs and when.  
The first and most basic step is masking 
irrelevant information from the forensic 
examiners. Hence, information that they do 
not need and that is extraneous to their work 
should be masked from them (see the Linear 
Sequential Unmasking method below).  This 
will not only make sure they focus on the 
information relevant to their forensic expertise, 
but will also increase efficiency because they 
will not waste time on irrelevant information. 
In some cases, regardless of the forensic 
domain, it is easy to determine that some case 
information (see level 3 in Figure 3) is not 
THE SOLUTIONS ALL SHARE A COMMON GOAL: TO INCREASE THE 
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relevant (e.g. whether the suspect confessed 
to the crime). At other times it is not so clear 
cut: for example, the location of where a gun 
is found may be relevant if it was hidden for 
a long time in a wet gutter, because that may 
impact the patterns of bullet cartridges fired 
from it.  
Sometimes irrelevant biasing information 
is not easily masked, such as those originating 
from within the evidence itself (see level 1 
in Figure 3). In such cases (e.g. handwriting 
and voice analysis) the context is engrained 
within the actual evidence and cannot be 
(easily) removed. However, in other cases (e.g. 
fingerprints) much of the context is irrelevant, 
so the forensic examiner must focus their 
decision on the actual fingerprint patterns. 
Although some contextual information is still 
needed – such as the material from which 
the prints were lifted, or the method used 
to develop the print off the surface – such 
information is mostly not biasing. 
The second step is sequencing the 
information. In cases where biasing 
information is necessary to conduct the 
forensic examination, it is recommended 
that such information will be provided to the 
forensic examiner only when it is needed. For 
example, the ‘target’ reference material (see 
level 2 in Figure 3) should only be provided 
after the analysis of the evidence from the 
crime scene, hence ensuring that the forensic 
examiner works from the evidence to the 
‘target’ suspect, rather than from the suspect 
to the evidence.  The US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) recognised that backward 
and circular reasoning from the evidence is 
a source of bias and have implemented a 
sequencing of information approach36. (It is not 
clear to what extent this, and other anti-biasing 
procedures, are currently in use in the UK.)
The Linear Sequential Unmasking (LSU) 
approach specifies that an examination of 
the actual evidence takes place first; that this 
analysis is documented; and only then is the 
forensic examiner exposed to the suspect. It 
further restricts changes that can be made to 
the evidence post-exposure to the reference 
materials36. For example, in DNA analysis, the 
forensic examiners must first characterise the 
profile from the biological material found at 
the crime scene before seeing the DNA profile 
of the suspect. 
Some aspects of applying LSU are simple 
and straightforward across forensic domains. 
For example, requiring forensic examiners to 
first examine the actual evidence from the 
crime scene without being exposed to the 
‘target’ suspect is very easy to implement 
without cost or effort, and will enhance 
forensic decision making by minimising 
backward and circular reasoning.  
Other aspects of applying LSU are 
dependent on the specific forensic domain. For 
example, the analysis and documentation of 
the evidence is different in DNA analysis (e.g. 
peaks) than in fingerprinting (e.g. minutiae).  
The complexity and effort in documenting the 
analysis will therefore also vary. Some forensic 
domains and certain aspects may be very easy 
to document, whereas other may be more 
challenging. 
The final aspect of LSU that needs to be 
considered before implementation is the 
restriction on changes to the evidence post-
exposure to the target suspect. LSU suggests 
a number of approaches to achieve a balance 
between not allowing any such changes versus 
permitting unrestricted changes. For example, 
changes may be allowed as a function of 
confidence during the initial analysis, so that 
things which were clear during the initial 
analysis cannot be changed later, whereas 
things that were ambiguous can be changed 
(but these changes should be documented). 
Each forensic domain can determine how and 
to what extent such changes are permitted. 
The LSU involves (sometimes temporary) 
blinding to information in the forensic 
comparative process, but other types of 
forensic work should also involve blinding of 
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information. For example, when one forensic 
examiner verifies a forensic conclusion of 
another examiner, the verifying examiner 
should be blind to various aspects of the first 
examiner’s decision (e.g. what they decided, 
why, who made the first decision, etc). 
Who will do the masking and sequencing 
of information? Often, one must know a lot of 
context in order to determine what forensic 
tests need to be done, what information is 
relevant, etc.  This could be carried out by a 
Case Manager3, who will initially communicate 
with the investigative detective, and know all of 
the available information about the case.  The 
case manager will then determine what tests to 
run, and what forensic work needs to be done.  
They will assign those forensic tasks to other 
examiners who will only be provided with the 
relevant information they need for those tasks, 
thus masking the irrelevant information. 
Furthermore, the case manager will also 
communicate with the police and provide them 
with the forensic results, explaining what they 
mean and how they may bear on the case.  The 
forensic examiners doing the actual forensic 
tests and comparisons will not be part of those 
communications, and will focus on their specific 
forensic analysis. Since the case manager role 
is most interesting, it may be a rotating role 
among the examiners.  
2.  Triage
Another set of solutions involves matching 
resources and effort to the complexity of the 
forensic work, and depending on whether it 
is within the ‘bias danger zone’3. For example, 
some forensic decisions are complex and hence 
more prone to errors than others. In such cases 
one may go to the trouble of fully blinding the 
verifier to all potentially biasing information, 
whereas one may not need to use such blind-
verifying procedures for simple, self-evident 
forensic decisions3.  
Similarly, some cases involve highly-
emotionally biasing information and a variety 
of pressures that may influence the forensic 
examiner, whereas other cases may have very 
limited (if any) biasing information.  The need 
to have a case manager and to blind case 
information (level 3 in Figure 3) may depend 
on the existence of biasing information. Hence, 
a triage approach can determine if and what 
measures are appropriate3.  The triage approach 
makes implementing the bias countermeasures 
much simpler and cost-effective. 
3. Countering base-rate expectations 
This is quite easy to achieve by introducing 
a few examples that change the base rate. 
In airport security, for example, this may 
involve introducing fake bombs into the X-ray 
screening procedure, a tactic known as Threat 
Image Projection (TIP). In the forensic domain 
such measures can be implemented in a variety 
of processes. For example, the base rate for 
verifying identifications is very high, and this can 
be countered by including a few ‘similar non-
matches’ as identifications within the verification 
stream3. 
Another example is countering the 
technology base-rate expectation, by including 
matches in locations that they rarely appear, 
or by randomising the positions so that there 
are no regularities of where the technology 
presents the most likely match3, 30, 31.  All of 
these measures aim to make sure that the 
forensic examiner is cognitively engaged and 
bases their decision on the actual evidence 
rather than base-rate expectations. 
4.  Training
The best procedures and forensic practices 
will not help if the forensic examiners do not 
accept the need to have them and understand 
their utility. Since cognitive bias in forensic 
science is a relatively new topic, most forensic 
examiners have never received training in this 
area and have very little (if any) understanding 
of the underlying cognitive issues. Even the 
forensic trainers themselves – those who 
instruct and teach the forensic examiners 
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about these issues – are predominately forensic 
scientists, not cognitive scientists, and therefore 
have little-to-no understanding of the human 
cognitive system to address the issues of 
cognitive bias (e.g. they often mistake them as 
ethical issues).  
Therefore, it is paramount that all forensic 
and CSI examiners receive proper training 
on the bias and cognitive factors involved in 
making forensic decisions.  This has started 
to take place: for example, Hertfordshire, 
Bedfordshire and Cambridgeshire Police are 
providing such training to their CSI and forensic 
examiners. Such training has already had a 
practical impact on the way they carry out 
forensic work: by removing possible irrelevant 
contextual information, for example, thereby 
ensuring that forensic decisions are based 
on the relevant forensic evidence and are 
not contaminated and biased by extraneous 
information (an aspect of the LSU method). 
Such higher-quality forensic decisions benefit 
the Criminal Justice System and save costs in 
the long run. 
It is also important to provide training 
to judges, lawyers and jurors, so that they 
understand the strengths of forensic evidence, 
but also its limitations and vulnerabilities to 
cognitive bias. Such training should include 
the Forensic Regulator Codes of Practice and 
Conduct guidance on “Cognitive bias effects 
relevant to forensic science examinations”39. 
With education in this area, along with 
cognitive best practices, forensic science 
can increase its contribution to the Criminal 
Justice System and beyond. However, without 
acknowledging these issues and implementing 
training and solutions, forensic work may suffer 
from a variety of biases. A number of police 
forces in a variety of countries are undergoing 
such training (e.g. in the United States, the FBI 
and Police Departments including those in 
New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
Kansas), have all provided cognitive training to 
their forensic/CSI examiners. It is suggested that 
HOPEFULLY WE WILL WITNESS THE INCREASED POWER 
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND TO SOCIETY AT LARGE.
such training also be provided to a variety of 
police forces in the United Kingdom. 
CONCLUSIONS
In most forensic domains – from the work 
at the crime scene to forensic comparisons 
at the laboratory – it is the human examiner 
who perceives information, interprets it, makes 
judgments and reaches a decision. Often it is 
the human examiner who is the ‘instrument of 
analysis’. However, until recently the role of the 
human examiner has been relatively neglected. 
For forensic science to increase its positive 
impact on the Criminal Justice System and 
beyond, it must ensure that cognitive bias in 
forensic work is minimised. Understanding 
human cognition helps to identify the weak 
points and vulnerabilities inherent in forensic 
science, and also to develop and implement 
biasing countermeasures. Without such 
measures, forensic examiners and CSIs will be 
cognitively contaminated and biased in their 
work.  These biases affect others and ultimately 
create a ‘bias snowball effect’37, 38.  
Taking on board the cognitive and human 
factors involved in forensic science is long 
overdue, but recent years have seen very 
fruitful progress in advancing these issues 
within forensic science. Hopefully this trend 
will continue and increase, and we will witness 
the increased power of forensic science to 
contribute to the Criminal Justice System and 
to society at large. 
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CASE STUDY
STATISTICS IN COURT
DAVID LAGNADO, University College London, with contributions from COLIN AITKEN, University of Edinburgh
Imagine you are a juror in a criminal trial, in which the defendant is charged with assault. A key piece of evidence is that the defendant’s footprint matches a print 
found at the crime scene.  The prosecution 
calls a forensic expert, who testifies that 
the probability of seeing such a match if the 
defendant was not the source of the footprint 
is 1 in 1,000. Based on this information alone, 
what is your estimate of the probability that 
the defendant left the print?  
Many people would be tempted to give a 
high probability, perhaps even quantifying it as 
999 in 1,000. But this line of reasoning is logically
flawed – it is an example of the notorious 
‘prosecutor’s fallacy’, so called because it usually 
overstates the prosecution’s case. 
The prosecutor’s fallacy is not just a 
reasoning error made by lay people. Legal 
experts such as prosecutors, judges, barristers, 
and forensic scientists are also susceptible, and 
the error often crops up in media coverage of 
legal cases.  The fallacy has figured in several 
high profile cases, with convictions being 
quashed due to the misrepresentation of the 
evidence.  The seriousness of the error has 
been recognised by courts, and instructions 
have been formulated to avoid the mistake. 
Nevertheless it still seems to be a pernicious 
problem, and it arises in many other areas with 
probabilistic evidence, such as medical diagnosis 
and psychological testing. 
 
WHY IS THIS A FALLACY?
The expert has told you the probability that 
the footprints would match, based on the 
hypothesis that someone else left the footprint.  
This is calculated from an estimate of how rare 
the footprint is in some relevant population. 
But this is entirely different to the probability 
that someone else left the footprint, based on 
the evidence that the footprints match. 
The former is a statement about the probability 
of the evidence, whereas the latter is about the 
probability of the hypothesis of interest. 
The logically correct method for 
incorporating the expert’s evidence into 
a judgment about the probability of the 
hypothesis is to use Bayes’ theorem, an 
approach that depends on an estimate of the 
probability of the hypothesis before considering 
the footprint evidence – a concept called ‘prior 
probability’.
An intuitive way to understand the problem 
is by casting it in terms of frequencies. Suppose 
that in the absence of the footprint evidence 
there are 10,000 men, including the defendant, 
in the local area that could have committed 
the crime. Given the expert’s statement that 
the match probability is 1 in 1,000, we would 
expect about 10 of these men to match the 
print. So the footprint evidence has narrowed 
the number of possible suspects from 10,000 
to about 11 (10 plus the defendant); this 
increases the probability that the defendant 
left the print from 1 in 10,000 to about 1 in 11 
(see Figure 1). 
This is a substantial increase, but it is still 
relatively unlikely that the defendant left the 
print, given that about 10 other men would 
also be expected to match.  The prosecutor’s 
fallacy implies that the probability the 
defendant left the print is 999 in 1,000, 
whereas the correct calculation, incorporating 
the prior probability, gives a figure closer to 1 
in 11. 
Note that footprints are used here for 
illustrative purposes, and are rarely used 
in forensic investigations. However, exactly 
the same logic applies to DNA profiles, 
fingerprints, and other kinds of trace evidence 
that are routinely used in court. Also, in the 
forensic context a ‘match’ often amounts to 
the claim of a correspondence between two 
items (to within a specified tolerance), but not 
to a claim that they are identical. Indeed, even 
two footprints from the same individual will 
not be identical.     
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WHY IS THE FALLACY HARD TO 
AVOID?
Forensic experts can only tell us how well the 
evidence supports a hypothesis.  This leaves 
us with the task of using that information to 
reach a judgment about the probability of the 
hypotheses – something that is difficult if left to 
commonsense and intuition alone. 
Extensive psychological research2, 3 reveals that 
when people face difficult probability problems 
they use ‘cognitive heuristics’ – shortcut 
solutions that can lead to systematic biases.  
The prosecutor’s fallacy is especially tempting 
because it incorporates several interrelated 
heuristics and biases.   
Attribute substitution: Faced with a difficult 
question, people often respond with a readily 
available but incorrect answer.  Thus the expert’s 
statement – the probability that the footprint 
evidence would match if someone other than 
the defendant had left the print (1 in 1,000) – 
is readily taken as the answer to the ultimate 
question of interest i.e. the probability that 
someone else left the print, given the evidence 
that the footprints match. 
Base rate neglect: When updating their beliefs, 
people often ignore information about how 
common something is in the general population 
– known as base-rate information – and give 
too much weight to case-specific evidence. In 
our case, this is tantamount to ignoring the prior 
probability that the defendant left the print, and 
focusing just on the match evidence.  
Belief bias: People are more likely to accept 
a fallacious argument if its conclusion fits with 
what else they know or assume.  This means 
that the prosecutor’s fallacy can seem more 
acceptable when there are other reasons to 
believe the defendant is guilty. 
Defaults: People often use default values to 
simplify their reasoning. In the legal case, people 
often assume a 50/50 prior probability, but this 
assumption is usually unjustified and prejudicial. 
Figure 1. Visual depiction of the suspect population (adapted from ref. 1).
Imagine 10,000 people who could 
potentially have committed the crime
But about 10 out of 
the other 9,999 people 
have the matching print
One of whom is 
the actual source
Actual source
Not source but 
matching type
Non matching 
person
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Explanatory scenarios: People usually reason 
in terms of scenarios and stories rather than 
probabilities, and often prefer scenarios that 
best explain the evidence, even if these are 
not the most likely explanations.  Thus the 
fallacy is promoted because the hypothesis that 
the defendant left the print is clearly the best 
explanation for the match, and yields a more 
satisfying story. 
WHAT CAN WE DO TO ALLEVIATE 
THIS FALLACY?
Ideally, everyone involved in a trial should receive 
proper training in the probabilistic evaluation 
of evidence. But psychological studies have 
highlighted various approaches that can also help 
people to reach better judgments and avoid 
errors like the prosecutor’s fallacy. 
Frequency formats: Framing the problem in 
terms of frequencies (as we did in the example 
above) helps people reach more accurate 
judgments and avoid the fallacy. 
Exemplar cueing: Framing the evidence in 
terms of how many other matches are expected, 
rather than just giving a match probability, makes 
people evaluate the evidence more accurately. 
Visual aids: Using diagrams to represent the 
relevant populations and show the expected 
numbers of matches (as in Figure 1) also 
improves reasoning. 
Verbal scales: We can calculate a likelihood 
ratio (LR), which compares the probability of the 
evidence under the prosecution and defence 
hypotheses (see Annexe pg 207).  These LR 
values can then be converted into a verbal 
scale4. For example, an LR of 100–1,000 can 
be expressed as providing “moderately strong 
support” for the prosecution rather than the 
defence hypothesis; an LR of 10,000–1,000,000 
as providing “very strong support”; and so 
on.  This enables evidential interpretation to 
satisfy the key characteristics of balance, logic, 
transparency and robustness.
However, these approaches are harder to 
scale-up to more complex problems, especially 
those with multiple pieces of evidence and issues 
of evidence reliability. One promising solution 
is to use Bayesian networks5, which build on 
likelihood ratios and Bayesian reasoning.  These 
networks provide a graphical representation 
of the interrelations between hypotheses and 
evidence, and can capture issues of evidence 
reliability and credibility.6 
A key question is whether non-experts need 
to engage with Bayesian computations from first 
principles, or whether they can be trained on 
simpler examples and then learn to trust and 
understand an expert’s explanations in more 
complicated cases.
What is clear is that the increasing use of 
forensic evidence and quantitative probabilistic 
analyses makes it essential that professional users 
of evidence understand how to interpret and 
present this information. 
THE INCREASING USE OF FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE AND QUANTITATIVE 
PROBABILISTIC ANALYSES MAKES 
IT ESSENTIAL THAT PROFESSIONAL 
USERS OF EVIDENCE UNDERSTAND 
HOW TO INTERPRET AND 
PRESENT THIS INFORMATION.
SECTION 2: 
THE CHANGING NATURE
OF CRIME
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£3.3 billion a year
UK forensic science makes 
important contributions 
to international resilience, 
demonstrated during the 
MH17 disaster victim 
identification process. 
The International 
Commission on Missing 
Persons and Bode Cellmark 
Forensics have tested
As the complexity of cyberattacks 
grows, so does the volume of 
evidence that can be collected in 
relation to a crime. 
With a 5% rise between 2013 and 2014, 
more than 40% of all criminal cases of 
fraud relate to misappropriation of identity. 
Its cost to the UK economy runs close to
 
50,000 
bone samples and 
30,000 
unidentified human remains 
from MH17 to date
Forensic science has a tendency 
towards being reactive; the 
future for crime reduction is in 
proactive strategies and policies. 
Foreign legal systems 
provide the UK with 
evidence about crimes, 
accidents and natural 
disasters involving Britons, 
while the UK is obliged to 
help investigate crimes 
committed by British 
citizens abroad. 
Crime no longer has 
national boundaries, 
so international law enforcement 
conventions have been adopted 
to respond to the 
changing nature of crime. 
The global cost of cybercrime 
is currently more than
$400 billion
per year
In a recent report the 
cost to the UK of 
cybercrime was 
estimated to be
£27 billion
per year
The international 
exchange of DNA data 
and fingerprints can 
identify trends and spatial 
features in cross-border 
crime and offending. 
Forensic science data can 
be used to inform crime 
prevention strategies. 
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CHAPTER 5
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CRIME
NATIONALLY-COORDINATED FORENSIC SCIENCE WOULD BE MORE 
PROACTIVE IN TACKLING EMERGING CRIME THREATS, AND ABLE 
TO PROVIDE A MORE DYNAMIC RESPONSE TO LOCAL, NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL THREATS, SUCH AS CRIME IN ACTION. 
PETE MERRILL, 
Head of Science 
& Innovation, National 
Crime Agency
National and international law enforcement agencies routinely 
collaborate in tackling cybercrime. Forensic science, in contrast, has failed 
to keep pace. If we are to combat the changing nature of crime, we must 
work together to develop global science toolkits.
e live in a world where 
global crime threats 
affect everyone, 
whether they live in 
a country of supply, trafficking or demand. 
International criminal markets crisscross the 
planet, transcending cultural, social, linguistic 
and geographical borders.  These markets 
are dynamic, sophisticated, highly profitable 
and able to adapt more quickly than legal 
counterpar ts.
Crime no longer has national boundaries 
and an offender in one country can 
simultaneously commit offences against 
victims in other states, meaning that 
national intervention activity often requires 
investigators to look beyond their own 
borders to protect their sovereignties and 
citizens from harm.
Acting alone to counter crime has become 
unworkable and, in response, international law 
enforcement conventions have been adopted 
to collectively respond to the changing nature 
of crime, to strengthen security and the rule of 
law, disrupt criminal markets and to strengthen 
integrity and anti-corruption activities.
Meanwhile, criminals have diversified 
and use new ways to carry out the same 
crimes, with technology playing a key role.  
Traditionally, global crime was physical: it 
came in the form of trafficking, star ting in 
one continent and ending in another, but 
routed through others to disguise its true 
source. Criminals have always chosen the 
safest method of operating, by identifying new 
crime sources, transit hubs and destinations, 
exploiting free trade zones and vulnerabilities 
in law enforcement capabilities across different 
jurisdictions. Now, the greatest threat is non-
physical: criminals exploit the internet for 
economic, cybercrime and sexual exploitation 
purposes.  They co-opt legitimate activities for 
criminal purposes, using corruption, coercion 
and white-collar collaborators and enablers 
in the private and public sectors to commit 
crimes.  Their activities threaten national 
infrastructures, security and our identities.
Law enforcement is not as agile in adapting 
its operational response to combat these 
threats, and forensic science capabilities often 
lag behind both the investigators’ operational 
tempo and public expectations, which impacts 
confidence and social wellbeing. Although 
national and international law enforcement 
agencies routinely collaborate in tackling the 
growing phenomenon of cybercrime, forensic 
science has failed to keep pace: it has not 
embraced the same collective responsibility, 
giving rise to missed opportunities. If we 
are to combat the changing nature of crime, 
we have no choice but to work together to 
develop global science toolkits.
While law enforcement is striving to 
adapt its effor ts and capacities to these 
new challenges, forensic science also 
needs to transform to keep up with the 
changing nature of crime. It should do so by 
maintaining and developing its core business, 
as well as supporting and embracing new 
ways of working.
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CRIME MOVES FROM THE PUBLIC 
SPACE TO THE HOME
The new environment in which criminals now 
operate – cyberspace – is without borders.  
The principle that ‘every contact leaves a 
trace’ still applies within the digital and online 
cyber world, but the technologies used to 
commit, enable and detect crime are not easily 
transferable within the traditional forensic 
sciences. 
The increased mobility and adoption 
of technology globally, driven by its wider 
availability and falling costs, means that the 
number of potential victims of cybercrime 
can only increase. For example, a criminal 
anywhere in the world with internet access 
can pay to watch and direct child abuse via the 
internet in live-time.  This demonstrates that 
law enforcement agencies must collectively 
investigate ‘crime in action’ across geographical 
and legal territories.  The need for collective 
responsibility for the forensic analysis of 
technologies and networks is also imperative.
Victim vulnerability, despite enhanced 
cybersecurity features and applications, is still 
a real threat. Increased web interconnectivity, 
greater dependency on technology by the 
public and business, the perception that the 
home is a safe environment and that security 
applications will always work – these all aid the 
criminals.
The ‘Dark Web’ provides a resource where 
criminals can access web-based tutorials, 
where they can buy instructions, watch 
tutorials and purchase the necessary tools to 
hack computers and commit crime, in vir tual 
anonymity.  This cyberspace can create a 
mental disconnect between the criminal, the 
crime and the real world, because the victims 
are faceless and no direct violence is used. You 
no longer need a gang, guns and a get-away 
car to rob a bank; an individual can commit the 
crime from their bedroom with nothing more 
than a laptop.
Forensic science faces a considerable 
challenge in supporting investigations into 
technology-enabled crimes in dealing with 
the evidential material within cyberspace: the 
physical devices, networks, and embedded 
digital systems. Collection, analysing and 
presenting this evidence is difficult enough, 
but it is exacerbated by the technology 
expectations of investigators and the public. 
We live in a digital age, in which technologies 
and applications change almost daily. 
Investigators expect to have the same level of 
mobile technology available to them in their 
professional life as they do in their private lives, 
and are frustrated when they do not.  The 
public can also experience this frustration when 
viewing forensic evidence presented in court.
Law enforcement alone will not be able to 
tackle the problem. Corporations, agencies, 
government departments, industries and 
academics – who all have digital and cyber 
expertise but are not necessarily engaged in 
criminal prosecutions – have a significant role 
to play in keeping the public safe. 
WHAT NEW THREATS DOES THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FACE? 
Forensic science faces additional challenges in 
digital and cybercrime investigations. Exhibits 
could have been deliberately damaged 
in an attempt to destroy evidence.  They 
are often security-locked, and data can be 
obfuscated legitimately for security reasons 
by manufacturers or by individuals using ‘off 
the shelf ’ privacy protection and disk cleaning 
tools. Criminals can also remotely counter law 
enforcement activity by deleting or creating 
false data logs. If done effectively, it is sometimes 
impossible to recover any evidence of illegal 
activity. Even when it is possible, it requires a 
difficult and lengthy process which increases the 
time between an offence being committed and it 
being resolved in a criminal court.
Moore’s law states that, over time, computing 
power grows at an exponential rate. Yet, while 
the manufacturers of goods and services exploit 
these technological advances, the forensic tools 
THE INCREASED MOBILITY AND  
ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
GLOBALLY,  DRIVEN BY ITS WIDER 
AVAILABILITY AND FALLING COSTS, 
MEANS THAT THE NUMBER OF 
POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF CYBERCRIME 
CAN ONLY INCREASE.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CRIME
58
required to investigate their misuse are not 
being developed in concert. Meanwhile, the 
forensic professional’s ability to act as an expert 
witness is being narrowed down to specific 
fields of activity, which are so complex that 
judges and jurors have little or no concept of 
the subject matter.
HOW CAN SCIENCE KEEP PACE 
WITH THE CHANGES IN CRIME 
AND TECHNOLOGY? 
The accelerating rate of change of forensic 
technology stands in stark contrast to the 
pace of the traditional forensic sciences. New 
products and services to support forensic 
science capability go through lengthy end-to-end 
quality and validation processes before being 
used within the Criminal Justice System. But this 
process is not agile enough to match the speed 
at which new forensic technologies are needed. 
This is most keenly felt at the basic research 
or proof-of-concept stages. Even at these 
preliminary stages, funded projects are often 
mandated with judicial end-user requirements 
that include accredited laboratories, along with 
training and application by competent staff – in 
other words, that these technologies should be 
‘fit for court’. But mandating these complex and 
costly end-user requirements at such an early 
stage of technology development can deter 
innovators.  This narrows the field of available 
expertise, creates perceived boundaries and 
stifles engagement.
Although the developers of these tools need 
to be cognisant of the requirements of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules that their technologies 
would eventually have to meet in the criminal 
justice system, innovators working at the lower 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 1–5 (see 
Table 1) should be allowed to focus on the 
technical requirements of their systems. Mandating 
costly base requirements (such as accredited 
laboratories) does not incentivise the science and 
technology community to provide rapid solutions 
for development. Instead, it should be sufficient for 
them to disclose their basic validation processes 
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported.
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated.
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept.
TRL 4 Technology basic validation in a laboratory environment.
TRL 5 Technology basic validation in a relevant environment.
TRL 6 Technology model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment.
TRL 7 Technology prototype demonstration in an operational environment.
TRL 8 Actual Technology completed and qualified through test and demonstration.
TRL 9 Actual Technology qualified through successful mission operations.
Table 1:  Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a technology management tool that provides  
a measurement to assess the maturity of evolving technology.
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before a new method is deemed ready for 
demonstration and operational evaluation for use 
within the Criminal Justice System.
To keep pace with the changing criminal 
threat, we need a nationally-coordinated 
governance framework across the forensic 
science community. It should lead an innovation 
centre, a knowledge exchange network, and 
undertake horizon scanning. It should manage 
the relationship with funding bodies, Innovate 
UK, higher education, research councils, users 
and service providers to ensure that they adopt 
a holistic approach to forensic science. 
Nationally-coordinated forensic science would 
be more proactive in tackling emerging crime 
threats, and able to provide a more dynamic 
response to local, national and international 
threats, such as crime in action. It would make 
better use of available technologies, develop 
specialist solutions that meet the standards of 
the Criminal Justice System, recruit specialist 
expertise for national use, and support the 
development and training of national capabilities.
The UK also needs to be better positioned 
within global forensics.  This is a considerable 
challenge, because UK forensic science is principally 
focused on the requirements of the UK’s threats, 
its control strategies, and local policing plans. 
European crime and global threats are not seen as 
a key driver for UK forensic science – as a result, 
the benefits of influence, collaboration and access 
to funding are not realised. 
Understanding the forensic science challenges 
requires both a dynamic short-term approach to 
tackle current and emerging threats, along with 
a more agile approach to long-term research 
initiatives.  This will only be achieved through a 
single forensic science gateway that can connect 
practitioners from the diverse forensic science 
disciplines and facilitate their collaboration to 
ensure corporate engagement.
COULD FORENSIC SCIENCE BE 
BETTER APPLIED TO TACKLING THE 
FACTORS THAT CAUSE CRIME?
Forensic science is designed to support the 
Criminal Justice System, and to deal with 
specific offences committed by specific people. 
It does not tackle the factors that cause 
crime, an important distinction.  This means 
that although law enforcement investigate 
and prosecute offenders, which can lead to 
convictions, it may not reduce the supply of 
illegal commodities, the number of trafficking 
victims, or curb online exploitation. 
Criminals may come and go, but the criminal 
markets and the factors that cause crimes 
remain. A disruption-only crime-fighting model 
will not solve the crime problem. Instead, 
understanding the crime landscape will help 
agencies to focus on the activities of significant 
impact, especially where they span multiple 
threat areas where intervention will have a more 
sustainable impact.
Calls for research in forensic science often 
focus on the natural sciences, rather than on 
studies of the social and behavioural drivers of 
crime.  These social science questions – which 
seek to understand crime markets, entities, 
structures and how they operate – are not seen 
as a high priority. Likewise, the effectiveness 
of forensic activity on public confidence, 
their understanding of the topic, and their 
expectations are vital issues that we need to 
understand in order to be more effective (see: 
The big questions in crime research, overleaf).
The current system of funding forensic 
science research is clearly biased towards the 
natural sciences.  To be successful in a funding 
bid, applications must be driven by an expected 
output of results and benefits. Projects are 
therefore risk adverse, with little or no flexibility 
to extend or change their scope. Proof-of-
concept bids and social or knowledge-building 
initiatives are rarely funded. Funding is often 
for too short a period; bidding formats differ 
across government departments; and there is a 
mismatch between the academic and the funding 
and commissioning cycles. 
If, as a society, we want to identify and 
understand the causes of crime, we must have a 
UNDERSTANDING THE FORENSIC 
SCIENCE CHALLENGES REQUIRES 
BOTH A DYNAMIC SHORT-TERM 
APPROACH TO TACKLE CURRENT 
AND EMERGING THREATS, ALONG 
WITH A MORE AGILE APPROACH TO 
LONG-TERM RESEARCH INITIATIVES.
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THE BIG QUESTIONS IN CRIME SEARCH
UNDERSTANDING ORGANISED CRIME MARKETS,  
ENTITIES,  STRUCTURES,  VALUE AND HOW THEY OPERATE
What are serious organised crime activities?
Where are they located?
Where is their marketplace?
Do they actually cross borders?
What are their connections?
What are their pathways, driveways, motivators and modus operandi?
How do they interact with the grey market and other legitimate networks?
Are they demand driven?
Are there a diverse number of ethnically heterogeneous actors?
Do they have an organisational structure or a party base?
Do they follow traditional or media concepts?
Do we understand what we are up against? 
Does offender management work?  
Are criminals more agile than law enforcement?
What are the enabling tools and trappings that go with the crime types?
Does each crime type have a different network?
What value is given to an individual’s reputation?
Is the nature of violence in serious organised crime changing?
What are the new patterns and crime types?
 
 How do we measure success within an environment where public confidence
and perception has such a varied range? 
How do we measure confidence, visibility, satisfaction, credibility and reputation?
What is the definition of public confidence?
What are the unspoken expectations?
Where are the boundaries of public acceptance for forensic science techniques?
What is the effect following a disruption on different communities?
Can we define the types of real and virtual communities? 
How can we actively engage with community experiments? 
How do you change lifestyle and culture?
Can we ‘future proof’ the public against crime?
What does civil engagement look like?
What factors create an environment of trust?
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND EXPECTATIONS
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Do we know enough to evaluate the intended consequences of our actions?
Is policy effective?
How do we measure outputs?
How do we measure impact? 
What types of disruption work?
How do we measure the impact following a disruption?
 How does law enforcement evaluate the threat, balance privacy and morality
and operate in an ethical way?
How do we manage activity outside statutory processes? 
How do we identify what is important?
How do we keep the focus on the mission?
What level of energy does it takes to disrupt crime?
Who does it actually affect?
How do we best design interventions?
Is there a place for conflict resolution?
How do we measure intangible and tangible benefits?
Can we include measurements from key stakeholders? 
Should we focus more on cyber or drugs – which is the bigger threat? 
HOW DO WE MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY?
national sponsor for fundamental research into 
the social and behavioural sciences. We also 
need to deconflict the competing priorities 
for funding, and take a long-term approach to 
providing an environment that will maximise the 
commercial markets for forensic science, to the 
benefit of both the public and private sectors.
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING 
CULTURAL NORMS ON CRIME
Public confidence in forensic science, and its 
ability to keep the public safe, are the most 
important drivers for innovation within forensic 
science. It operates within an environment of 
radical uncertainty, where there is greater public 
scrutiny around its activities, and a greater 
demand for transparency than ever before. 
As well as being adaptable to the changing 
nature of crime, forensic science has to be 
flexible enough to cope with the changing 
requirements of the law, political agendas and 
policies, organisational cultures, ethical and 
human rights challenges.  This is keenly felt when 
it comes to personal data held on national 
databases.  The difficulties in accessing and using 
national crime-fighting data have never been 
satisfactorily resolved.  This hampers academic 
research so much that it is often too far 
removed from the criminal investigation to be 
of value. Better access to crime knowledge and 
data is required to provide qualitative research, 
while still respecting the challenges associated 
with managing confidentiality, security, Criminal 
Justice System requirements and commercial 
considerations. It is also vital if we are to reduce 
the risks of research bias, and to avoid studies 
simply delivering pre-determined outcomes, 
rather than producing genuine insights.
All of the examples discussed in this chapter 
demonstrate that forensic science needs to 
adapt more quickly to the changing nature of 
crime if it to remain relevant, trusted and useful.
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CASE STUDY
TROJAN OPENS THE GATES  
TO COMPANY CASH 
I 
OLIVER SMITH, PwC Cyber Threat Operations
magine the following scenario. Police 
are poised to arrest an employee on 
suspicion of misappropriating company 
funds when an investigative interview 
with the suspect reveals a sequence of 
strange events. Upon closer examination, it 
transpires that a sophisticated and targeted 
attack by cybercriminals had succeeded in 
siphoning off close to £250,000 to bank 
accounts held in Cyprus, Ukraine and the 
United States.
Just days before – after star ting a new 
role in the finance team of a manufacturing 
company – the employee had received 
an email purportedly from the company’s 
bank.  This email seemed entirely innocuous, 
and was one of many other emails that the 
employee had received from the bank as par t 
of the process for setting up their access. 
However, the email was in fact spoofed, and 
had been sent by a cybercrime group – a 
form of cyberattack called ‘phishing’.  Targeted 
phishing emails (i.e. those that may refer 
to the target by name, or contain other 
information that may resonate with the 
target) are referred to as ‘spear phishing’.
The email contained a piece of malicious 
software (malware) intended to infect 
the employee’s computer with a carefully 
crafted program known as a banking Trojan.  
This malware, which is called a ‘Man in 
the Browser’ attack, allows the attacker to 
not only track and exploit the information 
being entered by a user, but also to ask for 
additional information and where necessary 
redirect the victims to bogus sites. Once 
executed, the malware was able to operate 
undetected, intercepting key information 
intended for the banking site.  The victim’s 
banking credentials were transmitted to the 
attackers, giving them access to the company’s 
bank account. 
The employee was then presented with an 
onscreen message stating that his card reader 
– a device designed to provide an additional 
layer of security around the authorisation 
of transactions – was required in order 
to complete the logon process. Given the 
employee’s unfamiliarity with the new banking 
system, he was not suspicious and followed 
the instructions. However, rather than being a 
step in the legitimate account access process, 
the employee had inadver tently provided an 
authentication code authorising a payment to 
a new account. 
The employee was presented with an error 
message that asked him to try again, and this 
process was repeated a number of times in 
short succession until the employee gave 
up trying to gain access to the account.  The 
attackers then proceeded to call the victim 
at his office masquerading as legitimate bank 
employees, which resulted in additional bogus 
transfers being authorised (this process is 
known as voice phishing, or ‘vishing’). Although 
the bank eventually blocked fur ther payments, 
it had missed several red flags, including that 
the company never made direct foreign 
REGARDLESS OF HOW ROBUST A COMPANY’S CYBER DEFENCES ARE, 
HUMAN ERROR IS OFTEN A KEY ROUTE FOR CYBER CRIMINALS TO GAIN 
ACCESS TO INTERNAL COMPANY NETWORKS OR SENSITIVE DATA.
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exchange payments, and always used the 
same intermediary to process any such 
payments.    
Cases such as this demonstrate that 
regardless of how robust a company’s 
cyber defences are, human error is often a 
key route for cybercriminals to gain access 
to internal company networks or sensitive 
data – and this form of crime is on the rise. 
PwC’s 2015 Information Security Breaches 
Survey technical report found that 
inadver tent human error had caused half 
of the single worst security breaches for all 
survey respondents in 2015, an increase of 
over 60% on 2014 (ref. 1).
In this instance, by capitalising on the 
employee’s unfamiliarity with the bank’s 
authentication procedures – and his 
all-encompassing social media profile, 
which contained his position and contact 
details – the criminals were able to steal 
a significant sum of money and even 
threaten the innocent employee’s liber ty. 
With the benefit of hindsight it was clear 
that the logon process was different, but 
at the time it all seemed very normal. As 
such, employee training and awareness 
of techniques such as spear phishing and 
vishing should be seen as crucial elements 
of any information security and risk 
management policy.
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CHAPTER 6
IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION
SUE BLACK, Centre 
for Anatomy and 
Human Identification, 
University of Dundee
Identity is a cornerstone of our modern society, and its influence as a central tenet of 
our culture will only increase and consolidate as citizens willingly surrender parts of their 
identity to gain, for example, access to commercial products.  The expansive ecosystem 
of government, science, justice, industry and society must find a way to work together to 
strike a workable balance between an escalating public demand for security and a laissez 
y theft. 
dentity and identification are two sides of 
the same coin, but they are, ironically, not 
identical. Heated philosophical debates 
on this matter have existed for centuries, 
and perhaps even from the evolutionary 
watershed when the most narcissistic of all 
species – humans – first discerned a sense of 
self1. From then onward, people have sought to 
guard their identity jealously from others who 
might wish to steal it; they have also learned to 
wield it as a powerful tool for both good and 
bad, and to raise it as a shield for protection.  
There is an inherent need within structured 
societies for citizens to be able to prove who 
they say they are, and for others to be willing to 
accept that their claim is not only accurate, but 
that it reflects who they have always been and 
will continue to be. If there is any doubt in this 
concept, then we must attempt to resolve it by 
presenting and evaluating evidence. 
The level of trust in this agreement has 
changed over time, and in today’s high-security 
world it is probably at its most extreme. Yet 
society has always been fascinated by the 
concept of identity, of being able to acquire and 
manipulate it, and as a result confuse and fool 
the unsuspecting. Alexandre Dumas’ 1846 book 
‘The Two Dianas’ was adapted from the real life 
16th-century case of identity theft associated 
with a peasant, Martin Guerre, and his 
subsequent trial and execution. It is interesting 
to consider that in today’s world of forensic 
science this case would have been solved very 
quickly: and this illustrates that the field is not 
static but that it is ever evolving, and one could 
argue that it is now progressing at its fastest 
pace. Indeed, the flexibility and manoeuvrability 
of identity continues to inspire creative minds, 
not only in literature and the media but also 
those intent on nefarious purposes. Such 
criminal tendencies need to be countermanded 
by the full focus of legislative, judicial, scientific 
and investigative capabilities.
‘POSSIBLY’ IS NOT A HELPFUL 
ANSWER
The philosophical concept of identity was 
first addressed within the much-debated 
three classical laws of logic: the law of identity, 
the law of non-contradiction and the law 
of excluded middle. Of course, in the ideal 
situation identity would follow the simplicity 
and pleasing symmetry of Aristotle’s law of 
identity (A=A) but this provides no space 
for extraneous factors including change in 
the predicate (as recognised by Heraclitus) 
or uncertainty in the tools available to the 
evaluator to establish unequivocal exactness 
(as evidenced by the concept of three-valued 
logic). Bivalent logic only provides for ‘true’ or 
‘false’ values, whereas three-value logic permits 
a third, indeterminate value that occupies the 
middle ground between the two finite points 
at the end of an identity continuum (match or 
exclusion).  Therefore, while these exquisite 
bimodal philosophical concepts might represent 
the holy grail of standards for modern day 
identification, such rigid inflexibility, which relies 
on certainty or indeed uniqueness, cannot be 
achieved realistically.  The degree of confidence 
that we have in our ability to assign identity 
to an individual or to a thing must therefore 
be predicated on probability and whether 
the likelihood is closer to confirmation or 
rejection of identity. Identity as it pertains to 
an individual must therefore, by definition, be a 
rigid bimodal concept (each person is unique); 
but identification, which is the process by which 
certainty of identity is assessed, occupies the 
middle ground of the third value.  This conflict 
comes into focus through provision of false 
rejection rates, false acceptance rates and the 
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bimodal requirement of the Criminal Justice 
System: is it him, or is it not? Under such 
circumstances, ‘possibly’ is not a helpful answer.
Identification must also be able to withstand 
variation not only in time (as an individual ages) 
but in space (identical twins) and therefore 
the complexity with which we not only 
express identity but the mechanisms whereby 
we detect, recognise, compare, evaluate and 
communicate it, are complex2.  There can be 
no doubt that some of the indicators of our 
identity are more readily accepted and more 
familiar than others, and many have stood 
an incredible test of time. However, current 
pressures on data security, privacy laws and the 
almost insatiable fervour to capture information 
about identity mean that this has become a 
challenging and fluid environment where our 
wish to protect our identity comes into daily 
conflict with society’s demands for us to reveal 
and relinquish it.
While the forensic aspect of identification 
has very much focused on its role in the 
Criminal Justice System, it has perhaps missed a 
prime opportunity to influence the commercial 
market through collaborative innovation and 
enterprise.  There is a strong value proposition 
in the forensic approach to identity because it 
offers a degree of scientific, grass-roots rigour 
that industry might capitalise upon if it is to 
weather the brewing storms of the consumer’s 
ebb and flow in confidence and trust. Early 
discourse, and a trusting environment that 
facilitates collaborative and honest dealings 
from the outset, would stand this relationship 
in good stead and prepare it for future criticism 
or adversarial conflict, civil or criminal, in the 
courts.  The need to obviate and manage 
such risk is core to both a robust commercial 
marketplace and to the enduring legacy of 
government policymaking, and it is fundamental 
to the principles of citizens’ trust and faith. 
BIOMETRICS BOOM
Identification is a natural and necessary process 
for many forms of social interaction, from 
productive enterprise to personal security, 
but only relatively recently has it become the 
subject of articulated government policies. In 
the wake of events such as 9/11, the London 
7/7 bombings and other security threats, an 
increasingly security-conscious society demands 
higher standards from our technologies and 
our underpinning scientific robustness3, 4.  Today, 
this is most commonly achieved through 
biometric analysis and the matching of source, 
intelligence or crime scene data with stored 
reference data5. In an early patent application 
for a personal biometric system, Yong Zhu and 
colleagues defined a biometric as “a measurable, 
physical characteristic or personal behavioural 
trait used to recognise the identity, or verify the 
claimed identity, of an enrolee”6.  The important 
word here for security purposes is ‘enrolee’, 
as it requires there to be a stored set of data 
against which a comparison may be made to 
establish a match7.  This is not always the case for 
those in the forensic field, who must interpret 
the evidence from a different investigative 
perspective where the owner of the biometric 
is not known to the investigator.  Therefore we 
have two communities approaching the same 
problem from very different angles. Such an 
interdisciplinary congruence is a rich ground for 
innovation, enterprise and entrepreneurism. 
But how protective is the consumer of their 
identity and how willing are they to sacrifice 
it? To gain access to the latest mobile phone, 
for example, one may have to surrender their 
fingerprint biometric. Should the consumer 
be okay with that? The ‘Biometrics Market 
and Industry Report 2004-2008’ from the 
International Biometric Group (IBG)8 suggested 
that fingerprint, face, hand and iris recognition 
accounted for almost 80% of the biometric 
WHILE THE FORENSIC ASPECT OF IDENTIFICATION HAS VERY MUCH 
FOCUSED ON ITS ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, IT HAS 
PERHAPS MISSED A PRIME OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE 
COMMERCIAL MARKET THROUGH COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION  
AND ENTERPRISE. 
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market in 2006. “It was predicted that by the end 
of 2013, Automated Fingerprint Identification 
Services (AFIS) technology would dominate 
the biometric marketplace with around 33% of 
the market share but by the end of 2015 this 
is closer to 50%, driven by large identification 
programmes and accessible and affordable 
personal security demands.”9.
While it is true that fingerprint recognition 
continues to dominate the biometrics industry, 
it is important to realise that it also dominated 
the field of forensic investigation for nearly 100 
years10 until it was eventually relegated into 
second place by DNA analysis11. Both DNA 
and fingerprint analysis have largely weathered 
the adversarial interrogation of the courtroom, 
although fingerprint evidence was recently 
downgraded from a biometric of ‘fact’ to one of 
‘opinion’ following the public enquiry into the 
Shirley McKie case12, and aspects of DNA analysis 
are also coming under greater scrutiny. Biometrics 
that are not only able to operate successfully 
within the security market but can also meet the 
criteria of evidential admissibility, are extremely 
important and potentially powerful tools for the 
analysis and determination of identity in both 
the forensic and the security related contexts13, 
14, 15.  This border interface between forensic 
science and the security market is a powerful 
translational scientific portal where a paradigm 
shift may be accelerated through the unrestricted 
bi-directional traffic of knowledge transfer and 
collaborative strategic alliances.  The development 
of new biometrics, and the support of emerging 
ones, would be greatly enhanced by a strategic 
working alliance of forensic science experts with 
colleagues in the security industries.
Vascular pattern recognition is a less well 
known biometric, but it is predicted to gain 
significant market share after years of being 
viewed as little more than a niche player.  This 
approach relies on the infra-red image capture 
of the arborescent (tree-like) pattern of the 
superficial veins, commonly in a finger, the palm 
or on the dorsum of a hand.  Through algorithmic 
extraction, the pattern is represented as a binary 
(black and white) image that can be utilised for 
pattern comparison purposes. According to the 
IBG, vascular pattern recognition constituted 
approximately 3% of the overall biometric 
commercial market in 2006 (ref. 8). However, 
the IBG correctly predicted a 300% growth 
in the use of vein recognition technology by 
2012 (refs 16, 17) and current market share is 
approximately 10%. Like fingerprint biometrics, 
vein pattern analysis has translated successfully 
into the forensic field as an emerging science, 
and particularly in the identification of hands 
from perpetrators of sexual crime, but more 
specifically child sexual abuse18, 19 (see case study 
on p80) .  The legal admissibility of this evidence 
was granted on the basis that the expert was 
a trained human anatomist who understood 
human variation18.  Therefore, vein pattern analysis 
has successfully crossed from the scientific/
medical world into the commercial marketplace 
as a largely unnoticed conduit, and is now 
translating onto the forensic arena with significant 
impact. Capturing this sometimes unexpected 
flow of knowledge and influence between 
disciplines is challenging but offers fertile ground 
for innovation.  The Law Commission report 
on ‘Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings 
in England and Wales’20 clearly provides room 
within the UK Criminal Justice System for the 
utilisation and introduction of novel or emerging 
sciences in the courtroom, but it is also clear on 
the extent to which opinions and inferences may 
be made in such circumstances.  
First generation (e.g. fingerprints) and 
second generation (e.g. DNA) forensic-based 
identification techniques have a track record in 
terms of evidential admissibility11 that emergent 
technologies must acquire. Developing a strong 
ethical framework is also a critical component to 
ensure the success of an approach, both in the 
Criminal Justice System and in the commercial 
sector19, 21. Biometrics that can cross between 
both fields raise different issues in the different 
locations, but the interchange offers tremendous 
WE HAVE TWO COMMUNITIES APPROACHING THE SAME PROBLEM FROM 
VERY DIFFERENT ANGLES. SUCH AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONGRUENCE IS A 
RICH GROUND FOR INNOVATION, ENTERPRISE AND ENTREPRENEURISM. 
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opportunity for robust and impactful research. 
Although this is currently little exploited, it is 
likely to prove a fertile ground for emerging 
technologies and new approaches if a productive 
environment can be created and supported.  
This interface of multidisciplinarity requires 
freedom to explore opportunities, but its impact 
for policy makers through emerging technologies 
and economic growth is largely unaddressed and 
untapped.  The emergence of new technology will 
not only be useful in the detection and capture of 
identity, but also in improving the accuracy of our 
comparative abilities, the solidity of our evaluation 
and the ease of its communication. Of course the 
value may not only lie in the use of identity but 
also in its protection, and if we are to continue to 
exploit biometrics then we must also think about 
how to develop a means to protect our identity – 
even if we are prepared to surrender it for goods 
and services.  The opportunities are limited only 
by imagination, but they must be prepared for 
with sound policy and governance.
REACTIVE OR PROACTIVE?
Given that identity has a value not only to the 
rightful holder but also to the criminal acquirer, 
it is inevitable that a black market culture will 
thrive unless prevention and strong gatekeeping 
also become a focus. Forensic science has a 
tendency towards being reactive to the needs 
of the investigative agencies, whereas the future 
for crime reduction must surely lie in proactive 
strategies and policies. CIFAS, the UK’s fraud 
prevention service, has reported that identity 
theft and identity fraud are among the fastest 
rising crimes of modern times22. With a 5% rise 
between 2013 and 2014, over 40% of all criminal 
cases of fraud relate to misappropriation of 
identity. Not surprisingly, there is a larger incidence 
in urban compared to rural areas, and major 
cities including London, Manchester, Birmingham, 
Leicester, Leeds and Glasgow have been identified 
as hotspots for such theft23.  The major purpose 
of identity fraud is to illegally obtain goods and 
services in the name of an innocent person, and 
it is believed that the cost to the economy runs 
close to £3.3 billion per year for the UK. It is 
also no longer a crime that can be attributed to 
a specific demographic in respect of sex, age or 
geographical location, and the cost of repair and 
restitution following identity theft is extensive for 
the victim, typically taking between six months 
and two years to resolve24. Understandably, there 
is a major commercial and governmental drive 
to protect identity, to make theft more difficult, 
and to reduce the financial burden on the 
economy.  This will only increase in importance 
and prominence as citizens prepare to trade their 
biometrics, and therefore their identity, as a token.  
The commercial answer to increasing security 
is for the customer to give up their biometrics, 
but that introduces an element of vulnerability 
that has largely either been ignored or poorly 
understood to date. Investment of resources 
needs to focus on prevention as a longer-term 
strategy for this escalating crime.
A growing global sense of fear and self-
protection has catalysed the evolution of, 
and dependence on, biometrics in all aspects 
of our daily lives5 such that it is now forms a 
very lucrative, buoyant and therefore highly 
competitive, commercial market. In recent years 
it has started to move away from the traditional 
approach of utilising a token or something that 
is known (e.g. a PIN number), and towards the 
exploitation of biometrics, which are viewed as 
offering greater security and confidence.  The 
most common biometrics to be utilised in this 
way are fingerprints and facial recognition, and 
it is of great concern how readily the public 
are prepared to surrender a biometric to gain 
access to the latest commercial product. A 
recent survey of CIFAS members revealed that 
over two-thirds claimed to own an electronic 
device with a biometric security step installed, 
showing a dramatic rise from the previous year 
where only half responded that their mobiles, 
laptops, tablets etc required biometric (usually 
face or fingerprint) access mechanisms. If this 
is the way forward for identification then it is 
imperative that informed discussions occur to 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 
BIOMETRICS, AND THE SUPPORT 
OF EMERGING ONES, WOULD BE 
GREATLY ENHANCED BY A STRATEGIC 
WORKING ALLIANCE OF FORENSIC 
SCIENCE EXPERTS WITH COLLEAGUES 
IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRIES.
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CASE STUDY
SUPERIDENTITY
SARAH STEVENAGE, University of Southampton
odern technology provides 
a myriad of ways to reveal 
identity, reflecting both 
the capabilities of current 
devices and the options that individuals have 
to manage their identity.  However, threats to 
communities, coupled with the price of mistaken
identifications, make it ever more important that
our decisions about identity and identification 
are accurate.  The SuperIdentity project was 
designed to respond to this need by using novel 
combinations of information.  The result is the 
capacity to make robust identification decisions, 
knowing both the confidence in a decision and 
the means to increase that confidence.
Funded by the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the 
SuperIdentity project ran from 2011 to 2015 
and represented a multi-disciplinary endeavour 
bringing together scientists from the universities 
of Bath, Dundee, Kent, Leicester, Oxford, 
Southampton and the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratories in the US. Its aim was 
to explore identity and identification through 
traditional and modern measures, with the iris, 
the voice and particular characteristics of the 
hand being amongst the emerging biometric 
measures under scrutiny (see Figure 1). 
Although the team was at pains to 
demonstrate the reliability of each measure 
as a cue to identity, using both human and 
automated processing, the real power of the 
SuperIdentity project lay in the fusion of these 
measures.  This enabled identification decisions 
to be boosted in terms of both reliability and 
confidence – put simply, the more measures that 
converge to signal identity, the more confident 
one can be in the resultant identification. 
Information fusion also enabled the intelligent 
use of measures in a different way, allowing 
previously unknown information to be predicted 
from what was known.  This critical shift from 
information combination to information 
prediction heralds a powerful new approach 
for scientists, with clear benefits in diverse 
fields such as legal investigations, advertising, 
marketing and more subjective judgements such 
as whether we trust someone.
The second notable advance provided by 
the SuperIdentity project was its consideration 
of measures from both online and physical 
contexts. In an era when we live our lives as 
Figure 1: The hand offers one of the most valuable new biometrics under scrutiny. After measuring hand geometry (left), 
infrared light reveals the hand veins in much greater detail than is possible under natural light (centre). Viewing the hand 
under natural light, with veins superimposed, allows both geometry and vein analysis for matching purposes  (right).
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much online as offline, there is a clear need 
to be able to identify an individual in either 
context; and, at times, in being able to link an 
online individual to their offline counterpart.  
The SuperIdentity team have explored the 
reliability of making these links by analysing 
the finger gestures used when interacting 
with a smartphone, and avatar-user 
resemblances. Links between these measures 
and key characteristics such as personality, age 
or sex may critically help to narrow a field of 
search when making an identification. 
The final advance provided by the 
SuperIdentity project was the capacity to 
create a framework to support identification.  
The greater the accuracy when identifying 
an individual from any particular measure, 
the more valuable that measure becomes. 
Equally, it also becomes more important 
to protect that piece of information 
from unwanted disclosure. Mindful of the 
prominence of privacy protection and 
data security, this element of our work 
reflects on both intelligence needs when 
gathering information, and citizens’ needs 
when protecting information. As such, the 
project reinforces the need to balance our 
technological capabilities alongside individuals’ 
attitudes, concerns and rights to privacy. 
Courtesy of Richard Guest, University of Kent, 
and Helen Meadows, University of Dundee
protect the rights of the individual, the needs 
of the commercial sector, and the vision for 
government policy and its enduring legacy.
How certain are we of the security of our 
fingerprint as it is recorded on our mobile 
device? The research firm Acuity claimed 
that 2014 was a “bumper year” for the 
biometrics industry in the run up to Christmas 
as shoppers capitalised on mobile payment 
facilities25. Indeed, research by Visa Europe 
indicated that three-quarters of 16–24 year 
olds in the UK would feel comfortable using 
fingerprint scans, facial recognition or retinal 
scanning in place of traditional passcodes to 
overcome the ‘inconvenience’ of having to 
remember information.  This was supported 
by a recent CSC survey where it was pointed 
out that the willingness to release security is 
not a ‘generational’ issue but one of ‘age’ and 
so this must remain an issue for the industry 
as the views of a population change with 
time. Next-generation passwords are also 
under development with a recent US military 
project to develop ‘cognitive passwords’.  This 
Application Programme Interface (API) is based 
on the emerging field of behavioural-based 
biometrics using algorithms to identify how a 
person accesses their desktop or mobile device 
(see case study on p68 for more on how the 
relationship between two different forms of 
our identity, physical and cyber, may be bridged). 
Behavioural biometrics, as opposed to biological 
biometrics, will always pose a problem for both 
the commercial and the forensic markets due to 
the inherent ability to necessitate compensation 
for change, and so these are more likely to 
remain in the realm of ‘intelligence’ related 
information rather than evidence.
As the ecosystem grows more complex, 
there is a move away from accepting single 
biometrics as being sufficient to meet the 
needs of heightened security, and the market 
has geared up towards multimodal biometrics 
platforms.  The intention is to raise confidence 
in the security measures, but unfortunately 
there is also a cost impact26. Increasing 
complexity gives a perception of increased 
confidence, and this is largely achieved not only 
through more robust statistics for matching but 
also through the complexities required to spoof 
the systems, making multimodal approaches less 
susceptible to attack27. If multimodal biometric 
THE MORE MEASURES 
THAT CONVERGE TO 
SIGNAL IDENTITY,  THE 
MORE CONFIDENT ONE 
CAN BE IN THE RESULTANT 
IDENTIFICATION
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access becomes the norm, is the consumer 
aware of what proportion of their physical 
identity they may have to sacrifice in the future 
simply to continue to function in the modern 
world?
PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS
There is considerable debate at present 
within the different security and biometric 
communities with regards to the right to 
privacy and the security of state-collected 
and stored data, and the case study on p71 
considers the importance of this area for 
enlightened and honest debate.  The current 
media furore relates to the legitimacy of covert 
capture of faces through recognition software 
programmes. As we become increasingly 
security conscious, the importance of the 
right to remain anonymous is likely to gain 
momentum and will require redress by data 
security and privacy legislation, a matter that 
was raised in the House of Commons Select 
Committee on 20 November 2014.  There is an 
urgent need to consider and debate the right 
to privacy over the need to manage a secure 
society. Are we sure that the Data Protection 
Act is strong enough to withstand the strains, 
both internal and external, that manifest as 
our identity comes under ever closer scrutiny? 
As we continue to increase our dependence 
on biometrics, their security and their legal 
robustness will become a troublesome issue for 
public confidence. If we lose our bank card or 
our PIN number then new ones can be issued, 
but if our biometrics are stolen then we cannot 
change our fingerprints – consequently, it 
becomes much more challenging to prove our 
innocence of a crime in the face of compelling 
biometric evidence. And if our multimodal 
biometrics are stolen, at what point are we no 
longer able to retrieve our identity from the 
hands of fraudsters and regain control? There 
are many significant challenges ahead for which 
we are perhaps not yet fully prepared and it is 
vital that the policy makers, industry, scientists, 
investigative forces and the judiciary work 
together not only to encourage development 
but also to manage and monitor the inevitable 
outcomes associated with a fast paced world. 
At the core of all aspects of modern 
identity and identification lies the requirement 
for an unshakeable certainty of continuity 
of information, and confidence in verifiable 
robust data. In times past, proof of identity 
lay in document-based evidence: producing a 
birth certificate was sufficient to satisfy most 
needs. However, UNICEF reported in 2000 
that approximately 40% of all births were 
not officially recorded, which may represent 
upwards of 50 million babies in a single year. 
On a rolling basis, this is a large number of 
individuals who potentially have no officially 
recorded identity.  This lack of documentation 
may not present as a problem if the individual 
remains within the confines of a community 
where that approach is accepted, but when 
they move outwith those boundaries – perhaps 
because of displacement following war or 
famine, fleeing from persecution as refugees, 
or as illegal economic migrants – their lack 
of corroborating identification can become a 
major issue for border controls, immigration 
and ultimately the civil courts (when human 
rights are being addressed) or the criminal 
courts (should the individual either present as a 
victim or an accused).  
A birth certificate, whether original or legally 
issued, is a ‘breeder document’ that can be 
used to obtain other forms of verification of 
identity. As such it carries an inherent value, and 
consequently a black market demand. However, 
the misappropriation and falsification of such 
documents has gradually eroded the confidence 
of authorities to accept them without question, 
specifically for high-risk activities such as 
crossing borders, opening bank accounts etc. In 
an attempt to eradicate the need for traditional 
paper-based documents and replace them with 
AS WE BECOME INCREASINGLY SECURITY CONSCIOUS, THE 
IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS IS LIKELY TO 
GAIN MOMENTUM AND WILL REQUIRE REDRESS BY DATA SECURITY 
AND PRIVACY LEGISLATION,
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CASE STUDY
MANAGING BIOMETRICS
ISABELLE MOELLER, Chief Executive, Biometrics Institute
he use of biometrics has become 
an important tool in the discussion 
around security and identity man-
agement. Biometric authentication 
has the potential to ease the burden of security, 
thanks to its simplicity and usability. 
 The Biometrics Institute Industry Survey 
confirmed in 2013 that biometrics are at 
a crossroads.  They are moving from large-
scale government use to everyday consumer 
applications. Only the responsible use of 
biometrics will lead to successful applications. If 
implemented responsibly, biometrics are certainly 
a privacy enhancing technology.
 When we provide a biometric or other 
sensitive personal data, we ask questions about 
trust and control. Governments are typically 
required to put very robust trust models in place 
to ensure that end-to-end security is provided, 
through government accredited networks, 
compliance processes for privacy, and record-
keeping legislation – all assurance mechanisms 
that involve partnerships and processes around 
access to data. But in other organisations that 
end-to-end security and assurance might not 
exist, an absence that demands far more than 
just a technology solution.
 Other key questions relate to control and 
data retention. What happens to that biometric? 
Who looks after it, and when will it be destroyed 
– after a person leaves school, or a particular
job? What processes exist for managing any 
compromise of identity data, for re-establishing 
confidence in identity, for redress?
 We have seen many successful 
implementations where biometrics have 
helped to transform identity management, 
privacy protection and identity security. 
Electronic passports facilitate a more efficient 
and secure travel experience, while large-
scale identity management systems facilitate 
the delivery of government services to the 
poor and marginalised. But the public requires 
assurance that biometric managers are 
BIOMETRICS ARE AT A CROSSROADS, 
MOVING FROM LARGE-SCALE 
GOVERNMENT USE TO EVERYDAY 
CONSUMER APPLICATIONS.
giving due consideration to privacy and data 
protection when they are considering, designing, 
implementing and managing biometric-based 
projects.
 The Biometrics Institute has therefore 
developed several best-practice documents 
to help guide members along the way: the 
Biometrics Institute Privacy Awareness Checklist 
and Biometrics Privacy Guideline (available from 
www.biometricsinstitute.org).
 We are also working on a proposal to create 
a Trust Mark to give consumers confidence in 
the responsible use of an identity product or 
service that incorporates biometrics.  This will 
give biometric solutions providers and operators 
a tool to demonstrate that due consideration 
has been given to privacy and trust during 
planning and implementation.
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an identification card supported by multimodal 
biometrics, India has embarked on an ambitious 
project to record biometrics in all 1.2 billion 
of its citizens. Each man, woman and child will 
receive a 12 digit unique identification number 
called an ‘aadhar’ as a proof of identity and 
this will be linked to their name, address and 
biometrics including iris scans and fingerprints28. 
Care is required here to ensure that biometrics 
collected when the person was 16 are still 
retrievable and applicable 20, 30 or 60 years 
later when they may come into question. 
If technology accelerated so much in that 
intervening period that the original databases 
could no longer be searched, then the longevity 
of the project must be addressed to ensure 
currency and long term accessibility while 
retaining the flexibility to advance with new 
technology.  This is the current problem facing 
the UK’s National DNA Database. Over 720 
million identification numbers have been issued 
so far in India, and it is expected to exceed 1 
billion by the end of 2015.  The cost for the 
upkeep, security and success of such a system 
will make an interesting case study, in terms of 
both risk assessment and its role in criminal 
activities.  The process is not without critics, and 
it is perhaps not surprising that the complex 
underpinning legislation is still pending in the 
Parliament of India. It is a brave move, and only 
time will be the judge of its success and value.  
The US military project to record 
biometrics in Iraq and Afghanistan has received 
considerable criticism from human rights 
supporters. Its aim was to record as many 
biometrics as possible from much of the Afghan 
population.  This information was used to try 
to understand the movement and complexity 
of the insurgent networks, but it has also 
become an increasingly valuable tool in the 
workings of the Afghan judicial system and in 
supporting progressive local and national social 
aid programmes.  The biometrics included a full 
set of fingerprints, full face photo and iris scan, 
and were linked to name, address, occupation, 
tribal name and a military grid reference 
for where the individual was processed. A 
subsequent Biometric Enabled Watch List 
(BEWL) collated individuals who had been 
determined to be possible threats and linked 
them to biometrics-enabled intelligence.  These 
so-called battlefield biometrics are a new and 
powerful tool in the war against terrorism, but 
there are also possible societal benefits that may 
emerge.  The argument and balance between 
invasion of privacy and the greater good is 
one that still requires honest and open debate, 
and it is a brave stance to hold to one without 
consideration of the other in our modern world.
CONCLUSION
Identity is a cornerstone of our modern 
society, and its influence as a central tenet 
of our culture is only going to increase. It 
influences our feeling of safety and security, 
and exposes our feelings of vulnerability. Our 
apparent willingness to part with it for the 
latest shiny trinket should be of major concern 
to governments and institutions – once a 
biometric becomes a viable route for identity 
fraud, then the opportunity to recover it 
and secure it becomes exponentially more 
challenging. When this is extrapolated to 
multimodal biometrics then the loss of identity 
into the hands of the fraudster will result in 
serious and possibly irreversible issues for 
law-abiding citizens.  This will encroach into the 
domain of the policymaker, who must balance 
an escalating public demand for security, a 
commercial clamour to provide it, and citizens 
who are willing to relinquish aspects of their 
identity, against a backdrop of criminal potential. 
A focus on the young and the elderly is 
imperative: despite campaigns and warnings, 
they are the most susceptible to criminals 
who target the very essence of who we are 
and see a value in our identity that many do 
not understand.  The expansive ecosystem 
of government, science, justice, industry and 
society must find a way to work together to 
strike a workable balance. Identity, identification 
and the key players who seek to exploit the 
differences between the two will be a vital 
driver in defining and regulating the profile of 
our future society.
IDENTITY IS A CORNERSTONE OF OUR 
MODERN SOCIETY, AND ITS INFLUENCE 
AS A CENTRAL TENET OF OUR CULTURE 
IS ONLY GOING TO INCREASE.
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EMERGING BIOMETRICS  
IN THE COURTROOM
LUCINA HACKMAN, CHRIS RYNN AND HELEN MEADOWS, 
Centre for Anatomy and Human Identification, University of Dundee
n the UK, around 16% of children have 
experienced sexual abuse by 16 years of 
age; of these, 95% are abused by someone 
they know. When an individual is found to 
be in possession of indecent images that include 
instances of the abuse of minors, it is essential to 
identify the perpetrator. In many cases, the images 
will not contain readily identifiable features such as 
the face of the perpetrator. But if the perpetrator’s 
hands or genitalia are captured in the images, new 
research has found that these can support the 
identification process.
In addition to well-established biometrics such 
as the ridge detail of the palmar surfaces of the 
hands (e.g. fingerprints), other anatomical features 
of the hand are widely accepted as commercial 
biometric identifiers that can verify an individual’s 
identity. Such systems utilise fingerprints, palm-
prints and vascular patterns of the hand (see 
Figure 1) to facilitate access to secure facilities 
or bank accounts.  This information might also 
be available to investigators who are trying to 
compare suspects to the perpetrators pictured in 
indecent images.  
When our team from the Centre for Anatomy 
and Human Identification (CAHID) investigated 
the first case of this type in 2007, little research 
had been undertaken into the individuality or 
uniqueness of certain anatomical features, in terms 
of their reliability for forensic human identification. 
But the knowledge gained from centuries of study 
into human anatomy suggested that these features 
were highly variable between individuals.  The 
University of Dundee compiled a database of hand 
images, and subsequent studies have created a 
core of research investigating the use of such data 
in forensic comparison for identification purposes1.  
This facilitated methods to make forensic 
comparisons of anatomical features in suspect 
and offender images, detailing the similarities and 
differences between the image of the offender’s 
hand and images of the suspect’s hands. 
The anatomical information is based on 
compound analysis of multiple features, such as 
scars of accidental origin; knuckle crease patterns 
(see Figure 2); superficial vein patterns (which 
develop during embryological development); as 
well as nail bed morphology and freckle patterns, 
both of which have genetic origins and are also 
influenced by environmental factors. Comparison 
of these features between offender and suspect 
can often provide sufficient information for 
exclusion of identity.
When defendants are confronted with the 
results of these comparisons, more than 80% of 
them change their plea.  This reduces the time 
and money consumed by a lengthy court case 
and, more importantly, negates the requirement 
for vulnerable children to give evidence in court, 
where they would have to face their abuser and 
relive their experiences.
Figure 1:  
Superficial vein 
patterning on 
the dorsum of  
a hand
Figure 2:  
Knuckle  
creases, nail 
bed morpholo-
gy and scars
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CYBERFORENSICS
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Cybercrime costs the UK an estimated £27 billion per year.  The growth in 
internet use, data storage capacity, cloud computing and encryption all pose 
major challenges for cyberforensics. But along with innovations such as block 
chain technology, they also offer opportunities for forensic investigators – if 
they are backed by suitable policy and legal frameworks.
ver the past ten years, the number 
of people connected to the 
internet has grown to 3.2 billion.  
This has enabled a boom in 
cybercrime – a range of activities that exploit 
vulnerabilities in the use of the internet and 
other electronic systems to illicitly access or 
attack information and services used by citizens, 
business and governments.
The global cost of cybercrime is currently 
in excess of $400 billion per year.  The cost of 
cybercrime is difficult to measure, however, in a 
recent report, the cost to the UK of cybercrime 
was estimated to be £27 billion per year1.  The 
growth in cybercrime has led to an increase 
in the volume of data, and the number of 
cyberforensic analyses, involved in investigating 
a case. In addition, the transnational nature of 
the internet can hinder the process of acquiring 
evidence and bringing a criminal to justice. 
Recent prosecutions in the UK and US have 
highlighted the fact that hackers continue to 
target credit card details and intellectual property. 
In September 2015, Vladimir Drinkman, a 34-year-
old hacker who hails from Russia, confessed to 
committing cybercrimes before a New Jersey 
federal court. His felonies, which cost businesses 
hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, involved 
breaching the corporate networks of major 
organizations such as Nasdaq, Dow Jones, 
Heartland Payment Systems, and JetBlue, among 
at least a dozen others, according to the US 
Department of Justice.  The initial entry was often 
gained using an ‘SQL injection attack’, a simple and 
well-documented attack that highlights the poor 
level of security exhibited by most corporate 
organisations when connecting to the internet. 
Other cyberattacks worthy of note include:
•  In September 2015, Apple announced 
that its development environment XCode 
had been subverted to make malicious 
software available from Apple’s App Store. 
Consequently, Apple has had to remove up to 
300 applications from the App Store.
•  In June 2015, the US Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) announced that it had 
been the target of a data breach involving 
the records of as many as 18 million people. 
Information targeted in the breach included 
personally identifiable information such as 
Social Security numbers, as well as names, 
dates, places of birth, and addresses.
•  Silk Road was an online black market launched 
in February 2011, and the first modern ‘dark 
net’ market. In 2013, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) shut down the website and 
arrested Ross William Ulbricht under charges 
of being the site’s pseudonymous founder, 
Dread Pirate Roberts.
Cybercriminals can range from foreign 
intelligence services and large organised 
crime groups, to disreputable (but otherwise 
legitimate) companies and individuals or small 
groups of opportunists. Elements of cybercrime 
include: 
•  Extortion (using techniques such as ‘ransom-
ware’ and ‘denial-of-service’ attacks)
•  Child exploitation, such as sharing and 
producing illegal images (see case study p80)
•  Theft of intellectual property, such as trade 
secrets and patents
•  Copyright infringement, such as illicit file 
sharing and forging of software
•  Malicious misuse (including hacking, worms/
viruses and botnets)
•  Data protection, such as theft of personal data 
and credit card details
The past ten years has also seen the growth 
of the Dark Web – content hosted on ‘dark 
networks’ that require specific software to 
CYBERFORENSICS
75
access, thus concealing it from most internet 
users and enabling anonymous browsing and 
communication.  The Dark Web has become a 
mature supply chain that supports cybercriminal’s 
activities, selling everything that a cybercriminal 
needs to engage in a malicious criminal activity. 
Once successful, the same supply chain allows the 
criminal to sell what they have stolen.  
Meanwhile, the Internet of Things (IoT) is 
expected to reach up to 100 billion objects 
by 20202.  The Internet of Things is the 
network of physical objects embedded with 
electronics, software, sensors, and network 
connectivity, which enable these objects to 
collect and exchange data.  The Internet 
of Things allows objects to be sensed and 
controlled remotely across existing network 
infrastructure, creating opportunities for more 
direct integration between the physical world 
and computer-based systems, and resulting in 
improved efficiency, accuracy and economic 
benefit. From a law enforcement perspective, 
the Internet of Things also offers a rich 
environment within which evidence can be 
gathered and validated.
The growth in cloud computing and cloud 
storage solutions (such as Dropbox, Google 
Drive, Amazon Cloud and iCloud) means 
that users now have the ability to share 
information and access it anywhere at anytime. 
This has opened up another important target 
for evidence gathering, but it also offers a 
useful tool for digital forensics examiners, 
who will be able to send commands through 
a cloud environment to other machines, 
producing faster results with little need to 
travel to the scene of the crime.
THE GROWTH IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING AND CLOUD 
STORAGE SOLUTIONS MEANS
THAT USERS NOW HAVE THE 
ABILITY TO SHARE 
INFORMATION AND ACCESS 
IT ANYWHERE AT ANYTIME. 
 
THE CYBERFORENSIC PROCESS
The standard computer forensic process consists 
of three basic elements (see Figure 1), each of 
which contains their own set of challenges.  The 
role and function of the forensic process is to 
acquire and analyse evidence in such a manner 
that it can be presented in a court of law.  
This means that the judge, jury and barristers 
must be able to understand and interpret the 
evidence, which requires an expert witness to 
educate them while presenting evidence. As the 
complexity of cyberattacks grows, so too does 
the volume of evidence that can be collected in 
relation to a crime.
1. Acquire 
As was seen with the investigation into the 7/7 
bombing in London, the volume of data currently 
required by law enforcement is growing. In fact, 
this problem can now be viewed as a ‘big data’ 
problem. Investigators must copy this data bit 
by bit – a process known as imaging – to show 
that they have not tampered with the evidence.  
Then they store the original evidence under lock 
and key, and work with the copy (also known as 
the forensics image).  
Cybercrime can involve complex supply 
chains spanning the globe (e.g. Silk Road), 
using anonymity technologies (such as Tor 
and the Dark Web) that allow individuals to 
purchase everything from malicious software 
kits to time on a botnet. As people make 
use of digital storage media with ever-larger 
volumes, it takes much more time to create 
a forensically-sound image and perform a 
triage on the data inside.  This is now star ting 
to approach the time available for law 
enforcement officials to hold a suspect before 
charging them.  The growth in the number 
of devices that make up the IoT (including 
smart meters, smart grids and industrial 
ACQUIRE ATTRIBUTE
ANALYSE
Figure 1 – The three elements of cyberforensics
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CRIME
76
process control systems) will pose significant 
challenges for this data acquisition process. 
2. Analyse 
The result of the disclosures made by Edward 
Snowden relating to the level of monitoring 
and surveillance of people’s activities in 
cyberspace has resulted in an increased use of 
cryptographic services.  These services range 
from disk encryption and web browsing to 
mobile chat programs.  The major challenge for 
law enforcement in this area lies in recovering 
the cryptographic keys that keep this data 
secure.  One can now purchase encrypting 
hard drives, smart phones and tablets that make 
it virtually impossible to recover data without 
the presence of the decryption key.
The growth in the use of anonymity services 
to hide ones identity during encrypted browser 
sessions has resulted in the increased need 
for law enforcement to perform ‘live memory’ 
forensics in real time while the machine is 
at the target’s website. With the volume 
of data now available to investigators, the 
time and processing capability required is 
increasing exponentially.  The impact is that law 
enforcement officials need to perform data 
mining on ‘big data’ scales of the order of 100 
billion items.
The transnational nature of cybercrime 
means that various law enforcement agencies, 
both within a country and across geographical 
borders, must share their data or intelligence. 
For example, credit card fraud in one area can 
be used to pay for cybercriminal or terrorist 
activities in another.
The major challenge associated with the 
analysis of forensic evidence relates to the 
identification, collection, acquisition and 
preservation of large volumes of digital 
evidence.  The growth of cloud computing 
and the IoT will only exacerbate this problem.  
The UK’s capability to address this challenge is 
limited to a few academic centres of excellence, 
and no law enforcement agencies currently 
possess this capability.
The growth of encryption technology also 
presents a serious technical challenge, with 
the creation of unbreakable ciphers such as 
AES (256-Bit). Modern USB/Flash technology 
has adopted encryption as a mechanism to 
protect person data.  The placement of such 
technologies within smartphones is now making 
it virtually impossible to recover data. On 25 
September 2014, FBI Director James Comey 
criticised Apple and Google for developing 
smartphone encryption so secure that law 
enforcement officials cannot easily gain access to 
information stored on the devices. He said:
“I am a huge believer in the rule of law, but 
I also believe that no one in this country is 
beyond the law. … What concerns me about 
this is companies marketing something expressly 
to allow people to place themselves beyond the 
law.”
The net effect is that it is getting harder for 
law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
recover digital evidence from encrypted devices. 
3. Attribute
The rising use of technologies such as virtual 
private networks, cryptographic tunneling, 
proxies and anonymity services (such as 
torrents and onion routing) have significantly 
diminished law enforcement’s ability to attribute 
an attack to an individual. Moreover, the very 
definition of cybercrime varies from country 
to country, as does the legislation relating 
to the acquisition and analysis of forensic 
evidence.  The net effect is that the burden 
of proof is different in different countries, and 
the rules of extradition between countries can 
vary. However, there are efforts to harmonise 
legislation on cybercrime, such as the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime3, which entered 
into force for the UK on 1 September 2011.
In 2015, the US government introduced 
an executive order allowing for sanctions 
to be taken against individuals engaged in 
significant malicious cyber-enabled activities.  
This executive order aims to give the US the 
ability to sanction people that are outside its 
jurisdiction, and where the US has little chance 
of extradition, by restricting their resources. 
THE VERY DEFINITION OF CYBERCRIME 
VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO 
COUNTRY, AS DOES THE LEGISLATION 
RELATING TO THE ACQUISITION AND 
ANALYSIS OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE.
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According to the US president, it provides 
his administration with “a targeted tool for 
countering the most significant” threats that 
could be waged against the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  The UK has no such framework 
within which to sanction individuals
STANDARDS
Over the past few years a number of standards 
have emerged in the area of cyberforensics. 
Current guidance from the forensic regulator 
states that:
“The provider of digital forensic science 
(the provider) shall comply with the Codes 
of Practice and Conduct for Forensic Science 
Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal 
Justice System (the Codes) and be accredited to
BS EN ISO/IEC17020:2012 for any crime scene 
activity and BS EN ISO/IEC17025:2005 for any 
laboratory function (such as the recovery or 
imaging of electronic data)”
Standards such as ISO/IEC17020:2005 and 
ISO/IEC17025:2005 provide certification of 
the imaging process, while standards such as 
ISO/IEC27037:2012 focus on the identification, 
collection, acquisition and preservation of 
potential digital evidence. 
However, they fail to address the data 
requirements in relation to:
•  The identification, collection, acquisition and 
preservation of digital evidence located in the 
cloud, the IoT, and social media
•  The presentation of digital evidence in the 
courtroom
FURTHER CHALLENGES IN 
CYBERFORENSICS
In recent years, crime labs have faced criticism 
for a ‘lack of validation’ in a variety of forensics 
disciplines. In January 2015, the US National 
Commission on Forensic Science stated there 
was “a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, 
published studies establishing the scientific 
bases and validity of many forensic methods”4.  
The term “foundation” was used no less than 
thirty times to emphasise that each forensic 
discipline must have a scientifically robust and 
validated basis to its methods, its technologies, 
and its process of interpreting data. 
In April 2015, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) admitted that microscopic 
hair analysis contained errors in at least 90% 
of cases5. Peter Neufeld, Co-Director of the 
Innocence Project, which is affiliated with the 
Cardozo School of Law in New York, stated: 
“While the FBI and DOJ are to be commended 
for bringing these errors to light and notifying 
many of the people adversely affected, this epic 
miscarriage of justice calls for a rigorous review 
to determine how this started almost four 
decades ago and why it took so long to come 
 to light.”
The relatively new discipline of 
cyberforensics certainly needs more 
foundational science. Many question the results 
of initial data-breach investigations for failing 
to identify who or what group was behind 
the crime. After a large data breach, Chief 
Executive Officers grow anxious awaiting an 
accurate attribution, while a news media frenzy 
lowers stock prices and threatens jobs.  The 
recent Sony hacking case, with an indication 
of North Korean state sponsorship, is just one 
prominent example.  
Even more shocking is that some 
traditionalists fail to recognise digital forensics 
as a forensics discipline, leaving computer 
experts out of national committees in this 
important field of criminal justice.  Today, digital 
evidence is often a key factor in many court 
cases, given the proliferation of mobile devices, 
email, text messaging, social media applications 
and digital cameras. Staying ahead of the cyber 
technology curve is an important issue for any 
forensics professional: high-tech apparatus is 
used in all the forensics disciplines and requires 
data-centric security and integrity to properly 
interpret results. 
Yet one should question whether computer 
forensics has really progressed much since the 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE IS OFTEN A KEY FACTOR IN MANY COURT 
CASES, GIVEN THE PROLIFERATION OF MOBILE DEVICES, EMAIL, TEXT 
MESSAGING, SOCIAL MEDIA APPLICATIONS AND DIGITAL CAMERAS.
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Yet one should question whether computer 
forensics has really progressed much since the 
late 1990s in terms its foundational approaches 
and techniques.  There have undoubtedly been 
advances in areas such as triage approaches, 
mobile devices, write-blocking, enterprise 
forensics to minimize human travel, and internet 
evidence-finding tools. But producing case results 
is still very time intensive, with few mathematical 
techniques being deployed to aid in accuracy 
and timeliness.  
First responders still spend a significant 
amount of time ‘bagging and tagging’ digital media 
and making bit-by-bit image copies.  Then they 
verify this copy through the use of ‘hash values’ – 
a unique number that changes if the evidence is 
tampered with – to show they are exact replicas. 
Given this backdrop, what is the next trend that 
will modernise cyberforensics? 
BLOCK CHAIN TECHNOLOGY
A block chain is a type of database that gathers 
data into blocks, and then uses cryptographic 
signatures to link them together.  This approach 
underlies cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, but 
it is also finding wider use in various financial 
services and other sectors (see Chapter 13 case 
study p148).
Block chain technology has the potential to 
revolutionize cyberforensics, and can be used to 
prove with mathematical certainty the lineage 
of data, chain of custody, and data integrity. 
Permissioned block chain solutions such as 
Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI), which is 
used today for cybersecurity applications, focus 
on data integrity and could allow forensics 
examiners to understand the sequential chain 
of events faster and with more precision when 
conducting forensics analysis. Proof of integrity 
and time from a common block chain (with a 
common clock) enables unified timeline analysis, 
no matter where in the world the data is stored, 
signed and verified by KSI.  This could change the 
primary way that forensics examiners approach 
their data analysis, producing more accurate and 
faster results to help resolve insider data theft or 
Figure 2: Trends in cyberforensics
 TIME POINT DETAILS
2007
Defining Digital 
Forensics
“The application of computer science and investigative procedures for a legal purpose 
involving the analysis of digital evidence after proper search authority, chain of 
custody, validation with mathematics, use of validated tools, repeatability, reporting, 
and possible expert presentation”6
2011
Geo-location and cloud 
forensics
“Examination might require access to computer and network resources involving 
expanded scope that may involve more than one venue and geolocation”7
2012
Cyberforensics 
certification
“Employing forensics professionals that hold the credibility of a globally accepted and 
comprehensive certification … provides a strategic advantage for public and private 
organizations”8
2013
Cloud forensics 
challenges
Outlined in US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cloud 
Computing Forensic Science Challenges9
2014
Hackers at home and 
abroad
Charges against five Chinese military hackers for cyber espionage signal a new era of 
prosecutions by the US Department of Justice for theft of intellectual property data9
2015
Use of block chain 
encryption
Growing recognition of the value that block chain-based technology provides for 
cybersecurity, data validation and digital forensics.
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isolate external threats exfiltrating data. 
The days of spending time making a copy of 
any digital evidence before starting the analysis 
are waning. Faster and more accurate methods 
are now available which include fault-tolerant 
and anti-tamper features. KSI offers both of these 
benefits to preserve important digital evidence. 
In today’s digital forensics lab, only one 
machine calculates the validation hash; but in 
the future, one could use pre-case forensic-
ready data systems to compute and assign hash 
values to all data in the system. Not only could 
a system have a digital fingerprint for each data 
object or file, it could also have a timestamp 
with each item afforded a Keyless Signature. 
Keyless Signatures are small and compact (about 
2kB), and are portable and can be imprinted 
with the data or stored separately. With KSI’s 
common clock, one could understand the chain 
of events better when conducting the forensics 
analysis – especially when trying to reassemble 
system contexts across multiple geographies.  
This supports the mutual auditability of forensic 
investigations, ensuring that all e-discovery efforts 
are immutable preserved against evidentiary 
items.  
Guardtime’s global KSI system is currently 
operational in partnership with Ericsson, one of 
the world’s largest telecommunication service 
providers.  The healthcare industry and the 
energy sector are also showing interest in this 
technology; and the transportation industry 
(with automobiles, airplanes, ships, and trains 
connected to the internet) has similar data-
centric security and safety concerns. 
Guardtime plans to have global scale 
cybersecurity and forensics services, and is 
working with a major telecommunications 
company to build a global infrastructure for 
clients to create pre-case hash values with 
Keyless Signatures.  This data centric security 
system uses Guardtime’s permissioned-based 
block chain and fault tolerant techniques to 
ensure the validation of the original files.  
This technique does not require a client to 
share the content of the files – they only need 
to use the algorithm to create the hash token. 
From a cybersecurity standpoint, it can also be 
used to ensure certain files were not changed or 
deleted, and that no data was added to a volume 
without following an agreed rule set. 
This may help to create a Criminal Justice 
System with more transparency of their chain 
of custody.  There is public demand for more 
transparency regarding police arrests, and for 
conclusive results in high-profile data breach 
cases. More modernisation that builds on the 
progress of the past decade (see Figure 2) to 
include industrial block chain encryption could 
cause a leap forward.
CONCLUSION
The challenges facing cyberforensics are 
substantial and require solutions at the technical, 
legal and policy levels.  The explosion in the 
volume of data and data types that are now 
available to the forensic analyst poses major 
technical challenges, and there are still problems 
to solve in acquiring data from some devices 
(e.g. IoT), partly due to the volatile nature of 
data on such systems. 
Innovations such as block chain technology 
can help to meet some of these challenges. But 
legal frameworks across the world are struggling 
to cope with the internet, because it recognises 
no geographical boundaries. Although recent 
court cases have seen the US government 
attempt to impose its legal framework on all 
servers owned by US companies, even if located 
outside of the US, the Supreme Court has 
yet to give its final ruling. What is clear is that 
international leadership is required to create 
international conventions and legal frameworks 
(such as the law of the sea) that will facilitate the 
detection and prosecution of cybercrime. 
INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
IS REQUIRED TO CREATE 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS THAT WILL 
FACILITATE THE DETECTION AND 
PROSECUTION OF CYBERCRIME.
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CASE STUDY
CHILD ABUSE IMAGE DATABASE 
ad, Home Office
he Child Abuse Image Database 
(CAID) is a national UK policing 
system that supports law 
enforcement in the pursuit of 
offenders involved in the sexual exploitation 
of children, and in seeking to safeguard the 
victims of this crime.  The Prime Minister 
announced the creation of CAID at the 
WePROTECT Summit at Downing Street in 
December 2014. 
Acting on intelligence received, the police 
enter a suspect’s premises and seize digital 
devices that may contain illegal images and 
video. Collectively, the devices seized in a 
single case can hold terabytes of data – the 
task of searching for illegal abusive material, 
and the evidence that will help to identify 
victims, is daunting. CAID’s database of illegal 
image signatures can quickly help investigators 
determine which devices are suspect and 
should be seized for detailed investigation.
In order to bring a successful prosecution 
for making, possessing or distributing abusive 
images, the police investigator must present 
evidence to the court about the quantity 
and severity of the images discovered in 
the suspect’s possession, because this will 
significantly affect the sentence in the event 
of a guilty verdict.  To achieve this, the 
investigator must sift through many thousands 
of images in order to categorise them.  This is 
both stressful and extremely time consuming. 
CAID is able to significantly reduce the stress 
and workload placed on investigators by using 
its database of known abusive images to pre-
categorise the contents of the seized devices 
following the original triage.  The investigator 
can quickly divide the thousands of image 
files into three groups: known illegal images; 
known legal images; and unknown images.  The 
pre-categorised images found by comparison 
with the CAID dataset may be sufficient in 
themselves to bring a prosecution, thus saving 
police time and bringing offenders to justice 
more promptly. More importantly, the saving 
in police time allows them to place greater 
focus on the search for previously unknown 
victims depicted in the abusive images seized.
Confidence in the quality of the CAID 
dataset, both by the police and the courts, is 
absolutely critical to success. An officer must 
be sure that an image presented as evidence 
meets the legal criteria regarding both the age 
of the child and the activity depicted, which 
can be extremely subjective in some instances. 
Therefore CAID has incorporated a voting 
system for the categorisation of abusive 
images, which requires an image to receive 
three votes in agreement from different 
police forces before it is given a confirmed 
categorisation.
The search for victims passes through two 
stages.  The offender may also be a contact 
abuser, in which case it is vital to identify any 
images which may have been taken using 
the offender’s own camera or in premises 
available to the offender.  The local element 
of CAID provides the investigator with image 
matching and analysis technology that enables 
them to make a rapid risk assessment. If the 
investigator determines that there are no 
local victims depicted, then the images can 
be uploaded to the CAID national database 
and made immediately available to regional 
and national victim identification specialists 
for investigation using CAID’s powerful image 
analysis tools. Speed is of the essence in 
the field of victim identification, and CAID 
delivers the means of rapidly sharing images 
and related intelligence with the officers best 
equipped to tackle this form of crime.
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CHAPTER 8
THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
TIM WILSON, 
Northumbria Centre 
for Evidence and 
Criminal Justice Studies, 
Northumbria University
Rising cross-border crime demands greater international criminal justice 
cooperation.  This presents challenges and opportunities for forensic 
science – which include developing common standards for procedures, 
measurements and databases – to facilitate the efficient sharing of evidence 
and information.  The principle issue for decision-makers is to ensure that 
UK scientists and technologists can fully participate in shaping the global 
future of forensic science. 
ncreased cross-border crime is an 
aspect of global change that affects 
everyday life.  This is par ticularly true 
of cyber and financial crime, but many 
other crimes can have an international 
dimension.  The British diaspora is now 
as large as about 10% of the UK resident 
population2, which means that forensic 
evidence or information is increasingly 
received from foreign legal systems, in 
connection with crimes, accidents and natural 
disasters involving Britons.
The ethical and pragmatic reasons for 
par ticipating in international criminal justice 
cooperation can be seen in the development 
of UK law and policy on extradition from the 
19th century onwards. In contrast to many 
other jurisdictions, British citizens were not 
allowed to hide behind its borders to evade 
justice for crimes committed abroad.  The 
rationale for this approach was restated in 
the Scott Baker Review of Extradition3:
“Extradition operates on the basis of 
mutual benefit and obligations. Given the 
ease of movement of people throughout 
the world, the United Kingdom needs the 
help of the international community to fight 
serious crime within its borders, just as much 
as other states need the assistance of the 
United Kingdom to deal with crime affecting 
their interests.”
Such cooperation is not simply a matter 
of mutual advantage.  The deontological 
and retributive (legal, moral and social) 
significance of the criminal law gives rise to 
an obligation to assist in the investigation of 
crimes committed by British citizens abroad, 
and in effor ts to bring them to account. 
As such, forensic science is an increasingly 
international exercise.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COOPERATION 
The internationalisation of crime takes 
several forms: 
1  Transnational offending: criminal conduct 
by an individual in a country that is not their 
country of birth. All the forensic science 
evidence will be recovered in the country 
where the offence or disaster took place, 
but forensically-acquired information (e.g. 
DNA profiles and fingerprints) may be 
available in other jurisdictions.  These will 
usually be obtained through cooperation 
between national police forces, directly 
assisted in a minority of cases by either 
Europol or Interpol, but invariably using secure 
communication channels provided by those 
organisations.
2  Transnational crime: an offence where the 
judicially-relevant locations (e.g. crime scenes) 
are in more than one country. International 
cooperation in such cases is likely to also 
involve judicial officials (e.g. prosecutors, 
investigating magistrates and extradition 
judges) and in some cases this may be 
facilitated through Europol and Eurojust.  
There will be similar judicial involvement 
(e.g. coroners, in England and Wales) in the 
identification and repatriation of the dead 
following a natural disaster. 
3  International crime: an offence that may 
have been committed in one country, from 
which the forensic science evidence must be 
obtained, but which can only be prosecuted 
elsewhere (e.g. crimes by a state against 
its own citizens, which are triable at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)).
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With the increase in international criminal justice 
cooperation, it has become more important 
to standardise how information is collected, 
analysed, stored and exchanged. Greater cost-
effectiveness and enhanced legal clarity are 
also essential when information and evidence 
crosses borders. For example, highly-standardised 
information that is already held on police forensic 
biometric databases (such as fingerprints and 
DNA profiles) can be exchanged quickly and at 
comparatively little additional cost.
Even when an alleged offence has no 
connection with the UK’s jurisdiction, UK 
forensic scientists and clinicians may still be 
commissioned to analyse evidence or review 
the work of other scientists.  This might be due 
to the reputational standing of UK experts, or it 
may reflect global shortages in disciplines such 
as forensic pathology4. Indeed, no country will 
necessarily have sufficient expertise to deal with 
the consequences of major natural disasters or 
terrorist incidents on the scale of 9/11 without 
international assistance.
UK forensic science makes important 
contributions to international resilience.  This 
was demonstrated, for example, during the 
last stage of the Flight MH17 disaster victim 
identification (DVI) work (see case study 
p90). Scientists from LGC Forensics were 
called in, alongside colleagues from Bode 
Cellmark Forensics (USA) and the International 
Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), to help 
the Netherlands Forensics Institute to accelerate 
the final DNA analyses of the victims’ remains5.  
This activity also illustrates how international 
requirements have taken the forensic use of 
DNA beyond its origins in civil or administrative 
paternity disputes and the investigation of 
traditional crimes.  The 50,000 bone samples 
and 30,000 unidentified human remains tested 
to date by, respectively, the ICMP and Bode 
Cellmark Forensics indicates the scale of activity.  
This exceeds the amount of DNA analysis ever 
performed in several EU countries for criminal 
justice purposes.
Forensic science expertise need not be 
confined to a reactive role. Knowledge and skills 
acquired in responding to past crimes can be 
utilised to prevent crime or make communities 
more secure. For instance, Swedish document 
examiners (who are experts in identifying and 
giving evidence about documents that have 
been forged or tampered with) assisted the 
Swedish government with the design of new 
passports and national identity cards.  Their 
detailed knowledge of how criminals have 
created counterfeit documents, or altered 
genuine documents, was used to create a new 
set of identity documents with greatly enhanced 
security features.  This not only contributes to 
Sweden’s security – it enhances global security, 
especially relating to international travel.
The nature of the legal framework for 
cooperation is a key factor in determining 
its cost.  The EU legal instruments for 
international cooperation between member 
states (and Schengen Area countries such as 
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) are, in the 
view of experienced lawyers working in this 
field, “infinitely more efficient” than bilateral 
arrangements.  The latter are “cumbersome, 
subject to local variation, and often inconsistent; 
all of which inevitably causes delay and 
confusion”6.  The Lyon-Roma Group within the 
G7 may sometimes provide a suitable forum for 
creating alternative modes of cooperation using 
Interpol secure communication channels with 
Canada, Japan and the USA7.  The most valuable 
G7 contribution to international forensic science 
capability, however, was its decision in 1996 to 
create the ICMP to identify missing persons 
from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.  This 
decision funded the creation of the specialist 
DNA expertise needed to develop highly 
reliable DNA analysis techniques and skills for 
DVI purposes, particularly from bone8. 
The US Government has made a crucial 
unilateral contribution to international 
cooperation, through the free provision of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s CODIS software. 
CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) is used 
in over 50 countries to identify matches among 
DNA profiles, including during the international 
exchange of DNA data9.
Over the past two decades, major scientific 
and technological advances such as ten-print 
fingerprint scanning, automated DNA and 
UK FORENSIC SCIENCE MAKES 
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
INTERNATIONAL RESILIENCE.
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fingerprint comparisons, and mobile access 
to databases have made the initial stages of 
international criminal justice cooperation 
significantly faster and more efficient. But costs 
will rise and delays are bound to occur – as they 
do in national investigations – when forensic-
science-derived information is assimilated and 
appraised with other information in a case; 
and when there is formal procuratorial or 
judicial international cooperation, particularly 
if extradition is required. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that international cooperation is 
predominantly focused on “preventing and 
combating organised crime, terrorism and other 
forms of serious crime”10.  This is also reflected in 
the operation of the EU (‘Prüm’) arrangements 
for the systematic exchange of forensic 
biometric data11.
THE SCALE AND NATURE OF 
TRASNATIONAL OFFENDING AND 
CRIMES
Although the internationalisation of crime may 
increasingly affect UK society, overall crime 
rates in this country continue to fall.  The 
most reliable data source, the Crime Survey 
for England and Wales, last year contained the 
lowest estimate since it began in 1981 (ref. 12).
Increased movement and migration does 
not appear to have had a major impact on 
criminal demographics, and the number of 
first-time entrants dealt with by English and 
Welsh criminal justice agencies has halved since 
2007. Where data does exist, crime by EU 
offenders in member states other than their 
own may be much lower than the proportion 
of such people within the resident population 
(approximately 4% of total crime in the Czech 
Republic; 3% in Italy, Germany and Denmark; 
2.5% in the Netherlands; 1.5% in Slovakia; and 
less than 1% in Austria and Poland)13, 14. 
There are no comparable national statistics 
for England and Wales, but the most recent 
analysis of available data reveals a picture 
consistent with the pattern elsewhere: offending 
by the citizens of other EU countries is chiefly 
relatively low-level acquisitive crime, particularly 
theft from shops. Overall, they account for 
some 1% of prosecuted offences in the UK 
(significantly lower than the proportion of such 
residents in the UK population) and appears to 
be concentrated geographically in the south-
east, eastern counties and Cumbria, rather than 
dispersed nationally14. 
Knowledge of these outcomes and trends 
help to frame our general understanding of the 
criminological impact of globalisation.  They do 
not, however, indicate the scale of the challenge 
to the Criminal Justice System created by a 
significant number of extra offences, some of 
which will be serious, and potential suspects. Bail 
and sentencing decisions – in addition to the 
conduct of investigations – require information 
about criminal careers and real-world identity 
that can only be obtained through cooperation 
with other jurisdictions. London exemplifies the 
increasing internationalisation of British policing. 
Foreign-born people (not just from the EU) 
comprised 37% of the population of central 
London and 33% of the outer boroughs in 2013 
(ref. 15), with foreign citizens accounting for 
25-30% of arrests16 and an estimated 25% of 
high-harm offenders (including organised crime 
group members and predatory sex offenders)17. 
In many investigations, sharing forensic biometric 
data will be either the only or the most efficient 
means of obtaining indispensable information. 
Experience in the Netherlands demonstrates 
how the exchange of DNA data has provided 
potential investigative leads and unlocked access 
to criminal back histories (see Table 1).
A match between anonymous profiles 
recovered from crime scenes in one or 
more countries may have considerable value 
if analysts can link such information with 
other crimes.  This may eventually lead to the 
identification of a possible suspect. 
The international exchange of DNA data 
and fingerprints can additionally identify trends 
and spatial features in cross-border crime and 
THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF DNA DATA AND FINGERPRINTS 
CAN ADDITIONALLY IDENTIFY TRENDS AND SPATIAL FEATURES IN 
CROSS-BORDER CRIME AND OFFENDING. 
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Table 1: Transnational crime and DNA identifications in the Netherlands (at February 2015)18
DUTCH DATABASE  
(PROFILE TYPE MATCHED)
OTHER MEMBER STATE 
DATABASES  
(PROFILE TYPE MATCHED)
NUMBER OF MATCHES 
REPORTED TO DUTCH 
PROSECUTORS AND POLICE
Anonymous profile  
(trace) recovered  
from a crime scene
The profile of a  
known person
3,100
Anonymous profile  
(trace) recovered  
from a crime scene
Anonymous profile  
(trace) recovered  
from a crime scene
2,326
The profile of a 
 known person
Anonymous profile  
(trace) recovered  
from a crime scene
836
 The profile of a  
known person
The profile of a  
known person
971
offending. Used in this way, forensic science 
data analysis can also be used to inform crime 
prevention strategies at a sub-regional level. For 
example, the initial exchanges of DNA data 
between Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
have shown that although all Belgian judicial 
districts have cases with an international 
dimension, some general trends can be 
discerned (see Figure 1). For instance, matches 
with France seem to have a greater affinity 
for southern districts than matches with the 
Netherlands. Nationality cannot be inferred from 
the database from which the Belgian matches 
came, but there may be some correlation 
between the source of matches and the linguistic 
regions. Generally, criminals travelling north may 
go further when committing crimes than offenders 
who have arrived in Belgium from the north.  These 
considerations are unlikely, however, to explain the 
concentration of international offending in two 
regions (Antwerp and Limburg).  There, different 
levels and forms of economic activity may operate 
as pull factors. If so, such considerations may need 
to be covered in the international aspects of crime 
prevention strategies in those areas.
Such analytical techniques will become even 
more powerful with the help of technological 
platforms that integrate different types of forensic 
information.  These might make use of knowledge 
gained from human biological traces, the chemical 
identification of illicit drugs and large amounts 
of digital evidence. Meanwhile, the exchange of 
Figure 1:  These maps of Belgium show the number and distribution of criminal cases associated with 
matches (sometimes multiple matches in a single case) between DNA profiles held on the Dutch (left) 
and French (right) databases with DNA profiles on the Belgian database19. 
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ten-prints can rapidly identify serial offenders 
engaged in cross-border crime who have been 
arrested elsewhere.
IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL 
USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
The difference between scientific and legal 
cultures can be a stumbling block for the 
efficient use of forensic evidence, and this will 
vary between jurisdictions. UK scientists and 
informed commentators, including the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, have complained about a generally 
low level of scientific knowledge among lawyers 
and judges20. But there is evidence that legal 
and scientific thinking is converging.  The courts, 
particularly the Court of Appeal and the Privy 
Council, are becoming increasingly confident and 
better informed in handling complex scientific 
questions21.
Internationally, though, such convergence 
may be less advanced in some countries, and 
can be hampered by the disparate procedures 
and expectations of both lawyers and 
scientists. In addition, scientists have sometimes 
reinforced the barriers to efficient and reliable 
communication between jurisdictions by 
adopting different standards and analytical 
processes, for example.  This happened with 
DNA multiplexes, designed to assay sets of 
genetic markers – known as loci – to ascribe 
with a high level of confidence unique identity to
individuals. Earlier tests in countries such as the 
UK, other EU member states, the US and China 
often used different markers in their analyses, 
and moving towards common international 
standards has been time-consuming and 
expensive.  This has now been largely resolved, 
however, and the loci used by these countries 
increasingly overlap (see Table 2).  This will result 
in major time and cost savings by avoiding the 
need for confirmatory retesting in order to 
have confidence in matches between national 
databases using different multiplexes. 
This convergence has also offered greater 
discriminating power as national databases grew 
larger, and increased the sensitivity of DNA 
analyses.  These developments have enhanced 
the value of forensic science for justice, but 
the increased sensitivity has also intensified the 
challenges of forensic science. For example, 
scientists now need to use enhanced anti-
contamination measures, and their reports 
need to be carefully scrutinised, because greater 
sensitivity could increase the identification of 
DNA traces that have been indirectly transferred 
to the crime scene from persons unconnected 
with the offence.
The development of DNA multiplexes with 
more overlapping loci is an example of how 
the international exchange of evidence or 
information provided by forensic science may 
bring additional urgency to research. But there 
are many other areas where collaboration and 
funding are likely to be concentrated in the 
continuing quest for global best practice.  
1  Human cognition explains the risks from 
cognitive bias (see Chapter 4). Different 
countries have responded to this issue in 
various ways, ranging from guidance about 
cognitive bias issued by the Forensic Science 
Regulator22, to the introduction of ‘contrarian 
thinking’ (almost a process of peer review) 
within Dutch police procedures for the 
investigation of complex and high-impact 
crimes23.  The effectiveness of different 
approaches should be carefully researched 
and the results shared internationally in order 
to identify global best practice.
2  Technological platforms for integrated 
forensic information. In several countries, 
 work is being undertaken to develop 
platforms for the integrated analysis of 
forensic information. Such a system might 
make use of knowledge gained from human 
biological traces, the chemical identification 
of illicit drugs and large amounts of digital 
evidence24. When such platforms become 
fully operational, forensic science institutions 
are likely to become involved in initiating 
and managing individual investigations, and 
perhaps even the more general prioritisation 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC 
AND LEGAL CULTURES CAN BE A 
STUMBLING BLOCK FOR THE EFFICIENT 
USE OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE, AND THIS 
WILL VARY BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS. 
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Table 2:  The international convergence of DNA multiplexes
YEAR MULTIPLEX NUMBER OF 
MARKERS
OVERLAP WITH UK 
MULTIPLEX AT THAT TIME
OVERLAP 
WITH USA 
MULTIPLEX AT 
THAT TIME
OVERLAP 
WITH CHINA 
MULTIPLEX AT 
THAT TIMEENGLAND 
AND WALES
SCOTLAND
1995 UK SGM 7 N/A N/A N/A
1998 USA ORIGINAL CODIS 13 6 N/A N/A
1999 UK SGM+ 11 N/A 8 N/A
2010 CHINA SINOFILER 15 9 11 N/A
2014 UK (ENGLAND AND WALES) DNA-17 17 N/A 11 8 10
2015 UK (SCOTLAND) DNA-24 24 17 N/A 13 14
2017  USA CODIS CORE LOCI 20 15 20 N/A 14
of non-scientific criminal justice resources.  
The automatic processing of combinations 
of data in this way will also severely test the 
adaptability and resilience of data protection 
regulations and the ability to adequately 
address ethical issues (see Chapter 9 case 
study p100). In this respect, England and 
Wales offers a global template for national 
governance, with the appointment of the 
Forensic Biometrics Commissioner and the 
National DNA Database’s independent 
Ethics Group, in addition to the Information 
Commissioner or equivalent data supervisors 
who are to be found in all EU and Prüm 
member states.
3  Individualisation. One of the major 
challenges faced globally in forensic science 
research includes the development of 
statistical models for the assessment of 
fingerprint comparisons, and in translating the 
results of such research to crime scene and 
courtroom. Indeed, some of the strongest 
criticism in the US National Academy 
of Sciences’ 2009 report ‘Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A 
Path Forward’25 was directed at fingerprint 
analysis. Since then, however, there have been 
advances in the measurement of the accuracy, 
reliability, repeatability and reproducibility of 
the conclusions offered by fingerprint experts26. 
Similarly, higher-resolution CCTV images are 
enabling the standardisation of facial recognition 
information, which is emerging as an equally 
important priority for multi-national research: for 
example, in a project involving forensic scientists 
from the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland 
that is investigating the calculation of likelihood 
ratios when using such images27. 
4  Human and microbial genetics. It is likely 
that forensic genetic analyses will continue to 
consume a large proportion of forensic science 
research and operational budgets, and pose 
new ethical and probative challenges.  The global 
forecast for the biometrics market – including 
commercial and security applications, as well as 
criminal justice – is an estimated growth from $8.7 
billion in 2013 to nearly $27.5 billion by 2019, 
but many of the new applications arriving on this 
market have been criticised as being based on 
“minimal scientific grounding”28. Faced with such 
multi-national market pressures, there should be 
more international collaboration in determining 
research priorities, and a greater sharing of the 
research burden. Significant local or regional 
socio-economic factors will, however, continue 
to shape distinctively national scientific priorities. 
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For example, China has more drowning deaths 
than anywhere else in the world29, and it is the 
leading cause of accidental death for children 
under the age of 14 (ref. 30). China’s scientists, 
therefore, have a major incentive for improving 
the reliability of techniques for the diagnosis 
of drowning. For deaths associated with water, 
pathologists often face a difficult diagnostic 
challenge in distinguishing accidents from those 
attributable to suspicious causes. One promising 
initiative is the development of in China of new 
DNA barcoding techniques for the detection 
and analysis of microscopic algae found in the 
victim’s body31. Success in this work would be 
of great value globally, contributing to accident 
prevention as well criminal justice.
5  Standardisation of evidential reporting, 
laboratory processes and governance 
(including data protection). Standardisation 
should not only apply to the methods used in 
the forensic laboratory; it is equally applicable 
to the governance of the institutions in which 
the work takes place, and how the use of data 
is regulated.  The Prüm biometric exchange 
arrangements require that all participating 
countries only exchange DNA and fingerprint 
data that is produced in units accredited 
to EN ISO/IEC 17025 (ref. 32). All Prüm 
participating states must also observe specified 
data protection principles.  The international 
exchange of forensic biometric data must be 
authorised under a national law that provides 
a means for citizens to check the lawfulness 
of the processing of their data, the recording 
of data exchanges, and random compliance 
checks by national supervisory bodies.  These 
data protection arrangements have to be in 
place before the exchange of data (other than 
for pilot testing) may commence33.
The demands on forensic scientists or 
clinicians also vary between countries 
depending on whether their judicial systems 
are inquisitorial (a continuing investigation, with 
the trial as a public verification of its findings) 
or adversarial (in which parties set out two 
conflicting sets of arguments). For example, an 
adversarial system traditionally confers a more 
proactive role on such expert witnesses. 
But criminal law is evolving in such a way 
that the distinctions between adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems are less clear cut, and 
standardised scientific expertise is becoming 
more portable across international borders. 
Under either system, the accused should know 
the nature of the forensic evidence to be 
brought by the prosecution, receive effective 
advice about its likely validity and how it 
might be challenged, and be told about any 
alternative views on what it might signify. In 
recent years, however, these principles have 
been reinforced in the European Union by 
directives to improve defence rights.  The UK 
government has, with the exception of the 
Legal Aid Directive, opted into these measures, 
which include the timely disclosure of the case 
against a suspect and the right of access to 
legal advice34.
These changes have come at a time when 
professional outlooks in both the scientific and 
legal communities have undergone remarkable 
progress.  This is partly a result of the testing 
of the epistemological foundations of DNA 
evidence.  This legal scrutiny has transformed 
the notion of transparency in forensic science, 
achieving a high level of consensus about the 
need for “clarity about how the probative value 
of the evidence is derived from recognised 
scientific procedures”35.  This change in how 
scientific evidence is regarded also reflects 
the influence of Case Assessment and 
Interpretation (CAI) that was pioneered by 
the former Forensic Science Service36, and the 
traditional disclosure duties on the prosecution 
under English law37.
The effects of these trends could be seen 
at the most recent European forensic science 
meeting, the 7th European Academy of 
Forensic Science triennial conference, held in 
September 2015. Events at that conference 
included debate about proposals for a pan-
European initiative for standardising scientific 
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES WILL 
BECOME EVEN MORE POWERFUL  
WITH THE HELP OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
PLATFORMS THAT INTEGRATE 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF FORENSIC 
INFORMATION. 
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Table 3:  The evolution of admissibility rules
Frye (1923)39 (still binding in many 
US state jurisdictions)
Daubert (1993)40 and the US Federal 
Rules of Evidence
Reliability limb of the common 
law admissibility test, informed 
by Criminal Procedure Rules and 
related Criminal Practice Direction 
in England and Wales (2014)
Has the underlying scientific principle 
gained general acceptance in the 
relevant scientific community?
Is the underlying reasoning or 
methodology scientifically valid and can 
it properly be applied to the facts?
Is there a sufficiently reliable scientific 
basis for the evidence to be admitted? 
Can the underlying theory or technique 
be tested and has it been tested?
 Has the underling theory or technique 
been subjected to peer review and 
publication in refereed journals?
Whether material on which the opinion 
is based has been reviewed by others 
(e.g. peer reviewed) and, if so, what the 
views of those others were
Has the underlying theory or technique 
attracted widespread support in a 
relevant scientific community or 
communities?
If there is a range of expert opinion in 
relation to the relevant matter, where 
the expert’s opinion lies and whether 
the expert has properly explained his 
or her preference
Whether the expert’s methods 
followed established practice and, if not, 
whether the expert properly explained 
the reason for divergence
 Known or potential error rate and the 
existence and maintenance of standards
The extent and quality of the data on 
which the opinion based and the validity 
of methods that were used to obtain it 
Whether the opinion takes account of 
matters such as the degree of precision 
or the margin of uncertainty (where it 
relies on the results of methods such as 
tests or measurements). 
Whether the opinion properly explains 
how safe or unsafe an inference from 
findings on which it relies is (if it relies 
on such an inference)
Whether the information which was 
available to the expert was complete 
and whether the expert took all 
relevant information into account
The extent to which the opinion is 
based on material which falls outside the 
expert’s field of expertise
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CRIME
90
CASE STUDY
O
DISASTER VICTIM  
IDENTIFICATION: MH17
JEN WILLIAMS, National Civil Contingencies and Disaster Victim Identification Coordinator, National Police Chiefs 
Council (NPCC)
n 17 July 2014, a passenger plane 
from Malaysian Airlines MH17 was 
shot down over eastern Ukraine 
by a missile.  The flight was from 
Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur and there were 
298 people on board. 
The bodies landed in Shakhtarsk Region in a 
war zone with the area controlled by a militia of 
pro-Russian rebels. Human remains and debris 
were spread over 34 square kilometres. Access 
was restricted and controlled by the rebels, 
and the human remains were collected by local 
farmers and miners. Of the 298 people killed in 
this incident, 283 were passengers and 15 were 
crew members.  The nationalities encompassed 
10 different countries with the majority being 
from the Netherlands (193).  Ten passengers 
were travelling on a British passport; 6 people 
under the age of 21 were British dual nationals 
travelling on their other passport.
The initial proposal was for the victims’ 
remains to be taken by train to Kharkiv, a 
city controlled by Ukrainian authorities, for 
the identification process. Following political 
negotiations it was agreed that the bodies 
would be flown to the Netherlands for the 
identification processes.  The first remains arrived 
in Kharkiv on 22 July, and the first flight to the 
Netherlands took place on 23 July.  This was 
unusual, as recovery and identification would 
normally take place in the country where the 
incident occurred. However, the Netherlands 
is respected for its disaster victim identification 
(DVI) and is a member of the Interpol DVI 
Steering Group.  
When UK citizens are killed abroad in 
suspicious circumstances and the remains 
returned to England or Wales, a coroner’s 
investigation must be held.  Therefore it is 
important that the investigation into the identity 
of the victims, and how, where and when they 
died, meets the Interpol identification standards 
and provides the additional required information. 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have other rules, 
although the integrity of the investigation is 
equally important. 
Interpol identification standards require 
scientific identification by one of the primary 
identifiers: odontology, ridgeology (fingerprints 
and footprints) and DNA. DVI itself involves 
matching ante mortem samples with post 
mortem samples to provide a conclusive 
identification.  This means working with the 
family of the deceased to identify sources for 
primary identifiers from the family, home and 
medical sources such as dentists and doctors.
The Dutch lead for the identification 
processes invited colleagues from the Interpol 
DVI Steering Group to assist with the 
management of the operation.  The UK provided 
a DVI manager; a team for the mortuary 
that included an odontologist, a CT scanner 
and radiography expertise; and a team for 
reconciliation and identification files. Forensic and 
intelligence collection within the UK and 3 other 
countries (Netherlands, New Zealand and South 
Africa) provided the ante mortem samples for 
the British Nationals.
The challenge was immense, due to both the 
collection methods and the disruption to the 
bodies, some of which were mere fragments. 
Victims were identified by odontology (119), 
fingerprints (64) and DNA (130), with some 
having more than one primary identifier. 
Secondary and supporting evidence was also 
sought in each case.  There were 730 initial 
post mortems, which increased to over 5000 
after DNA investigations on co-mingled human 
remains.  To date, 296 of 298 victims have been 
identified, and after the process was extended 
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to try to find remains for the final 2 victims it 
was finally closed at the end of August 2015.  
In order to improve future international 
DVI investigations, the Interpol DVI Steering 
Group has been working to provide 
standardised practices and has recently 
reviewed both the Interpol DVI forms and 
guidance to simplify the DVI process.  The UK 
has designed recovery booklets to assist with 
a coordinated recovery process, and these 
have now been endorsed by Interpol.  The 
European Police College (CEPOL) is creating 
a DVI training course, supported by the 
Interpol DVI Steering Group, to standardise 
processes across EU member states and 
support international interoperability. 
INTERPOL IDENTIFICATION 
STANDARDS REQUIRE 
SCIENTIFIC IDENTIFICATION 
BY ONE OF THE PRIMARY 
IDENTIFIERS: ODONTOLOGY, 
RIDGEOLOGY 
(FINGERPRINTS AND 
FOOTPRINTS) AND DNA. 
DVI ITSELF INVOLVES 
MATCHING ANTE MORTEM 
SAMPLES WITH POST 
MORTEM SAMPLES TO 
PROVIDE A CONCLUSIVE 
IDENTIFICATION.
practice in all key subject areas, thus improving 
the ability of judges and prosecutors to assess 
the probative value of scientific evidence; and 
training for forensic scientists, irrespective 
of procedural differences between their 
jurisdictions, in evaluative reporting.
A principle of English law that has been 
developing in recent years is that forensic 
science evidence may not be admitted if it is 
not sufficiently reliable to be put before a jury. 
Until recently, however, the English threshold 
for accepting scientific evidence was low 
compared with US criminal procedure based 
on the Daubert decision and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. Last year, the Court of 
Appeal indicated that following changes in the 
Criminal Procedure Rules, “a new and more 
rigorous approach on the part of advocates 
and the courts to the handling of expert 
evidence must be adopted”38.  The evolution 
of admissibility rules in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence is summarised in Table 3.
With the 2014 rule changes, the English 
judiciary has attempted to achieve a new 
balance in the admission of scientific evidence.  
This is intended to combine a more rigorous 
or critical approach by advocates and the 
courts to such evidence38, with continued 
access to “the advantages to be gained 
from new techniques and new advances in 
science”41.  The reforms are being supported 
by training organised by the Advocacy Training 
Council (ATC) “to support advocates in 
making an informed assessment as to the 
reliability of experts”42.
Yet when viewed in the light of international 
perspectives, two questions arise. First, the 
promising dialogue now seen in this country 
between law and science – with senior judges 
attending a recent Royal Society meeting (see 
Chapter 1 case study p20) – is personal and 
has not been institutionalised. For example, 
there is no formal link between the Forensic 
Science Regulator and the judicial rule-making 
bodies. A substantial risk of errors remains 
because of the random nature by which 
probative issues come before the Court of 
Appeal, and the absence of any provision for 
judicially appointed scientific experts. Secondly, 
as the authors of the 2009 US National 
Academy of Sciences report put it, whether 
judicial review alone can cure “the infirmities 
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CASE STUDY
FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA
T
CERYS REES, Head of Chemical and Biological Analysis and Attribution, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl)
hroughout the summer of 
2013, the world watched as 
pictures and videos emerged 
from Syria suggesting that the 
use of chemical weapons should be added to 
the repor ts of other atrocities taking place 
in that country. Even before these pictures 
emerged, the chemical and biological analysis 
and attribution capability (CBAAC) at Dstl 
had been analysing physiological samples 
from victims and environmental samples 
from the areas that were repor tedly af-
fected.  This analysis aimed to provide the 
highest levels of government – in the UK 
and internationally – with empirical evidence 
of whether this was indeed the first use of 
nerve agents in more than 25 years; and to 
augment the broader analysis of the situation 
that was already being provided by Ministry 
of Defence’s (MOD) Defence Intelligence 
Assessment Staff.
The MOD and the Home Office had 
already recognised that the UK needed the 
capability to analyse samples for the presence 
of chemical and biological agents to the 
highest possible standards. Consequently, 
much of Dstl’s analysis was accredited to 
the international standard ISO 17025:2005, 
which is the standard applicable to forensic 
laboratories. In addition, the Dstl maintained 
a chain of custody for each sample to 
demonstrate that they could not have been 
tampered with, or altered in any way, while in 
the laboratory. (Based on these procedures, 
the laboratory has since been successfully 
reviewed against International Laboratory 
Accreditation Cooperation G19 – Modules 
in a Forensic Science Process and the UK 
Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of 
Conduct). 
Our analysis of blood, hair and urine from 
casualties showing symptoms consistent 
with nerve agent poisoning revealed 
markers characteristic of exposure to sarin.  
The analysis – of three separate sample 
types from the same individual – provided 
compelling evidence that this could not 
have been a ‘spoofed’ exposure, but could 
only have occurred following an attack with 
sarin.  This proved to be the first laboratory 
confirmation that chemical warfare agents 
had been used in Syria. Our highly specialised 
analytical work also revealed traces of sarin 
and/or its characteristic breakdown products 
in associated environmental samples such 
as soil, wood and wire. Fur ther detailed 
analysis of the environmental samples 
identified indicators of how the sarin had 
been produced. When the data from the 
physiological and environmental samples (and 
their sourcing) was evaluated in conjunction 
with the rich intelligence picture, the 
resulting all-source assessment provided UK 
government with high confidence information 
that the chemical weapon sarin had been 
used on numerous occasions.  
When considered in light of The Review 
of Intelligence of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Butler review, 2004), which 
stated that “more weight had been placed on 
intelligence than intelligence could bear”, the 
high-confidence information from laboratory 
analysis of samples to a ‘forensic’ standard 
has now been shown to be highly beneficial 
for decision makers at the most senior levels 
of government, when combined with other 
sources of information. 
Research within CBAAC is now focussed 
on developing techniques to provide 
attribution information such as: the origins 
of precursor chemicals used to make the 
sarin; when the chemical agent was produced; 
93
THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA
THE HIGH-CONFIDENCE 
INFORMATION FROM 
LABORATORY ANALYSIS 
OF SAMPLES TO A 
‘FORENSIC’ STANDARD 
HAS NOW BEEN SHOWN 
TO BE HIGHLY BENEFICIAL 
FOR DECISION MAKERS 
AT THE MOST SENIOR 
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT.
and the identity of specific individuals 
responsible for both the production and 
use of this type of weapon. Although it 
is challenging to acquire this information, 
it could have a profound effect on UK 
foreign policy, and help to deter states 
and terrorist organisations from pursuing 
weapons of this nature in the future.
of the forensic science community”25. It is likely 
that this central test facing forensic science 
internationally will only be resolved through 
systematic and extensive research, and that 
will require significant and sustained funding.  
This year, $8.5 million of the US National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
budget will be devoted to forensic science 
research, and an additional $4 million has 
been provided to NIST to fund external 
research in a Centre of Excellence (COE). In 
the previous year, the US National Institute 
of Justice disbursed more than $20 million in 
research grants into forensic science. Based 
an equivalent proportion of GDP, matching 
the US government sponsorship of forensic 
science research would require targeted 
budgets of about $5.5 million in the UK, within 
an aggregate investment of some $34.4 million 
by the entire European Union43.
CONCLUSION
The insights of earlier generations of UK 
scientists in applying fingerprint comparisons 
and DNA analysis have fundamentally 
shaped contemporary conceptions of 
criminal investigation. Pioneering work on 
the standardisation of laboratory procedures 
and biometric databases; the use of such 
techniques in tackling high-volume crime; and 
the assessment and interpretation of scientific 
evidence; have all provided benchmarks that 
have been adopted in other countries or 
incorporated into international standards.  
The principle issue for decision-makers today 
is how to most effectively and efficiently 
ensure that UK scientists and technologists 
can participate in the globally-collaborative 
enterprise of shaping the future of forensic 
science, and benefit from the knowledge, 
expertise and ideas to be found in the 
international community. Achieving those 
goals would contribute to the resilience of 
both science in general, and criminal justice in 
particular, in the UK.
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CASE STUDY
WILDLIFE CRIME
LUCY WEBSTER, Wildlife Forensic Scientist, Science and Advice for Scottish Agriculture (SASA)
he illegal wildlife trade is one of 
the most significant transnation-
al organised crimes, generating 
billions of dollars each year for 
those involved1.  These crimes impact the 
populations of animals and plants persecuted, 
including many critically endangered species, as 
well as the communities where these species 
are found. 
For some endangered species, limited trade 
is permitted by CITES (the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora2). Permitted trade is 
strictly controlled, and export and import 
permits are required from the relevant CITES 
management authorities to move specimens 
internationally.  This system for cross-border 
movement has, however, been abused. For 
example, legally hunted rhinoceros horn 
trophies are known to have disappeared after 
import to the hunter’s home country. 
One such case involved a hunter in 
the Czech Republic, who had imported a 
rhinoceros trophy from South Africa. At an 
inspection visit by the local CITES Enforcement 
Authority, no rhinoceros horn trophy was 
present.  The hunter claimed to have had the 
horn carved into small cups, but the CITES 
Enforcement Authority were not convinced 
by this story.  To establish whether the cups 
were rhinoceros horn in origin or not, a 
sample of a cup was sent to the Wildlife DNA 
Forensic unit at SASA3 for DNA analysis. A 
DNA test to identify the species of origin from 
the cup sample was applied, identifying the 
carving as originating from a cow (Bos taurus) 
contradicting the hunter’s claim.  This case has 
not yet been concluded, but it is likely that this 
rhinoceros horn has become part of the illegal 
wildlife trade. 
The need for specialist wildlife forensic 
services is clear – without DNA testing, it may 
have been impossible to refute the hunter’s 
claim. Wildlife forensic science encompasses 
a range of specialist disciplines including non-
human DNA analysis, veterinary pathology, 
morphological examination and specialist 
chemical analysis4, 5. Outside the mainstream 
of forensic science provision, and yet providing 
evidence for criminal investigations, the 
development of standards in these specialist 
fields has been driven from within the wildlife 
forensic community6, 7, 8.  The Society for Wildlife 
Forensic Science (SWFS) was established in 
2009 to facilitate the development of this 
field and the standards required8. In addition 
to provision of proficiency testing, the society 
launched a certification scheme in 2012 
for individual practitioners.  The standards 
issued by SWFS are overseen by the Forensic 
Science Standards Board in the USA9, although 
they were written to be applicable at an 
international level. 
SWFS has members representing more 
than 60 laboratories across 15 countries.  This 
network of wildlife forensic scientists can help 
to answer investigative questions regarding the 
origin of seized specimens, making a substantial 
contribution to combat the illegal wildlife trade.
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CHAPTER 9
DESIGNING OUT CRIME
NICK ROSS, Chairman 
UCL Jill Dando Institute 
of Crime Science
Forensic science has long focused on crimes that have already occurred. 
But there is untapped opportunity for the insights and methodologies of 
science to prevent crimes from happening in the first place.
orensic science (FS) has contributed 
greatly to the evidence-base of 
criminal investigations. It has 
triumphed in exposing miscarriages 
of justice. It has evolved from a supporting role 
to become a front-line analytic tool, often 
directing the efforts of investigators.  The vast 
majority of serious cases, and a significant 
proportion of all Crown Court cases, now 
include presentation of one or more types of 
forensic evidence, and public confidence in FS is 
so robust that the Lord Chief Justice of England 
and Wales has wondered aloud about whether 
such faith is justified1.
Many scientists share those doubts, as Itiel 
Dror observes in Chapter 4.  The US National 
Academy of Sciences concluded in 2009 that, 
“with the exception of DNA analysis, no forensic 
method has been rigorously shown to have the 
capacity to consistently, and with a high degree 
of certainty, demonstrate a connection between 
evidence and a specific individual or source.”2 
There are other legitimate concerns about 
the use of FS in court, not least those of critics 
like Dror who warn that FS may help legitimise 
deep-seated weaknesses in court processes.  
These include a reliance on adversarial methods 
and on precedent, strict rules which exclude 
evidence from being aired, and a demand for a 
binary outcome. No other questions that relate 
to public safety are now judged in this way.
There is also the matter of cost.  The 
criminal law is facing a financial crisis. Against a 
trend in which many goods and services have 
experienced price deflation, the expense and 
length of court cases has been rising steadily for 
a century. It is far from clear whether, on balance, 
FS makes the Criminal Justice System nimbler 
and more cost-effective (see Chapter 2 case 
study p29). 
PRE-EMPTING CRIME
There are major opportunities for FS to refine 
its techniques, be more economical, and make 
itself more relevant to the judicial system. 
But there may be even greater prospects for it 
beyond the confines of criminal justice. Since 
the inception of modern FS, which began with 
fingerprinting in the 19th century, it has been 
enlisted to help win a war that, ideally, would 
have been averted in the first place.  Traditionally 
a criminal investigation follows in the wake of 
victimisation; a key question for forensic science 
is the extent to which science could pre-empt 
the crime. Indeed, it is a remarkable that FS has 
thus far mostly seen its role as downstream of 
offending: finding someone to blame has had 
more importance than finding a solution to 
future crime.
Blame plainly has its merits. Catching and 
convicting wrongdoers can create a triple-
whammy: providing a much-needed sense of 
justice, in some cases removing the wrongdoer’s 
freedom to cause more harm, and, ideally, 
deterring future crime. 
But court dispositions seem to have had 
disappointingly little influence on the ebb and 
flow of offending. In Britain, this pattern was 
obscured because of a reliance on data recorded 
by the police, which capture less than half of 
crime revealed by other methods3, 4 (see Figure 
1) and can be vulnerable to recording error 
and deliberate obfuscation – so much so that in 
2014 the UK Statistics Authority suspended their 
designation as National Statistics. At least one 
chief constable has described them as “dead in 
the water”5.
Victims surveys such as the Crime Survey 
for England and Wales (CSEW)3 have become 
the preferred method for measuring trends 
in all but the rarest of crimes. Mark Bangs, 
senior statistician in the Office for National 
Statistics’ Crime Statistics and Analysis Team, 
says: “The CSEW provides a better reflection 
of the extent of crime than police recorded 
figures, as the survey asks about crimes that 
are not reported to or recorded by the police.  
The survey is also unaffected by changes in 
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Figure 1:  Trends in police-recorded crime for England and Wales, compared with Crime Survey for England and Wales3, 4
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Figure 2: Trends in crime: average of one-year prevalence rates (the number of people who have experienced that crime) 
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police recording practices or levels of public 
reporting to the police, so it provides a more 
consistent measure over time.” Victim surveys 
are also less susceptible to classification error or 
manipulation6 than police records.
Given this standardised metric there is now 
overwhelming consensus among statisticians and 
senior police that crime surged from the 1960s 
to the 1990s and then fell faster than it had risen. 
This pattern was broadly common across the 
industrialised world and the trend was similar in 
countries with punitive or liberal penal policies 
(see Figure 2)7. 
In other words, catching people is a necessary 
response to crime but the Criminal Justice 
System has rarely been proven to dictate, or 
even largely influence, rates of victimisation.  This 
is not to say that there is no role for deterrence 
and incarceration, but that their impact is not 
always conspicuous. Accordingly, it might be 
useful for scientists to apply themselves to the 
factors that are at least closely correlated with 
the rise and fall of crime. 
We do not have to look far. It has long been 
known that protective measures can enhance 
security.  This is why early people dwelt in caves 
and later built castles and city walls. It is why we 
have locks and PIN numbers for our credit cards. 
There is truth in the old saw that opportunity 
makes the thief.
Of course there is more to crime than 
opportunity alone.  There has to be a person 
or population predisposed to cutting corners 
or being downright antisocial, and there needs 
to be temptation (which lawyers call a motive).  
That gives us several angles for potential 
intervention. But to assume that crime is simply 
caused by criminals is rather like saying illness is 
caused by patients, or that driving is caused by 
motorists. It is tautological rather than useful in 
designing a response. Moreover it is harder (and 
usually ethically more challenging) to change 
people than it is to change the circumstances in 
which they find themselves. 
The disconnect between courts and crime 
becomes more starkly apparent when checked 
against individual crime types. Crime, like illness, 
is really a collection of many different malaises. 
While individual trajectories can contribute to 
a common pattern, there can be contrasting 
undercurrents below the troughs and waves. Yet 
examination of almost any category of offending 
has shown little correlation with what happened 
in courts. For example, homicide in Britain 
swelled alarmingly after the abolition of capital 
punishment, but it was already rising before that 
event, and has fallen dramatically since. Car crime 
rocketed despite little change in penal tariffs 
and has subsequently dropped by about three-
quarters (see case study p105), again with no 
dramatic change in court disposals.  The same 
is true of burglary and most other traditional 
physical and contact crimes.
The steep falls in offending, and particularly 
blue-collar crime, show that we can reduce 
crime through better preventative measures, 
and can do so on a dramatic scale. High-
quality research has also shown that whereas 
sometimes crime is simply displaced from one 
target to another, more frequently there is a halo 
effect whereby fewer people are recruited to 
antisocial behaviour8. (Typically the pattern seems 
to be that growth in opportunities for acquisitive 
crime leads eventually to a rise in violent crime, 
but that removing temptations for physical theft 
causes fewer people to graduate into more 
serious crime.)
DESIGNING OUT CRIME
Designing out crime is in many ways little 
different from designing out accidents. Cars 
provide an obvious example: for many decades 
manufacturers blamed motorists for road 
casualties, thereby absolving themselves of the 
need to engineer solutions, until campaigners 
like Ralph Nader turned the tide of public 
opinion. Similarly the industry denied its own 
responsibility for car theft until vehicle crime 
became so ubiquitous that the government 
called business leaders to account and published 
‘lists of shame’ identifying models most likely 
to be stolen. It might just be coincidence but 
WHEREAS SOMETIMES CRIME IS SIMPLY 
DISPLACED FROM ONE TARGET 
TO ANOTHER, MORE FREQUENTLY 
THERE IS A HALO EFFECT WHEREBY 
FEWER PEOPLE ARE RECRUITED 
TO ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR.
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recorded offences halved within eight years and 
have continued to plummet. 
There are dozens of similar stories where 
thoughtless innovation led to surges in crime and 
where sensible interventions led to precipitous 
drops. Within a few years of the replacement of 
shop counters in favour of self-service checkouts 
there was, perhaps inevitably, a surge in 
shoplifting9, one in which prominent middle-class 
people were caught up along with those whom 
conventional criminology might have predicted 
to be criminals. When prosecutions failed to 
stem the losses, retailers began to introduce an 
array of surrogate shop counters in the form 
of RF readers, dummy display packaging, CCTV 
and security guards. Similarly, as consumerism 
took off and ordinary homes became filled 
with tempting products such as TVs and video 
recorders, domestic burglary surged until in 
1989 the Association of Chief Police Officers, 
endorsed by the Home Office and the 
insurance industry, introduced new standards for 
new and refurbished properties called Secured 
By Design. As deadlocks, double-glazing, and 
intruder alarms became widespread, the rate of 
burglaries fell emphatically and consistently for 
quarter of a century. 
Violent crime too has been curbed by 
prudent interventions intended to make 
circumstances default to safety rather than 
provocation. Segregating rival football fans and 
penalising clubs for misbehaviour restored 
respect for British soccer after years of global 
infamy. Redesigning spaces so that drinkers are 
jostled less, provided with food, or supplied with 
harmless glassware has had a marked effect on 
casualties where alcohol is implicated. Sometimes 
circumstantial change has on its own fuelled 
or quelled crime waves.  The rising popularity 
of mobile phones and portable electronic 
gadgets propelled a swell of street robberies 
until their security measures made mugging 
increasingly redundant – mobile phone theft is 
now concentrated mostly between children for 
whom bullying has always been a problem (see 
case study p102).  The link between opportunity 
and violence is less clear-cut than in acquisitive 
crime, but correlations like those between 
knife-carrying and wounding in Scotland suggests 
that opportunity makes the killer as well as the 
thief.  There are also many theories about the 
falling rates of violent crime – from abortion 
leading to fewer unwanted male children, to 
declining alcohol and drug use, or even a drop 
in atmospheric lead concentrations – all showing 
some degree of persuasive correlation, though 
none consistently.  The simplest reason – the 
Occam’s Razor answer – might be that physical 
theft acts as a recruiting sergeant to more 
serious offending, so that as stealing declines 
so, eventually, will assault.  There are probably 
many factors working in tandem, some much 
more important than others. On the other hand 
there are unequivocal connections between 
circumstance and many types of offending. 
Among these are internet-enabled crimes, such 
as spamming, scamming, identity theft, child 
sexual exploitation and fraud; ill-conceived 
expense-claim systems like those that ensnared 
so many otherwise honourable MPs; or the 
multi-billion pound tricks and swindles within 
poorly supervised financial service industries. 
Just as we have learned to curb blue-collar 
offences, we have thrown open vulnerabilities 
to white-collar ones, tempting largely different 
populations to offend and demonstrating clearly 
that the middle-classes are no more immune to 
temptation and opportunity than are the poor – 
or for that matter the exceedingly rich. 
THE OPPORTUNITIES OF SCIENCE
There is ample opportunity here for the insights 
and methodologies of science to save us from 
future harm. Science uses observable, testable 
and repeatable measurements and experiments 
to understand how things commonly behave. 
It is a systematic process of evaluating theories 
through meticulous control of contaminating 
IT HAS LONG BEEN KNOWN THAT PROTECTIVE MEASURES CAN 
ENHANCE SECURITY.  THIS IS WHY EARLY PEOPLE DWELT IN 
CAVES AND LATER BUILT CASTLES AND CITY WALLS. IT IS WHY 
WE HAVE LOCKS AND PIN NUMBERS FOR OUR CREDIT CARDS. 
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CASE STUDY
ETHICS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
T
CHRIS HUGHES, Chair of the National DNA Database Ethics Group
he application of science to the 
prevention and detection of 
crime faces a range of ethical 
issues that set it apart from most 
other fields of human endeavour.  Those arise 
from the subject matter of the discipline, the 
purposes for which it is carried out and the 
ethical relations of the various parties.
Efforts to prevent crime include the use 
of psychological and behavioural economic 
models.  These may be applied to ‘design out’ 
crime, through techniques such as presenting 
visual cues to encourage social interaction; or 
to adjust market behaviour, by restricting sales 
of some goods or promoting the sales of less 
harmful competitors; or to ‘nudge’ pro-social 
behaviour. But these approaches highlight a 
conflict between the proponents of a minimal 
state, and those who consider that society 
should act collectively to prevent suffering and 
promote happiness.
The forensic scientist has an overarching duty 
to tell the truth. But they also have a duty to 
communicate that to judges, juries and lawyers 
in a way that they can understand and evaluate 
fairly: otherwise, both the accused and the 
victim are denied a fair trial. In forensic science, 
however, significant aspects of its techniques are 
either part of the closely-guarded intellectual 
capital of commercial entities, or seen as 
sensitive information whose disclosure could 
assist criminals or undermine national security.  
The challenge for the scientist and the judge 
is to ensure that the underlying process is 
sufficiently understood and testable for a fair 
trial, without unduly compromising the public 
interest in other ways.  
A third ethical dimension is of particular 
significance for genomic and cognate 
investigations. In a forensic investigation, the 
key driver is to establish the identity of a 
person in order to determine whether they 
have committed a criminal offence.  They are 
likely to feel that this amounts to an intrusion 
into their privacy without consent.  This stands 
in sharp contrast to most other biomedical 
sciences, where investigations aim to treat 
an individual’s medical condition, or require 
informed consent from a research subject, 
or involve minimal interference through the 
review of medical records.  The countervailing 
ethical arguments, of course, relate to the 
victims of crime whose rights have been 
infringed, the duty of society at large to 
uphold the criminal law by identifying the 
perpetrator, and the duty of society to protect 
its members from being harmed by undetected 
perpetrators.
The fourth substantive dimension lies 
in the large-scale collection and storage of 
information about individuals.  The non-
consensual collection of fingerprints, samples 
for DNA profiling and custody photographs 
amounts to an intrusion into the individual’s 
privacy.  The retention of CCTV footage and 
data relating to telephone and internet traffic 
creates a similar possibility of intrusion.  
Those setting the boundaries for what is 
WITHOUT PUBLIC DEBATE AND SCRUTINY OF INNOVATIONS,  
THE ACCEPTABILITY OF FORENSIC PRACTICE MAY BE UNDERMINED.  
THIS WOULD POSE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE TO THE LEGITIMACY 
OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, ALONG WITH COHESION AND 
TRUST IN SOCIETY.
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acceptable forensic practice in these areas 
must properly evaluate the harms and 
benefits that flow from the act of obtaining 
and using the information – to the individual 
whose data is gathered, and to other 
individuals who are affected.  This must be 
balanced against the consequences of not 
acting: both the act and the omission have 
moral consequences. 
Many factors circumscribe acceptable 
forensic practice, including the impact 
on a fair trial, the interference with an 
individual’s privacy and family life, and 
whether the information was obtained in a 
lawful manner. When considering the latest 
scientific and technological innovations 
of forensic science, however, the norms 
of what society sees as acceptable are 
uncertain and fluid.  The duty of forensic 
science in such cases is, above all, to 
communicate and explain what is proposed 
and its consequences. Although individuals 
will ascribe different meanings and values to 
such actions, providing a clear explanation is 
the first step towards engaging with society 
– a process that ultimately determines the 
desirability or otherwise of developments in 
forensic science.   
International legal instruments (of the 
UN, and Council of Europe) set norms 
for the protection of human rights, but 
they also recognise “the importance of 
promoting public debate on the questions 
posed by the application of biology and 
medicine”, as well as the state’s duty 
to provide public information. Without 
public debate and scrutiny of innovations 
in forensic science – through the media, 
ethics committees, professional bodies and 
legislatures – the acceptability of forensic 
practice may be undermined.  This would 
pose a significant challenge to the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice process, along with 
cohesion and trust in society.
factors such as bias and chance. It is open to 
peer review and public scrutiny and, if true to 
itself, regards facts as provisional and subject to 
revision in the face of further evidence. Science 
has proved uniquely successful in changing our 
future for the better (and arguably sometimes 
for the worse). Its findings have transformed our 
understanding of ourselves and its discoveries 
have been more spectacular than anything 
imagined by fiction writers or by poets. 
FS embraces every scientific field from 
archaeology to zoology. At its best it is 
multidisciplinary, embracing biology, chemistry, 
epidemiology, physics, psychology or any other 
specialty that can help to solve a problem. 
Science has already been drafted in to tackle 
politically-motivated crime – scientists are 
involved in anti-terrorism considerations, for 
example – and it can bring the same skills to 
help private or public sector enterprises to 
foresee danger and design products, policies or 
services that default to safe. Forensic scientists – 
those with a ready-honed interest in crime – are 
well placed to colonise this field.
The enrolment of students in FS has grown 
strongly in recent years (see Chapter 2  case 
study p30), to the extent that there have been 
warnings about falling standards, with some 
courses even described as “softer sciences”10. 
Many graduates, even the best of them, may find 
it hard to get employment in their chosen field.  
There is therefore a push factor, as well as an 
opportunity, for FS to look beyond the realms of 
catching offenders or of prosecuting or defending 
people in the courts.
In doing so, forensic scientists will need 
to hone their ethical skills and perhaps learn 
from the model of medicine, which has 
developed strict protocols for research and 
even for resource allocation. Security should 
be emancipating but if it is done badly it can 
become intrusive and limit our freedoms and 
quality of life (see case study p100). Moreover, 
the very concept of crime can be surprisingly 
elusive, and laws can be capricious or unfair 
as well as subject to revision. What we should 
seek is to cut the agony that people suffer 
unnecessarily.  That task, apart from knowledge 
for its own sake, is surely one of the greatest 
goals of science, and in particular one of the 
greatest opportunities for forensic science.
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MOBILE PHONE CRIME 
NICK ROSS, Chairman, UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science
Mobile phones exemplify how the ebb and flow of crime is heavily dictated by temptation and opportunity.  Their emergence 
in the 1980s, and the take-up of second-
generation technology in the 1990s, spawned an 
entirely new category of crime – and went on to 
revitalise an old one.
The new challenge was air-time fraud (i.e. 
making calls without paying).  The old one was 
footpad robbery, which had come to be called 
mugging. Had forensic science existed with a 
remit to prevent crime as well as to detect 
it, more thought would have been given to 
designing out the vulnerabilities and provocations 
of mobile phones, rather than retrofitting them.  
This failure to think ahead cost billions of pounds, 
resulted in significant harm to individuals and 
dented public tranquillity.
As so often happens in product innovation, 
manufacturers took care to ensure that the 
new devices were electrically safe, non-toxic 
and robust, but the potential to incite crime was 
not considered important. As a result, people 
quickly found ways to mimic the identity of 
other people’s phones and thereby steal their 
airtime. In the early 1990s this parasitic fraud 
grew exponentially, especially in the US where 
handheld scanners became a craze and cell 
phone numbers could easily be cloned.
At first the telecom companies sought to pass 
on the costs to subscribers whose handsets had 
been compromised. Only when they themselves 
became obliged to write down the losses did 
they introduce defences such as encrypting cell 
phone serial numbers.  The result was a drop in 
crime even steeper than had been the rise (see 
Figure 1).
Significantly, the demise of air-time fraud did 
not appear to cause a switch to other crimes.  
This is important because classical theories in 
criminology attribute crime to social disaffection 
known as anomie, with the fatalistic implication 
that a crime prevented is a merely a crime 
displaced elsewhere. Of particular importance 
to the phone companies was that there was 
no displacement to subscription fraud, where 
accounts are opened in false names.  Their 
overall losses to fraud tumbled by 80% within  
five years.
Meanwhile, phone handsets themselves 
created a parallel crime wave. As they became 
smaller and more ubiquitous, they came 
to embody all six of the classic criteria for 
theft, which crime scientists call CRAVED  
(Concealable, easily Removable, widely Available, 
Valuable, fashionably Enjoyable and Disposable)2. 
In 1993, the government’s crime prevention 
committee warned preventative action was 
needed. Nothing was done.
By 2001, the Metropolitan Police Service 
estimated that around 40,000 mobile phones 
were reported stolen in London each year, 
accounting for more than half of all street attacks. 
In 2003, the problem had become so worrying 
that the government summoned industry 
leaders to an emergency summit. As a direct 
result, safeguards were introduced to ensure 
individual handsets could be tracked when they 
made contact with the network.  Thereafter, 
phone theft in England and Wales began to fall 
and continued to do so until around 2010, when 
a new generations of smart phones unleashed 
new temptations, especially among the young3. 
(In 2012, two–thirds of handset theft victims 
reported to the Metropolitan Police were 
between thirteen and sixteen years old.)
The actual volume of handset theft has 
been hard to quantify because police figures 
only count cases reported to them.  Thus 
they inevitably undercount crime and are 
influenced by many factors, including insurance 
penetration.  The most reliable measure, the 
one most respected by the Office for National 
Statistics, came from a sweep by the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales in 2013/14 (ref. 
4). Even this must be treated with caution, 
because an innocently mislaid phone may 
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Figure 1: US air-time fraud in the 1990s (ref. 1). 
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Tumbling & Cloning Losses
Subscription Frauds
easily be assumed to have been stolen. But 
it provides the best estimate we have, and 
suggests a very steep decrease in victimisation 
over the preceding decade5. It seems likely this 
decline owed much to the fact that trackable 
phones have little black market value. A causal 
relationship is hard to prove but there are many 
precedents, including sustained and precipitous 
falls in vehicle crime after security features 
were improved (see case study p105).  There is 
also evidence from phone thieves themselves 
who, after all, make essentially rational targeting 
decisions6. Even so, with an estimated 784,000 
victims a year in England and Wales in 2013-4, 
handset theft is still a significant challenge for 
society4. 
Consequently, the Behavioural Insights Team 
(BIT) worked with the Home Office and the 
Metropolitan Police Service to see if some 
handsets provoked more crime than others. 
If so, they could rank phones by type and 
manufacturer, and so bring pressure on suppliers 
to make their products, and thus their customers, 
more crime-resistant. 
The study involved more than 100,000 
mobile phone thefts reported in London 
between August 2012 and January 20147. As 
with previous research it found evidence to 
suggest that phone theft is disproportionately 
targeted at the young. It also revealed that 
women were victimised more than men. More 
importantly for crime prevention, BIT was able 
to build on others’ work8 to produce the first 
official Mobile Phone Theft Ratio.  The outcome 
was striking. Crime surveys had already shown 
that more iPhones were reported stolen 
than other handsets, but by comparing thefts 
against volumes of suspected, untargeted 
thefts, the researchers showed that this was 
not merely a reflection of how many were in 
circulation. In fact, Apple products were targeted 
disproportionately (see Figure 2).
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CRIME
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Figure 2: The Mobile Phone Theft Ratio: The top 20 most likely phones to be targeted by thieves between August 2012 
and January 2014 (ref. 7).  This ratio is derived by dividing the share of thefts of a given model that were plausibly targeted 
(e.g. a phone that has been snatched) by the share of thefts of a given model that was unlikely to have been targeted (e.g. a 
phone stolen as part of a burglary).
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This ratio is derived by dividing the share 
of thefts of a given model that were plausibly 
targeted (e.g. a phone that has been snatched) 
by the share of thefts of a given model that was 
unlikely to have been targeted (e.g. a phone 
stolen as part of a burglary).
This may reflect that iPhones were expensive, 
which made it tempting to report thefts in 
order to make insurance claims. Moreover, Apple 
might protest that its products were especially 
fashionable in this period and so more desirable 
to thieves. But the analysis also suggested that 
suppliers can control crime rates to a great 
extent. In September 2013, Apple introduced a 
new operating system called iOS7 with a ‘Find 
My Phone’ function that could remotely lock 
the handset. When the feature was announced, 
reported thefts of Apple phones subsequently 
peaked and then declined markedly, unlike those 
from other manufacturers. 
 Analysis showed that this decline was unique 
to Apple, and theft rates for other phones 
did not drop at the same time. In the months 
that followed, as more security features were 
embedded in more devices, recorded mobile 
phone crime as a whole continued to fall9. (BIT 
proposes to update the Theft Ratio and provide 
comparison websites to inform consumers, 
encourage industry innovation and promote 
wider use of existing security features.)
The research adds weight to the already 
impressive volume of evidence that crime is not 
determined by personality or social factors alone 
but, perhaps more importantly, by the ease and 
attractiveness of committing an offence. Since 
a proportion of phone theft involves physical 
assault, there is evidence that violent crime as 
well as acquisitive crime can be curbed with 
increasing effectiveness. 
Consumers need to be informed about the 
relative risks they face, and government and 
other agencies should recognise they have a 
role in targeting appropriate and proportionate 
pressure on those whose products unwittingly 
create crime pollution. 
Cutting victimisation requires forensic science 
techniques to be applied at the design stage, not 
after poorly thought-through products, services 
or policies have already been subject to misuse.
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TRENDS IN VEHICLE CRIME 
T 
MIKE BRIGGS, Crime Research Manager at Thatcham Research
he impact of vehicle crime goes 
far beyond car theft – it enables 
many other crimes, from joy 
riding and fraud to terrorism.  
Twenty years ago, the rate of vehicle crime was 
high and getting worse, so the UK government 
persuaded the motor insurance industry to set 
security standards that would counteract this 
trend. Efforts to tackle criminals in this area, by 
undermining their systems and knowledge, are 
still being led by the United Kingdom.
Those security standards included fitting 
vehicles with an immobiliser and insurance-
certificated alarm. But manufacturers could also 
take components off the vehicle – reducing 
the number of door locks, for example – in 
order to defend those components at less 
cost.  These changes, based on standards set 
by Thatcham, started the trend for a dramatic 
reduction in vehicle theft (see Figure 1).  The UK 
branch of the International Association of Auto 
Theft Investigators (IAATI UK) now acts as an 
important forum for those involved in tackling 
vehicle crime to share information and best 
practice. 
However, vehicle crime rates may now be at 
a turning point. When manufacturers bring in 
new technology, so too do organised criminal 
gangs (OCGs). As soon as we find ways to raise 
security standards, OCGs find new weaknesses 
in those systems. Over the past 4 years, we have 
seen a rise in OCGs attacking vehicles and, in 
some cases, removing them more effectively than 
the owners could themselves. Indeed, vehicle 
recovery rates are now at their lowest since 
records begin (see Figure 2), and the costs of the 
crimes are rising because younger vehicles are 
being stolen. 
Figure 1: UK domestic vehicle theft has fallen dramatically over the past two decades.
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That means my team and I must set security 
standards that anticipate a thief ’s next move.  
We focus on three key areas:
1  Body security
•  Protecting on-board diagnostic (OBD) 
systems
• Additional locks, including wheel security
• Catalyst converter protection
2  Electronic security
• Alarm Systems
• Immobiliser Systems
• Tracking systems
3. Vehicle identification
•  Parts marking, with details recorded in a 
database available 24/7
•  Glass etching, with details recorded in a 
database available 24/7 
•  General vehicle identification, through 
security schemes such as CESAR or 
MASTER
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are 
designing new ways to combat criminal gangs. 
But generally it is the aftermarket industry that 
fills the gap, as they once did with immobilisers 
and alarms.  Today we see the same happening 
with vehicle tracking systems. 
Tracking and navigation systems allow us to 
recover evidence, and we also gain vital data 
from keys and vehicle control units. But the 
falling costs of technologies such as fully-keyless 
door unlock and keyless engine start means that 
criminals can also exploit them to steal vehicles, 
and we are in danger of seeing a fresh surge in 
joy riding. 
Beyond that, cybercrime is the next big threat 
to tackle. Criminals have been interfering with 
vehicle software since the late 1990s, but they 
are now able to carry out these attacks much 
more rapidly: the times required to code a key 
or start the engine have fallen from over 30 
minutes to 6 seconds. 
Further information can be found at  
www.thatcham.org
Figure 2: UK domestic vehicle recovery has declined substantially over the past two decades.
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In 2014,  over
35 million
 fakes were detained at EU 
borders.  Of these, 25% were 
potentially dangerous to the 
health and safety of consumers
In 2009 the OECD reported that the 
trade in fake goods was as high as
$250 billion
 
Larger than the national GDPs of approx. 
150 economies
Currently 713 GPHF-Minilab units 
are used globally across 92 countries 
to fight the counterfeit drug trade.
 Around half 
of some air pollutants in the UK 
come from other parts of Europe
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CHAPTER 10
AUTHENTICITY AND PROVENANCE
DEREK CRASTON, 
Government Chemist, 
LGC
New forensic approaches in detection and identification offer potential solutions to 
fraud or product quality issues in many areas of public protection. But they would 
benefit from the wider availability of high-quality reference databases, greater use of 
anti-counterfeit measures, and more collaboration between policymakers, industry 
and the measurement community.
CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES PLACE A PREMIUM ON THE 
AUTHENTICITY AND INTEGRITY OF GOODS AND SERVICES.  THE 
CONVERSE – INVOLVING FRAUD OR POOR QUALITY STANDARDS – 
JEOPARDISES HONEST BUSINESSES, CONSUMER TRUST AND HEALTH. 
onsumers seek a range of desirable 
attributes when purchasing goods, 
but some qualities are self-
evidently common across many 
product types: safety, provenance, utility and 
value for money.  The seller is responsible for 
being honest about what is claimed for their 
goods – either directly or by implication – and 
society expects regulation of legal or quality 
standards in associated markets. Subversion of 
such standards, ranging from cutting corners to 
outright criminality is, unfortunately, increasingly 
common. Indeed, according to reports1,2, the 
annual international global trade in counterfeit 
goods alone is measured in the hundreds of 
billions of pounds. 
Consumers and businesses place a premium 
on the authenticity and integrity of goods and 
services.  The converse – involving fraud or poor 
quality standards – jeopardises honest businesses, 
consumer trust and health. Examples include 
the horse meat episode3, the dangers associated 
with trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals4, the 
economic impact of counterfeit electronics, the 
well recorded morbidity and mortality caused by 
counterfeit alcoholic drinks5,6, and risks to people 
with food allergies due to inadvertent exposure 
to allergens7.  The extent and impact of these at 
a sector level is described in Chapters 11, 12 and 
13. 
Consumers rely on retailers and regulators to 
assure the quality and authenticity of goods, and 
it is unlikely that emerging technology will change 
this dependence in the immediate future. So how 
can a retailer be sure of the products it provides? 
Such assurance depends on an understanding and 
monitoring of risks; and related to this, managing 
and auditing product, ingredient and component 
supply chains, as well as production processes.  
The aim should be to establish trust in the supply 
chain, earned by demonstrated (and audited) 
competence and integrity; but also backed up by 
systems able to secure the supply chain against 
criminal infiltration. Risk assessment is also a 
critical component of regulatory enforcement 
strategies. Allied to both enforcement and supply-
chain management is the need for detection tools 
that can be deployed in specialised laboratories or 
in the field to test for conformity.
THE DETECTION CHALLENGE
Detection involves compositional analysis, to test 
whether a product contains what is claimed.  This 
can uncover the potential substitution, extension 
or adulteration of the product with similar but 
cheaper ingredients; the presence of undeclared 
ingredients or components that may be added 
to reduce production costs or increase the sale 
price; the over-declaration of key or quantitative 
ingredients; and compliance issues such as non-
declaration or false declaration of processes. 
Investigators also need tools that can verify claims 
about the origins of product ingredients, and 
the location of production: in other words, who 
made it and what did they make it from?
For example, whether a wine or whiskey is of 
the age and from the location indicated on the 
bottle; or whether clothes or cosmetics were 
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made by the company named on the label. Is 
it Scottish beef? Or Parma ham? The range of 
potential issues is wide and changing, and often 
motivated by the high financial gains that can be 
made through illegal activity.
The most counterfeited products are 
those of higher price, by virtue of intellectual 
property or brand equity, and/or the scarcity 
of components or ingredients, or the cost of 
complex production or processing.  This provides 
a degree of predictability that can be built in 
to risk assessments, and which enables better 
targeting of enforcement resources. Prediction 
of risk forms an important part of the National 
Intelligence Model8, which is also informed by 
horizon-scanning: using global data feeds of 
recalls or incidents, for example, as well as local 
information from whistleblowers. Regulatory 
bodies monitor incidents and recalls at national, 
regional and global levels. For pharmaceuticals, 
national authorities such as the UK’s Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) post information on local recalls9 
while the World Health Organization provides 
information on counterfeit medicines at a global 
level10. Similarly in the foods area, EU member 
states have national systems for reporting non-
compliance incidents relating to food and feed 
that has been inspected on the market or at the 
border, and if appropriate these are shared across 
geographies through the Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed11 operated by the European 
Commission. 
Although incidents or recalls report events 
after they have happened, they provide an insight 
into the potential for similar events to occur in 
the future and are consequently useful data feeds 
for organisations that review risk (such as the 
European Food Safety Authority’s Stakeholder 
Group on Emerging Risks, and the EU Food 
Fraud Network). However, better prediction of 
quality or authenticity issues requires complex 
interpretation of multiple information sets that 
include an understanding of influencing factors 
such as price, production cost, supply chain and 
manufacturing complexity, regulatory activity, 
ease of ingredient or component substitution, 
likelihood of identification, and ease of detection. 
Each of these influencers is subject to change 
in response to macroeconomic factors such 
as oil price, consumer confidence, materials 
demand and global outputs (e.g. crop yields) and 
technology advancement. 
This complexity might in future benefit from 
developments in ‘big data’ by capturing, combining 
and analysing multiple and variable information 
sources to improve risk assessment and incident 
prediction. As yet, there is insufficient information 
sharing across multiple interfaces: from agency 
to agency, and especially between some parts of 
industry and government. Until our intelligence 
systems improve, it remains highly likely that 
incidents and criminal activity will continue to be 
detected on a regular basis through health events 
(as is still the case for the many deaths caused 
by counterfeit medicines, particularly in the 
developing world) or by targeted surveillance by 
Trading Standards and government programmes 
(as was the case with horse meat). It is also 
worth reflecting that improved intelligence can 
only partially mitigate the likelihood of fraud, since 
those involved in related criminal activity have a 
very wide field of opportunity and are normally 
adept at reacting to intelligence-led activities.
DEVELOPMENTS IN MEASUREMENT 
SCIENCE
Given the challenges of identifying areas of future 
concern, detection technology is needed that can 
not only analyse for specific ingredients (‘known 
knowns’), but also screen for potential adulterants 
(‘known unknowns’) and ideally for anything that 
should not be present within the end product 
(‘unknown unknowns’).  The later, often termed 
‘untargeted analysis’, creates a major challenge in 
measurement science and will most likely require 
the flexible application of multiple techniques to 
deliver the necessary range of sensitivities and 
chemical or biological diversity. 
Fortunately, developments in measurement 
science continue to enhance investigative 
capability.  The major trends include an increased 
ability to screen for multiple chemicals or 
biological forms; improvements in sensitivity; and 
THE RANGE OF POTENTIAL ISSUES 
IS WIDE AND CHANGING, AND 
OFTEN MOTIVATED BY THE HIGH 
FINANCIAL GAINS THAT CAN BE 
MADE THROUGH ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. 
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S NUCLEAR FORENSIC INVESTIGATION USES MANY DIFFERENT ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES, SUCH AS GAMMA 
SPECTROMETRY, SEVERAL DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF MASS SPECTROMETRY, AND 
ELECTRON MICROSCOPY TECHNIQUES.
FORENSIC SCIENCE: BEYOND THE COURT
CASE STUDY
NUCLEAR FORENSICS
VLADIMÍR ŠUCHA, MARIA BETTI AND KLAUS LÜTZENKIRCHEN, Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
ince the early 1990s, the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission has assisted 
government authorities by analysing 
nuclear materials intercepted from illicit 
trafficking, unauthorised possession and illegal 
disposals. Nuclear forensic analysis provides 
information about where and when the seized 
material was produced, as well as its intended 
use.
Nuclear forensic investigation uses many 
different analytical techniques, such as gamma 
spectrometry, several different types of mass 
spectrometry, and electron microscopy 
techniques. In recent years it has focused on 
characteristic parameters called nuclear forensic 
signatures, which are found in uranium ore 
concentrates and other uranium products from 
the nuclear fuel cycle.  These signatures include 
the ratios of stable isotopes of elements such as 
sulphur, strontium and neodymium; the relative 
concentrations of rare earth elements; and the 
ratio of thorium-230 to uranium-234, which can 
enable investigators to determine the origin and 
the age of the material. 
The following example highlights the potential 
for a nuclear forensic investigation to resolve 
a case of illicit possession of nuclear material. 
In 2007, several items – presumably pellets 
of nuclear fuel – were seized by the police in 
Northern Germany.  The JRC’s Institute for 
Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe was 
asked to characterise the material and to provide 
clues on its origin.  The pellet material was 
identified by mass spectrometry as low-enriched 
uranium with 3.4% of fissile uranium-235, typical 
of nuclear reactor fuel. 
Adding the information on the pellets’ 
dimensions, measured by microscopy, allowed 
investigators to identify the production facility.  
This origin was corroborated by the low trace-
element content of the pellets, which was 
consistent with the fabrication process used in 
that particular facility; as well as by the measured 
age of the pellets (the uranium used for pellet 
production was prepared in November 1990, 
with an uncertainty of three months).
The knowledge that the JRC gains from 
its wide experience in case work, and its 
continuous research and development activities, 
is transferred to national governmental 
organisations by providing training courses in 
nuclear forensic investigations.  This training 
covers areas including: national response 
plans; basic training for first responders (e.g. at 
radiological crime scenes); specialised training for 
measurement experts; and tailor-made training 
courses for laboratory scientists in specific 
methods and instruments.
International cooperation in nuclear forensics 
is of the utmost importance, because nuclear 
security is a border-crossing challenge. Illicit 
trafficking incidents, and the responses of 
government authorities, often involve more 
than one country.  The JRC has been co-chairing 
the International Technical Working Group in 
Nuclear Forensics since its foundation in 1995 
– which includes co-operation with the UK’s 
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE – see 
case study on p116) and National Nuclear 
Laboratory – and is involved in the activities 
of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT). It also cooperates closely 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in many areas related to nuclear security, 
particularly in nuclear forensics.
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the facility to deploy tools out in the field. More 
sophisticated tools are also being developed that, 
for example, provide evidence relating to the 
source of ingredients or production, or to the 
authenticity of associated packaging. 
 Untargeted investigations applying 
chemometrics (the application of mathematical 
approaches to handing complex data sets) to 
spectroscopy is a well known research area12.  
There are a number of other measurement 
techniques that can screen samples for 
multiple small and large molecules, such as 
proteins and DNA, and these have advanced 
over the past decade in response to market 
needs and to new requirements in areas like 
biomarker identification and ‘omics’ investigation. 
For example, the measurement of multiple 
small organic molecules by nuclear magnetic 
resonance13 (NMR) or mass spectrometry14 
(MS) has been applied extensively to study 
the so-called metabolome – the range of small 
molecules that appear in biological samples as 
a consequence of, for example, the activities of 
human metabolism. MS combined with liquid 
or gas chromatography (which can separate 
the chemical components of mixtures) is now 
a routine tool within analytical laboratories. It 
is used in a wide range of areas that require 
analysis for multiple chemical forms, including the 
screening of food and environmental samples 
for the presence of pesticide and drug residues, 
studies of drug metabolism, and investigations in 
forensic toxicology. 
Advances in chromatography now allow 
hundreds of chemicals to be screened in a 
single measurement run, generating information-
rich datasets that can be stored for future 
interrogation should knowledge of new threats 
subsequently emerge. With the continued growth 
in MS databases, and the advances being made 
in data mining and analysis, it is now possible 
to generate ‘fingerprints’ for particular product 
types, and to identify the presence of unexpected 
or unknown compounds15.  These approaches 
have already shown promise in studies of food 
authenticity and for identifying unknown ‘designer 
steroids’ in sport doping investigations16, and are 
expected to gain more widespread usage as the 
technology continues to evolve.
Accurate mass MS is now also routinely 
applied in protein (peptide) analysis and in 
‘proteomics’. As Government Chemist, we have 
used this technology to analyse for differences 
between closely related fruit species, and thereby 
identify chemical targets that indicate the trace 
adulteration of foods with allergenic ingredients17. 
Broad screening of proteins is also possible 
through techniques such as highly multiplex 
immunoassays and array technology18. Protein 
microarrays are used for both analytical and 
functional applications, such as studies of protein 
interaction, biochemical activity and immune 
response.  These analyses mostly involve arrays 
of antibodies that bind to specific proteins, 
and are applied primarily in clinical chemistry. 
However, the low cost and sensitivity of antibody 
detection methods also lends itself to many other 
applications relating to biological origin (including 
authenticity and allergenicity), and the simplicity 
of related detection methods could a powerful 
way to move from laboratory measurement to 
field-based application (see below) if issues in 
specificity and cross-reactivity can be resolved.
Medium-density microarrays have also seen 
a recent resurgence in molecular biology.  They 
are used to identify multiple genetic variants, 
for example, and for the broad screening of 
multiple genes and RNAs. As such, they add 
to a molecular biology tool kit that includes 
other measurement techniques including next-
generation sequencing (NGS), high-throughput 
genotyping and multiplexed real-time PCR. 
Such techniques are extremely powerful in 
determining biological origin because they can 
discriminate closely-related (sub) species, and 
even pin down a sample’s geographic origin if 
high-quality reference sequence databases are 
available.
Indeed, this requirement for appropriate 
reference databases is a recurring theme. 
Reference databases are essential for 
interpreting variations from a product’s expected 
composition, and apply equally to methods that 
measure the overall response of a product to an 
THE REQUIREMENT FOR APPROPRIATE 
REFERENCE DATABASES IS A RECURRING 
THEME.  THEY ARE ESSENTIAL FOR 
INTERPRETING VARIATIONS FROM A 
PRODUCT’S EXPECTED COMPOSITION.
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external input, as well as those that seek specific 
chemicals or chemical sequences. Approaches 
that depend on reference databases include:
•  multi-spectral imaging for determining food 
authenticity19
•  near infra-red (NIR) and Raman spectroscopy, 
which are useful for pharmaceutical counterfeit
detection20 due their discriminating power, 
portability and relatively simple operation (see 
Chapter 12, case study p138)
•  electrical and optical testing, and digital imaging,
of electrical components21
•  spectroscopic methods for detecting 
counterfeit clothing22
TEASING OUT TRACES
Advances in measurement science have not 
only improved our ability to screen multiple 
components – they have also allowed 
investigators to detect compounds at increasingly
diminishing levels. Forensic science remains a 
catalyst for this trend: it aims to generate DNA 
data whenever possible; to find traces of chemica
warfare agents and their derivatives, which may 
inform security activities; and to provide evidence
of criminal activity, such as the handling of drugs. 
Our ability to extract and amplify DNA 
is now such that, in principle, it is possible to 
detect single gene copies, even against a high 
background of genetic material. For example, 
digital PCR23 (dPCR), an approach first developed
in the 1990s, is a technique that is used to 
quantify the amount of DNA in a sample by 
counting amplifications from single molecules. 
Improvements in MS are leading to selective 
methods that can detect molecules at less than 
a picogram (10-12 g) per kilogram of sample. 
Even higher sensitivities are possible using 
immunoassays, in which improved affinities, 
better methods and novel forms of detection 
have enabled signal generation with femtogram 
(10-15 g) to attogram (10-18 g) levels of input 
material24. Indeed, the combination of sensitive 
detection with solution partition or imaging has 
led to a number of approaches that can detect 
and count individual molecules.  These advances 
offer great potential for diagnostics, for research 
at the cellular level and for identifying potentially 
harmful contaminants. However, the application 
of ultra-sensitive techniques in forensics and 
compliance testing needs to be approached with 
 appropriate interpretative caution. 
For example, as the relevance and value of 
DNA profiling to forensic investigations has 
increased, so too has the desire to generate 
 this information from smaller amounts of DNA. 
When the level of DNA in a sample falls well 
below the recommended threshold it is still 
possible to generate interpretable profiles, but 
these need to be evaluated more carefully: 
contamination raises the risk of misidentification, 
and there is a greater likelihood of obtaining 
partial profiles and seeing other imperfections in 
the DNA amplification process that might lead 
 to incorrect interpretation of the data25.  These 
challenges in DNA apply equally to issues in 
authenticity and compliance, such as the presence 
l of trace levels of species (for example, genetically 
modified organisms) in processed foods and 
 other products.
Many synthetic chemicals can now 
be detected at background levels in the 
environment.  These levels and variations need 
to be understood before setting meaningful 
action or compliance limits, as do the current 
 limitations of associated measurement capability 
(see Chapter 14). As such, regulation and policy 
that is based on based on zero tolerance, 
such as banned veterinary residues in food 
and drugs in sport, will become increasingly 
difficult to enforce without effective guidelines 
for interpretation. Such guidelines should 
recognise well-developed statistical techniques 
in hypothesis testing and advances in toxicology 
such as margin of exposure26 comparative 
risk assessment. We need further exploration 
and dissemination of approaches to establish 
practical yet suitably precautionary approaches 
to essentially unanswerable questions such 
as “Is it nut free?” or “Is it carcinogen-free?”. 
OUR ABILITY TO EXTRACT AND AMPLIFY DNA IS NOW SUCH THAT, 
IN PRINCIPLE, IT IS POSSIBLE TO DETECT SINGLE GENE COPIES, 
EVEN AGAINST A HIGH BACKGROUND OF GENETIC MATERIAL.
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Can anything ever be claimed as ‘pure’? (see 
case study on p120).  To what extent does 
the presence of chemicals at ultra-trace levels 
really indicate contamination or adulteration, 
or represent a meaningful risk to consumers? 
These are questions that will need to be 
addressed as our measurement tool kit 
continues to advance. Moreover, there is an 
unmet need for the development and teaching 
of end-to-end interpretative skills across 
multiple disciplines in areas such as forensic 
science and food crime. 
Traditional crime scene forensic investigations 
draw together all of the available evidence and 
then apply multiple techniques in order to build 
up a picture of what occurred, and the roles of 
the specific individuals that were present when 
the offence was committed.  There are analogies 
here with the more general fight against fraud 
and counterfeiting, where the article is often 
distributed with additional components, and 
where potential surface contamination can 
provide useful intelligence.  These additional and 
rich sources of information reside, for example, in 
the form of external packaging and blister packs 
for pharmaceuticals; labels and logos for designer 
goods; and packaging and identification numbers 
for electronic devices.
Similar to crime scene forensics, analysing 
products and their associated articles for 
authenticity and compliance often requires 
multiple measurement techniques, including 
specialist methods that are not routinely 
applied in product quality control and assurance
(see Chapter 11). Notable in this respect is the 
emergence of isotope ratio measurement27, 
which exploits the subtle geographic differences
in the ratios of stable isotopes of common 
elements to investigate claims about a product’s 
origin.  This is potentially the most challenging 
of all authenticity issues e.g. is this Atlantic or 
Pacific cod? Was this chemical made in factory 
X or factory Y? Was this wine made from 
grapes produced in region A or B? (see case 
study on p118).
Although both elemental and isotope-based 
measurements provide the basis for much of 
the information pertaining to the point of origin 
of animals, plants and food products, alternative 
rapid and cost effective methodologies are 
also being examined. For example, molecular 
biology approaches that focus on DNA-based 
techniques are increasingly being evaluated for 
use in traceability studies, as is evident from the 
number of national and international traceability 
projects now in existence (e.g. Labelfish, the 
Atlantic Network on Genetic Control of Fish and 
Seafood Labelling and Traceability). Approaches 
including end-point PCR, real-time PCR, and 
DNA sequencing can identify and capitalise 
upon minute differences in the genome of 
geographically-isolated populations of the same 
species, and can be used to augment the more 
routinely used elemental and isotope-based 
measurements for point-of-origin studies.
IN THE FIELD
All of the advanced detection and identification 
technology described so far is normally operated 
in controlled laboratory environments, with 
documented and accredited quality systems that 
incorporate procedures for calibration (by using 
appropriate certified reference materials, for 
example). 
These laboratory measurements can provide 
reliable data that is quantified to a known level 
of uncertainty, satisfying the needs of regulators 
and our legal system. However, laboratory 
measurement requires samples to be taken 
from the field, transported and administratively 
processed prior to analysis.  This takes time 
(typically days) and requires systems to be in 
place for tracking and ensuring continuity of 
evidence. Ultimately, though, the data generated 
is only representative of the sample provided, and 
 hence interpretation is needed to elucidate how 
this relates to the entire batch of product under 
investigation. 
 These limitations mean that there is now 
significant interest in techniques that can 
be applied in the field to provide real-time 
information, and to assist in product sampling 
strategies to maximise the likelihood of detecting 
non-compliant or fraudulent events. A range of 
technologies are under development for field 
application, and there are already a number 
LABORATORY MEASUREMENT REQUIRES 
SAMPLES TO BE TAKEN FROM THE FIELD, 
TRANSPORTED AND ADMINISTRATIVELY 
PROCESSED PRIOR TO ANALYSIS.
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CASE STUDY
PROVENANCE OF  
NUCLEAR MATERIALS
DANIEL THOMAS, Nuclear Threat Reduction, AWE
Imagine the following scenario, and the 
questions it raises:
•  Police receive a phone call claiming that a ‘dirty 
bomb’ has been placed in central London. Is 
this real, or a hoax? Is there anything to find? 
How to find it? 
•  Police then find a suspect package. Is this 
what they’re looking for? Is it a radiological or 
nuclear device? What precautions are needed?
•  Investigators confirm that the device contains 
nuclear material and explosives. But is it an 
improvised nuclear device (IND)? What could 
the consequences be if it is detonated?
•  The device is made safe, and nobody is injured. 
But who was involved in building and planting 
the device? How did it happen? Where did the 
material come from? How was the material 
removed from normal regulatory control? Is 
this our material? If not, where did it come 
from? Could there be other devices, or more 
lost material of concern?
Throughout this scenario it is clear that the 
government, the police service and supporting 
agencies would be faced with a multitude of 
urgent issues before investigative and forensic 
questions can be addressed. Nuclear materials 
that represent the gravest concerns – those 
which can be used to build a nuclear device 
– typically have half-lives longer than tens of 
thousands of years, giving them an enduring 
potential for misuse.
But provenance will ultimately become a key 
question, asked by the most senior decision-
makers.  They will want to know where and 
how the material was acquired, and who was 
involved. Nuclear forensics has a key role to play 
in answering these questions, by using forensic 
analysis to assess these radioactive substances as 
well as items contaminated by them. 
Nuclear forensics can draw out links between 
a scene, an object, a person or persons, identify 
the radioactive material and show where 
it could have originated.  This relies on the 
longstanding capabilities of AWE (the Atomic 
Weapons Establishment) in this area, which have 
been enhanced in recent years by the Ministry 
of Defence in order to respond to developing 
needs such as provenance.  The Office for 
Security and Counterterrorism in the  
Home Office also funded the Conventional 
Forensic Analysis Capability (CFAC) at AWE, 
which provides the capability to carry out 
recovery of fingerprints, DNA, fibres, hairs, 
and digital information from radioactively-
contaminated items. 
The approach taken at AWE, on behalf of the 
UK government, has been to ensure that nuclear 
forensics can be carried out in an integrated 
fashion, by bringing normally disparate technical 
disciplines together. Experts from a range 
of disciplines will increasingly need to work 
together in order to solve the forensic puzzles 
presented by perpetrators.
Nuclear materials have been produced 
globally over many decades in facilities that were 
focused on producing material and meeting 
the required specifications; personnel were not 
tasked with helping to establish provenance 
following the loss and subsequent discovery of 
that material. Consequently, there will probably 
not be a predetermined ‘unique fingerprint’ for 
identifying the provenance of many materials, 
nor will historical records necessarily provide 
the fidelity of data required for provenance 
assessments that use a data matching approach. 
The challenges arising from questions 
of provenance mean that new interpretive 
knowledge is being developed, in addition 
to the analytical capabilities to measure the 
properties of materials. New technical skills such 
as chemical modelling and statistical analysis will 
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be needed to understand the properties 
of materials produced long ago in the UK, 
so that we can assess the future unknowns.  
This is particularly important as the people 
who worked in these production and 
manufacturing domains retire. 
By measuring various properties of the 
material (isotopic, chemical and physical), 
identifying the type of process that may 
have produced it, and knowing whether 
UK-produced materials are consistent with 
those measured properties, investigators will 
be able to use an exclusion-based approach 
that allows them to rule out known sources 
from their investigations. Nuclear forensics and 
provenance is an evolving discipline, and it has 
great intellectual and technical opportunities 
for scientists to apply themselves to matters of 
national security concern.
of good examples of where these are being 
deployed, including the use of transportable 
ion-mobility spectrometers (IMS) in airports and 
border crossings to detect explosives and drugs. 
Recently it has become possible to augment 
IMS at these sites using Raman spectroscopy 
to screen for the same types of compounds in 
packaged materials and solutions28. Raman and 
NIR have also been extensively investigated 
and used for the detection of pharmaceutical 
counterfeits, and hand-held versions of both are 
now available for enforcement and surveillance20. 
A range of other portable diagnostic devices is 
emerging, which could transform enforcement 
and supply chain monitoring.  These include 
sensor systems based on affinity reagents 
(immunoassays) with, for example, optical, 
electrochemical or surface acoustic wave 
detection, and DNA diagnostics with on-
board amplification systems that are capable 
of providing information in relatively short 
timeframes (typically 10-60 minutes). Indeed, 
DNA intelligence tools are already available for 
crime scene investigation29 and for rapid diagnosis 
of disease – further development is likely to 
lead to instruments that can be deployed for 
bio-security applications, and for food safety and 
authenticity screening.
However, even with the support of portable 
measurement instruments, detection tools will 
not be sufficient on their own to eliminate or 
identify all forms of fraud. Fraudsters will adjust 
their tactics, evading different forms of detection 
by exploiting weaknesses in measurement 
methods.  This was most notably illustrated 
in China, when melamine was added to milk 
that had been watered down.  The nitrogen-
containing melamine was intended to fool 
the methods for determining milk content, 
which were based on the analysis of nitrogen 
as a quantitative measure of related proteins. 
Conversely, some organisations specifically add 
markers to their products to aid detection: 
drinks manufacturers may add combinations 
of chemicals (and macromolecules like DNA) 
to readily differentiate their products from 
counterfeit versions; and many companies 
add physical features such as watermarks or 
holograms as an anti-counterfeiting measure.
Designing anti-counterfeit or safety and 
compliance measures into products, packaging 
and processes offers optimal protection to 
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CASE STUDY
FORENSIC GEOSCIENCE
 
LORNA DAWSON, Head of the Soil Forensic Group, James Hutton Institute; and RUTH MORGAN, Director of the 
UCL Centre for the Forensic Sciences
Forensic geoscience is an increasingly im-portant discipline that studies soils, min-erals, dusts, plants and rock fragments to help determine their provenance (i.e. 
a chronology of their ownership, custody or loca-
tion).  These materials have been used as forensic 
trace evidence for many years and are often highly 
distinctive from one region to another. 
Such traces are extremely useful in a forensic 
context, because of their environmental specificity; 
their high levels of transferability; their ability to 
persist on items such as clothing, footwear, tools 
and vehicles; and their high levels of preservation 
after long periods of time, even after activities 
such as burning and washing.  This resilience makes 
geoforensic trace materials – frequently present 
at crime scenes, and in forensic exhibits – highly 
valuable forms of intelligence and evidence that 
can aid crime investigations and reconstructions.
There have been significant advances in 
forensic geoscience over the past decade, both 
in the development of analytical approaches and 
also in understanding of the behaviour, transfer, 
persistence and preservation of sediments, soils 
and plant material. Evidence samples can now 
be analysed by a wide range of complementary 
methods that address their physical, chemical and 
biological components with greater precision, 
speed and accuracy than ever before.  This allows 
samples of less than 10 milligrams to be accurately 
characterised, and mobile platforms are increasingly 
enabling real-time decisions that aid investigations.  
These developments have enabled geoscience 
techniques to be applied in a greater range 
of cases, and in helping to review ‘cold cases’. 
Improved analytical capabilities, coupled with the 
development and availability of relevant databases, 
allow forensic geoscientists to help police to search 
for unknown objects or people, prioritise areas 
for investigation or search, and provide robust and 
reliable evidence in court. 
Advances in forensic geoscience have also 
underscored the importance of developing the 
empirical evidence base that we need to interpret 
and assign the significance and importance of 
these materials in specific scenarios. Without 
these established evidence bases, it would not 
be possible to offer such reliable evidence for 
presentation in court.
The full potential of forensic geoscience has 
only truly begun to be recognised in the past 
decade. Since many criminals now show a high 
level of forensic awareness in relation to evidence 
such as fingerprints, blood and other body fluids 
– along with an ability to fake products with 
forensic precision – police and security agents 
are encouraging the use of geoforensic evidence 
applications.  To date, forensic geoscience has 
mainly been used in the context of high-impact 
crimes such as murder, rape, aggravated burglary 
and terrorism investigations, where resources allow 
it. However, techniques are increasingly becoming 
cheaper and faster, and have the potential, once 
fully tested, to become regularly used forensic 
tools. 
Forensic geoscience is also being applied in 
a wider range of investigations, including wildlife 
crime, fraud identification, food adulteration, 
kidnapping, trafficking and smuggling. Using state-
of-the-art techniques in chemistry, biology, and 
microscopy, it is possible to identify if particular 
foods have come from a claimed location. For 
THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ENABLED GEOSCIENCE TECHNIQUES TO 
BE APPLIED IN A GREATER RANGE OF CASES, AND IN HELPING TO 
REVIEW ‘COLD CASES’ .
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example, elemental composition can indicate 
the type of soil in which garlic cloves were 
grown; isotope and trace chemical values 
can indicate in which distillery a whisky was 
produced; isotopes and elemental profiles show 
where cheeses, oils or soft fruit were produced; 
organic compound analysis can determine 
cultivar level identification; strontium isotopes 
can discriminate between zones where beef 
has been produced; and grain shape and 
texture can identify the beach where drugs 
were imported from. 
Forensic geoscience can also help 
investigators to reconstruct journey histories, 
often a critical issue when reconstructing 
crime scenes and establishing pertinent time 
lines. Current research is demonstrating 
that sediments can be transferred to the 
components of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) or high-value goods, which can indicate 
where they were manufactured.  This type of 
intelligence can indicate locations of interest in 
terrorism and illegal trafficking investigations, 
or reveal important social networks integral to 
terrorist activities.  The sediments on footwear 
and vehicles can indicate where a crime may 
have taken place, and may provide evidence of a 
person being at a particular place of interest.
With the developments in analytical 
technology, and an increasing understanding 
of how soils and sediments move within 
natural and anthropogenic environments, 
forensic geoscience has more power to answer 
questions such as: “Where did the trace material 
come from?” or “Where has this item been?”. 
Understanding the context of a specific case is 
crucial in helping to answer such questions. In 
addition, being able to explain the significance 
of the evidence that has been analysed, and 
demonstrating logically and transparently how a 
conclusion has been reached, remains important 
for forensic geoscience specifically and trace 
evidence generally.
traders and the public (see Chapter 9). Other 
related measures include the ability to follow 
production process, and to track the movements 
and associated environmental exposures of 
ingredients, components and finished products 
from source to retail.  This approach is already 
being used in a number of areas: ear-tagging 
individual cattle allows meat to be traced up 
the food chain; quality-by-design and process 
monitoring tools support good manufacturing 
practice (GMP); radio-frequency identification 
technology (RFID) tracks product movements; 
and continuous temperature monitoring ensures 
the integrity of cold supply chains (see case 
studies on p112 and p116 for further examples 
about nuclear materials).
CONCLUSION
The global illicit economy is growing rapidly,  
due to a wide spectrum of activities that include 
counterfeiting goods. It has already infiltrated 
and corrupted legal markets, reduced consumer 
confidence, impacted traders, provided a 
disincentive to investments in R&D, and raised 
public health risks. 
This threat is preventing fair markets  
from reaching their potential and endangering 
our health and safety.  Technology – including 
advances in measurement science – must 
continue to evolve to meet this challenge.
THE GLOBAL ILLICIT ECONOMY 
HAS ALREADY INFILTRATED AND 
CORRUPTED LEGAL MARKETS, REDUCED 
CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, IMPACTED 
TRADERS, PROVIDED A DISINCENTIVE 
TO INVESTMENTS IN R&D, AND 
RAISED PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS. 
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NOTIONS OF PURITY: 
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
FRANCESCA BRAY, Social Anthropology, University of Edi
Purity and pollution were inititreated in anthropology as ereligious concepts1–3, and thea central concern in the anth
gy of religion today.  Though variously defi
different religions, purity is everywhere a 
precondition for communicating with the
nburgh
ally 
xclusively 
y remain 
ropolo-
ned in 
spiritual 
 gods 
through prayer or ritual. 
Purity can be defiled by inappropriate emotions 
or thoughts, acts or contacts, by sickness and 
by passages through the life cycle, notably birth, 
menstruation and death. Some categories 
of people, things or acts are inherently and 
irrevocably tainted: a Hindu untouchable cannot 
become touchable however pious his behaviour; 
in ancient Greece or imperial China there was 
no redemption for parricide. Much pollution, 
however, is transitory and an affected individual can 
achieve or regain purity through rituals, discipline, 
pilgrimage, fasting or simply the passage of time. 
For example, Christianity requires the ‘churching’ 
of a woman who has given birth; in Chinese 
Buddhism the taint of a family death dissipates 
gradually, aided by a sequence of sacrifices for the 
soul of the departed and their transformation into 
an ancestral spirit.  Typical prohibitions for saints 
and priests, and for the laity before conducting 
major rituals or undergoing rites of passage, 
include bans on sexual intercourse, eating meat or 
expressing anger. Views on alcohol differ between 
religions: in some it is permanently forbidden to 
all the faithful, in others one should abstain before 
praying, some require officiants to share blessed 
wine with their congregation, while some require 
anyone offering a sacrifice to be roaring drunk4–12.
How do we explain similarities and differences 
in how purity and pollution are construed? 
Anthropologists have taken two distinctive 
approaches. One pragmatic, materialist school 
has sought to explain ‘native’ rules about purity as 
proto-scientific systems of hygiene, for instance 
interpreting the Judaic taboo on pork as a latent 
understanding that pigs’ meat carries parasites 
dangerous to human health.  This common-
sense interpretation, popular among cultural 
ecologists through the 1950s and 1960s and 
most vividly formulated by the cultural materialist 
Marvin Harris, today attracts little anthropological 
but much popular interest13, 14. “Comparative 
religion has always been bedevilled by medical 
materialism,” Mary Douglas remarks tartly15. 
The second school of thought about purity 
and pollution originated in 19th and early 20th 
century studies by Robertson Smith, Émile 
Durkheim and others who argued that religions 
are neither divinely inspired nor materially rooted. 
Rather, they are an expression of collective values. 
Sacred and secular must therefore be analysed 
not as separate domains but as interdependent 
elements of a single moral-symbolic system. 
It was the structuralist anthropologists of the 
1960s who breathed new life and vigour into 
this approach.  The landmark study was ‘Purity 
and Danger’ by Mary Douglas. A focus on purity 
and pollution, Douglas showed, can illuminate the 
deepest workings of any society, including our 
own. While the categories of purity and pollution 
may be most evident in the religious and ritual 
domain, they reflect deeper structures of symbolic 
thought manifested in secular values and everyday 
practices, from the preparation of meals to 
definitions of nationality10, 16.
Dirt is matter out of place, Douglas famously 
remarked, and its threat to purity must therefore 
be approached through order: “Uncleanness or 
dirt is that which must not be included if a pattern 
is to be maintained,” she wrote17. Danger lies 
not in the existence of the unclean per se, but in 
the transgression of boundaries, the mingling of 
categories, the contamination of pure by  
impure4, 12. Douglas’s important insight has inspired 
a succession of groundbreaking anthropological 
studies of the imperatives of purity in such diverse 
fields as racial science, nationalism, victims of 
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atomic disasters, etiologies of AIDS, and views of 
genetic engineering18–23.
The underlying assumption here is that purity 
is the desired state which any taint impairs. But 
this attitude is more culture-bound than we 
realise.  The development of modern science is a 
history of purification. In order to extract better 
knowledge, chemists, engineers and physicists have 
quarried the messy material stuff that surrounds 
us; isolated and purified it in order to classify it and 
study its properties. Nature is then rendered into 
its very purest form – abstract thought: theories 
or laws of universal validity, expressed in terse, 
uncontextualised verbal or numerical form24. 
As Bruno Latour observes, a defining premise 
of modern sciences, both natural and social, 
and indeed of our modern life generally, is that 
objectivity is considered both possible and 
necessary. We have supposedly escaped the 
primitive entanglement of mind, soul and body, of 
moral and material. Instead we bring an effective 
approach to the world and its problems that 
categorically separates the social and the natural, 
the human and the artefact, the mind and the 
objectively observable fact – a universal science 
beyond politics or creed25. 
But in reality such purification is impossible, 
as Latour and his fellow researchers in science 
and technology studies have shown. Science 
depends on funding and politics. Politics and power 
permeate every human act. Researchers are 
cultural, political and often religious beings: nuclear 
scientists conduct rituals and rites of passage 
as part of their research; particle physicists and 
molecular biologists evaluate the quality of evidence 
in quite distinctive ways26. Environments are co-
produced by the collectivity of their denizens, 
and humans more than any other life form have 
remade ‘nature’ in their own image throughout 
their existence. Scientists do not discover nature 
in the raw; they define the categories they will 
research, seek effective catalysts for the reactions 
they want to produce, design instruments, carefully 
select and breed experimental animals to fit the 
experiments, pre-select the ecological niches or 
soil cores with which they investigate ‘nature’27–29. 
In the process, definition and distinction become 
increasingly complex and challenging. Is a pest-
resistant GM eggplant more or less pure, natural 
and organic than a non-GM eggplant treated 
with pesticides? From atmospheric levels of sulfur 
dioxide to the meat content of a proper sausage, 
scientists, regulators, legislators, corporations, 
farmers, shopkeepers, activists and consumers 
wrangle continually over definitions and degrees of 
safe, acceptable or simply workable purity, impurity 
or contamination30–32.
Even in the strictly material sense, then, purity 
is not a state of nature, nor is it unconditionally 
desirable. While regimes of purification bring 
greater control, more predictability and increased 
efficiency, they also contain the threat of inbreeding, 
sterility and vulnerability. Purity and hybridity 
become inextricably entangled33. Pure lines of 
wheat cannot rival hybrids for yields.  They are 
painstakingly bred not to grow in their own right 
but to cross breed into high-yield hybrids. Hybrids, 
however, do not breed true and must be replaced 
yearly. In the case of wheat, pure lines must be 
maintained to reproduce the essential hybrids. 
One could argue that in the case of human 
societies, a similar if not identical dialectic between 
purity and hybridisation, analogous processes 
of hybridisation, miscegenation and tincture, are 
essential for long-term health and survival. And yet, 
as anthropological studies of assisted reproductive 
technologies or of immigration vividly illustrate, 
they are widely viewed with misgiving, resentment 
or fear16, 19, 34, 35.  The anthropology of purity 
reminds us that culture, politics and morality are 
intrinsic to any scientific or legislative attempt to 
classify or to purify.
EVEN IN THE STRICTLY MATERIAL SENSE, PURITY IS NOT A STATE OF 
NATURE, NOR IS IT UNCONDITIONALLY DESIRABLE.
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CHAPTER 11
FOOD CONTROL AUTHORITIES NEED TO CONTINUALLY ADAPT EXISTING 
TECHNIQUES AND DEVELOP NEW METHODOLOGIES TO DETECT FRAUD
FOOD AND DRINK
VLADIMÍR ŠUCHA, 
ELKE ANKLAM AND 
FRANZ ULBERTH, 
Joint Research Centre, 
European Commission
Food adulteration is as old as trade itself, but it has grown into a global criminal enterprise 
that costs billions of pounds in lost revenue every year, and may also put consumers at risk 
of harm. Authorities and policymakers must have access to up-to-date knowledge about 
fraud detection and prevention technologies to safeguard the integrity of the food chain.
he adulteration of foods has a 
history dating back to ancient 
times. Cato gave one of the 
earliest accounts of adulteratio
foodstuffs in his treatise ‘On Agriculture’ (arou
160 BC) when he reported on the adulterat
of wine. Likewise, Roman legislation was awa
that olive oil can be a target of fraudulent co
mingling. Food adulteration practices are as o
trade, and strict punishment of fraudsters, wh
detected, was announced and implemented. 
One of the earliest known modern accou
on food fraud was given by Frederick Accum
who published ‘A Treatise on Adulterations 
of Food and Culinary Poisons’ in 1820. He 
described common malpractices such as 
adding chalk to flour, and sawdust to bread, a
well as recycling spent tea leaves and coffee 
grounds. Intentional food adulteration increa
considerably during the Industrial Revolution 
following the separation of the direct link 
between farmers/food producers and town 
dwellers. Unfortunately, some of the known 
malpractices raised concern for food safety. 
Examples include the introduction of chemical 
hazards through adding, for instance, strychnine 
to beer to save on the more expensive bitter 
hops; colouring candies and preserves with 
toxic metal salts; or diluting vegetable oils with 
industrial oils.
Fraudulent malpractice creates unfair 
competition, leading to market distortions, 
which in turn may impact the local or even 
the international economy.  Today, economic 
adulteration and counterfeiting of global food 
and consumer products is expected to cost 
the industry $10 billion to $15 billion per 
year1. Preventing fraud in the agri-food chain, 
and promoting authentic products, are key 
goals to assure the commercial success of 
uropean high-value agri-food products on 
ternational markets. Marketing standards and 
U quality schemes aim to ensure that consumer 
xpectations are met, and enable the functioning 
 the internal market and global trade in 
ricultural products. Losing reputation in this 
ea will negatively impact on competitiveness 
nd profitability of the agri-food sector in the EU.
HALLENGES IN FOOD AND DRINK 
UTHENTICITY CONTROL
he driving force behind food adulteration is 
 maximise revenues by either using a cheap 
gredient to (partially) substitute a more 
xpensive one; or to (partially) remove the 
gher-valued component in the hope that the 
altered product passes undetected by the final 
user or consumer. For example, fraudulently 
watering down milk or skimming off cream have 
both been practised for a long time. 
Certain production methods, notably for 
organic foods or those where animal welfare 
practices are promoted (e.g. free-range 
products), have gained a significant market share 
in developed countries.  The popularity of these 
production methods arises from widely-held 
beliefs about their superior nutritional qualities 
resulting from their ‘naturalness’, which should be 
preserved to a higher degree.
Similarly, the marketing of agricultural 
products has been focused recently on the 
promotion of premium goods in Western 
countries. Such products command a premium 
because they were produced within a well-
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defined geographical location, and/or applying 
only traditional methods of production, and/
or using only certain ingredients (see case 
study p125). Similar considerations apply to 
other speciality products, such as foodstuffs 
that respect fair-trade principles or religious 
beliefs (e.g. halal or kosher) or care for the 
environment (e.g. food miles).  To capitalise on 
market demands and improve profits, goods of 
lower economic value may be co-mingled into 
higher priced commodities.  This harms honest 
producers who suffer from unfair competition, 
and consumers whose fundamental rights are 
violated by fraud. 
Extension of a product with a cheap ingredient, 
or counterfeiting of a branded product, does not 
usually carry a health hazard for consumers. But 
there are notable exceptions. In 1981, the Toxic 
Oil Syndrome in Spain affected nearly 20,000 
consumers who ate rapeseed oil denatured with 
aniline that was refined and sold to consumers 
as olive oil2. In 2008, the Chinese milk scandal 
sickened more than 50,000 children after they 
consumed milk tainted with melamine3; and in 
2012, 38 people died in the Czech Republic 
following the consumption of spirits in which part 
of the ethanol was replaced by methanol4.   
The need to detect the intentional addition 
of hazardous chemicals gave a great impetus to 
the development of analytical chemistry applied 
to food, and the establishment of food chemistry 
as a scientific discipline enabled society to 
adopt appropriate countermeasures to pursue 
fraud. But unscrupulous purveyors of fraud also 
benefited from this development, because the 
availability of compositional data enabled them 
to fine-tune their illicit manipulations in order 
to evade legal action. In general, fraudsters 
tend to be quite innovative and well informed 
about weak points in food inspection systems.  
Therefore, food control authorities need to 
continually adapt existing techniques, and 
develop new methodologies, to detect fraud and 
protect the fundamental rights of consumers. 
Food fraud can have various levels of 
complexity, from diluting milk with water to 
a very complex practice of adding gently-
deodorised olive oil to extra virgin olive oil. 
Correspondingly, methods for detecting fraud 
range from simple to highly sophisticated 
approaches. In principle, the food forensic 
scientist faces three problems5:
1  Identification of a marker (or markers) that 
allow discrimination between the genuine 
and the adulterated state of a food or food 
ingredient. Detection can be rather simple 
if the commodity used for extending the 
authentic product introduces a substance 
(marker) that is not naturally present in the 
original. For example, the addition of vegetable 
oils or fats to butter can be easily detected 
by tracing phytosterols, which do not occur 
in measurable amounts in genuine butter fat. 
In most cases, however, such fundamental 
differences do not exist, and scientists 
need to rely on empirical differences in the 
composition of constituents of the genuine 
and the adulterated product. Quite often, 
advanced statistical techniques are necessary 
to turn analytical data into information for 
decision-making. 
2  Access to authentic samples to establish the 
markers and develop diagnostic tests. Physical 
access to samples can sometimes represent a 
bottleneck, particularly when the food has been 
grown or produced overseas. Repositories of 
authentic samples are difficult to maintain, so 
characteristic features (e.g. compositional data, 
spectra, molecular markers, etc) are stored in 
electronic format. Creating and curating such 
databanks is a resource-intensive process, and 
access in certain cases is only possible on a 
subscription or fee-for-service basis, which 
could limit their public use.  The EU wine 
databank, established already in the 1990s in 
accordance with Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 
(ref. 6) and. operated by the European 
FRAUDULENT MALPRACTICE 
CREATES UNFAIR COMPETITION 
WHICH MAY IMPACT THE LOCAL OR 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY.  TODAY, 
ECONOMIC ADULTERATION AND 
COUNTERFEITING OF GLOBAL FOOD 
AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS IS 
EXPECTED TO COST THE INDUSTRY 
$10 BILLION TO $15 BILLION PER YEAR. 
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Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), is 
one of the few examples where compositional 
data of a premier agricultural product are 
systematically collected.  The databank contains 
the isotopic composition of wines, which are 
made available to the competent authorities in 
the Member States when disputes regarding 
watering or sugaring of wine arise. 
3  Creating reliable forensic evidence and 
confidence in the data that will stand up 
to scrutiny in the judicial system. Cases 
where only one marker forms the basis for 
discriminating the genuine and the adulterated 
product are relatively straightforward to 
handle, taking into consideration the empirical 
distribution of the marker, as well as the 
uncertainty in the measurement of the 
marker. But things get more complicated 
when complex statistical models using many 
input variables (e.g. those generated by 
spectroscopy) have to be used for decision-
making.  The judicial system does not 
always accept evidence generated by such 
approaches.  
In the EU, Article 8 of the EU General Food 
Law7 stipulates that the interests of consumers 
shall be protected by preventing fraudulent or 
deceptive practices misleading the consumer. 
In addition, national laws in EU Member States 
provide various definitions for the violation 
of statutory agri-food chain requirements.  
They are qualified by the intention to deceive, 
and the motive of financial or economic gain, 
though constitutive elements vary from one 
national system to the other. In a number of 
Member States, those facts may be relevant 
for the application of criminal penalties and 
of procedural rules on criminal prosecution. 
According to a statement by the UK Food 
Standards Agency8, for example, food fraud is 
committed when food is deliberately placed on 
the market, for financial gain, with the intention 
of deceiving the consumer. 
Certain diagnostic tests, in particular those 
based on DNA analysis, are highly sensitive 
and can indicate the presence of exogenous 
DNA as a result of contamination due to 
cross-contact with other foodstuffs.  To decide 
whether the presence of a foreign substance 
is due to accidental contamination or intended 
co-mingling requires an assessment of the 
amount of the substance present, which is not 
straightforward to derive from the quantity of 
foreign DNA.  This kind of uncertainty needs to 
be taken account of when weighing the forensic 
evidence in a court of law. 
The horsemeat adulteration scandal showed 
that one of the weaknesses of the current 
system of enforcement along the food chain 
was that Member States’ competent authorities 
found it difficult to communicate efficiently with 
their counterparts in other Member States — 
which is essential in cases where violations have 
cross-border impact. 
The Commission decided therefore to 
activate a dedicated network of administrative 
assistance liaison bodies that would handle 
specific requests for cross-border cooperation 
in cases of ‘food fraud’.  The dedicated liaison 
bodies are referred to as Food Fraud Contact 
Points (FFCP).  They act, as do all administrative 
assistance liaison bodies, within the legal 
framework provided in Title IV of Regulation 
(EC) No 882/2004.  The group of FFCPs is 
collectively referred to as the Food Fraud 
Network (FFN)9. 
On 14 January 2014, the European 
Parliament published a resolution on the 
control of fraud in the food chain10, calling 
on the European Commission to take all 
THE FIGHT AGAINST FOOD FRAUD CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACH INVOLVING COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION 
AMONG ALL STAKEHOLDERS, AT ALL LEVELS OF THE FOOD 
CHAIN. INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY EUROPOL SUGGEST 
THAT ORGANISED CRIME SYNDICATES ARE INCREASINGLY 
RESPONSIBLE FOR CASES OF FOOD FRAUD AND ADULTERATION. 
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CASE STUDY
SCOTCH WHISKY:  AUTHENTICITY, 
PROVENANCE AND ASSURANCE
JULIE HESKETH-LAIRD, Deputy Chief Executive of the Scotch Whisky Association
cotch Whisky is a prestigious spirit drink 
with a global reputation. Sold in around 
200 markets worldwide, Scotch Whisky 
exports are worth around £4 billion 
each year. 
The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) works to 
sustain Scotch Whisky’s place as the world’s leading 
high-quality spirit drink and secure its long-term 
growth in the market. 
Scotch Whisky is protected as a ‘geographical 
indication’ (GI) to safeguard the industry’s intellectual 
property and underpin our cultural heritage and 
employment. We want consumers to be assured 
that they are getting the best product, traditionally 
produced to strict standards. Scotch Whisky’s 
reputation has taken years to build and we are 
committed to maintaining and building on that. 
That is why a major part of the SWA’s work 
is to safeguard Scotch Whisky against fraud. At 
any one time our legal team has about 70 actions 
in courts around the world, and many more 
investigations under way. Crucial in the fight against 
fakes is the need to determine whether the 
suspected product is consistent with Scotch Whisky. 
Investigations require forensic support in the 
form of authenticity analysis of the liquid. As well 
as determining spirit strength and the presence 
of additives — which are not permitted in Scotch 
Whisky — sophisticated techniques are employed 
to check authenticity.  
The raw materials and production processes 
used to produce Scotch Whisky result in a spirit 
with certain chemical characteristics that can be 
checked by analysis.  This is because the production 
of genuine Scotch Whisky leads to the presence 
of certain components in the finished product. 
Many of these components will contribute to the 
colour, aroma and taste of scotch.  The relative and 
absolute concentrations of particular components 
allow conclusions to be drawn on how the product 
has been made. 
Brand owners may build up unique and 
confidential authenticity indictors underpinning 
the analytical fingerprints of their brands. Fast and 
reliable field tests have even been developed for 
use in market. 
Our strategy for generic analysis has involved 
developing an analytical fingerprint for Scotch 
Whiskies as a whole.  This fingerprint can then 
be used to show how Scotch Whisky is distinct 
from whiskies of other origins, other distilled spirits 
or cheaper neutral alcohol, each of which may 
contribute to the composition of products falsely 
claiming authenticity.
For example, Scotch Whisky must be matured 
in oak barrels for at least three years. Maturation 
changes the chemical composition of the spirit, 
with the lignin in the wood broken down into 
compounds that can be identified by analysis. 
Chemical analysis can therefore indicate whether 
the maturation compounds are consistent with 
aging in oak for at least three years, and identify 
flavourings that have been added to mimic the 
effects of maturation.
The SWA instructs an independent laboratory 
set up by the Scotch Whisky industry, the Scotch 
Whisky Research Institute (SWRI), to analyse 
products described as ‘Scotch Whisky’, but 
suspected to be fake. We are one of several 
customers of the SWRI, which also assists 
enforcement authorities in the UK and abroad.  The 
SWRI has access not only to published research 
on the analysis of Scotch Whisky, but also has its 
own extensive database on the analysis of Scotch 
Whiskies collected over many years. Every year 
around 160 suspect ‘whisky’ samples sourced by 
the SWA are tested by SWRI, which also provides 
expert evidence in legal proceedings in respect of 
many of the samples tested. 
Robust protection of Scotch Whisky requires 
robust science, and the Scotch Whisky industry  
has both.
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necessary steps to make combating food 
fraud an integral part of EU policy. It also 
encouraged the commission to consider 
developing an EU reference laboratory 
for food authenticity, and called for the 
establishment of an anti-food fraud network 
as a means of improving coordination among 
the competent European bodies (Europol, 
Eurojust), in order to prevent and detect food 
fraud more efficiently.  The associated report11 
identified the top 10 food products that are 
most at risk of food fraud (see Table 1); a 
US Congressional Research Service report 
came to similar conclusions12. In response to 
the horsemeat scandal, the UK government 
commissioned Chris Elliott of Queen’s 
University Belfast to review the integrity 
and assurance of food supply networks. His 
report identified several systemic gaps and 
suggestions for addressing them, including the 
need for unannounced audits of food business 
operators; intelligence gathering; strengthening 
the Public Analyst system; and setting up a 
food crime unit and crime prevention activities 
within the UK Food Standards Agency13 (see 
case study p129).
Table 1: Top 10 food products that are most at risk of food fraud
 COMMODITY  FRAUD CASES
OLIVE OIL Extension with other vegetable oils, notably hazelnut oil 
Misdescription of geographical origin and olive variety 
Misdescription of olive oil quality (refined oil sold as extra virgin oil) 
FISH Substitution of high-value fish, particularly filets, by cheaper varieties 
Substitution of ‘wild-caught’ fish by farmed fish 
Misdescription of geographical origin (particularly for salmon) 
Misbranding of ordinary catch as coming from sustainably managed stocks
ORGANIC 
FOOD
Misdescription of production method
MILK Addition of water and salts 
Substitution of milk from other species (ovine, caprine, ewes, human) by cow’s milk 
Substitution of milk protein or fat by non-milk ingredients (plant proteins, animal and vegetable fats) 
Addition of nitrogen-rich substances (e.g. melamine, urea) to increase apparent protein content 
Misdescription of milk reconstituted from milk powder as fresh milk
GRAIN Misdescription of soft wheat as hard wheat (durum wheat) 
Misdescription of long grain rice as Basmati rice
HONEY Extension of honey by sugar syrups obtained from sugar cane, sugar beet, maize, wheat, rice, agave, maple 
Misdescription of geographical origin and botanical variety
COFFEE Misdescription of geographical origin and variety (Coffea robusta, Coffea arabica) 
Extension with roasted cereals, chicory, figs, caramel, malt
TEA Misdescription of geographical origin and variety 
Extension with twigs and leaves from other plants, coloured sawdust, used tea leaves
SPICES Addition of synthetic dyes (e.g. Sudan red) 
Extension with extraneous substances 
WINE Addition of water and sugaring of must (chaptalisation) 
Misdescription of geographical origin, grape variety and vintage year 
Addition of chemicals (e.g. diethylenglycol) 
FRUIT 
JUICES
Addition of water, sugars or pulp wash 
Extension of authentic juice with cheaper alternatives 
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Table 2: Fingerprinting techniques used in food forensics, grouped by type and/or analysis target
ELECTROPHORETIC 
(PROTEINS)
DNA ANALYSIS SPECTROSCOPIC CHROMATOGRAPHIC
Protein electrophoresis
Isoelectric focusing
Two-dimensional 
electrophoresis
Restriction fragment length 
polymorphism  (RFLP)
Random amplified 
polymorphic DNA (RAPD)
Amplified fragment length 
polymorphism (AFLP)
Simple sequence repeats 
(SSR)
Single-nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP
UV/Visible 
Fluorescence
(Fourier-transform) infrared
Raman
Mass (MS)
Nuclear magnetic resonance 
(NMR)
Thin-layer (TLC)
Gas-liquid (GLC)
High-performance liquid 
(HPLC)
FORENSIC TECHNIQUES 
The fight against food fraud calls for an 
international approach involving cooperation and 
consultation among all stakeholders, at all levels 
of the food chain. Investigations carried out by 
Europol suggest that organised crime syndicates 
are increasingly responsible for cases of food 
fraud and adulteration. 
Consequently, the detection and prevention 
of food fraud requires strategic planning and 
investment at the national and European level 
with a proportionate and sustainable budget. 
It also requires access by the enforcement 
authorities to state-of-the-art analytical tools, 
which enable them to detect (and provide 
judicial evidence of) fraudulent practices.
Modern measurement science offers a wealth 
of technologies that can be used to detect 
fraud in the food chain.  Traditionally, chemical 
composition analysis has played a dominant 
role, particularly where marketing standards for 
certain commodities (e.g. edible oils, honey, etc) 
exist. Where the test results of a suspect product 
do not conform to the standard, fraudulent 
manipulations may be the obvious reason. Simple 
physicochemical methods, such us freezing-
point depression (e.g. for detecting the watering 
of milk), electrical conductivity and refractive 
index (e.g. for honey authenticity) are suitable 
to detect gross violation. But more refined 
techniques need to be applied to identify more 
sophisticated cases of adulteration. 
Analysts will use a targeted technique if 
they know what kind of adulterant has been 
used (e.g. a DNA-based assay for detecting 
horsemeat, or a chromatographic method for 
detecting melamine added to a dairy product); 
or they will resort to an untargeted technique if 
no prior information exists. In the former case, 
analysts will only detect what they are looking 
for (‘known knowns’), whereas the latter tries 
to address the ‘unknown unknowns’. Since 
many different adulterants can be used, the 
effectiveness of targeted testing for detecting 
food fraud is limited; methods that assess the 
‘integrity’ of the food are, therefore, becoming 
popular. 
Analytical approaches used in food forensics 
are based on separation science; spectroscopy; 
molecular biology; and analysis of stable isotopes 
of light elements.  The first approach tries to 
unravel the composition of mostly small organic 
molecules (metabolites) of a particular food or 
food ingredient to create a detailed, quantitative 
profile, or a qualitative fingerprint that is 
characteristic of the authentic product. Several 
forms of spectroscopy (UV/Visible, fluorescence, 
Fourier-transform infrared, Raman, or nuclear 
magnetic resonance) create fingerprints without 
prior separation of individual components and 
are consequently viewed as ‘holistic’ methods, 
which use the whole information content of the 
created spectra. 
Methods based on DNA analysis are 
FORENSIC SCIENCE: BEYOND THE COURT
128
invaluable for the discrimination of food-
producing animal and plant species.  The power 
inherent in DNA analysis has enabled law 
enforcement in difficult cases where certain 
varieties of a given species command different 
prices, or are used for distinguishing quality 
levels. DNA-based assays have been used 
to discriminate, for example, Arabica from 
Robusta coffee beans, mandarin from orange 
juice, several meat species, Basmati rice from 
other long-grain rice, grape varieties used in 
wine making, and olive cultivars for olive oil 
production14. Real-time quantitative polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) based tests are even 
able to estimate the amount of the adulterant 
added (e.g. the amount of horsemeat in beef 
burgers).  The PCR products (amplicons) 
can further be manipulated and separated 
by electrophoresis to generate specific 
fingerprints, which are of diagnostic value.  
Table 2 gives an overview of fingerprinting 
techniques used in food forensics15.
Combinations of techniques exist: the 
most widely used combines GLC or HPLC 
with mass spectrometry (MS). In using these 
techniques, an enormous number of ‘features’ 
(fragments of molecules, which are eluted from
the chromatographic system at a characteristic 
time) are generated per analysis. Similarly, 
spectroscopic techniques (where the whole 
spectrum is considered) also generate massive 
amounts of data. Only the combination of 
data processing by advanced mathematical 
algorithms and subsequent multivariate 
statistics allows the recognition of patterns 
that are useful for discriminating between 
genuine and adulterated products. Among the 
more widely applied statistical techniques are 
principal component analysis (PCA), linear 
discriminant analysis (LDA), soft independent 
modelling of class analogy (SIMCA), partial 
least squares discriminant analysis (PLS-DA), 
and artificial neural networks. Some of the 
statistical routines even allow quantification 
of added substances. Chemometrics, which is 
the use of advanced statistics for the analysis 
of chemical and biological data, has been 
developed, refined and applied with success in 
academic research related to food forensics. 
However, the criminal courts have been slow 
to accept its utility for evaluating and weighing 
evidence, despite the existence of solid 
knowledge in the field of forensic statistics16. 
An important quality characteristic of 
certain food products or ingredients is 
their geographical origin. EU quality policy 
has created quality schemes that grant 
Protected Designation of Origin labels to 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, which are 
produced, processed and prepared in a given 
geographical area using recognised know-how. 
Verifying that claim is a delicate task, requiring 
isotopic ratio mass spectrometry (IRMS) 
analysis of the stable isotopes of light elements 
 (hydrogen/deuterium, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, 
sulphur), which are related to the region where 
the products were grown (see Chapter 10 
case study p118). Specifically, stable isotope 
ratios of hydrogen (H) and oxygen (O) in 
produce relate to the environmental water of 
the growing region. Isotope effects fractionate 
H and O isotopes through evaporation, 
condensation and precipitation as they move 
through the hydrological cycle.  These effects 
are well understood and have led to the 
production of isotope landscapes (isoscapes), 
allowing investigators to predict the isotopic 
composition of food grown in a particular 
 region.  This gives the forensic scientist a 
powerful tool to check whether a geographical 
origin claim is correct. 
Stable isotope ratios of carbon determined 
by IRMS can discriminate between plants 
that use C4 carbon fixation rather than the 
C3 photosynthetic pathway.  This plays an 
important role in determining whether sugar 
or sugar syrups produced by a C4 plant 
(maize and sugar cane) has been added to, 
for example, wine must or fruit juice, without 
EU QUALITY POLICY HAS CREATED 
QUALITY SCHEMES THAT GRANT 
PROTECTED DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN 
LABELS TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
AND FOODSTUFFS, WHICH ARE 
PRODUCED, PROCESSED AND PREPARED 
IN A GIVEN GEOGRAPHICAL AREA 
USING RECOGNISED KNOW-HOW. 
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I KEEPING ONE STEP AHEAD OF FRAUDSTERS ACROSS COMPLEX GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS IS A CHALLENGE.  
TACKLING IT DEMANDS EFFECTIVE 
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND REGULAR AUDITING AND 
TESTING BY FOOD COMPANIES AND 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES. 
CASE STUDY
STOPPING FOOD FRAUD
SUE DAVIES, Chief Policy Adviser, Which?
n 2013, the discovery of widespread adul-
teration of beef products with horsemeat 
outraged consumers and brought food fraud 
into the spotlight. It prompted a govern-
ment-commissioned review of the integrity of food 
supply chains by Professor Chris Elliott of Queen’s 
University Belfast. His recommendations1 for a 
‘consumer first, zero tolerance’ approach were 
accepted and led to a number of changes, including 
the creation of a new National Food Crime Unit 
within the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
Estimating the true scale of food fraud is one 
of the first tasks of the new unit. It is already 
clear that substituting cheaper ingredients can be 
lucrative. In some cases it can also lead to safety 
concerns, as seen with potentially carcinogenic 
Sudan I dyes added to chilli powder and, more 
recently, the substitution of ground almonds with 
peanuts has caused allergy risk. Fraud also causes 
wider consumer harm: causing them to pay for 
something of poorer quality than they expected, 
and also potentially leading to inadvertent 
consumption of ingredients that people avoid for 
religious or other cultural reasons.
Keeping one step ahead of fraudsters across 
complex global supply chains is a challenge.  
Tackling it demands effective intelligence gathering, 
economic analysis and regular auditing and 
testing by food companies and public authorities. 
Ensuring analytical availability and capability is 
a crucial aspect of this. As a result of the Elliott 
report, a network of centres of excellence is now 
being established. 
Over the past two years, testing by Which? 
as part of its Stop Food Fraud campaign has 
found problems with a spectrum of products.  
The results have been shared with the FSA 
for investigation. In April 2014, 40% of 60 lamb 
take-aways tested were found to be adulterated 
with other meats, mainly chicken and beef. 
In September 2014, we discovered haddock 
substituted with cheaper whiting in 5 out of 
15 Glasgow fish and chip shops. Goat’s cheese 
tested by Professor Elliott in October 2014 
found that 9 of 76 samples were adulterated, 
and 6 of these were more than 50% sheep’s 
cheese. Further work with Professor Elliott in 
August 2015 found that 25% of 74 dried oregano 
samples analysed containing cheaper leaves such 
as olive and myrtle. While the analysis for meat 
substitution was relatively routine, Elliott’s team 
developed an innovative approach using both 
Fourier-transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) 
and liquid chromatography high-resolution mass 
spectrometry (LC-HRMS) to screen and confirm 
oregano adulteration.  
Stopping food fraud has to remain a priority, 
with effective, preventative action from both the 
food industry and government. Which? consumer 
research has shown that failing to act would 
have a long-term negative impact on consumer 
confidence; and that consumers expect public 
authorities to ensure their food is what it says it 
is. A September 2014 survey found that over half 
(55%) of people were worried that a food fraud 
incident would happen again. A quarter (23%) 
said that in the past 12 months they had changed 
the type of meat products they bought because 
they were worried about food fraud. 
With local authority resources under strain and 
food standards work in decline in many parts of 
the country, the FSA and its new National Food 
Crime Unit will have a crucial role to play.
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T
UL BRERETON, Head of Agri-food Research, Fera Scienc
he microbiome is the comb
genetic material of all the m
organisms that typically inha
particular environment. Alth
usually associated with studies of the hum
gut, understanding the nature of the micr
ome of animals, plants, and their environm
CASE STUDY
EXPLOITING THE MICROBIOME
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is a potentially new and powerful method for 
assessing where items originate and where they 
have been.
Many geological, biological, and environmental 
markers (such as the composition of chemical 
elements, or the shape of a sand grain – see 
Chapter 10, case study on p116) are already 
used to match items with a particular point of 
origin. But the microbiome has been under-
utilised in forensics.
Given the increased regulatory emphasis on 
accurate labelling of a food’s geographical origin, 
there is a need for systems that accurately assess
provenance. One approach exploits micro-floral 
signatures – the genetic profile of all the algae, 
fungi and bacteria present in a sample.  These 
signatures could be used to identify where a 
sample was originally produced, but also link 
samples to particular environments where they 
have been, a crucial aspect for forensic analysis. 
Until recently, it has been difficult to measure 
and interpret the microbiome due to the 
diversity of micro-floral populations, and the 
limitations of the tools used to measure them. 
But the advent of Next Generation Sequencing 
(NGS) has provided a step change in analysis 
that now permits rapid interrogation of the 
RNA/DNA sequences that make up the 
genome; as such, it offers for the first time the 
potential for forensic analysis to exploit the 
microbiome. 
Attributing a geographical origin to a sample 
(“Where does it come from?”) is usually more 
challenging than confirming a match between an 
unknown sample and a reference control (“Is it 
from here?”).  To answer the former question, 
investigators need to understand the relationship
between the micro-floral markers, and how 
the characteristic signatures of these markers 
vary from one place to another. Large numbers 
of data points are needed to understand the 
potential variability of markers within particular 
target regions; this requires resource-intensive 
production, analysis and storage of these data, 
limiting the application of the technique. 
Fera (formerly the Food and Environment 
Research Agency) has developed a method 
that uses the latest NGS technology to facilitate 
rapid and wide-ranging interrogation of microbial 
genomes. Funded by the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and 
the Food Standards Agency, Fera has undertaken 
a pilot study of the microbiome concept that 
aims to confirm the geographical origin of 
oysters from beds around the UK coastline1. 
We focused on genomic sequence data from 
 a particular bacterial gene that is commonly used 
to differentiate bacterial species. Our hypothesis 
was that it could also be used to differentiate 
samples of Pacific oysters, according to their 
production site and related conditions such as 
how they were grown and the origin of the 
spat (‘larvae’) that the oysters grew from. 110 
oysters were collected directly from 11 major 
production sites around the UK. Bacterial gene 
sequences were generated by sequencing oyster 
gill tissue. After analysing the sequence data using 
bioinformatics techniques, differences in bacterial 
communities between locations and substrate 
were identified using statistical procedures. 
We found strong links between the 
microbiome and the oysters’ geographical 
origin; and also between the microbiome and 
the oysters’ substrate (e.g. whether they were 
grown on trestles or on the sea bed).  The 
length of time that oysters had been grown at 
the sampling location was also weakly linked to 
the composition of their microbial community, 
although this correlation was less strong than 
with the sampling location itself, indicating that 
 the oyster microbiome is influenced most 
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strongly by the water in the locality. Further 
work is assessing the impact of seasonality 
on the oyster microbiome in the different 
production sites, in order to ensure that the 
microbiome markers are robust and not 
affected by the season in which the samples 
are taken. 
This approach has many potential 
applications in broader areas, such as:
•  Forensics: being able to link an item/person 
to a particular location
•  Food waste (spoilage): using analysis of 
the microbiome to better understand and  
extend shelf life
•  Microbial epidemiology: using micro-floral 
signatures (including those from non-
pathogenic sources) to trace pathogen 
outbreaks
•  Food authenticity: using a food’s microbiome 
as an authenticity marker or specification
declaration. In combination with a specialised 
NMR technique called site-specific natural isotope 
fractionation (SNIF), even the addition of beet 
sugar (a C3 plant) to wine must (chaptalisation) 
can be detected. 
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Traceability is a key element in ascertaining the 
safety of the food chain, but it is also an important 
tool to ensure its integrity. 
Anti-counterfeiting technologies play an 
important role in ensuring product safety, as well 
as authenticity, although the technology only allows 
track-and-trace of the package and not the package 
content. Authentication packaging technology 
offers many levels of varying sophistication either 
using overt technology (holograms, security 
threads, watermarks, colour shifting ink) or covert 
technology (UV ink, fluorescence fibres added to 
packaging paper, biological or chemical tags such 
as DNA printing inks). Synthetic and unique DNA 
can be incorporated in packaging material for 
authentication of genuine products that encodes 
product-specific information, which are impossible 
to forge. 
Hyperspectral imaging, which marries 
spectroscopy to image analysis for providing 
spectral, as well as spatial information, is a powerful 
tool that can be used for rapid non-destructive 
quality and authenticity assessment of food, 
particularly meat and spices.
Next-generation sequencing (NGS), at least 
theoretically, makes it possible to identify all species 
present in a food product.  The technique holds 
great promise for identifying pathogens isolated 
from clinical material and food to support trace-
back investigations to identify the source of an 
outbreak (see case study p130). NGS has the 
potential to advance food authenticity testing, but 
requires further refinement and development, 
particularly related to data analysis (bioinformatics), 
before finding its way into routine laboratory use.
Competent authorities and policymakers in the 
EU must have access to up-to-date knowledge 
related to fraud detection and prevention 
technologies, as well as the  
relevant databases, to safeguard the integrity of 
the food chain. Responding to this need, the JRC is 
putting in place dedicated research infrastructures 
to provide the European Commission and EU 
Member States with the necessary knowledge to 
fight food fraud.
IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO 
MEASURE AND INTERPRET 
THE MICROBIOME DUE TO 
THE DIVERSITY OF MICRO-
FLORAL POPULATIONS, AND 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE 
TOOLS USED TO MEASURE 
THEM AGAIN.
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CHAPTER 12
COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICALS 
AND METHODS TO TEST THEM
HARPARKASH KAUR, 
London School of 
Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine
Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a global threat that can kill patients, contributes to the 
rise of drug resistance, and increases citizens’ mistrust of health systems.  To monitor drug 
quality, governments and health programs must invest in regulations, technologies, and 
infrastructure, including anti-counterfeiting measures, specialised analytical facilities run by 
experienced staff, and portable technologies for screening medicines in the field.
he United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime has identified 
pharmaceutical counterfeiting as 
a global threat1. Although health 
professionals assume that they are prescribing 
good-quality medications, and patients 
believe that these medications will cure them, 
counterfeit drugs are often revealed only after a 
patient fails to recover2.
The medicines supply is carefully monitored 
in the UK, but this is not the case in resource-
constrained countries, where a range of 
factors are contributing to pharmaceutical 
counterfeiting.  These include: lack of legislation; 
weak or absent regulatory authorities; demand 
exceeding supply; the high price of ‘innovator 
drugs’ (i.e. brand-name drugs); the difficulty 
in tracking transactions involving many 
intermediaries; and the lack of laboratories or 
field-tests to assess the quality of drugs. 
Poor-quality medicines are divided into four 
main classes: counterfeit, falsified, substandard 
or degraded. But there are no universally-
accepted definitions of these categories3.  The 
World Health Organization (WHO) defines 
spurious/falsely-labelled/falsified/counterfeit 
(SFFC) drugs as follows4:
“A counterfeit medicine is one which is 
deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled 
with respect to identity and/or source. 
Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and 
generic products and counterfeit products may 
include products with the correct ingredients 
or with the wrong ingredients, without active 
ingredients, with insufficient active ingredient or 
with fake packaging” 
Falsified (fake) medicines do not contain the 
stated active pharmaceutical ingredient (SAPI) 
and may carry false representation of their 
source or identity. (A falsified drug could signal 
a potentially counterfeit product, which does 
not comply with intellectual property rights 
or may infringe trademark law)5. Substandard 
drugs are produced with inadequate attention 
to good manufacturing practices and may 
have contents or dissolution times that are 
outside accepted limits, due to poor quality 
control6. Degraded formulations may result 
from exposure of good-quality medicines to 
light, heat, and humidity. It can be difficult to 
distinguish degraded medicines from those 
that left the factory as substandard, but the 
distinction is important because the causes and 
remedies will be different.
The WHO’s International Medical Products 
Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) 
estimates that up to 25% of the total 
medicine supply in less-developed countries 
is counterfeit7. Obtaining exact figures is very 
difficult, however, as the very nature of this 
trade means that it attempts to operate below 
the regulatory radar, and many suspect drugs 
remain undetected.  The prevalence of poor 
quality drugs can only be known after a formal 
drug quality survey has been performed, and 
objective evidence of the quality of drugs 
available from most countries is lacking.
Alarmingly, if a medicine contains too few 
active pharmaceutical ingredient (APIs) to 
kill all the pathogens in a patient’s body, it 
encourages the emergence of drug resistant 
strains. And because the poor are often limited 
to buying not just the cheapest product, but 
also the smallest pack size, that also makes it 
more likely that they receive inadequate doses 
of an active ingredient, further accelerating 
drug resistance. Poor quality medicines may 
also lead to distrust in the healthcare system 
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and threaten decades of progress in public 
health. It is simply unacceptable that the 
quality of drugs is poor or uncertain for the 
most disadvantaged people, who have the 
least resources and are attracted by the lower 
prices of counterfeit drugs. 
ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Several countries have recently ratified legislation 
to combat the sales of falsified medicines.  The 
United States passed the drug quality and 
security act8, while China and India have brought 
in legislation to use bar codes and adopt track-
and-trace systems to check that quality-assured 
medications reach patients.  Tagging technologies 
include radio-frequency identification or 
RFID9, Microtags10, NanoEncryption™ 11 and 
AuthentiTrack® 12, which allow manufacturers 
and distributors to track medicines through 
the supply chain. Microtags are micrometer-
sized particles uniquely encoded with multiple 
levels of security information within a space of 
50–110 micrometers (the size of a speck of 
dust).  The tags are made of inert materials, are 
safe for human consumption and will not alter 
the potency of the medicine.  The information 
they carry can be decoded with laser pens, 
optical scanners or other scanning technologies 
provided by the Microtag maker.
Global alarm about the emergence of 
antibiotic-resistant ‘superbugs’ is prompting wider 
use of these tagging technologies. In developing 
countries, generic antibiotics can be obtained 
without a prescription and little is known about 
their quality. Misuse of antibiotics – through 
unnecessary over-prescribing and sub-optimal 
dosing resulting from substandard antibiotics – 
engenders the development of resistance.  The 
sheer volume of antibiotics sold daily, and their 
relatively low production cost, makes them a 
vulnerable target for counterfeiters, illegitimate 
internet pharmacies, and drug manufacturers 
who use poor manufacturing practices. 
Antimalarial drugs are another vulnerable 
target. Considerable technical, financial and 
human resources are required to inspect, 
analyse and police the drug supply, all of which 
are lacking in most malaria-endemic countries. 
A systematic review of the literature reported 
that few surveys of antimalarial medicines used 
robust methodology, and that the majority 
did not differentiate between substandard 
and counterfeit medicines13. Surveys require 
epidemiological knowledge, and an adequate 
sample size from as wide a range of outlets as 
possible, to provide a reliable estimate of the 
frequency of poor quality drugs. 
Reliable surveys are essential to justify and 
promote the political action that would create 
the mechanisms needed to assure drug quality14.
METHODS TO TEST MEDICINES 
1. Visual and physical inspection 
The first step in determining the quality of a 
medicine is to look for the key features of any 
high-quality medicine.  The package should 
include a list of active ingredients, the name and 
address of the manufacturer, storage conditions, 
batch or lot number, dates of manufacture and 
expiry, and directions for use. An instruction 
leaflet (in the appropriate language and without 
any spelling errors) should be enclosed with 
the tablets.  The tablets themselves should 
match the authentic product in their shape, 
size, and colour. If the solid dose formulation is 
crumbling, chipped or cracked, it may indicate 
a substandard or degraded medicine. However, 
in my experience it can be difficult to persuade 
manufactures to supply genuine product for 
comparison. Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
employ overt anti-counterfeiting strategies 
such as visible holograms, as well as invisible 
covert features to mark the authenticity of 
their products. Sadly, holograms can also be 
counterfeited, as was the case for packages 
of antimalarial artesunate in South East Asia 
that claimed to be manufactured by Guilin 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd15.
2. Laboratory tests 
A well-equipped medicines quality control 
laboratory (MQCL) is a crucial component 
of any drug quality assurance system. It 
THE SHEER VOLUME OF ANTIBIOTICS 
SOLD DAILY AND THEIR RELATIVELY 
LOW PRODUCTION COST MAKES THEM 
A VULNERABLE GROUP OF DRUGS FOR 
TARGETING BY COUNTERFEITERS
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should be equipped with a range of analytical 
equipment (see below), as well as quality-
assured reference standards, all of which is 
cost intensive. An MQCL also requires staff 
with a high level of technical expertise and 
experience of method development. 
High-performance liquid 
chromatography (HPLC) is an analytical 
technique used to separate specific 
compounds, and then identify and quantify 
them based on how long they take to separate, 
and their spectrophotometric properties. 
HPLC can be coupled to various detectors, 
but the ultraviolet photodiode array (UV-
PDA) is regarded as the ‘gold standard’ for 
drug quality analysis because it offers accuracy, 
specificity and precision in quantifying the 
amount of APIs present. It is, however, relatively 
expensive and requires greater expertise to 
operate, which demands extensive training and 
technological support.
HPLC can also be coupled to a mass 
spectrometer (LC-MS). Although this gives 
analysts abundant chemical information, it 
also relies on tedious, time-consuming sample 
preparation, and typically requires a reference 
standard to determine API levels.
However, more recent MS technologies 
avoid sample preparation and give almost 
instantaneous results. Direct analysis in real 
time (DART) MS allows the analyst to hold a 
tablet in front of a mass spectrometer and get 
information about its composition in seconds16, 
while desorption electrospray ionization 
(DESI) MS involves spraying a solvent at the 
tablet to free APIs for analysis17. 
Dissolution testing offers a valuable 
prediction of the in vivo bioavailability and 
bioequivalence of tablets and capsules, by 
measuring the amount of drug released 
into a dissolution media (liquid) over time.  
The presence of incorrect excipients, as 
well as poor manufacturing processes, may 
contribute to poor dissolution resulting in 
lower bioavailability. Indeed, an epidemic 
of malaria on the Afghan-Pakistan border 
was confirmed to result from the poor 
bioavailability of locally-procured substandard 
antimalarial drugs18.  These tests require a 
sophisticated dissolution apparatus, as well as 
analytical equipment (HPLC with UV-PDA) 
and reference standards, which are expensive 
and may be difficult to obtain. Furthermore, 
analysts need to have access to the dissolution 
information that is expected for each 
medication, and the tests are both labour- and 
cost-intensive.
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) 
spectroscopy is a powerful tool that allows 
analysts to determine the structures and 
relative concentrations of molecules in 
a sample without active pharmaceutical 
reference standards. For example, NMR 
analysis of the hydrogen and phosphorous (1H 
and 31P) atoms in the anti-leishmanial drug 
miltefosine helped to prove that a generic 
version procured from Bangladesh did not 
contain the SAPI19. 
3. Screening techniques
Thin layer chromatography (TLC) is an 
inexpensive, simple, flexible and effective 
method for verifying the identity of a 
formulation. It requires a variety of chemical 
reagents and plates, reference standards of 
the SAPIs, and some basic training for the 
analyst. For example, two TLC-based tests can 
check the quality (falsified or authentic) of the 
most effective antimalarial drugs, artemisinin 
combination therapies (ACTs), in the absence 
of a MQCL20.
Many developing countries do not have 
the technical, financial, or human resources 
required to inspect and police the drug 
supply7.  Thus simple and affordable field 
methods provide a practical means of rapidly 
monitoring drug quality. Portable labs – in 
particular the Minilab®, a ready-to-use TLC 
CONVENIENCE SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN SOUTH EAST ASIA IN 2000/1 
AND 2002/3 SUGGESTED THAT 38% AND 53% OF THE ARTESUNATE 
BLISTER PACKS OBTAINED FROM PHARMACIES AND SHOPS WERE 
COUNTERFEIT.  
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kit from the German Pharma Health Fund 
(GPHF)21 – provides a versatile means for 
initial screening of many drug formulations, 
including antimicrobials, antimalarials, and 
antiretrovirals. Currently 713 GPHF-Minilab 
units are used globally across 92 countries to 
fight the counterfeit drug trade.  
The Tanzanian Food and Drugs Authority 
pilot-tested the Minilab® and found it to be 
relatively inexpensive and rapid, but that it 
detected only grossly substandard or wrong-
drug samples. Ultimately, the Minilab® should 
be used in conjunction with robust laboratory-
based testing22.  This approach was recently 
used to assess the quality of two brands of 
antibiotics, amoxicillin and co-trimoxazole, 
manufactured in six countries and purchased 
in Ghana, Nigeria and Nigeria. All of the 
samples of amoxicillin complied with United 
States Pharmacopeia (USP) tolerance limits for 
dissolution testing, but 60% of co-trimoxazole 
tablets did not. But there was some disparity 
in the Minilab® results, highlighting that this 
portable laboratory should not be relied upon 
to make regulatory decisions23.
4. Portable instruments
Hand-held devices based on spectroscopic 
methods are now being investigated as 
screening tools that can rapidly detect poor-
quality drugs throughout the supply chain 
(see case study p138). Non-destructive 
spectroscopic techniques such as Raman 
spectroscopy and near infrared (NIR) 
are currently being evaluated for their ability 
to scan drug samples through the blister 
pack, without using the toxic chemicals 
or flammable solvents typically found in a 
MQCL. Both techniques rely on comparing 
characteristic spectral ‘fingerprint’ of a 
suspect medicine with a genuine sample.  This 
necessitates access to a database of spectra, 
created by investigators, for every brand of 
medications from every manufacturer (see 
case study, p140).
One potential drawback of using Raman 
spectroscopy is that only the sample surface is 
probed, so if the SAPI is not evenly distributed 
throughout the entire tablet, the resulting 
content information may be inaccurate. 
Additionally, many pharmaceutical preparations 
contain highly fluorescent excipients, thus 
affecting the quality of the spectrum.  The 
TruScan® hand-held Raman device has 
successfully detected some counterfeits in 
the field, but it has not been useful to detect 
substandard medicines24. 
Unlike Raman spectroscopy, infrared (IR) 
spectroscopy has a larger depth penetration into 
the sample surface. Near-infrared spectroscopy 
(NIR) can reveal whether excipients are not 
in the correct proportions, suggesting that the 
medicine is counterfeit, but it cannot detect 
substandard medicines25.  NIR is also relatively 
simple to miniaturise: for example, the SCiO 
NIR device, at present under validation, is a 
smart-phone-sized instrument that promises 
to be highly effective at checking the quality 
of medications in the absence of a MQCL26. 
Meanwhile, the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has recently started using its Counterfeit 
Detection Device CD-3 to screen tablets, 
packaging and even documents at ports of entry 
or in remote areas, although further development 
is still needed27.
QUALITY OF ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS 
IN MALARIA-ENDEMIC COUNTRIES 
A recent meta-analysis reported that 35% of 
antimalarial drug samples from 21 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, failed chemical content 
analysis28.  The underlying research predominantly 
used the ‘convenience’ sampling approach, where 
research teams purchased medicines from drug 
sellers who were easily-accessible, or who were 
already thought to sell poor-quality medicines. 
Results based on this low-cost sampling 
approach can be useful in drawing attention to 
a potential problem. For example, convenience 
surveys conducted in South East Asia in 2000/1 
and 2002/3 suggested that 38% and 53% of 
the artesunate blister packs obtained from 
pharmacies and shops were counterfeit29.  
But the convenience approach may not be 
A RECENT META-ANALYSIS REPORTED 
THAT 35% OF ANTIMALARIAL DRUG 
SAMPLES FROM 21 SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES, FAILED 
CHEMICAL CONTENT ANALYSIS. 
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SAMPLING  
APPROACH ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
CONVENIENCE • Rapid
• Low cost
•  Lack of defined sampling frame of standardised 
approach
•  Uncertainty in whether sampling is representative 
and therefore reliability of the estimates of drug 
quality obtained
•  Generalisability of findings may be weak
•  Results may be difficult to replicate
MYSTERY 
CLIENTS
•  Use of defined sampling frame
•  Can yield representative sample from all types of 
outlets and/or brands 
•  Low risk of sampling bias in samples collected, as 
outlets are unaware of survey
•  Reliability and generalisability of results should be 
strong
• Results can be replicated
•  Sample will only be as comprehensive and/or 
representative as the sampling frame that was 
used
•  Need to authenticate and update sampling frame 
increases time and cost of survey 
•  Information on sources of poor quality drugs 
is limited to brand, batch and country of 
manufacture as stated on packaging
OVERT •  Use of defined sampling frame
•  Can yield representative sample from all types of 
outlets and/or brands 
•  Results can be replicated
•  Can collect additional information at minimal 
additional cost to mystery approach
•  Sample will only be as comprehensive and/or 
representative as the sampling frame that was 
used 
•  Need to authenticate and update sampling frame 
increases time and cost of survey
•  Possible risk of sampling bias in samples collected, 
if some outlets refuse to be sampled or are 
aware of which samples might be poor quality 
and differentially withhold these
•  Reliability and generalisability of results may be 
compromised if sampling bias occurs
Table 1:   Comparative strengths and weaknesses of the three sampling approaches used
representative of the places where patients 
actually buy their medicines, and it may also be 
biased: for example, if the collector consciously 
or subconsciously set out to procure or not 
procure poor-quality formulations (see Table 1)30.
In 2006, the WHO banned malaria 
medicines that contain just one active 
ingredient (such as artesunate), in favour of 
artemisinin combination therapies (ACTs) that 
contain more than one active ingredient.  This 
treats the disease more rapidly: the artemisinin 
component kills the majority of the parasites 
at the start of the treatment, while the more 
slowly-eliminated partner drug clears the 
remaining parasites, in the hope that resistance 
will be slowed enough to allow for the 
development of a pipeline of efficacious drugs. 
Once ACTs had been enforced in malaria-
endemic countries, it was believed that they 
would be in danger of being counterfeited. 
Hence, the Artemisinin-based Combination 
Therapy Consortium Drug Quality programme 
purchased over 10,000 artemisinin-containing 
antimalarials (ACAs) in 6 malaria endemic 
countries, from private sector retail outlets 
such as pharmacies and drug shops, following 
representative sampling approaches31. Outlets 
were selected at random in most countries 
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from lists obtained from the relevant 
government’s ministry of health; whereas 
in other countries we initially conducted a 
pilot study by collecting samples using the 
‘convenience’ approach to gain perspective 
on the type of outlets and brands of ACAs 
available. 
Medicine samples were subsequently 
purchased using one of two approaches.  
Through the ‘mystery client’ approach, the 
person purchasing the medicines posed as a 
malaria patient or their relative; through ‘overt 
sample collection’, vendors were informed 
that we were going to analyse the quality of 
the medicines they sold, and samples were 
purchased once they consented.  This allowed 
us to interview the vendor to obtain data 
on the availability and supply of antimalarials, 
their storage conditions, and the training of 
providers. 
The collected samples were analysed in 
three different laboratories in the UK and the 
US. First, they were sent to the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), 
where they were logged and their packaging 
and blister packs scanned. Each tablet was 
weighed and its dimensions recorded on the 
database. Each sample was analysed using 
HPLC UV-PDA to measure the amount 
of APIs, which was then expressed as the 
percentage of the SAPIs and used to classify 
the quality of the sample. Duplicate samples 
from each packet of tablets analysed at LSHTM 
were sent to the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention in Atlanta, where a 
random 10% were analysed for confirmatory 
HPLC-PDA results. A duplicate set was also 
sent to the Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Atlanta, for ambient MS analyses to verify the 
pharmaceutical ingredients present and identify 
any unstated compounds. Samples were 
classified as ‘acceptable quality’ if the SAPIs 
were present at between 85% and 115% of 
the SAPI quantity. Medicines outside this range, 
for either or both of the partner compounds, 
were classified as substandard.  These 
substandard medicines were also examined to 
detect the presence of degradation products, 
caused by poor storage conditions such as 
heat and humidity. Medicines were regarded 
as falsified when either one of the SAPIs was 
not present. All results were compiled into 
a report and disseminated to the relevant 
ministries of health before being submitted as a 
manuscript to peer reviewed journals.
In these investigations of ACAs, we found no 
evidence of falsified medicines in 4,928 samples 
(over 50 brands) from Cambodia, Ghana, 
Rwanda and Tanzania. Of the 5,151 samples 
that were collected in Bioko Island (Equatorial 
Guinea) and Nigeria (over 142 brands), 1.9% 
were falsified i.e. they contained neither of 
the SAPIs. Instead, they contained compounds 
including chlorzoxazone (a muscle relaxant), 
ciprofloxacin (an antibiotic) or acetaminophen 
(paracetamol, a commonly used painkiller).  
The falsified medicines found in this research 
are far fewer than the 35% fakes suggested in 
previous reports. However, it is worth noting 
that substandard drugs were found in all the 
countries that we studied, with the most in 
Cambodia (31.3%), Ghana (37%) and Tanzania 
(12%); others were less than 8%.
The key strengths of this investigation are 
that representative sampling approaches were 
used to purchase a sizeable number of samples; 
these were analysed in three independent 
laboratories, using two different detection 
methods (HPLC with UV-PDA and MS)30.
Representative methods to sample 
medicines are important for generating 
reliable estimates of the prevalence of poor 
quality drugs in a given country. However, this 
type of study is cost intensive, both for the 
purchase and analysis of drugs. It is important 
to establish affordable systems that sample 
medicines in a representative way, and develop 
robust laboratory techniques to analyse them 
on a regular basis.  This will enable for the 
accurate quantification and tracking of the 
scale of poor-quality medicines that threaten 
the treatment of this life threatening disease. 
WE NEED GREATER INVESTMENT 
IN DEVELOPING AND VALIDATING 
PORTABLE TECHNOLOGIES THAT 
CAN BE USED IN THE FIELD.  
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CASE STUDY
OPERATION PANGEA  
GIFT MINTA, Senior Criminal Intelligence Analyst, Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
Operation Pangea is an International Internet Week of Action (IIWA) to tackle the online sale of illicit and counterfeit 
medicines, and highlighting the dangers of 
buying medicines online. Coordinated by 
Interpol, the annual operation brings together 
customs, health regulators, national police and 
the pharmaceutical industry from countries 
around the world. Activities target the three 
principal components used by illegal websites 
operators to conduct their trade: internet 
service providers (ISP), payment systems, 
and delivery services (including ports).  The 
operation has gained significant momentum 
since its launch in 2008, growing from 10 
participating countries to 115 countries in 
2015. Operation Pangea VIII (9–16 June 2015) 
resulted in the record UK seizure of 6.2 million 
doses of falsified, counterfeit and unlicensed 
medicines, with a total value of £15.8 million.  
This marks an increase of 97% on the preceding 
year’s operation.
Operation Pangea traces its origins back to 
a threat assessment conducted by the MHRA 
Enforcement Group that revealed a disturbing 
increase in internet-facilitated medicines 
crime between 2000 and 2005. At that time, 
approximately 85% of the total referrals to the 
Enforcement Group were internet-facilitated 
crimes.  The MHRA consequently launched the 
UK Internet Day of Action (IDA Operation 
Bali) in April 2006, to investigate internet 
sites offering illegal medicines, and followed 
that with Operation Latvia in 2007. Realising 
that the fight against the online sale of illicit 
and counterfeit medicines required a global 
effort; this approach was introduced to some 
European member states via Interpol in 2008. 
The MHRA Enforcement Group now 
uses several different strategies to combat 
the activities of criminals responsible for the 
illegal sale and supply of medicines online.  
This includes collaboration with the UK’s 
Border Force to intercept medicines and 
medical devices at ports, for example, and uses 
intelligence analysis to adapt to the criminals’ 
changing tactics. 
In recognition of the growing threat 
from cyber related criminality, the MHRA 
has developed a specialist role of Internet 
Infrastructure Investigator, whose activities has 
significantly reduced the number of websites on 
the UK domain tree that illegally sell medicines.  
This disruption-based approach has forced 
criminals to relocate their businesses outside 
UK jurisdiction, and transfer their wares from 
manufacturers to the UK public – a tactic 
known as drop shipping. Nevertheless, thanks 
to effective profiling through intelligence 
analysis, the MHRA has helped to increase the 
volume of seizures of unlicensed, falsified and 
counterfeit medicines and devices.  
The MHRA Enforcement Group also works 
with forensic science providers to combat 
pharmaceutical crime. By testing seized 
medicines using various chromatographic and 
spectroscopic analytical techniques, reports and 
witness statements are generated to support 
investigations and prosecutions. Scientists can 
be called as expert witnesses, or help with 
court proceedings by corroborating scientific 
findings and confirming criminality.  
And many of these techniques are now being 
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used in the field. Raman and near infra-red 
spectroscopy have helped to the increase 
the volume of illicit medicine seizures 
since they were first used at the Coventry 
International Hub in Operation Pangea IV. 
When Raman equipment was used at the 
Heathrow Worldwide Distribution Centre 
(HWDC) in Operation Pangea VIII, it 
resulted in the interception of approximately 
20,000 doses of unlabelled or unmarked 
tablets, which contained medicinal and 
controlled substances indicated for weight 
loss, anxiety and hormone therapy. 
It is clear that Operation Pangea has been 
a significant success story, and demonstrates 
the importance of working in partnership, 
evidenced by the high volume of seizures 
during the weeks of activities at the ports. 
But criminals continue to evolve their 
methods: recent seizures of unlicensed 
medicines by the MHRA Enforcement 
Group indicate that consignments were 
not imported via the known ports of entry 
and modes of transport. It is assumed 
that criminals involved in this illicit trade 
have turned to alternative fast parcel and 
courier companies to avoid detection, which 
emphasises the importance of effective 
working relationships with the industry and 
Border Force.    
CONCLUSION
Producing counterfeit drugs is an easy 
endeavour, requiring only a tablet press, a 
printer, commonly-found household materials 
and a malevolent mentality. In August 2015, 
the US FDA approved for the first time a drug 
made using 3D-printing technology32.  This 
technology is a potential danger in the hands 
of counterfeiters. Enormous effort is spent 
in determining the most efficacious drug for 
treating a disease, and supporting its use in 
nationwide programs. It is essential that the 
quality of these drugs is monitored to maintain 
good quality, not least to avoid the development 
of drug resistance caused by falsified and 
substandard medicines. 
We need greater investment in developing 
and validating portable technologies that can be 
used in the field, to ensure good-quality drugs 
reach the patient.  The techniques mentioned in 
this article can be used to determine the quality 
of drugs, but are not available in the majority of 
resource-constrained countries. Hence, there are 
few data to inform policy or interventions. 
We need more research funding to uncover 
the extent of the counterfeiting problem; to 
evaluate appropriate methods for drug-quality 
assessment; and to estimate the impact of poor-
quality drugs used to treat various diseases. 
In addition, better collaboration between 
academic researchers, the Pharmaceutical 
industry, medicine regulatory authorities and 
law enforcement agencies will greatly help to 
ensure that the vulnerable are protected from 
poor-quality medicines. Enhanced regulation 
and quality assurance of genuine manufacturers 
would also help reduce the problems of 
substandard and falsified medicines. 
Sensitive and specialised chemical techniques 
(HPLC, dissolution testing, LC-MS, NMR and 
MS), operated by experienced staff, are needed 
in bio-analytical laboratories in disease-endemic 
countries, so that they can be utilised relatively 
quickly determine the quality of drugs to treat 
fatal diseases. 
Both national and international programs 
must take steps to ensure that they use quality-
assured drugs in their effort to eliminate diseases 
such as malaria and visceral leishmaniasis. As 
more people travel around the world, there is an 
urgent need to ensure that medicines available 
globally are of good quality.
FORENSIC SCIENCE: BEYOND THE COURT
140
CASE STUDY
THE COUNTERFEITING OF  
HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS 
T
DAVID A TAINSH, Chief Product Quality Officer, NISHA MISTRY, Senior Investigator (R&D), GlaxoSmithKline
he counterfeiting of healthcare 
products represents an 
unacceptable threat to 
patients’ welfare.  There is 
no such thing as a ‘good’ counterfeit. A 
combination of inappropriate ingredients 
and lack of adherence to strict conditions 
of quality assurance, testing and hygiene in 
manufacturing mean they are never safe to 
use. As technology improves, counterfeit 
packaging becomes increasingly sophisticated 
and more difficult to detect. Patients buying 
or being given counterfeit medicines are 
unlikely to know that what they have is not 
genuine and could be harmful.  This risk is 
par ticularly high when obtaining medicines 
from unauthorised websites.
The prevention and detection of 
counterfeits is primarily a matter for 
national governments worldwide, but the 
pharmaceutical industry has an impor tant 
role to play in helping to minimise the 
counterfeiting of its products. Forensic 
techniques, for example, can differentiate 
genuine from counterfeit products.
Medicinal tablets consist of the drug plus 
other ingredients.  These other ingredients 
reflect how they are manufactured, and 
how they are designed to dissolve when 
swallowed. Counterfeit medicines may 
contain more or less of the originator drug, a 
different drug or no drug at all, together with 
any combination of other ingredients.  The 
possibilities are endless – but detectable.  
In any investigation, a number of 
techniques are used in combination to prove 
or disprove authenticity.  These two case 
studies illustrate the power of individual 
techniques to generate essential clues in the 
form of unique analytical fingerprints.   
CASE STUDY 1
Raman microscopy highlights that even 
counterfeits are not the same 
In Raman spectroscopy, a monochromatic laser 
beam is shone onto (or through) a sample, 
and the resulting scattered light is analysed for 
changes in wavelength.  This leads to a spectral 
‘molecular fingerprint’, highly sensitive to the 
structure and crystalline form of the material 
under investigation. With Raman microscopy, it 
is possible to collect Raman spectra from single 
points on a sample as well as spectral maps fro
larger areas. 
In Figure 1, Raman microscopy has been used in 
a fast, non-contact, non-destructive way to generate
mean fingerprints of a number of tablet samples 
purporting to be the same as the authentic tablet. 
Not only do the fingerprints of the other tablets 
demonstrate that all the samples are counterfeit 
– the counterfeits themselves appear to belong to 
four different types. 
m 
 
CASE STUDY 2
Fourier Transform-Infra Red Spectroscopy 
(FT-IR) and Liquid Chromatography-Mass 
Spectroscopy (LC-MS) determine the active 
drugs in the counterfeit  
In IR spectroscopy, a beam of infra-red light 
is passed through a sample.  The transmitted 
light from the sample shows how much 
energy is absorbed at each wavelength, and 
this absorption gives information about the 
molecular structure of the sample. It can provide 
characteristic fingerprint spectra of a particular 
molecule in minutes, so the technique can be 
used to determine chemical identity.
In Figure 2, the FT-IR spectrum of a suspect 
headache powder highlights that there are 
differences relative to the authentic product.
In Figure 3, comparison of the counterfeit 
product spectrum with the spectra of authentic 
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active ingredients – paracetamol, aspirin and 
caffeine – reveal that aspirin is not present, 
because characteristic peaks are missing in the 
counterfeit spectrum.
LC-MS combines the ability of high-
performance liquid chromatography to separate 
components of a mixture, with the ability of 
mass spectrometry to provide information about 
the mass of individual molecules. Using a high-
resolution mass spectrometer with accurate 
mass measurement enables investigators to 
determine a specific molecular formula for each 
component of a separated mixture.
In this example, investigators found that aspirin 
(or acetylsalicylic acid) had been replaced by 
salicylic acid, a different active ingredient that is 
only used in products for the treatment of skin 
conditions such as verrucae.
Other industries – particularly those in the 
consumer products sector – apply similar forensic 
analysis and investigative techniques to determine 
product authenticity and to differentiate between 
counterfeit and genuine products. For example, 
the food industry applies many of the same 
techniques used in pharmaceutical investigations 
to confirm authenticity of food products, including 
the determination of whether products have 
been contaminated maliciously or inadvertently 
(see Chapter 11).  The cosmetic industry applies 
comparable tools to differentiate genuine products 
from counterfeit cosmetics in the same way. 
Ultimately, these are specialist means of 
detection, but significant advances in technology 
and the widespread availability of portable 
instruments mean that it is becoming much easier 
to deploy them in mobile laboratories, or even 
through the use of hand-held devices, so that real-
time determinations can be made in the field. 
Figure 1: Comparison of mean Raman spectra for an authentic 
tablet and 4 counterfeit tablets
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Figure 2: FT-IR spectra shows that a suspect headache powder 
does not match an authentic product
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Figure 3: FT-IR comparison shows that the suspect powder 
contains paracetamol and caffeine, but no aspirin
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Over the past 15 years, product counterfeiting has become one of the most prolific areas 
of economic crime, enabled by the rapid growth of the internet. Investment in forensic 
analysis techniques and capability, as well as advanced anti-counterfeiting measures, is es-
sential to tackle this criminal threat – but it could also stimulate significant growth within 
genuine markets. 
he production and sale of 
counterfeit consumer goods 
damages both producers and 
consumers. It deprives our 
creators, inventors, artists and designers of 
their just rewards; and means that consumers 
spend money on fraudulent, sub-standard goods, 
while exposing themselves to the potential 
harm caused by a disregard for safety standards 
in counterfeit products. It also denies the 
government much needed tax revenue to fund 
essential public services. 
In addition, Interpol and Europol have outlined 
a clear connection between the trafficking of 
counterfeit goods and other types of organised 
crime1, with the profits from counterfeit products 
being channelled into areas such as the trafficking 
of drugs and people, and related financial crimes 
such as money laundering and corruption.
Over the past 15 years, product counterfeiting 
has become one of the most prolific areas 
of economic crime. As far back as 2009, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) reported that 
global trade in fake goods was as high as $250 
billion2.  This amount was described as being 
larger than the national GDPs of approximately 
150 economies. However, despite efforts by 
organisations such as the OECD, it is still not 
possible to calculate the true scope, scale and 
impact of the problem.  This makes it extremely 
difficult to influence enforcement agendas and 
key decision makers, and to focus resources 
correctly in order to take appropriate and 
decisive action.
THE INTERNET EFFECT
As part of its study, the OECD highlighted why 
the situation was likely to worsen. It envisaged 
that a major threat would be the potential 
for counterfeiters to increase the use of the 
nternet to peddle their fakes. In fact, the OECD 
accurately predicted that the Internet would:
•  Make it easier for counterfeiters to conceal 
their true identities and lower the risk of 
detection
•  Enable counterfeiters to establish enticing sales 
sites and then quickly take them down or move 
to markets where enforcement is perceived to 
be weaker
•  Provide opportunities for criminals to develop 
vast numbers of illicit e-commerce sites and 
listings and make it very difficult to find and 
take action against them
•  Allow sellers to reach a huge global audience at 
low cost, 24 hours a day
•  Make software and images widely available to 
make it easy for counterfeiters to create ‘clone’ 
websites, which look identical to legitimate 
online stores and sales platforms.
The OECD’s forecasts have largely proved to 
be true. Online shopping has snowballed, and 
the opportunity to buy and sell almost every 
conceivable type of product has burgeoned 
beyond anticipation. In the UK alone, it is 
predicted that online retail sales will reach over 
£52 billion in 2015 (ref. 3).  This is over 15% of 
all retail sales made in the UK and means that, on 
average, UK consumers will spend £1,174 online 
in 2015, making us the most regular internet 
shoppers in Europe.
Unfortunately, as the OECD also predicted, 
legitimate traders have not been the only 
ones to recognise the value and opportunities 
of e-commerce.  Through the internet, 
counterfeiters are now able to engage with 
consumers directly and deliver millions of 
imitation products directly to their homes. 
European Commission statistics back this 
up. Its latest report on the subject, produced 
in 2014, highlights the fact that over 35 million 
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nforcement and regulation can be 
incredibly challenging in this ever-
evolving environment. Indeed, reflecting 
on the local authority model, it is clear 
that the current structure of Trading Standards 
services hampers enforcement in this specific area. 
As discussed in this chapter, the manufacture and 
distribution of counterfeit goods has resulted in a 
surge of large-scale criminal operations that cross 
borders at both national and local authority levels. 
In recent years, Trading Standards services, as 
with other local authority services, have adapted 
in the face of austerity. On average, staff numbers 
have dropped by 40% and budgets by 50% (ref. 1). 
However as the primary enforcement agency 
tasked with tackling the import and distribution 
of dangerous counterfeit goods, Trading Standards 
services also have responsibility for the legislative 
enforcement of a diverse array of other consumer 
protection issues, including underage sales, tackling 
rogue traders, combatting scams, animal health 
issues and weights and measures. Some Trading 
Standards services currently operate with just 
one part-time member of staff, yet they must 
still attempt to enforce all statutory legislation 
assigned to Trading Standards. Unfortunately, in 
this climate of diminishing resources and increased 
legislative burdens, many individual Trading 
Standards services are struggling to cope with 
tackling this large-scale cross-border crime. 
In an attempt to address this issue, National 
Trading Standards has begun work to organise a 
more coordinated effort to tackle the distribution 
of dangerous consumer goods with their Safety at 
Ports and Borders project.  The team works with 
14 local authority services across ports, airports 
and postal hubs to intercept and detain unsafe 
or illegal counterfeit consumer products.  They 
also act as a single point of contact for border 
authorities, and utilise an intelligence-led approach 
to prioritise their resources effectively. Between 
April and December 2014, a staggering 1.9 million 
non-compliant or unsafe goods were intercepted 
at UK ports through the ports project. Of those, 
over 670,000 were faulty or non-compliant 
cosmetic products2.
Despite the successes of the project, it is 
clear that these efforts are only really addressing 
the tip of the iceberg in terms of the types of 
dangerous consumer products entering the UK.  
The patchwork of coverage provided by local 
authority Trading Standards services remains of 
concern in terms of tackling locally-based online 
sellers, who can easily move their operations 
from one locality to another in order to evade 
detection.  
Furthermore, for those Trading Standards 
and border agencies involved in the ports 
project, it is clear that they are unable to open 
every container and intercept every potentially 
dangerous import.  Thus for the tens of thousands 
of products that are successfully intercepted and 
seized by the team, there are many thousands 
more that make it onto market stalls, into shops 
and directly through the doors of UK consumers.  
Technological advances that would enable 
automated verification of certain types of goods 
at UK borders would go a long way in helping to 
tackle the stream of counterfeit goods entering 
the UK, especially during out-of-hours periods 
when Trading Standards inspectors are unavailable 
to monitor imports.  
Furthermore, outside of the work directly 
conducted at UK ports in tackling dangerous 
counterfeits, advances in forensics that would 
make it easier and more cost-effective for Trading 
Standards officers to test products that are 
manufactured and dispatched primarily within the 
UK would also enable quicker and more effective 
enforcement to tackle these issues at home.
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fakes were detained at our borders, many of 
which were small parcels being delivered through 
express and postal traffic, as a result of internet 
orders4. Demonstrating the increasing trend in 
globalisation for online retailing, over 83% of all 
counterfeits seized by customs authorities actually 
originated in China and Hong Kong. 
Perhaps the most worrying fact produced 
by the Commission was that over 25% of all 
counterfeits detained at the borders were 
potentially dangerous to the health and safety of 
consumers. Many counterfeit electrical appliances 
are sold without a ground-fault circuit interrupter 
(GFCI), which protects users against electrical 
shock, for example in the event that a hair dryer 
falls into water.  The purchase of counterfeit 
batteries may damage genuine electrical 
appliances such as tablets and smart phones.  
These batteries have not been subjected to the 
correct consumer tests, and have been known 
to cause overheating, explode or even catch fire 
under conditions in which a genuine product 
would survive.
Counterfeiting can no longer be considered 
to be an innocuous, small time, criminal 
sideshow. Moving massive volumes of product 
around the world, and evading enforcement 
authorities in the process, requires vast 
resources, wide-reaching transport chains and 
sophisticated networks. What has become clear 
in recent years is that the criminals involved in 
counterfeiting are extremely determined, and 
have not only become adept at manufacture 
and distribution – they have become shrewd 
marketing and sales people. By building 
impressive online websites and stores that 
appear to sell original products at discounted 
prices, they continually attract individual 
consumers and businesses to buy nothing 
more than inferior and substandard replicas.  
The added attraction for buyers is that the 
sites appear to be owned by UK or EU-based 
companies, but in reality they are mostly based in 
China or Russia.
A more recent development that has aided 
counterfeiters has been the attention given to 
social media (see case study p147). Using multiple 
auction sites, and social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter, criminals are gaining the 
confidence of users through images of genuine 
goods, fake labels and packaging, and prices that 
are actually close to those being charged for 
real products.  This latest ploy is used to deceive 
buyers into believing they are getting a bargain. 
However, the end result is that, once again, they 
often end up receiving cheap tat and potentially 
having their identities stolen and their bank 
accounts infiltrated as well.
A FORENSIC APPROACH 
Responding to the growing threat of 
counterfeiting requires new and innovative 
approaches and initiatives. Over the past 20 
years, enforcement in the UK has tended to 
focus on reducing the volume of available 
counterfeit products.  This has meant an 
emphasis on disrupting manufacturing, 
distribution and sales chains so that potential 
buyers are unable to get access to products.
However, due to a run down on resources; 
continuously extending enforcement 
responsibilities (local authority Trading 
Standards services are tasked with enforcing 
over 250 pieces of statutory legislation); and 
more effective manufacturing, transportation, 
distribution and selling models used by 
international criminals; it is clear that this work 
has been unable to effectively stem the supply 
for counterfeit goods. For more background 
on the Trading Standards situation, see the case 
study on p143.
Diverse legal frameworks across the world 
also contain obstacles that affect practices used 
in enforcement and information exchange.  The 
fact that penalties differ between jurisdictions 
has an effect on the courts and the mind-set of 
the general public in disparate ways.
As a result, there is a need for central 
government to work with enforcement 
authorities to identify successful best 
practices and build greater understanding and 
collaborative strength to adopt alternative 
strategies – including forensic analysis – that 
focus on other areas. An increase in the 
OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS,  
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UK HAS  
TENDED TO FOCUS ON REDUCING 
THE VOLUME OF AVAILABLE 
COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS.
CONSUMER PRODUCTS
145
CONSUMER PRODUCT:  
SAFETY CONCERN
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED  
TO TEST PRODUCTS
Food products: presence of toxins, permitted and not 
permitted colours and additives, sugar content and nutritional 
value
Liquid Chromatography Mass Spectrometry (LCMS)
Analysis using chemical reagents
Imported food and animal feed products: high levels of residual 
pesticides or heavy metals like mercury
Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometry (GCMS)
High Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC)
Cold Vapour Atomic Absorption Spectrometry (CVAFS)
Counterfeit food products: authenticity  
and harmful ingredients 
HPLC
Gas Chromatography (GC)
Melamine kitchenware: release of formaldehyde Spectrophotometry
Toys: compliance with BS EN71 (the British Standard for toy 
safety), including tests for heavy metals in paint, flammability 
and detachability of small parts
Inductively Coupled Plasma Atomic Emission Spectroscopy  
(ICP-AES)
Rate of spread of flame test within a flammability chamber
Tension, torque, drop, impact, compression and soaking tests 
to determine mechanical properties
Cosmetics: prohibited substances such as lead, mercury, 
hydroquinone or phenol; restricted substance such as 
hydrogen peroxide or p-phenylenediamine (PPD); and levels 
of permitted preservatives such as benzoic acid, sorbic acid, 
phenoxyethanol and parabens
Atomic Absorption Spectrometry
CVAFS 
HPLC
Titration
Table 1: Consumer products, potential safety concerns, and analytical techniques used in investigations
availability of forensic data would help to define 
the scope and methods of illicit goods trading 
in the UK, and focus the appropriate amount of 
resources to stop illegal trade. In other words, 
enforcement needs to be reshaped to change 
perceptions and understanding, rather than 
solely being aimed at wiping out the availability 
of fake goods. 
This strategy requires forensic analysis built 
on robust statistics and certified measurement 
methods, and has enormous potential to 
strengthen the value of genuine goods.  This in 
turn ensures real financial advantages to the 
manufacturing economy, on a huge scale: the sale 
of counterfeit goods has a serious detrimental 
effect on the economy, with a projected cost of 
thousands of jobs.  This forensics-based approach 
would also inspire consumer confidence, 
and enable secure supply chains that result in 
economic growth with an increase in employment. 
To ensure the authenticity of traded goods 
in the UK, the local authority Trading Standards 
services work in collaboration with the public 
analyst laboratories. Public Analysts provide 
scientific and calibration services ensuring 
product safety and compliance with all relevant 
UK legislation. In doing so, they use a variety 
of forensic techniques to both protect the 
consumer from harm and support enforcement 
services, particularly Trading Standards Officers. 
Examples of forensic techniques used 
to identify and investigate issues relating to 
consumer products are detailed in Table 1.
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES
An important growth area in the forensic 
analysis of consumer goods involves putting 
the process of authenticity verification in the 
hands of consumers, rather than relying on a 
governmental body to validate genuine goods 
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through targeted sampling within centralised 
laboratories. 
Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) have recently developed 
inks using nanocrystals5, dyed with rare earth 
minerals in unique polymer stream patterns, 
which can be used to identify legitimate 
products through the printing of unique 
security tags or barcodes.  These patterns glow 
under UV light and can be detected with a 
smartphone. 
Another important threat to the purchase of 
genuine consumer goods is the growth in 3D 
printing and additive manufacturing technology. 
Engineering firms are adopting these techniques 
as a means of cheaper and more efficient 
manufacturing. But the technology can also 
make it easier to produce counterfeit goods 
if the drawings for a genuine part are leaked 
online, or even reverse engineered. A striking 
example of this can be found in a 2014 
Washington Post article6, which accidentally 
published a leaked photograph of the US 
Transportation Security Administration’s master 
key for its approved locks that are used on 
millions of suitcases worldwide. Although the 
photo was removed from the website within 
hours, a set of computer automated design 
(CAD) files had been uploaded to the internet 
in an equally short amount of time, with 3D 
printed keys produced and successfully used to 
open TSA locks the same day.
A recent report7 from the information 
technology research and advisory company 
Gartner predicted that the emergence of 
3D printing will create major challenges with 
regards to intellectual property (IP) theft, 
resulting in a loss of “at least $100 billion per 
year in IP globally” by 2018. New safeguarding 
techniques are required to counter the threat 
from this novel technology. One possible 
solution has been put forward by the US 
company Quantum Materials Corp8, which has 
developed a technology that uses embedded 
nanocrystals within 3D inks to produce a 
physically unclonable signature known only to 
the manufacturer of the product. While this 
enables the secure identification of genuine 
parts, it does not stop the production and use 
of unauthorised copies.
In developing innovative technologies in 
consumer protection, we must be mindful that 
these advances create the following benefits:
•  More focused and targeted deterrence of 
the trafficking of dangerous products and 
organised criminality
•  Enable greater collaboration between the 
relevant authorities, such as those in the UK, 
EU, international enforcement bodies, and 
policymakers (including Europol, Interpol, 
the World Customs Organization, and the 
European Commission)
•  Empower harm reduction tactics within local 
and global markets
•  Facilitate assurance of provenance throughout 
the supply chain, from manufacturer to 
consumer, to raise confidence and therefore 
value in genuine goods
From the consumer viewpoint, more should 
be done to make the online shopping arena 
a safer space.  The most recent Ofcom 
Communications Market report9 found that 
smartphones have now overtaken computers 
as the preferred method of browsing the 
internet. While the use of virus protection and 
firewall software may be common knowledge in 
protecting computers from online attacks, few 
smartphone users install specialist smartphone 
security software and are therefore at risk of 
fraud through malicious websites and phishing 
attacks. Although dedicated store apps offer a 
level of protection, not all companies have their 
own apps and a large amount of trade is still 
carried out through browser-based shopping. 
There are a number of accreditation schemes 
designed to enable safe internet shopping, 
including Brand-i10 (a shopping directory that 
only lists webstores selling genuine products), 
VeriSign Trust11 (a seal awarded to the website 
when the company’s identity has been verified 
and the site has passed daily tests for malware), 
and the Trusted Shops scheme12 (an online shop 
certification system resulting the display of the 
IMPROVING THE SECURITY AND 
VERACITY OF SUPPLY CHAINS, 
THROUGH THE USE OF ADVANCED 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES, REQUIRES 
INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION. 
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here is little doubt that efforts 
to confront intellectual property 
(IP) infringement have seen 
major changes in recent years.  
Traditionally, Trading Standards was, quite 
rightly, focused on counterfeit products being 
offered for sale at car boot sales and local 
markets. While this does still take place, the 
past decade has seen a significant shift towards 
online infringement. Initially centred on auction 
websites, this has moved in the past few years 
towards social media. Indeed, the most recent 
IP Crime Report1 makes specific reference to 
the significant opportunities and challenges 
that social media present. Figures published 
in the report show that products sourced 
from social media are now the second-largest 
source of reports made to Crimestoppers 
regarding IP infringement. An unfortunate 
side-effect of this increase is an associated 
increase in issues of product safety.  There 
are numerous recorded incidences of serious 
injury and even death associated with the sale 
of counterfeit products bought online.
A recent case investigated by the National 
Trading Standards eCrime Team (NTSeCT) 
highlights the growing phenomenon of 
products sold through social media. Initially, a 
quantity of potentially IP-infringing products 
was uncovered through the diligent work 
of Trading Standards officers at one of the 
ports of entry on the south coast of England. 
Intelligence suggested the products were 
destined for sale online, so the case was 
referred to NTSeCT.  The products recovered 
included various cosmetics, manicure kits and 
associated electrical devices (nail-gel dryers 
and electric nail-files etc).  The electrical 
products were of particular concern because 
they were specifically intended for use in nail 
salons, which would then expose countless 
consumers to potentially significant risk of 
injury.
The ultimate destination of the products 
was traced to a warehousing and storage 
facility in the south-west of England. Following 
the execution of an entry warrant, fur ther 
significant quantities of similar products were 
uncovered along with business records and 
various electronic devices such as laptops 
and mobile phones. As is routine in Trading 
Standards cases, the electronic devices 
were examined by digital forensic specialists 
within the eCrime Team – a key component 
in successfully identifying and prosecuting 
offenders. 
Digital forensic examinations regularly 
uncover evidence of the products’ supply 
chain; communications concerning their 
purchase; and evidence of the intended outlet 
for the products.  This is not only vital in 
securing successful prosecution outcomes, 
it is also a rich source of intelligence when 
trying to identify the wider organised crime 
networks that are known to be associated 
with counterfeiting. In this case, the forensic 
analysis uncovered details of the product 
manufacturers in China, the shipping company, 
the importer and evidence to indicate that the 
products were ultimately destined for retail 
online through social media.  This intelligence 
helped Trading Standards to prevent fur ther 
shipments from entering the UK, while 
ensuring that products already in the country 
were destroyed and prevented from entering 
the supply chain.
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CASE STUDY
BLOCK CHAIN:  AUTHENTICITY  
AND PROVENANCE 
P
JESSI BAKER, CEO of Project Provenance Ltd
roduct supply chains are often 
complex and opaque. It can be 
difficult to prove where materials, 
ingredients and products have 
come from, or how they were created. Up 
and down supply chains, there is a call for 
more transparency and an increasing demand 
for products with proven origin. Information 
about how products are made and used can 
inform better purchasing decisions – based 
on more than just their price, quality and 
brand – but that information needs to be 
both available and trusted. 
This end-to-end transparency is almost 
impossible to achieve with existing systems, 
because the information would have to 
be pooled into large data silos.  This has 
technological, economic, and organisational 
limitations: 
•  Pooling data creates a single point of 
weakness and failure that also acts as a 
bottleneck; it can also lead to potential 
biases and selective disclosure 
•  The future costs of such data silo projects 
are highly opaque, and joint initiatives are 
often impractical because there is little 
incentive for individual par tners to join 
when they can freely benefit from the 
results – for example, in a sprawling food 
supply chain where middlemen may fear 
being cut out if data is exposed
•  Par tners may fear an undesired disclosure 
of critical business information, causing a 
loss of competitive advantage 
•  NGOs or third par ties that could be 
commissioned as a neutral operator often 
lack the technical exper tise to do so
Block chain technology now offers a solution. 
A block chain is a form of database that 
groups data into blocks, and links them using 
cryptographic signatures. Crucially, these 
blocks are shared across a global peer-to-
peer network.  This provides an open data 
platform that can deliver neutrality, reliability 
and security. 
The basic block chain mechanism was 
originally proposed as par t of a solution for 
administering the shared accounting ledger 
underlying Bitcoin. Beyond this financial 
application, block chains can be generalized 
and used to implement arbitrary digital 
contracts that no one – neither the users 
nor the operators of the system – can break.  
This makes block chains a unique platform 
for applications involving multiple par ties 
with little trust in each other : for example, 
fragmented product supply chains or 
complex chains of custody. 
One key attribute of block chains that 
make them well suited to storing and 
transferring material is the public/private key 
infrastructure. It mimics a physical signature 
by provably registering an identity with a 
digital document or instruction, without 
giving others the ability to reproduce those 
signatures. Consequently, it is possible to hold 
a small piece of data (known as a secret, or 
private key), and use it to demonstrate that 
you have explicitly sanctioned a par ticular 
piece of information (a document, image, 
order or other such digital item) without 
ever uncovering that secret to another par ty.
Provenance has developed a block chain 
to handle supply chain data. Suppliers, 
manufacturers, brands and cer tifiers can 
employ this framework to access, publish 
and transfer records of ownership of physical 
assets, along with key information about their 
creation, transformation or ownership.  This is 
linked to physical items with smar t tags and 
IDs (e.g. barcode and batch number). 
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This framework provides an immutable, 
public (although pseudo-anonymous) 
record that is interoperable across all data 
systems. It is also auditable, cost-efficient, 
and offers guaranteed continuity because 
it is independent of any single company or 
data operator.  This allows the authenticity 
or provenance of an item to be tracked 
along even the most complex chain of 
custody.
INFORMATION ABOUT 
HOW PRODUCTS 
ARE MADE AND USED 
CAN INFORM BETTER 
PURCHASING DECISIONS 
– BASED ON MORE THAN 
JUST THEIR PRICE, QUALITY 
AND BRAND – BUT THAT 
INFORMATION NEEDS 
TO BE BOTH AVAILABLE 
AND TRUSTED. 
European Trustmark). Research is needed to 
ascertain whether a universal verification scheme 
is achievable across all platforms: that would 
require close collaboration between regulatory 
bodies, banks, retailers and phone manufacturers. 
Improving the security and veracity of supply 
chains, through the use of advanced new 
technologies, requires investment in innovation.  
The first steps in this space were made with 
the advent of radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) technology, and stamping of goods 
with holographic logos. Further advantages for 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations within the supply chain are afforded 
through the use of block chain technology, 
for example (see case study p148). Lab on a 
chip (LOC) technology, combined with the 
rapid expansion of smartphone technology, 
has shown great promise in transforming 
the biomedical landscape13. In this case, the 
analysis environment is shifting: from centralised 
laboratories with long turn-around testing 
routines, to point-of-care diagnostics that 
almost instantly put information into medical 
practitioners’ hands.  The same type of 
technology could be leveraged to produce a 
similar revolutionary change in the detection 
and policing of counterfeit goods.
CONCLUSION
In tackling the ever-growing issue of consumer 
fraud, we should be mindful that advances in 
manufacturing and communications technology 
presents opportunity not just to the criminals 
producing and distributing counterfeit goods, 
but can also stimulate significant growth within 
genuine markets. 
By creating the right conditions within the UK 
to facilitate innovation in the area of forensic 
evaluation of consumer goods, as well as expert 
consumer protection services that can call upon 
these to react to criminal threats, we create 
value for the UK manufacturing market.
The authors would like to thank Kent Scientific Services and The 
Anti-Counterfeiting Group for their assistance with the research for 
this chapter.
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CHAPTER 14
WE BREATHE, EAT AND DRINK OTHER 
PEOPLE’S POLLUTION.  THE ‘TRAGEDY 
OF THE COMMONS’ HAS A POWERFUL 
PRESENCE ACROSS THE ENVIRONMENT. 
IT HAS PROVED DIFFICULT TO DESIGN 
MARKET SOLUTIONS TO DEAL WITH 
THESE ISSUES OF EQUITY. 
ENVIRONMENTAL FORENSICS
IAN L. BOYD 
Chief Scientific 
Adviser, Defra
We breathe, eat and drink other people’s pollution. Yet it has proved difficult to 
design market solutions to deal with this equitably, so that the individuals who cause 
environmental degradation carry the costs of those actions.  To promote good 
environmental outcomes, micro-innovation in measuring environmental variables needs to 
be matched by macro-economic innovation to build market-based solutions. 
orensics is not a discipline commonly 
associated with environmental issues. 
Whether tracing the source of 
environmental pollution based on a 
chemical signature or holding a nation to account 
for its non-compliance with internationally-agreed 
standards (e.g. in trans-boundary pollution), this 
requires measurements to assess whether the 
law has been broken. In broad terms, this can be 
described as ‘environmental forensics’.
This chapter is addressed to policy developers, 
regulators and NGOs. Like other developed 
countries, the UK is on a journey from 
understanding that it is essential to regulate the 
effects that people have on the environment, 
to understanding how regulation can be 
implemented most effectively and efficiently. 
UK environmental law is largely led from the 
European Union, and the legal process has 
not proceeded much beyond the imposition 
of legally-binding regulation, often measured 
against standards and targets. Prevention 
through improved behaviour would be a better 
mechanism than regulation, but moving social and 
cultural norms to a position where environmental 
protection is part of the reward structure is still 
a long way off.  This chapter sets out where the 
challenges lie for achieving this transition, and the 
role of science in driving this progress.
The rationale for setting environmental 
standards and measuring compliance is strongly 
driven by the concept of equity. Around half 
of some air pollutants in the UK come from 
other parts of Europe1 – and, of course, the UK 
contributes to the air quality problems of other 
European countries. Water contaminated by 
sewage washed out to sea has the potential to 
contaminate seafood, which could be distributed 
widely through the food chain.  The choices 
people make about how to dispose of waste can 
have widespread effects, sometimes with long 
time lags between the release of pollutants and 
the ultimate effect, and this has become an issue 
driving global politics when it comes to different 
national responses to the need to reduce carbon 
emissions.
We breathe, eat and drink other people’s 
pollution.  The ‘tragedy of the commons’ has a 
powerful presence across the environment. It 
has proved difficult to design market solutions 
to deal with these issues of equity, so that the 
individuals who cause environmental degradation 
carry the costs of those actions. Indeed, costing 
environmental degradation is itself difficult. It has 
become a duty of government to hold polluters 
to account for their compliance with standards 
of behaviour designed to try to account for 
these costs. 
The market itself is unsympathetic to this need 
and the activities to cost them through regulation 
for public good are often one step behind market 
innovations. Even establishing strong principles 
such as ‘the polluter pays’, which forms a basis of 
European environmental law, has a mild effect on 
this process.  There is a need to better align the 
common goods derived from the environment 
with market behaviours.
Measurement is at the root of providing 
assurance around compliance with standards, 
and for invoking direct action to detect and 
remedy environmental problems, sometimes 
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by prosecuting offenders.  These measurements 
span traditional forensics and involve: provision 
of post-hoc proof of illegal action, such as 
the release of toxic chemicals; preventative 
monitoring through regular measurement and 
reporting of compliance against a standard; and 
provision of evidence used to inform decisions 
about environmental permitting.
Forensic methods also apply where there is a 
need to control the emergence of bad outcomes.  
The investigation that led to the understanding 
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
involved detailed analysis that ultimately enabled 
the detection and control of the disease agent. A 
similar kind of investigation led to the discovery of 
the tropospheric ozone hole and the subsequent 
establishment of the Montreal Protocol, which 
regulates the release of ozone-depleting chemicals 
in to the atmosphere; and to the identification of 
tributyltin (TBT) as a potent endocrine disrupter, 
which has now been eliminated from anti-fouling 
paints used on ships. Forensics merges almost 
imperceptibly with investigative epidemiology and 
environmental science.
WHY TAKE A FORENSIC APPROACH 
TO THE ENVIRONMENT?
We value the environment for the benefits 
it provides.  These benefits take many forms, 
including the goods and services from the 
environment that support our health and welfare. 
According to the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS), nearly one-quarter of the net worth of 
the UK is accounted for by the environment, 
although this is likely to be only a partial view of 
its true worth because it is difficult to estimate 
the non-market values derived from the 
environment. 
Recent work under the National Ecosystem 
Assessment2 and by the Natural Capital 
Committee3 has gone a long way to improving 
explicit valuation of the environment in ways that 
could eventually result in environmental assets 
appearing as part of a national infrastructure 
balance sheet. In the long term, one objective 
would be to build market-based mechanisms 
to sustain environmental benefits.  The corollary 
of such a mechanism is that there would also 
be mechanisms to cost the impact of different 
activities on the environment, based on the rate 
at which they would deplete the environmental 
asset base. Ensuring that people pay this cost 
would be an important feature of any market-
based mechanisms applied to a more generic 
form of regulation. For the time being these 
mechanisms largely do not exist, so it is for 
governments to safeguard the benefits through 
statutory, voluntary and regulatory mechanisms.  
This has led to the development of a doctrine 
of market intervention in order to design 
environmental resilience.
There is now a long and contentious history 
about how the safeguards have been built in to 
European and national legal and administrative 
instruments, such as European Directives. 
A similar process has happened within the 
United States.  The contentious nature of the 
issue has largely revolved around the absolute 
and relative valuations that different sections 
of society have placed on the environment. 
Individual actors operating rationally but with 
self-interest are rarely rewarded for acting in 
the wider public good.  The lack of an agreed 
basis for constructing objective valuations of 
environmental goods leaves a lot to play for, often 
seen in political debates that continue to the 
present.
Government regulation to prevent the 
misallocation of environmental resources is 
consequently a very blunt instrument.  The 
resulting complex mesh of environmental 
regulation has the characteristics of an over-
engineered construction produced by designers 
who neither understood the forces they were 
attempting to control, nor the materials used 
to build the structure. Arguably, the designers 
were also unsure of the structure’s purpose. In 
the absence of a common currency for valuing 
(and possibly trading) environmental assets, 
there is now a plethora of different variables 
used as end points, or objectives, in themselves. 
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CASE STUDY
ENVIRONMENTAL DNA ANALYSIS 
FOR WILDLIFE CONSERVATION  
PETER BROTHERTON, Director of Specialist Services and Programmes, Natural England
ome wildlife species are hard to find. 
When elusive creatures are also in 
decline and strictly protected under 
European law, difficulties in detecting 
them can be problematic for conservationists 
and businesses alike. One such species is the 
great crested newt (Triturus cristatus), our most 
charismatic amphibian. Great crested newts 
have declined across Europe due to losses of 
their ponds and other habitats, but they are still 
widespread and locally common in some parts 
of the UK. As a European Protected Species, it is 
an offence to kill, injure or disturb great crested 
newts or damage their habitat.  To avoid com-
mitting an offence, businesses are required to 
assess whether they are present in any suitable 
ponds likely to be impacted by a development.  
Traditionally, this assessment has been a skilled 
and time-consuming process: each pond re-
quiring at least four night-time visits during the 
breeding period by licensed surveyors who use 
three separate survey methods to search for the 
newts.  The complexity of this traditional survey 
technique imposes significant costs and delays 
on developers, while also making it hard to plan 
their effective conservation.
In 2013, Natural England and the 
Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) supported research to 
investigate whether emerging environmental 
DNA (eDNA) techniques could offer a solution 
to the problem of surveying for great crested 
newts. eDNA is nuclear or mitochondrial 
DNA that is released from an organism into its 
environment, and initial proof of concept studies 
had demonstrated that its detection could 
be an effective survey technique in aquatic 
environments.  The government-funded study 
conclusively showed that eDNA surveys were 
at least as effective as the traditional technique, 
while also providing estimated savings of up to 
£1000 per pond1. Natural England was quick to 
approve the new technique, and industry was 
quick to respond. Over 2500 eDNA tests were 
carried out in 2015, suggesting that businesses 
are likely to have saved over £2 million in survey 
costs this year alone thanks to the introduction 
of the eDNA test; time-related savings are likely 
to be even more significant. A growing number 
of laboratories are also coming forward to offer 
the test. 
Innovation feeds innovation. Our ability to 
more easily detect great crested newts has 
made it possible to engage the public in the first 
national survey of the species, begun in 2015. 
Even more significantly, Natural England is now 
working with local authorities to use eDNA to 
develop a detailed understanding of local great 
crested newt populations.  This information will 
enable the piloting of a new, strategic approach 
to the conservation of the species across 
planning authority areas, doing more to protect 
and enhance the most important locations 
for the species, while making it easier for 
development to proceed in other, less significant 
great crested newt areas.  This transformative 
approach will see a shift in the emphasis of 
Natural England’s licensing decisions towards 
achieving better conservation outcomes for 
newt populations as a whole instead of seeking 
to protect newts in locations that are unlikely to 
be viable in the long-term.  This is good news for 
business and good news for newts. 
As DNA detection techniques become more 
advanced, we can expect to see a rapid growth 
in wildlife applications, from early detection 
of invasive species and diseases through to 
understanding soil communities.  The innovations 
we are achieving with great crested newts are 
only the start of this story.
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Whether these actually reflect meaningful 
outcomes varies with circumstances, but in 
many cases the connection between these 
and the values placed on the environment 
by society are tenuous.  These values are 
themselves inconsistent and therefore difficult 
to compare; and, where conflict arises, it 
becomes impossible to provide an objective 
assessment of where priorities should lie.  
The implicit claim made of these variables 
is that they are surrogates for valuation, but 
this sometimes lacks credibility. For example, 
‘waste recycling’ is a measurement that has 
been treated as an end in itself, rather than 
one possible route to reduce residual waste 
and improve resource extraction. Focus on this 
measurement is potentially distorting action 
away from reducing our use of resources and 
reusing ‘waste’, both of which are the real 
objectives.
Consequently, the UK is mandated to 
measure an immense amount of information 
about everything from the chemistry of rivers 
to the number of birds on farmland and the 
noise emitted by human activity in the ocean. 
Efforts to focus attention on the features that 
genuinely inform us about the health of the 
environment have been hampered by a lack of 
underlying knowledge about their impacts. For 
example, we know almost nothing about the 
consequences of man-made noise in the ocean, 
but we have created binding commitments to 
measure noise within certain sound frequency 
ranges – without even knowing whether those 
frequency ranges are important, or what the 
dose-response might be. In this particular 
case, we do not even know how the response 
might manifest itself, whether in fish, marine 
mammals, plankton, corals, jellyfish, or seaweed. 
Noise could affect any or none of these species, 
and there is even uncertainty about whether 
we need to study populations or individuals 
in this context.  The rationale for actions like 
this hinges on the hazard-avoidance doctrine 
commonly used today.  This doctrine suggests that 
any changes caused by human presence must be 
avoided, even if (as in this case) the changes most 
probably lie within the normal range of natural 
variability.
Seen in this context, the direction of travel in 
environmental forensics – towards measuring 
and controlling more and more, at finer and finer 
levels of detail, just in case it might be important 
in future – is clearly untenable. 
This is the practical consequence of the 
‘Precautionary Principle’, stimulated by a systemic 
pessimism about the ways in which innovation 
can imperceptibly draw down environmental 
capital without paying a proper cost, but without 
also recognising that innovation has a double 
edge because it is both a threat and a solution.  
The need for the measurement or monitoring 
of environmental indicators through time was 
initially driven by a sincere search for those 
surrogate indicators within the environment that 
most effectively represented societal valuation. 
But this has gradually mutated into a process of 
measurement and reporting of data as an end in 
itself, which supports the doctrine of designed 
resilience, often closely associated with the 
doctrine of hazard avoidance. Both are hungrier 
for evidence showing compliance to potentially 
flawed standards than they are for evidence to 
improve the basis upon which those standards 
are designed. Across Europe, feeding the resulting 
appetite for environmental data is now an 
industrial-scale process requiring governments to 
establish bodies like the UK’s Environment Agency, 
which also has regulatory powers. At European 
scale, coordination and thought leadership is in the 
hands of the European Environment Agency, while 
regulation sits with the European Commission.  
The data are used to prosecute the miscreants – a 
process known within the European structure as 
‘infraction’ – and to produce reports intended to 
illuminate the state of the environment4. Some, like 
the volume ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings’5, 
seemed intentionally designed to magnify the 
THE UK IS MANDATED TO MEASURE AN IMMENSE AMOUNT OF 
INFORMATION ABOUT EVERYTHING FROM THE CHEMISTRY OF RIVERS 
TO THE NUMBER OF BIRDS ON FARMLAND AND THE NOISE EMITTED BY 
HUMAN ACTIVITY IN THE OCEAN.
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THE ABILITY TO REPORT MEASUREMENTS IN REAL TIME, AND AT A 
REDUCED COST, IS MAKING SOME DATA MORE ACCESSIBLE, HELPING 
DECISION-MAKING AT ALL LEVELS OF SOCIETY AND MOVING US 
TOWARDS THE GOAL OF ENSURING THAT PEOPLE HAVE THE 
INFORMATION THEY NEED
negative consequences of not adopting the 
doctrines of hazard avoidance and designed 
resilience.
PREVENTION VERSUS DETECTION
Functional environmental forensics can perhaps 
be seen to bifurcate along two interacting 
tracks. One track involves detecting and 
correcting incidents where an agreed standard 
has been exceeded (detection); the other 
uses feedback from forensic measurements to 
change behaviours within society, thus reducing 
the probability of exceedance in the first place 
(prevention). 
Detection is usually linked with operational 
management to support trade regulations and 
protect human health, for example. Prevention 
concerns long-term objectives that seek 
progressive environmental improvement, or 
attempt to prevent the slide towards declining 
baselines of environmental quality, a process 
that has been suggested to have happened for 
marine fish populations.
Prevention is often seen to be the most 
cost-effective option; the very high costs of 
environmental remediation often mean that 
investments in prevention are likely to be 
worthwhile. Consequently, the considerable 
infrastructure that has emerged to support 
prevention within Europe probably has a strong 
economic rationale, although this has not, as 
far as I am aware, been tested adequately 
against any counterfactual.  The current range 
of different infrastructure and bureaucratic 
solutions applied to environmental regulation 
across the developed world provides an 
opportunity to build a better understanding of 
the relative merits of investment in detection 
and prevention. It is a moot point whether 
prevention is always more effective than a 
combination of risk-based detection and 
proportionately large penalties.  The latter is 
more likely to achieve a culture of deterrence 
and build a sense of devolved responsibility than 
the former, where there are few incentives for 
individuals to take responsibility for their own 
actions. Developing countries would be well 
placed to benefit from such an analysis when 
contemplating how to design their own systems 
of compliance with environmental standards. 
A potential strength of the doctrine of 
designed resilience and investment in prevention 
is the prospect it provides for progressive 
improvement of environmental quality. Ramping 
up the thresholds of compliance over time 
has been critical to achieving reductions in 
residual waste, improved beach water quality 
and reduced vehicle emissions.  This can only 
be achieved against a background of effective 
measurement using standardised methods. 
One example of the aggregated progress 
enabled by this approach can be found in 
improvements in air quality (see Figure 1). 
Although the speed of change in this and other 
cases is slower than many would wish for, the 
rate of change is probably proportional to 
the rate of evolution of the delivery process.  
This, in turn, is a complex function of several 
rate-limiting processes, including the rate 
of innovation in technology and business 
systems; depreciation and obsolescence of 
past investments; and the discounting applied 
to the future benefits derived from current 
investments. However, none of these would 
operate effectively unless there was a system 
for setting evidence-based standards, and the 
field of environmental forensics provides this 
foundation.
WHAT SHOULD BE MEASURED?
The environment is a complex place, with 
many variables that could be measured to 
assess compliance, control outcomes and adapt 
to emerging challenges. Environmental data 
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Figure 1: Annual emissions of major air pollutants relative to levels in 1970 (ref. 1). Solid lines show the measured relative  
emissions.  The introduction of measured standards and targets has been an important factor in achieving improvements in 
air quality.
DNA IN THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT 
CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE 
PRESENCE OF KEY CRYPTIC SPECIES AT 
A SMALL FRACTION OF THE COST.
are becoming increasingly accessible through 
automated measurement and new sensors.  
The ability to report measurements in real 
time, and at a reduced cost, is making some 
data more accessible, helping decision-making 
at all levels of society and moving us towards 
the goal of ensuring that people have the 
information they need to make decisions based 
on the costs of their actions. Increasing volume, 
accessibility and precision of measurements 
presents challenges to this goal, because data 
are not equivalent to information for those 
without the expertise to interpret the data. 
Greater precision means that dose can be 
measured to phenomenally low levels, but that 
precision is not necessarily matched by the 
same level of understanding of dose-response 
at these low levels.
The doctrine of hazard avoidance tends 
to perpetuate and amplify ignorance of 
the importance of dose. For example, it is 
attractive to some environmental pressure 
groups to play strongly on the recent 
assessments concluding that glyphosate, 
a commonly used herbicide, is probably 
carcinogenic. Because we can now measure 
glyphosate in food and other environmental 
products to extraordinary precision, it follows 
that we are increasingly aware of its presence 
at very low doses. However, this does not 
equate to the presence of a pharmacologically 
important dose, and this point is often ignored 
by those making these kinds of claims.
The DPSIR (driver, pressure, state, impact, 
response) framework has provided a further 
guide to the construction of environmental 
measurement and the application of regulation. 
DPSIR captures the concept of cause-effect, 
which is probably not sufficiently central to 
thinking within the field of environmental 
forensics. In principle, it is better to regulate the 
driver that creates an environmental pressure, 
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because it is earlier in the sequence of causation.
The problem for many regulators is that 
causation is often poorly understood, and the 
public perception of causation in contested 
areas is susceptible to propaganda – as has 
happened with the controversy around 
changes in populations of pollinators. In this 
case the public perception is that some forms 
of pesticide are responsible for declines in bee 
populations, whereas it is much more likely 
that a wide range of factors are responsible, 
including weather, long-term trends in land 
use, increasing disease and poor data about 
pollinator populations, as well as pesticides.  
That makes it difficult to develop regulations 
that will help pollinator populations to 
recover : not only are there many contributing 
drivers, but there is also uncertainty about 
the actual direction of change in many of 
these populations, and there are asymmetrical 
views about causation amongst some of the 
stakeholders who need to be persuaded to 
adapt their behaviour. In this case, forensics 
provides the evidence that will shift behaviours 
in such a way as to achieve the objective – by 
distributing the costs among those who value 
the benefits brought by pollinators, and by 
incentivising those whose valuation is lower 
than the cost they would have to pay to 
adapt their behaviours.  These incentives are 
often provided through direct payments for 
specific activities, as happens in environmental 
stewardship schemes delivered under the 
Common Agricultural Policy.
The case of pollinators is perhaps an 
example of how market-based solutions may 
tend to emerge in future. Public concern 
becomes reflected in a shift in the valuation 
of an environmental asset, leading to a greater 
proportion of people being willing to carry a 
cost of supporting the asset. A similar process 
may have begun with air quality. However, in 
each case there is a need to present good 
quality evidence to the public in ways that 
they can understand and act upon.
TYPE AND QUALITY OF 
MEASUREMENT
Technology is driving innovation in environmental 
forensics in the same way as it is in other 
forensic applications. Harnessing the power 
of non-targeted analytical techniques such as 
metagenomics, isotope analysis, DNA finger 
printing and next-generation sequencing is 
essential (see Chapter 10). 
These can be applied to a wide range of 
approaches, including understanding the sources 
and legality of supply of food to timber and fish6. 
DNA in the wider environment can provide 
evidence of the presence of key cryptic species at 
a small fraction of the cost of previous methods 
(see case study on p152). Further examples 
of progressive technological improvements 
include: rapidly increasing availability and spatial 
and temporal resolution of Earth-observation 
data at declining cost; and intelligent, statistically-
robust sampling designs that make measurements 
cheaper and more effective, and which allows 
adjustment of precision to be scaled to the 
appetite for risk.
The way in which the UK implements air 
quality measurements is an example where 
a sparsely distributed network of monitoring 
stations is supplemented by modelling of the 
dispersal process for different chemicals and 
particles.  This approach merges accurate, site-
specific monitoring data with metrological 
models.  This system remains compliant with EU 
regulations but costs significantly less to support 
than other more extensive air quality monitoring 
networks in other EU member states.
Genomics methods are used to help direct 
action, rather than to apply standards to improve 
water quality.  This is especially the case when 
distinguishing human and animal bacteria on 
bathing water pollution, and the methods can 
now also distinguish animal species, allowing more 
targeted management responses at local scales. 
Greater capability to measure also has a double 
edge. Forensic investigation of the presence 
of viruses and bacteria in shellfish, based on 
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genetic signatures, has driven a discussion about 
higher standards for shellfish flesh that would 
impose significant impacts on the industry.  
There is no method for distinguishing live or 
infectious material from dead or non-infectious 
material, and deeper investigation often shows 
that tell-tale fragments of viral DNA do not 
represent the presence of ‘live’ virus. Similarly 
when Cryptosporidium entered the water supply 
to over 300,000 homes in Lancashire during 
August 2015, the local water company issued 
a ‘boil notice’.  There were no cases of illness 
that could be linked to the contamination, and 
there was a strong suspicion that the oocysts 
of Cryptosporidium, a protozoan parasite, were 
unviable. Again, the detection methods had a high 
sensitivity, but a low capacity to distinguish the 
viability of the infectious agent.
The move towards better, cheaper, smaller 
and lower-power sensors has the potential to 
revolutionise environmental measurement and, 
with it, to change environmental forensics.  Taking 
the laboratory to the field, and disseminating 
information from sensors embedded in everyday 
devices such as cars and phones, will place the 
power of detection and analysis in the hands of 
many more people.  This will help to transfer 
the power to make informed decisions closer to 
those for whom the costs and benefits matter 
most, and could incentivise behavioural choices 
in ways that reward individuals for working in the 
common good. If car drivers had access to simple 
air quality measurements about their own car’s 
contribution to air pollution, it would probably 
create a very different culture of car ownership, 
and manufacturers would respond accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Environmental forensics provides the supporting 
evidence for a complex set of legislative, 
regulatory and voluntary instruments that 
support many of the normal functions within 
society. As a field, environmental forensics has 
expanded rapidly in the past 30 years and is now 
supported by an industry that generates the 
forensic data required to assess the environmental 
performance of everything from individuals to 
multi-national governance processes, or machines 
to entire industrial processes.
This rapid growth has been driven by the 
joint doctrines of hazard avoidance and designed 
resilience, a result of the failure to find (or even 
to seek) market solutions that help to couple 
individual incentives to broader public goods 
derived from the environment. While the 
processes in place have been built for very sound 
and pragmatic reasons, there is a need to shift 
towards more risk- and market-based solutions.
There will always be a need for regulation 
and statute in this field, and a strong role for 
government, but the nature of environmental 
forensics needs to change.  The current system, 
illustrated by the approaches adopted in 
Europe and to some extent the United States, 
is arguably unaffordable in the long term, 
especially if it was to be rolled out across the 
developing world.  Technology innovation can 
help to sustain the system, by delivering more 
data at greater precision closer to the events 
that affect behavioural choices. But the down 
sides associated with the interpretive capacity of 
decision-makers needs to be addressed through 
sophisticated information delivery processes. 
Micro-innovation in measuring environmental 
variables needs to be matched by macro-
economic innovation to build market-based 
solutions. Internalising and accounting for the 
economic costs of alternative actions for the 
environment – while providing forensic evidence 
to support this approach – is most likely to be 
the best way forward.  Transitioning developed 
economies such as the UK to this alternative way 
of working needs leadership and vision.
AS A FIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL FORENSICS 
HAS EXPANDED RAPIDLY IN THE PAST 30 
YEARS AND IS NOW SUPPORTED BY AN 
INDUSTRY THAT GENERATES THE 
FORENSIC DATA REQUIRED TO ASSESS 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
OF EVERYTHING FROM INDIVIDUALS TO 
MULTI-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
PROCESSES, OR MACHINES TO ENTIRE 
INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES.
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In the future, we may be able to 
identify a person’s activity or where 
they have been by studying microbial 
communities in their bodies, known 
as the ‘microbiome’. 
Advances in technology 
that allow the human 
genome to be mapped 
in hours rather than 
weeks will accelerate 
the availability of 
genetic information. 
Miniaturisation and 
innovations such as 
RapidHIT DNA or 
paraDNA will bring 
conventional laboratory 
techniques closer to 
crime scenes and speed 
up the identification of 
offenders.
Forensic investigators will 
use ‘big data’ gathered 
from the Internet of 
Things and different 
databases, using algorithms 
to give advance warning 
of events.
The high cost and judicial 
impact of failing to meet 
standards means forensic 
techniques must be 
validated and backed by 
a strong evidence base 
before being used. 
The global market for 
traditional forensic science 
is predicted to reach 
$17.7 billion 
by 2019. Digital forensics 
promises further growth. 
The UK has a long-standing 
reputation for being at the 
forefront of forensic science 
innovations, including 
developing fingerprinting 
and DNA profiling. 
By 2020, there will be an estimated  
5 billion 
internet users and up to 
100 billion 
connected devices worldwide.
In-built security systems 
could be developed that 
connect smartphones to the 
authorised user through 
digital biometrics. This could 
be used to investigate 
criminal activity.
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CHAPTER 15
FUTURE APPROACHES IN  
ANALYTICAL SCIENCES
By 2025, forensic science will be transformed by large-scale data analysis, automation, novel analytical techniques, 
and digital forensics.  The UK has the potential to be at the forefront of these developments if basic science, 
commercial technology development and government policy can be better coordinated.
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ooking ahead to 2025, what are the 
new technologies that are likely to 
impact upon forensic science and its 
ability to keep pace with – or ahead 
of – new forms of criminal activity? What is the 
best way to manage that innovation? And how 
can UK businesses benefit from innovations in 
forensic techniques?  This chapter will address these 
questions by considering the following points:
•  The future technological trends that will help to 
tackle criminal threats, and the changing face of 
crime, out to 2025
•  The new sciences that might be relevant
•  The use of a wide range of digital traces to 
determine who is where, and when
•  The challenges presented by new technologies, 
and whether there is a point at which advances 
in science become counter-productive
•  Automation of forensics and the wider legal 
system, along with the impacts of managing large 
volumes of data
There are also several critical factors that we 
need to consider when emerging technologies or 
sciences present opportunities to enhance public 
safety.  These are:
•  Credibility: Is the proposed method a credible 
technique that can be validated for use in the 
context of a legal arena, both criminal and civil?
•  Accessibility: In order for the technique to be 
used, it should be accessible to legal professionals 
from both a prosecuting and defence basis
•  Admissibility: If the technique is to be used for 
purposes other than investigation, it needs to be 
legally admissible within the rules of evidence
•  Affordability: While this should not be a barrier to 
delivering safe and secure justice, the cost of the 
technique relative to the challenge it is meeting 
is an important factor (you would not expect 
expensive analytical time to be used for low-level 
minor crime, for example). 
Perhaps the largest transformation in forensic 
science over recent years has been the reduction 
in the costs of analytical services.  This has been 
delivered through a blend of more effective 
procurement and advances in automation and 
miniaturisation, as well as a much sharper focus on 
the needs of the end user. In this environment, this 
trend will need to continue to provide comparable 
services that are affordable, as well as developing 
opportunities to be more effective and innovative 
in the way forensic science can be utilised as a 
tool for public safety.  There is a significant risk that 
the drive to reduce costs will impact on future 
capability, with limited investment in research and 
development activities. Short-term cuts in forensic 
research and development will inevitably lead 
to longer-term problems.  The community and 
government should be considering the end-to-end 
process of forensic techniques and the associated 
investments required to ensure that there is a 
sustainable research and development capability.  
The UK has had a long-standing international 
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reputation for being at the forefront of forensic 
science innovations: for example, the application of 
DNA in a criminal investigation and enhancement 
techniques for fingermarks, and it is of obvious 
importance that this should be maintained and 
enhanced. 
FUTURE TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
Without doubt, technology will play a significant 
role in the future of forensic science and how it 
is used in both civil and criminal applications.  The 
exponential growth of accessible electronic devices 
has touched every aspect of everyday life, from 
the way we communicate through to business 
transactions that never see human interaction. 
While these advances bring opportunities, they 
also come with the potential for risk and harm to 
anyone engaged in using them. 
The speed of change in computer technology 
shows no sign of decreasing. Developments in 
mobile devices and storage technology now mean 
that data is no longer always stored on a dedicated 
device but can be distributed over a variety of 
networks and devices located anywhere.  This 
development of cyber-based devices shows no 
sign of slowing down. It is very difficult to predict 
where, for example, social media will develop in the
next ten years, but it will clearly be operating at a 
different level to that experienced today.  There is 
currently a global internet population of 2.4 billion 
users that sends around 204 million email messages
and searches Google 4 million times every minute. 
By 2020, there will be an estimated 5 billion 
internet users and up to 100 billion connected 
devices worldwide, representing a step change in 
the use of technology1.
These internet users will be linked through the 
internet of things (IoT), a vision to connect physical 
devices and objects to a network that allows 
remote monitoring to gather information (see case 
study p170).  This trend towards connectivity of 
everyday items will in the future provide links to 
criminal activity that could pinpoint an individuals’ 
location through wifi, ZigBee, Bluetooth and RFID 
monitoring; provide information about physical 
characteristics such as exertion; and even monitor 
personal metabolic information.  This interaction 
could be through clothing that incorporates 
wearable technology, vehicles, or access control 
systems, and there needs to be a balance between 
public safety and the privacy of the individual to 
gain public acceptance for using these data sources 
in forensic investigations.
In the future, forensic investigators will be 
gathering much larger amounts of data with far 
more complex analytical techniques.  This is often 
referred to as ‘big data’, and it takes large amounts 
of conventional processing power to convert 
this data into useful information. In complex 
investigations this often exceeds current capability, 
and the future of large-scale data analytics could 
be in grid computing, which is distributed across 
multiple processing facilities and unlocks rapid data 
analysis for investigators. Although this is probably 
beyond the scale of high-volume crime (such 
as burglary), it will be used in counter terrorism 
and serious and organised crime. Add to this the 
potential of cognitive computing, which will make 
 autonomous decisions without human intervention; 
as a result, many forensic processes providing 
interpretive evidence could be speeded up through 
automation, removing human error rates and 
 increasing efficiency.
There are already forensic identification 
processes in place using ‘lights out’ approaches, 
such as the confirmation of identity by checking 
ten-print fingerprint forms in the criminal record 
collection without any human intervention. In 
addition, the ability to fuse datasets together, 
combining information from different databases so 
that they can be handled by a single analytical tool, 
will enable the interrogation of information across a 
wide range of sources.  The ‘fusing’ of the data could 
identify valuable information that would be missed 
when considering the data in isolation. 
This will also lead to the development of 
algorithms that will be much smarter in predictive 
computing, able to interpret data in a way that can 
start to give advance warnings of events based upon 
the analysis of a range of data sets.  The value to 
the Criminal Justice System is likely to be in spotting 
trends, particularly when linked with datasets from 
hospitals or social services, for example, to identify 
hidden crimes like child sexual abuse.
WITHOUT DOUBT,  TECHNOLOGY 
WILL PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE 
FUTURE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE AND 
HOW IT IS USED IN BOTH CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL APPLICATIONS.                   .
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The analysis of data as a science is becoming 
more evident in government initiatives such as 
the Data Science in Government programme, 
which emphasises the importance of a structured 
approach and wider involvement of those outside 
the traditional forensic communities. As the 
volumes of data increase, our understanding of 
the complexities needs to grow concurrently.  The 
potential for poor analysis of large data sets to be 
masked by computer analytics can be mitigated by 
fostering the right blend of skills in those developing 
and performing the analysis.    
There is an increasing trend for miniaturisation 
of technology that will allow law enforcement 
and other users to bring conventional large-scale 
laboratory techniques closer to the scene of 
crime. Examples that are being developed include 
rapid DNA units that provide one-stop analysis of 
samples at the scene in less than two hours and 
portable hand held GCMS (gas chromatography-
mass spectrometry) equipment for rapid analysis 
of drugs.  These will evolve into more portable 
integrated units that deliver real time information 
to investigations through immediate on-site analysis 
linked remotely to databases that autonomously 
identify people and materials. Improvements in 
energy sources beyond conventional lithium ion 
batteries will enable extended usage without the 
need to connect to mains supplies.
Advances in robotics offer a range of 
opportunities, including carrying out hazardous 
tasks and thereby reducing the risk of harm to 
human operators. Examples of this could be the 
initial assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) incidents using 
intelligent robotic ground-based or aerial units with 
a sensor array that detects a range of hazardous 
materials and relays analytical information in 
real time back to incident controllers. Other 
applications are the expansion of robotics in 
laboratory and process functions, to automate tasks 
and provide the potential for 24-hour operating. 
While robotics will not replace humans, in the 
future they have the potential to make processes 
more efficient and effective.
NEW SCIENCES RELEVANT TO 
FORENSICS 
In many cases, forensics sciences can be regarded 
as an applied use of a traditional scientific discipline.  
The use of DNA in investigations, for example, is 
taken from conventional biology techniques but with 
a different application. James Watson and Francis 
Crick first described the double helix structure of 
DNA in 1953, and the discoveries that followed 
were applied in many disciplines before DNA 
analysis was first used in a law enforcement context 
in 1984. 
It is therefore commonplace that the forensic 
world will utilise advances in other areas, because 
the level of research and development investment 
in medicine, defence and food is far greater than 
in forensic science. Advances in synthetic biology 
may speed up the process and offer new methods 
of working that are far more efficient than current 
techniques. It may also complicate the analysis 
through the introduction of manufactured genetic 
material.  The challenge is to ensure that the 
forensic world reacts to these developments in a far 
quicker and coordinated manner to maximise the 
opportunities they present.
In a forensic context, current DNA technology 
is very effective at determining the probability of 
two samples originating from the same source, by 
comparing a set of common genetic markers. We 
are pushing the boundaries of sensitivity to the point 
where background information is starting to interfere, 
creating complex mixtures that are uninterpretable. 
Although UK forensic standards focus on seventeen 
markers, there are around 23,000 genes within the 
human genome that we largely ignore.  The use of 
phenotypic profiling – studying the traits that result 
from the expression of genes – is understood in 
other sectors, and forensics should harness this 
to allow the determination of information such 
as physical characteristics, susceptibility to medical 
conditions and perhaps even behaviours.
Advances in next-generation sequencing (NGS) 
technology currently produce information at a 
greater rate than the computer processing can 
deal with, so there will be a need in the future to 
develop a means of processing large amounts of bio-
informatics data.  The advances in technology that 
WE ARE PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES 
OF SENSITIVITY TO THE POINT WHERE 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION IS 
STARTING TO INTERFERE, CREATING 
COMPLEX MIXTURES THAT ARE 
UNINTERPRETABLE.
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allows the genome to be mapped in hours rather 
than weeks will accelerate the availability of rapid 
genetic information. One of the significant barriers 
is the ethical implications of further genetic sample 
analysis, which could provide sensitive information 
that needs to be managed carefully. But the science 
does open up opportunities never seen before.
The analysis of biological material to determine its 
origin is a valuable tool. However, there is potentially 
even more information to be gleaned from 
biochemical analytical techniques that can identify 
substances in secretions and other body fluids.  The 
future will bring us smaller portable equipment, such 
as portable Raman infrared devices with live links to 
real-time libraries of source material, that will enable 
users to identify not only source material but also 
identify contaminants, building a unique picture of a 
person’s lifestyle and movements.  These techniques 
will also be utilised to consider the provenance of 
samples in terms of origins and sources of material 
e.g. confirmation of genuine pharmaceutical or food 
products, which is a growing problem for society 
(see Chapter 12, case study p138; and Chapter 11, 
case study p125).
The human body is a complex machine made 
up of different cells that each contain copies of 
the human genome. But the body also contains 
microbial communities, collectively known as the 
human microbiome, which is largely unexplored 
from a forensic context. We utilise examinations 
of this nature for the analysis of soil and vegetation 
but not for humans, which may provide a unique 
and diverse profile of an individual.  The potential 
is that in the future we may be able to identify 
a person’s activity by their microbiome or even 
identify where a person has travelled by testing for 
characteristics within the microbiome (see Chapter 
11, case study p130). Early studies have been able 
to link office workers to their keyboards through 
microbiological analysis, so although this approach 
is still in its embryonic stages, it could offer valuable 
information to end users. However, to exploit the 
information available from the biome, we need 
to develop solid reference data sets before this 
becomes a routine forensic activity.
Material sciences bring both threats and 
opportunities to the forensic world.  The growing 
trends of recycling and reusing materials means that 
products are becoming less ‘pure’ and represent 
a more blended constituency.  This makes it more 
difficult to maintain reference techniques for analysis, 
as they perform differently depending upon the 
ingredients of the sample. Although this will impact 
evidence recovery, the wider societal benefits needs to 
be considered. Conversely, products such as powders 
can be engineered at the nano-scale to be far more 
effective that conventional micron-sized powders 
which increases performance and will become the 
routine approach for developing powdering techniques 
to recover fingermarks at scenes. 
Imaging has been used in the forensic world since 
the early examinations of crimes in the 19th century, 
recording and preserving the scene for a range of 
different reasons. It enables those not present to 
visualise the scene from a distance, and the techniques 
adopted over the years have improved significantly.  
There is now a step change available in bringing the 
crime scene to the individual, rather than a physical 
visit.  The ability to provide a high-definition virtual 
crime scene using augmented reality that can be 
visited by many experts and investigators without fear 
of contamination or conflict has many advantages.  
Transmission of information in real-time to 
investigators and specialists, with direct interaction in 
the examination, will revolutionise scene examinations 
and prove to be a much more effective means of 
recovering and analysing evidence. Other areas of 
imaging that are emerging are the use of computed 
tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) for forensic autopsies, which have the potential 
to reveal far more information that conventional 
examinations; and may in future reduce the need for 
surgical interventions, which will preserve the dignity 
of the deceased and improve their family’s acceptance 
of the investigation.
As well as imaging techniques, we should also 
consider imagery and video as a source of evidence 
that comes directly from a wide range of sources, 
including CCTV, body-worn video and unmanned aerial 
vehicles. Indirectly, there will be access to more imagery 
from open sources on the internet such as Facebook 
and YouTube uploads.  The key issue is that there will 
be more higher-quality imagery available from more 
sources, which will require improved algorithms and 
software to deploy video analytical techniques.  This 
THE POTENTIAL IS THAT IN THE 
FUTURE WE MAY BE ABLE TO  
IDENTIFY A PERSON’S ACTIVITY BY 
THEIR MICROBIOME
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SKILLS AND COMPETENCY FOR  
ANYA HUNT, CEO, The Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences
he Chartered Society of Forensic 
Sciences (CSFS) is the UK 
professional body representing 
the forensic sciences. With 3,000 
members worldwide, it offers a huge resource 
of knowledge and experience that shapes the 
forensic sciences globally.  The CSFS was formed in 
1959 as the Forensic Science Society (FSSoc), and 
was renamed after being granted a Royal Charter 
in 2013.  The CSFS is at the forefront of standards 
development, education and training, and is 
committed to supporting its members throughout 
their career in forensic science.
The society has developed a wide-reaching 
quality standards framework that includes:
• An accreditation,  recognition and endorsement 
scheme for setting standards in forensic science 
education
• Competency assessment f or graduates and 
experienced forensic science practitioners
• An extensiv e and expanding programme of 
continuing professional development (CPD) 
conferences and events
• A pub lication bundle with monthly releases of 
peer-reviewed and general interest content for 
the dissemination, discussion and evaluation of 
innovations in the field.
The CSFS is a registered charity that receives 
no public funding, and is responsible for supporting 
the entire forensic community with extremely 
limited resources. Indeed, many of its activities 
are unfunded, and rely on the good will of its 
members. 
EDUCATION
In the mid-1990s, forensic science degree-
level courses were being developed across the 
country, many born out of failing analytical science 
departments. As part of its 2004 inquiry ‘Forensic 
Science on Trial’1, the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee asked the FSSoc to 
develop its accreditation system in line with UK 
National Occupational Standards, while keeping 
the costs of accreditation to a minimum.  
In 2004, the FSSoc piloted and launched its 
Accreditation Scheme, which is now world-
renowned.  The aim was to map and measure 
the forensic science content of full undergraduate 
and postgraduate programmes (level 6–7) 
against recommended component standards 
that are recognised by industry.  This has now 
being expanded to incorporate a recognition and 
endorsement scheme for courses with a smaller 
amount of forensic content, and for courses 
offered at levels 3–5.  The overarching aim is to 
give students and employers confidence in the 
quality and quantity of forensic science educational 
provision. While this scheme continues to develop 
and grow, the scheme does not attract any public 
subsidies and some valued educational institutions 
find the costs of accreditation preclusive.
COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT
In 2010, following the demise of the Council for 
the Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP), 
the CSFS was approached by a number of niche 
forensic practitioners looking for assurance 
that their discipline and its practitioners were 
recognised as professionals by the courts.  This led 
to the society developing an ever-expanding suite 
of Certificates of Professional Competence.  The 
aim is that individuals work with the society to have 
their knowledge, experience and skills assessed 
independently against defined core standards.  
The assessment, together with a demonstrable 
commitment to CPD, builds towards the individual’s 
professional portfolio of ongoing competency. 
This potentially benefits the entire Criminal 
Justice System, yet there are currently no tangible 
resources available that would allow this scheme 
to grow. Countries such as the Netherlands have 
benefitted from public funding to develop the 
highly-acclaimed Nederlands Register Gerechtelijk 
Deskundigen (NRGD), or Netherlands Register of 
Court Experts.
In 2013, the changing forensic science 
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landscape resulted in a large-scale migration 
of staff between different organisations in 
the sector. Forensic employers, police and 
private-sector companies asked the CSFS to 
find ways to assess the suitability of potential 
new entrants to the forensic profession, 
based on their balance of educational 
achievement, skills and experience. As a result, 
the society launched its Pre Employment 
Assessment of Competence (PEAC) scheme 
this year.  The pilot saw 28 forensic science 
graduates undergo a range of assessments 
to demonstrate their knowledge and skills in 
realistic case-work scenarios. PEAC is being 
well received by industry to assist in their 
recruitment process. 
PROFESSIONAL ACCREDITATION
The UK forensic science community is 
now more diverse than ever before, with a 
mixture of sole traders, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), large multinationals, 
and in-house police facilities.  The Forensic 
Science Regulator’s Code of Practice2 specifies 
that all organisations providing work for the 
prosecution must be accredited to the relevant 
ISO standard by 2020.  The society is engaged 
with practitioners across the sector to develop 
resources to support them in achieving this 
goal.
By the end of 2015, for example, the CSFS 
will have a register of consultants (made up 
of its highly experienced members) who will 
be available to assist others with all aspects of 
their accreditation journey, including bespoke 
support on validation and peer review where 
such expertise is not available internally.  
Throughout 2015–2016, the CSFS is also 
working with the UK Accreditation Service 
(UKAS) to develop a realistic, proportionate 
accreditation model suitable for SMEs.  These 
efforts could have wide reaching implications, 
and have an important role to play in 
ensuring a full and varied forensic provision.  
then opens up the possibilities of automated real-
time facial recognition, and a more widespread use 
of video analytics. 
All the information gathered – whether it is 
large volumes of data from genomic sources, right 
through to fingerprint information – must be 
interpreted in some way to identify an individual.  
The volume of data suggests that there will be a 
change in the standard approaches to calculating 
and presenting scientific evidence, for example by 
using Bayesian Networks (BNs). BNs are graphical 
models that allow reasoning when uncertainty is 
present, even when the interdependence between 
different types of evidence is very complex. A BN 
approach can also model the strength of connection 
between evidence types and update predictions 
(sometimes referred to as a probabilistic belief) as 
new information becomes available.  This is just one 
type of statistical model, and their use in general will 
increase as it becomes impossible to provide the 
degree of uniqueness traditionally demanded of the 
forensic process by court presentation. An illustrative 
example is the case of fingerprints. Historically, 
fingerprint evidence was not presented with any 
form of statistical basis, but improvements in the 
understanding of and advancements in statistical 
models could improve the way such identification 
evidence is used. 
DIGITAL TRACES
In conventional forensic science, Edmund Locard’s 
principle that every contact leaves a trace is 
fundamental to the application of scientific 
techniques to connect physical items together.  This 
applies equally to the digital world, where at some 
point there will be a connection that will leave a 
digital trace. Everyone casts a digital shadow or 
footprint though their deliberate or inadvertent 
interactions with technology. 
This could be as innocuous a carrying a mobile 
telephone, driving a vehicle, watching a smart TV or 
surfing the internet – your presence will be left in 
some way unless you are extremely tech savvy and 
make a deliberate intention to block these traces. 
Even then, with the right forensic analytical techniques, 
traces can be found with enough effort. In the future, 
it might be possible to delve deeper into technology 
to reveal even more useful information (see case 
study p172). In this context we should consider how 
the forensic examination of these digital traces can be 
used in delivering public safety. 
The trend towards storing data remotely from 
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mobile and network-based applications is increasing 
rapidly.  The challenge lies in how to retrieve data 
that is stored in cloud systems and gain a complete 
picture, as it may be distributed across different 
geographical locations and jurisdictions.  There is 
a balance to be found between the privacy of 
individual’s data and the needs of law enforcement 
to access data.  There is active encouragement 
from government for manufacturers to make 
devices more secure to reduce theft, but this makes 
the legitimate interrogation of the devices more 
challenging.  
The Internet of Things (IoT) will enable a hyper-
connected world in which devices and objects 
interact with each other.  The future city will operate 
in an environment where the physical, digital and 
virtual worlds converge, and communicate to 
provide information across a range of platforms 
connected to sensors gathering data.  This volume 
of data will provide a mass of information intended 
to make life easier and more efficient, but it also 
offers opportunities for a safer community. In an 
extreme case, this could involve intelligent sensor 
networks that take advantage of connected real-
time analysis to monitor for explosive traces in 
public areas such as transport hubs; or automatically 
monitoring changes in the home and reporting 
them to a person’s smart phone.  This may offer 
more novel sources of evidence in an investigation.   
The smart phone of the future will be very 
different to that of today. It will evolve into a more 
flexible, longer-lasting device that brings functions 
that interface with the IoT, offering rapid access 
through the next generations of wireless mobile 
connectivity. In-built security could be developed 
that directly connects the device to the authorised 
user through a range of digital biometrics, such as 
vein identification or heartbeat monitoring.  The 
phone will develop further into a digital assistant 
that allows you to control many aspects of life with 
verbal communication.  These digital interactions 
will leave an electronic trail that tracks your financial 
interactions, social habits, locations and lifestyle 
habits, all of which could be interrogated and used 
to investigate criminal activity (subject to the correct 
approvals and authority).
It is clear that the availability of information from 
open sources such as the internet are becoming 
increasingly relevant to routine investigations, not 
just in what is considered as cybercrime. It may 
well be that a person’s online identity (email or 
social media profile, for example) will be a more 
reliable source of identity than a physical address or 
telephone number. Many people already retain their 
email address longer than a physical address. 
While conventional biometrics are 
measurements used to uniquely identify a person, 
digital biometrics are those captured through 
electronic means.  This includes voice, hand 
geometry (see Chapter 6 case study p68), and 
keystroke dynamics, along with the well-used face 
and fingerprint biometrics. Many of these are 
associated with verifying personal identity, which 
then allows access to a system or physical space; 
it could also be used as an investigative tool for 
corroboration purposes.
IMPACT OF AUTOMATION
Advances in robotic technology will allow humans 
to be removed from a range of forensic processes.  
These could be repetitive laboratory processes or 
hazardous tasks that present problems to human 
operatives, digital examinations of electronic data or 
assessments of CBRNE incidents.  There are many 
positives in automating some activities, but there are 
downsides: the initial development and outlay costs 
can be expensive, and removing humans from the 
process could lead to a deskilling of the workforce. 
Although this could actually reduce the costs over 
the whole lifecycle of the automation programme, 
it really depends whether there is sufficient appetite 
to manage the risk of investment.
Other areas to consider are improved 
productivity, as machines would be able to work 
24/7 to produce DNA profiles, for example. 
Unless the whole process of interpretation and 
identification is automated, however, the initial 
benefits may not be realised. Consistency and 
reliability will be improved by removing humans 
from these processes, leading to more accurate 
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results that are not subject to any form of cognitive 
bias that may influence the decision making process. 
The use of robotics and automation of 
hazardous processes will enable a far safer working 
environment to be developed.  The de-risking 
of activities deemed too dangerous for human 
intervention will mean that hazardous crime-scenes 
– which may not be fully examined today – could 
in the future be subject to the same recovery of 
evidence afforded to less hazardous scenes.
One of the areas requiring automation is the 
management of large volumes of data that cannot 
be effectively processes using current capabilities. As 
we recover and produce greater volumes of data, 
grid computing will become an important way to 
manage this information.
CHALLENGES: NEW TECHNOLOGY 
AND SCIENCES
Emerging technologies and approaches to applying 
scientific methods in forensic disciplines clearly offer 
great opportunities, but they also bring challenges.  
The application of new scientific methods to any 
illicit activity will require the courts to accept these 
methods.  This will involve a full validation and 
accreditation process to provide reassurance to 
the courts that the technique is fit for purpose and 
sufficiently reliable to, in extreme cases, take away 
a person’s liberty for many years. It is therefore 
essential that the technique is safe, secure and 
reliable.  The evidence threshold for civil courts is 
lower, but the science should still be valid if it is to 
be used.
The first real breakthrough in applying science to 
criminal investigations came in the late 19th century, 
when fingerprints were used to investigate crime 
on the basis of their uniqueness.  This has been 
accepted over the years as a primary identifier, and 
in the UK we identify roughly 50,000 offenders from 
crime scenes each year using fingerprints.
The first use of DNA in a forensic context in 
1984 revolutionised the way that crime was 
investigated, and has proved to be a mainstream 
technique with the formation of a national database.  
This required a step change in our approach, which 
disrupted business processes, infrastructure 
requirements, cultural acceptance as well as 
significantly changing the operating model for forensic 
science. But it has brought significant benefits to 
public safety, and there are 25,000 DNA matches 
between crime scenes and offenders each year. 
We are, however, now at a point where the 
boundaries of sensitivity have been stretched to 
the point where it becomes increasingly difficult 
to separate the sample from the background 
mixture.  There needs to be careful consideration 
that further sensitivity, in its current form, will need 
advanced analytical software to interpret the 
complex information present in a sample to ensure 
that DNA profiling not become counter-productive.
CONCLUSION
The UK has a vibrant science base that has 
generated many advances in science across 
a range of sectors. It is clear that there is 
significant opportunity to consider where there 
is transferrable science that can be applied in a 
forensic context: for example, the medical and 
agriscience fields are already very advanced in their 
use of Next Generation Sequencing, which the 
forensic community could learn from.  There needs 
to be a mechanism that enables the identification 
of transferrable science.  This could be through 
virtual networks of academic institutions or the 
formation of a dedicated research institute across 
existing capability that considers both digital and 
traditional forensic future requirements.
In terms of the functional challenges, any 
significant innovation in forensic science will 
be disruptive to a certain extent.  The key is to 
consider the benefits against the disruption, and 
only then can the decision be made. Any innovation 
needs to be cost effective in its application, and 
while early adopters of innovation may pave the 
way for others, this can be done in a controlled 
manner through structured coordination.  This will 
identify all the issues such as affordability, regulatory 
constraints, and future-proofing workflow impact, 
as well as the wider societal impact such as public 
acceptance and privacy concerns. 
The relevant professional community will 
scrutinise any new innovation to critically review 
THE FIRST USE OF DNA IN A FORENSIC 
CONTEXT IN 1984 REVOLUTIONISED THE 
WAY THAT CRIME WAS INVESTIGATED, 
AND HAS PROVED TO BE A MAINSTREAM 
TECHNIQUE WITH THE FORMATION OF 
A NATIONAL DATABASE.
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CASE STUDY
FORENSICS AND  
THE INTERNET OF THINGS
ALASTAIR COOK, Director of Critical Insight Security Ltd 
The Internet of Things (IoT) increasingly connects people and services to a plethora of wireless-enabled devices, 
presenting opportunities for both investigators 
and criminals. Appropriate treatment and use of 
data generated by IoT devices could yield crucia
leads in a complex investigation, and in some 
circumstances it could be the primary source of 
evidence. 
Consider a scenario where three murder 
victims are found in a park, with signs of a 
struggle plus a number of items left by at least 
one other party at the scene. Although some 
mobile phones were present at the scene, one 
has been intentionally smashed.  The second 
mobile had charge in its battery, but had been 
remotely wiped by an unknown person using 
an app that was supplied with the phone’s 
operating system (see Figure 1).
To enable a productive digital forensic analysis, 
investigators need a high-integrity method 
l to obtain, store, share and analyse the data 
associated with these devices, so that they can 
use this knowledge to infer the sequence of 
events that led to the crime.  These methods 
could include:
1  A trusted framework that allows the data to 
be imported and preserved in its original form, 
while also enabling a team of investigators 
with varying technical skills to interact with it. 
   
  
  
Figure 1: Crime scene evidence
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As some of the data may not be immediately 
available – it might be stored in public or 
private clouds, for example – this environment 
must be ‘live’, so that diverse sources of data 
relevant to the investigation can be imported 
as they become available.
2  At the point of import, any relationships in 
the data should be automatically discovered, 
tagged and highlighted to the team. Linked 
Data techniques (which allow semantic 
analysis by both machines and investigators) 
can be used to generate human and machine-
readable statements about the data and its 
context. Using terminology and identifiers that 
are recognised by the team, as well as open 
source or internationally-recognised standards, 
would significantly increase the utility of the 
data and draw upon global knowledge in a 
way that is almost impossible with current 
methods. 
3  Semi-automated identification of appropriate 
analytic techniques could allow niche methods 
to advance the investigation, or associate 
people and places with the devices.  This 
may draw on international data sets or 
online services that have greater statistical 
significance, better reference methodologies 
and more rigorous scrutiny than national 
or regional teams would be able to achieve. 
Some of these may not be from the forensics 
community – they could include online 
medical or personal fitness services, for 
example.
This approach could efficiently yield the 
following summary of assertions that inform an 
investigation, and may be of sufficient integrity 
to identify participants in the crime, or even be 
admissible in a criminal prosecution:
“The team found that the 3 victims regularly 
shared the same running route. On the day 
of the crime they exhibited elevated signs of 
stress and changed their route 16 minutes into 
the run.  There were indicators of a physically 
intense struggle for the last 3 minutes of the run. 
A security device on the hand of one victim was 
linked to a car that was infrequently used by the 
victim and some other, subsequently identified, 
persons linked to the crime.  The bag was 
procured in Europe, and carried a device that a 
non-UK criminal gang used to track the delivery 
of stolen assets or weapons.  The jacket was 
procured in Antwerp and had been worn in the 
UK for 3 weeks prior to the crime.  This allowed 
a possible CCTV image of the wearer to be 
obtained. It appears that Victim B was followed 
by the wearer of the jacket for 2 days prior to 
the crime.”
Such information could routinely enhance 
investigations if the three highlighted methods 
can be implemented alongside forensic advances 
in other domains.  This will allow investigators to 
adapt to changes in technology, users’ behaviour 
and criminals’ tactics at a scale that current 
methods cannot achieve. It should also provide 
a sound basis for the scientific scrutiny and 
investigative integrity that should be expected of 
all areas of forensics.
SEMI-AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION OF 
APPROPRIATE ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES 
COULD ALLOW NICHE METHODS TO 
ADVANCE THE INVESTIGATION, OR 
ASSOCIATE PEOPLE AND PLACES WITH 
THE DEVICES. 
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CASE STUDY
NEXT-GENERATION  
DIGITAL FORENSICS 
GRAHAM BROMELOW, MCM Solutions
C hild sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) was reported in every UK policing region in 2014 (ref. 1), and remains a priority in 
police investigations. Digital forensics is at the 
heart of investigations into indecent images 
of children (IIOC), and ‘traditional’ digital 
data recovery (triage) and analysis tools are 
used throughout UK law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies. 
The evolution from complex and slow 
‘traditional’ forensic tools to next-generation 
IIOC solutions has allowed investigators to 
close the opportunities criminals have to hide 
illegal data on their devices.  The development 
of cutting-edge extraction and analysis tools is 
an iterative one, with constant feedback and 
consultation from end users and organisations. 
The challenge is to develop an easy-to-use 
and reusable system that handles complexity, 
can be deployed from on-scene to lab based 
environments, and rapidly extract or process 
large amounts of data while maintaining 
a high-quality output. Alongside these 
challenges, new technologies are helping to 
overcome barriers such as budget cuts, lack 
of manpower and socio-political reluctance 
to arm first responders with forensic skill sets. 
Indeed, the business case for moving to next-
generation IIOC solutions is a ‘no brainer’: it 
can bring down the costs of prosecuting a 
single case from approximately £40,000 to 
less than £1,000. 
As the amount of IIOC content grows, 
along with the proliferation of personal 
devices and data storage, both front line 
and rapid laboratory-based forensics are 
now critical in preserving life and convicting 
criminals while decreasing the length, budgets 
and backlogs of investigations. New, easy-
to–use digital technologies, licenced on 
removable USB devices, provide non-technical 
investigators with a lightweight portable 
tool that dramatically cuts investigation 
lengths.  The most powerful extraction tool 
(a patented capability originally developed as 
a military capability) can forensically ‘image’ 
a 1TB laptop in under 35 minutes; another 
‘military’ tool enables IIOC content to be 
located on a target computer within a few 
minutes.  This offers non-technical investigators 
the capability to perform the initial 
investigations themselves, producing reliable 
court-admissible results on their own. 
Simple-to-use user-interfaces allow the 
non-technical investigator to run a full digital 
acquisition, or effortlessly select granular 
search criteria for a ‘sniper forensic’ analysis. 
Unskilled users could potentially damage 
digital evidence during a traditional triaging 
process, making it redundant in a court case. 
Now, highly configurable search profiles 
ensure that such ‘collateral digital intrusion’ is 
eliminated, assisting with compliance and any 
warranty issues of IIOC investigations.  
Advanced technologies have simplified 
and streamlined the process of analysing 
items with evidential value. Despite criminals 
becoming better at hiding IIOC content, 
innovative technologies can rapidly uncover 
them with techniques including skin tone and 
face detection (see Chapter 6 case study p68), 
video frame caching, checking video signatures, 
EXIF extraction (file metadata), preconfigured 
file signatures, keyword lists, and many more.
Another challenge within digital forensics 
is helping to overcome the growing concerns 
from social networking sites, cloud storage, 
email file sharing, online gaming platforms and 
search engines that digital environments use 
to store and share CSEA and IIOC content. 
Equally as concerning is the expansion of Tor 
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anonymity software, which masks users’ 
identities and makes it harder to locate 
IIOC users and distributors.
Nevertheless, the National Crime Agency 
recorded1 a decline in open searches to 
access IIOC, which is now even lower due 
to web giants Google, Facebook and Twitter 
removing millions of IIOC images from 
the internet in 2015. Analytical tools can 
now dive deep into hundreds of internet 
ar tefacts, such as instant messaging and chat 
apps, browser history, Facebook and Twitter 
feeds to recover and display evidence. 
Our digital evidence is so powerful 
that most people charged with possessing 
IIOC material plead guilty when shown 
a report detailing what was found on 
their computers.  The judicial system is 
also supporting these new capabilities 
and making changes so that offenders 
are subject to speedier justice. Other 
technological developments can ensure 
victims of abuse can be identified more 
quickly.
The evolution of computer technology 
and the internet has undoubtedly led to 
a growth in the number of of educated 
computer criminals.  They are now using a 
range of anti-forensic techniques and tools 
– including cryptography, disk cleaning and 
file wiping utilities that focus on destroying 
and altering data – to affect the integrity 
of an investigation and the reliability of 
evidence in court., Law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies will have to face this 
growing challenge over the next 5 to 10 
years.
the validity of the science or technology, in order 
to determine if the approach is scientifically sound.  
The end users will review this and assess the outlay 
costs, business benefits and impact of introducing 
a disruptive innovation.  The legal professionals will 
consider the use of innovations in the context of 
the current legislative framework, and decide if 
it needs to be amended to accommodate such 
changes.  The policymakers will consider the 
societal impact and the maintenance of public trust 
in the context of the political environment.  The 
industry approach is critical, in that it must take 
account of all these factors: ultimately, there has 
to be a product or service that can be converted 
from an innovative idea into a marketable 
commodity that will generate income. 
The introduction of new sciences and 
automation to forensic techniques will not remove 
the scientist from the equation. But the forensic 
scientist of the future will be a very different person 
to those of previous years (see case study p166).  
They will interact with more automated processes, 
have a greater understanding of the complexities of 
large-scale data analytics, and present their findings 
utilising statistical methodology.  This will require a 
step change to the development programmes that 
are building the future forensic scientists. In line with 
this, the judiciary will need to be far more aware 
of the implications of science and technology in 
the court room. All of this must operate within an 
appropriate regulatory framework that maintains 
the standards required for the delivery of assured 
science. 
The UK has traditionally held a strong position 
globally in the field of forensic science, and we need 
to ensure that this global position is maintained 
and enhanced through government support to 
academia, industry and the end users of such 
innovations.  This can only be done by providing 
an open innovation channel that ensures academic 
research is supported and, where appropriate, 
converted into commercial opportunities that the 
end user community will buy into.  That means 
providing access to test databases that act as 
operational environments to provide a far better 
understanding of the requirements.  This applies as 
much to the civil applications of forensic science as 
it does to the criminal uses. Greater coordination 
of a tripartite arrangement, focussed on forensic 
science and technology driven by government 
policy, will enable the UK to grow both capability 
and reputation on a national and international basis.
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The UK has a strong track record of innovation in forensic science, and its forensic 
science providers have a close working relationship with the police. Engaging all of the 
partners involved in taking innovations through to market adoption – including academia, 
industry, end users and government – gives the UK an opportunity to become a global 
leader in the forensic science market.  The government now has an important role to play 
in helping innovators to bridge the ‘valley of death’ as they seek to turn proof-of-principle 
techniques into commercial products.
orensic science is a multidisciplinary 
field that relies on technologies and 
methodologies from a wide range 
of sectors. Although it primarily 
addresses questions relating to crime, it also 
covers a wider spectrum of activities such as 
consumer and environmental protection, health 
and safety, the authenticity and provenance of 
goods, and civil proceedings such as breach of 
contract and negligence. Intelligence, gathered 
overtly or covertly, can also predict when crimes 
are about to take place, enabling pre-emptive 
interventions or better evidence-gathering. As 
a result, forensic science makes a significant 
contribution to our justice and security systems, 
ensuring our economic stability. 
The UK has a strong track record 
of innovation in this area, including the 
development of fingerprinting, and more recently 
DNA profiling. Forensic science provides 
innovators with potential opportunities in a 
diverse range of disciplines, as well as a truly 
global market for its scientific and technological 
developments. Moreover, England and Wales 
remain the only countries to have privatised 
all of their forensic science services.  This has 
created a closeness between the private sector 
and police service users that is relatively unique 
compared with the rest of the world.
These factors mean that the UK could 
become the best place in the world to 
commercialise forensics innovations in the future 
– as long as the right market dynamics can be 
created. In particular, all of the partners involved 
in taking proof-of-principle innovations through 
to market adoption – including academia, 
industry, end-users and government – need to 
work together to bridge the ‘valley of death’ that 
so often prevents high-technology products from 
realising their commercial potential.
MAPPING THE INNOVATION 
LANDSCAPE: FROM CONCEPT TO 
IMPLEMENTATION
According to the Crown Prosecution Service’s 
(CPS) Code for Crown Prosecutors, evidence 
may only be used in court if the prosecutor 
is satisfied that it is reliable, credible and 
admissible.  The high cost and judicial impact 
of failing to meet these standards means that 
any forensic technique must be validated to 
a high level, and backed by a strong evidence 
base, before it is used in criminal investigations.  
That makes the innovation landscape for 
forensic science more complex, with a diverse 
range of stakeholders at all points on the 
route from concept development through 
to implementation (see Box 1). Chapter 
17 contains a more detailed look at these 
stakeholder groups, and their interactions.
This complexity and diversity means that 
no two stakeholders have the same strategic 
priorities or pressures, and all have different 
perspectives and interpretations about what 
forensic science is, and what it can and cannot 
do. Another consequence, not unusual in 
multidisciplinary innovation, is the lack of a 
common taxonomy. 
All stakeholders need to engage and 
communicate directly with all other members 
of the value chain. In particular, the pull from 
the Criminal Justice System (CJS) must not 
be lost in the noise. Engagement should take 
place in the context of a national strategy, 
with universal buy-in. Scientific excellence, 
commercial success and just outcomes will 
depend on consistent implementation of 
government strategy, including sufficient funding 
and open communication. Potential mechanisms 
for such engagement are discussed further in 
the chapter. 
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RISKS, BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES 
TO INNOVATION
In 2014, The Government Chief Scientific Adviser 
has previously said1:  
“Advances in science and technology can yield 
significant societal benefits and drive economic 
growth.  The challenge for society is to channel 
existing evidence about innovative technologies 
and their risks to improve decision making in the  
area of regulation and policy making.”
This accurately summarises the cost-benefit 
analysis that must be completed before new 
technologies are applied within the forensic 
science sector.  This poses several challenges for 
any innovator or technology developer, who 
must identify: 
• The unmet need within f orensic science that can 
provide a suitable return on investment and that 
is compatible with their existing capabilities
• The customer s that require and are willing to 
pay for the service or product
• The k ey opinion leaders within the sector that 
will champion the innovation through to its 
eventual implementation
•  The value proposition of providing such a 
solution, i.e. what level of investment is required, 
and how long before a return is achieved
• Who are the main competitors
• The regulator y hurdles prior to implementation
• The r isks associated with translating the 
FORENSIC SCIENCE PROVIDES 
INNOVATORS WITH POTENTIAL 
OPPORTUNITIES IN A DIVERSE RANGE 
OF DISCIPLINES.
technology from the laboratory to the 
real world (e.g. degradation of analytical 
performance, in terms of reproducibility and 
false positives or false negatives)
•  The sources of financial input at each stage  
of innovation
Courts require that forensic evidence is based 
on processes and scientific principles that have 
very little uncertainty.  This inevitably means 
that there will be some inertia against new 
technologies, due to the serious impacts caused 
by the failure of a forensic method.  These 
risks can be reduced by ensuring that any 
new innovations are compliant with existing 
standards and best practice, in particular the 
Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice 
and Conduct, CPS guidance, and the relevant 
legislation.  These codes include guidance on the 
processes to be used for validation, accreditation 
and implementation of an innovation, from the 
initial research and development phase, followed 
Box 1: Forensic science stakeholders in the UK
• Academia 
• Funding b 
• F orensic s
Services Ltd, 
(e.g. universities)
odies (e.g. Research Councils UK, Innovate UK, Police Innovation Fund)
ervice providers, including larger companies (e.g. LGC Ltd, Key Forensic 
Cellmark Forensic Services) and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
• La w enforcement agencies (e.g. Police service, National Crime Agency, Operational Counter 
Terrorism users)
• Go vernment
• Regulators 
• Guida n
(
ce an
National Police 
Technology Lab
 departments (e.g. Home Office, Ministry of Defence)
e.g. Forensic Science Regulator) 
d best-practice providers (e.g. Crown Prosecution Service, College of Policing, 
Chief Council, Centre for Applied Science and Technology, Defence Science and 
oratory, Forensic Science Special Interest Group, European Network Forensic Science 
Institute) 
• Accr editation Providers (e.g. UKAS: see Chapter 3 case study p34)
• Networking (Chartered Society of Forensic Science, Association of Forensic Science Providers, 
Forensic Science Special Interest Group, European Network Forensic Science Institute)
• End user s (C
• Journalists
rown Prosecution Service, Courts, Counter Terrorism and Intelligence)
• Gener al public, including victims of crime 
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by pilot studies, use on live samples, first CPS 
case management and its first test in court.  
The codes also detail how the whole process 
should be monitored and reviewed. Direct 
communication between scientists and end-users 
in the CJS is key to ensuring that innovation is 
implemented in a timely manner.
Other potential end-users of forensic 
science are the military, counter-terrorism 
and intelligence agencies.  Their operational 
needs are likely to be different from those 
of the courts, and therefore a dialogue with 
organisations such as the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (Dstl) and the Centre 
for Defence Enterprise (CDE) are essential to 
establish end-user needs and ensure that the 
innovation will be fit for purpose. Forensic tools 
can also be used to determine authenticity in 
areas including clothes, foods or perfumes, which 
require liaison with industry and regulatory 
bodies. 
But the primary customers (and budget 
holders) for most innovations in forensic science 
are law enforcement agencies or forensic 
service providers (FSPs). Increasingly, police 
forces are bringing more forensic services within 
their organisations, blurring the lines between 
themselves and FSPs.  The main risk for the law 
enforcement agency is that their investment 
results in a procedure that is not suitable for use 
in the Criminal Justice System. Once again, early 
engagement between scientists and the CJS is key.
For an FSP, there is an additional risk that 
their investment in an innovation does not 
provide a return.  That financial return is only 
possible if the innovation is monetised and 
adopted by a sizeable market, with a proportion 
of the revenue returned to the service provider 
and ultimately the innovator.  This monetisation 
could be through the provision of a service 
directly to the customer, or more likely through 
the licensing of the intellectual property to one 
of the leading service providers in the sector. 
For any innovation to be widely implemented, it 
must either speed up a current methodology or 
satisfy an unmet need; have limited competition; 
and be successfully transferred from the 
controlled environment of the laboratory into 
the real world, where it can be used by non-
experts.  The overall cost of implementing the 
technology into the forensic workflow will also 
need to be minimised to avoid driving up costs 
to the customer. 
It is clear from both case studies in this 
chapter that securing funding to move from 
the initial research and development phase 
at an academic institution, through to the 
development of a commercial product, remains 
difficult (see case studies on p179 and p181). 
Partnerships between academic institutions 
and end-users can help to guide innovations 
through this development process. Potential 
innovators – who may be new to the 
sector – should be made aware of the 
wider global markets, and their high esteem 
for UK forensic science; as well as existing 
networking opportunities. For example, the 
Forensic Science Special Interest Group (FoSci 
SIG) is a community that includes everyone 
involved in forensic science, and enables 
closer networking and better communication 
between all stakeholders for improved research 
and development. FoSci SIG is run by the 
Knowledge Transfer Network (KTN) and was 
set up in July 2012 following a recommendation 
in June 2011 by the Home Office Chief 
Scientific Adviser in his review of ‘Research and 
Development in Forensic Science’. FoSci SIG 
has an online searchable database of challenges 
in forensic science, which helps to match key 
questions with innovators’ potential solutions2. 
TURNING SCIENCE INTO FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 
Fundamental ‘blue skies’ research usually 
takes place in universities with the support 
of research council funding. Some of these 
activities will result in capabilities that may be of 
benefit to forensic science.  The challenge for 
the community is in identifying those projects, 
FOR ANY INNOVATION TO BE WIDELY 
IMPLEMENTED, IT MUST EITHER SPEED 
UP A CURRENT METHODOLOGY OR 
SATISFY AN UNMET NEED; HAVE LIMITED 
COMPETITION; AND BE SUCCESSFULLY 
TRANSFERRED FROM THE CONTROLLED 
ENVIRONMENT OF THE LABORATORY 
INTO THE REAL WORLD.
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especially when the innovation is initially applied 
in a different discipline. 
If the project is more applied, then the 
academic researchers need to have a clear 
understanding of the realities of the end-user 
needs and environment, which can only be 
gained through interaction with an end-user, and 
ideally with the wider stakeholder community. 
Increasingly, the importance of applied research 
is being acknowledged within universities and the 
research councils. All research council proposals 
must demonstrate ‘Pathways to Impact’, including 
how researchers will communicate, engage and 
collaborate with stakeholders and potential 
beneficiaries of the research. 
There is also a growing expectation within 
universities that research should be translated, 
with any revenue generated being returned 
to the university.  This strategy is further 
encouraged through the Quality Related-
Business Research Element (QR-BRE) funding 
from the Higher Education Funding Councils of 
both England and Wales, and by the fact that 
an assessment of impact now makes up 20% 
of the Research Excellence Framework, and 
therefore directly influences future mainstream 
Quality Related (QR) research funding in all UK 
universities. 
However, it should also be acknowledged 
that the current requirement for an academic 
to achieve traditional ‘outputs’ for their research 
(80% weighting) is also a barrier to investing 
time in activities such as validation, which may 
not be publishable in peer-reviewed journals 
but is crucial for the end-stage of adoption of a 
technology.     
To help these applied projects, it is important 
that the sector establishes and supports 
events that actively engage all stakeholders and 
generate opportunities for networking; offers 
funding for proof-of-principle studies and/or staff 
exchanges; and provides commercial training on 
how to develop an initial idea into a business 
plan, so that innovators can attract follow-on 
funding from agencies such as Innovate UK.  The 
Network+ schemes being organised by the 
Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) 
and the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) provide such funding, 
but the field also needs a forensic science 
champion for these schemes, with a proven 
track record of engaging with the other key 
stakeholders in the sector.  
Any intellectual property generated by this 
research could be exploited in two ways. It could 
be licensed to an FSP or commercial organisation, 
which would then develop the product and take it 
to market, eventually providing a revenue stream 
to the university. Alternatively, the academics 
involved could form a spin-out company to further 
develop their value proposition, with a view 
to either providing a service directly or exiting 
through a trade sale.  
Very few academics choose the latter 
option. But those who do take this brave 
step need financial support and mentoring. 
Incubation centres such as the STFC/European 
Space Agency Business Incubation Centre in 
Harwell, and the associated funding available 
from Innovate UK through the Harwell Space 
Launchpads, offer an excellent model of how 
start-up companies can develop if they have 
a funding roadmap to facilitate growth and to 
support it in securing investment capital. 
The Security Innovation and Demonstration 
Centre (SIDC)3, launched by the Home Office in 
2014, could provide another important incubation 
facility for forensic science. As an open innovation 
centre focused on security challenges, it will 
enable innovators to access end users and their 
environments for rapid real-world evaluation 
of new concepts, using a shared laboratory and 
demonstration space hosted at the Home Office’s 
Centre for Applied Science & Technology (CAST). 
The SIDC aims to support start-ups through 
links to mentors and investors, thereby de-risking 
the introduction of new technologies. It will also 
host demonstrations to overseas delegations to 
ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE REALITIES OF THE END-USER NEEDS AND ENVIRONMENT, 
WHICH CAN ONLY BE GAINED THROUGH INTERACTION WITH AN 
END-USER, AND IDEALLY WITH THE WIDER STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY. 
SECURING THE FUTURE OF UK FORENSIC SCIENCE
178
support UK security exports.
More established companies typically decide 
whether to develop a new technology based 
on an assessment of strategic need, and the 
potential return on their investment. A purely 
commercial environment, where market 
forces alone drive the agenda, may hamper 
further development of an existing technique 
for several reasons. Some companies may be 
unwilling to invest in a new ‘market leading’ 
technology if the legal process requires that the 
methodology is disclosed, thus allowing other 
companies to develop rival products. Or they 
may wish to only employ members of staff who 
directly provide services (and therefore bring 
in income). As a consequence of these factors, 
in the future most commercial companies may 
not have dedicated research and development 
departments to bring through innovative new 
technologies or methods.
But innovation is not just about making 
breakthroughs or developing a novel invention. 
Incremental innovations are far more common, 
and result in improved performance for existing 
technologies.  They may offer better accuracy 
or precision, lower the limit of detection, or 
improve reproducibility; or they can increase 
the throughput of an analytical process, or 
reduce costs. One recent example is the 
availability of commercial robotic auto-samplers 
that interface with gas chromatography-mass 
spectrometers, which now enable the majority 
of sample preparation and analysis to be 
performed automatically, without the need for 
skilled human intervention. However, the source 
of funding for such incremental developments 
remains an open question, especially as one 
moves further away from the market and the 
level of risk increases for the innovator.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UK IN A 
GROWING MARKET
Some police services are now approaching 
universities to undertake research projects on 
their behalf. Regional meetings (e.g. in Yorkshire 
and the Humber) have allowed universities 
to present their capabilities and the possible 
analytical tools they have available, and for the 
police to present the problems they would like 
to investigate. A simple summary of what police 
services typically require is: “What we do now, 
but quicker and on site, please”.
As par t of its remit to enable closer 
networking and better communication 
between forensic science stakeholders, the 
FoSci SIG promotes an annual networking 
event called the Forensic Science Technology 
Showcase.  The aim is to bring together 
funders and potential buyers so that 
innovators can showcase new technologies, in 
order to help them find a market4. 
Innovators can also make these 
connections through the Chartered Society 
of Forensic Sciences, which has members 
from all aspects of forensic practice, crime 
scene investigation, policing, military, medical, 
dentistry and legal professions5. It offers 
continuing professional development (CPD), 
scientific meetings (with CPD points), 
qualifications, social and networking events, 
professional recognition and scholarships.  The 
society also provides an accreditation system 
for academic institutions that deliver forensic 
science undergraduate and postgraduate 
courses (see Chapter 2 case study p30).
The Association of Forensic Service 
Providers (ASFP) could also play an important 
role. It is an independent, representative body 
that seeks to facilitate the effective delivery 
of justice and promote public confidence in 
forensic science6.  The AFSP was constituted 
on 1 July 2010 with a mission to represent 
the common views of the providers of 
independent (i.e. non-police) forensic science 
within the UK and Ireland, while maintaining 
and developing best-practice in forensic 
science and providing expert opinion in 
support of the justice system, from scene to 
court. As such, it could act as a single voice 
for FSPs in the UK and Ireland, help to share 
international best practice, and promote 
global market opportunities. 
INNOVATION IS NOT JUST ABOUT 
MAKING BREAKTHROUGHS OR 
DEVELOPING A NOVEL INVENTION. 
INCREMENTAL INNOVATIONS ARE 
FAR MORE COMMON, AND RESULT 
IN IMPROVED PERFORMANCE FOR 
EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES. 
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CASE STUDY
INNOVATE UK AND THE  
FORENSIC SCIENCE SPECIAL  
INTEREST GROUP
B
MEEZ ISLAM, Teesside University
lood represents one of the most 
frequently encountered and useful 
types of physical evidence found at 
violent crime scenes. Investigators 
typically identify the presence of blood by using 
‘presumptive tests’: these indicate whether 
a substance is likely to be blood, but do not 
offer absolute proof. Current methods such 
as the Kastle-Meyer test, the leuco-malachite 
green test, and the luminol test, all use indicator 
chemicals that either change colour or glow 
when exposed to haemoglobin.
Although these tests are useful in many 
circumstances, they are also subject to false 
positives (i.e. they can indicate blood when 
none is actually present) and they may also 
detrimentally affect subsequent DNA tests.  
There is consequently a need for a more reliable 
means of detecting and identifying blood stains 
at crime scenes or from recovered evidence, in 
a non-contact, non-destructive manner. Recent 
research by my group at Teesside University has 
investigated the potential of visible-wavelength 
hyperspectral imaging, which can identify the 
spectral signature of haemoglobin in blood, with 
high specificity and sensitivity. Using a prototype 
instrument, we have obtained promising 
preliminary results showing that hyperspectral 
imaging can detect and identify both visible and 
latent blood stains on a range of backgrounds1.
Since obtaining our initial results, we have 
faced a number of challenges in disseminating 
our results to the police service and forensic 
laboratories; making contact with potential end 
users; and in obtaining funding to develop our 
prototype. Fortunately we have received support 
from Innovate UK, through its Forensic Science 
Special Interest Group (FORSIG). Its meetings 
and Technology Showcase events have allowed 
us to demonstrate our instrument to relevant 
end users in the police service, as well as 
forensic service providers.  This has allowed us to 
make useful contacts and get valuable feedback 
on our prototype. 
FORSIG highlighted relevant funding calls 
and was instrumental in pushing for a relevant 
Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) phase 
1 funding call from the Home Office.  They 
provided advice which allowed us to make a 
successful bid for proof-of-concept funding from 
that call, which has led to further development 
of our prototype. 
FORSIG also suggested that we set up a 
spin-out company to help commercialise our 
technology. Consequently, we have recently 
founded Chemicam Ltd, which currently consists 
of five partners and which aims to develop 
a commercial blood detection instrument. 
Significant challenges remain before we 
commercialise the technology – we are looking 
for more funding, and need to clear various 
regulatory hurdles, for example – but Innovate 
UK and FORSIG have clearly helped us to get 
closer to that goal.
THERE IS A NEED FOR A MORE 
RELIABLE MEANS OF DETECTING 
AND IDENTIFYING BLOOD STAINS AT 
CRIME SCENES OR FROM RECOVERED 
EVIDENCE, IN A NON-CONTACT, 
NON-DESTRUCTIVE MANNER. 
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The main growth market for UK forensics is 
likely to be in:
•  Digital forensics: Many crime investigations 
now involve mobile phones (tracking 
someone’s whereabouts, for example, or video 
evidence of an incident); or crime committed 
through the internet (see Chapters 7 and 15).  
These all need better approaches to retrieving 
and analysing electronic data.  
•  Rapid Identification of Offenders: The 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
Live-time Forensics strategy aims to speed 
up the identification of offenders by using 
innovations such as RapidHIT DNA or 
paraDNA analysis.
But the limited size of the forensic science 
market in any one country means that innovators 
and service providers must also consider 
opportunities and needs in the global forensic 
science market. Potential routes for innovators to 
access overseas markets, in addition to the above 
named organisations, include:
•  The Science and Innovation network, funded 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
and the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills  
• Innovate UK
• UK Trade and Investment
•  Other UK government departments – such as 
Ministry of Defence – that share best practice 
with other nations
•  European Network of Forensic  
Science Institutes
•  Horizon 2020 Secure Societies programme, 
which includes calls in ‘big data’ analysis; in situ 
forensic tools for the crime scene; remote 
control technologies for monitoring and 
examining scenes; internet forensics; ‘stand-off ’ 
body scanning
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
The government has an important role to play 
in helping forensic science innovation to thrive 
in the UK. Its CAST and SIDC can help to bring 
innovations through to market-readiness. And 
the Home Office is currently establishing a 
National Strategy for Forensic Science that will 
provide direction on the future opportunities 
for innovation, taking into consideration all 
members of the stakeholder community. In 
developing this, the Home Office may wish 
to explore how the UK healthcare sector has 
recently addressed the issue of clinical innovation 
and adoption.  The NHS Five Year Forward 
View sets out additional steps that the NHS 
will take to accelerate innovation to find better 
ways of delivering health and care.  This strategy 
includes the establishment of fifteen regional 
Academic Health Science Networks (AHSN), a 
similar number of Clinical Research Networks 
(CRNs) and the recent global call for the 
establishment of five ‘test beds’ that will receive 
national support for implementing high-potential 
innovations that respond to local clinical needs.
Each of the AHSNs has been given significant 
funding and a five-year license from NHS 
England to “facilitate the adoption of innovative 
practices, products and services at scale and 
more quickly than has previously been achieved 
in the NHS”. 
The NHS has also recognised that “too often, 
new technologies have been tested alone, in 
isolation from complementary innovations in 
how NHS services are delivered, limiting the 
value they produce”. AHSN, CRNs and test beds 
are seen as the mechanism by which this can 
be addressed, and similar bodies could have a 
positive impact on forensic science.
A national strategy for the sector is essential, 
along with appropriate funding.  That strategy 
should include mechanisms for academia, 
industry, customers, end-user communities and 
the government to engage and communicate 
more effectively, to ensure that innovations 
are fit-for-purpose and that CJS requirements 
are not over interpreted, potentially stifling 
innovation.
 THE LIMITED SIZE OF THE FORENSIC 
SCIENCE MARKET IN ANY ONE COUNTRY 
MEANS THAT INNOVATORS AND SERVICE 
PROVIDERS MUST ALSO CONSIDER 
OPPORTUNITIES AND NEEDS IN THE 
GLOBAL FORENSIC SCIENCE MARKET.
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BIOSENSORS IN FORENSICS
ENCOURAGING INNOVATION
BARBARA DANIEL,  Head of Forensic Science Unit, King’s College London
n January 2006, our group at King’s 
College London (KCL) was awarded a 
£178,613 research grant from the Engi-
neering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council (EPSRC) under its ‘Think Crime’ funding 
programme. Our research proposal had been 
prompted by a discussion with the Director of 
Forensic Services at the Metropolitan Police 
Service (FS-MPS), who asked whether it was 
possible to detect a 5-microlitre blood spot 
somewhere on a black tracksuit. Quite a chal-
lenge – but one we thought we could over-
come by using fluorescently-labelled antibodies 
that would bind specifically to red blood cell 
surface antigens. 
The major problem, in this forensic context, 
was how to get rid of any antibodies not 
specifically bound to the blood on the tracksuit. 
We came up with the idea of attaching the 
antibodies to magnetic nanoparticles and 
removing the excess with a magnet, a method 
that worked surprisingly well, even on fabrics. 
In 2009, we applied for follow-on funding to 
develop the technology, but it was deemed to 
be too far away from the market to be eligible. 
We then fell into a gap where the research was 
either ‘not innovative enough’ or ‘too far from 
the market’.  This illustrates an all-too-common 
difficulty in bringing forensic science techniques 
from the laboratory into routine use.
We continued to work on the problem, 
with the cost of consumables covered by 
the FS-MPS.  This resulted in some positive 
proof-of-concept work in the development 
of biosensors for the detection of body fluids 
in a forensic context, and formed the basis 
of an application for funding to the EPSRC 
in 2013.  This application was unsuccessful, 
after a reviewer from the forensic community 
reported that new technology would have little 
impact on forensic science because existing 
methods for body fluid detection are available 
and effective. 
Yet two very high profile cases would have 
been resolved much more quickly if a better 
method for the detection of body fluids was 
available. In the case of Stephen Lawrence, a 
minute trace of blood was missed and only 
discovered after many years, following hours of 
painstaking searching by an exceptional forensic 
scientist. Meanwhile, the blood spot missed 
on the shoe of Damilola Taylor’s assailant was 
attributed to human error. 
Our technology could result in a fifty-fold 
reduction in the time and expense spent on 
routine biological search methods. In light 
of these advantages for policing, the Police 
Innovation Fund awarded a grant to the FS-
MPS and KCL in August 2014 to develop this 
method.  The results are promising1, and we 
are currently seeking industrial partners to fully 
develop the technique. 
Biosensors rely on substrate-specific 
recognition moieties (similar to antibodies) 
capable of working efficiently within a mixture, 
without cross-reacting or giving false-positive 
results.  They must also be able to perform 
under the many and varied conditions 
encountered in forensic investigations. 
Developing these moieties is essential but 
time-consuming, and is therefore particularly 
vulnerable to falling into the ‘funding gap’ well 
known to researchers.
Fundamental research may be high risk 
and complex, but is important for the 
forensic community and funding bodies to 
recognise that it is vital to the implementation 
of revolutionary approaches to forensic 
investigation. 
OUR TECHNOLOGY COULD RESULT IN 
A FIFTY-FOLD REDUCTION IN THE TIME 
AND EXPENSE SPENT ON ROUTINE 
BIOLOGICAL SEARCH METHODS. 
SECURING THE FUTURE OF UK FORENSIC SCIENCE
182
T
CHAPTER 17
ACCESSING FORENSICS  
AS A NEW MARKET
MARK LITTLEWOOD, 
co-ordinator of the 
Forensic Science Special 
Interest Group; 
GILLIAN TULLY, Forensic 
Science Regulator
Although the UK market for forensic science is small and declining, the global 
market continues to grow and expand into new areas of science.  The UK 
should maintain its current high standing in the traditional forensic disciplines, 
while seeking opportunities to access overseas markets and developing new 
expertise in emerging areas such as digital forensics.
his chapter examines the forensic 
science sector as a new market, 
and offers insights into some 
of the key considerations of 
bringing a new technology into the Criminal 
Justice System (CJS). It describes the size and 
growth rate of the sector, potential areas for 
knowledge transfer, the processes involved and 
how to interact with key stakeholders, ethical 
considerations and resources to facilitate market 
entry.  This chapter draws extensively on, and 
uses updated sections from ‘Taking Forensic 
Science R&D to Market’1, a report by Gillian 
Tully and Kevin Sullivan that was published by 
the Forensic Science Special Interest Group 
(FoSci SIG) in 2013. It offers a much more 
comprehensive view of what is involved in 
bringing a new technology to market.
MAPPING THE FORENSIC MARKET 
The forensic market can be divided into two 
sectors: traditional forensics and digital forensics.
1.  Traditional forensics
Forensic science provision in the UK is 
fragmented, making it difficult to estimate the 
current size of the market.  This, combined with 
differing approaches across the world, mean that 
a global figure is even more elusive.  The forensic 
science market is further complicated by the 
split between external and in-house work such 
as scene of crime analysis and fingerprinting.  
The UK’s external market was predicted to fall 
from £170 million to £110 million between 
2009 and 2015 (ref. 2). However, more recent 
estimates have been more pessimistic, with 
the largest forensic service providers indicating 
a 2015 market value of £70 million to £100 
million, the Home Office indicating £70 million 
to £80 million, and the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO – now called the 
National Police Chiefs’ Council) £63million to 
£70 million. Various explanations for this decline 
have been offered, including disproportionate 
cuts to forensics compared with other police 
work; lower crime rates resulting in a reduced 
demand for forensic services; and a reduction in 
costs due to technological advances3. Previous 
attempts at estimating the size of the in-house 
market have proved inconclusive4.
The global market has been predicted 
to grow at a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 8.34% between 2014-2019 (ref. 
5) to reach $17.7 billion6, with developed 
countries accounting for more than 50% of the 
total market. However, automated processing is 
likely to force down the costs of standardised 
tests, reducing the total spent on forensic 
technologies in these regions.  This, combined 
with increased investment in infrastructure, 
modern equipment, DNA databases etc in 
developing countries, will see the Asia-Pacific 
and other regions outside North America 
and Europe accounting for 60% of the global 
forensic science market in the future6.
The forensic technologies market has been 
segmenting into 4 broad categories6:
•  DNA Profiling
•  Biometrics / fingerprint analysis
•  Chemical analysis (drugs / explosives / 
toxicology)
• Firearms identification and analysis
Of these, DNA profiling and chemical analysis 
typically account for the vast majority of the 
market (see Figure 1). 
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
DNA Profiling
Biometrics/Fingerprints
2,495
1, 846
Source: KOL Opinions, Expert Interviews, Press Releases and TMR Analysis
Controlled Substances/Drugs, Toxicology, Trace Evidence
Firearms/Toolmarks Other Forensic Requests
Figure 1: North American forensic technologies market 2011-2019, by services (USD Million)6.  
Data for the UK and rest of the world are not currently available. 
2. Digital forensics
The data above do not include the field of 
digital forensics, which is becoming an ever 
more significant part of forensic investigations.  
The use of smart phones and tablet computers 
is growing exponentially, and along with 
technologies such as smart home and smart 
vehicle systems they generate and contain 
masses of data, which can be used to investigate 
a suspect. 
Forensic specialists face huge difficulties in this 
area, considering:
•  The number of devices that could be 
associated with a single suspect
•  The number of different devices on the market, 
which would each require a protocol to 
analyse their contents
•  Operating systems with different encryption, 
each having regular updates that could change 
the analysis protocols 
•  The globalised nature of the digital world: these 
devices are probably manufactured overseas, 
which may make it more difficult to seek 
support for them
Thus, greater resource is likely to be put into 
digital forensics in the future.  This might grow 
the total forensic market, or could take financial 
resources away from traditional forensic 
disciplines.
In summary, the UK market for forensic 
science is small and declining. However, 
the global market continues to grow and 
expand into new areas of science.  The UK 
should maintain its current high standing in 
the traditional forensic disciplines, seeking 
opportunities to access overseas markets while 
developing new expertise in emerging areas 
such as digital forensics.
PROCESS STEPS NEEDED TO BRING 
A NEW TECHNOLOGY TO MARKET
The Criminal Justice System (CJS) has 
requirements that must be met before a 
new technology will be adopted by the 
police service, courts and other stakeholders.  
Technologies not only need to produce 
admissible evidence, they also need to be 
accepted as being credible.  To demonstrate 
credibility, technologies need to be fully validated 
and documented to allow the potential for all 
development materials to be reviewed in future 
court cases.
1. Key stakeholders and how to interact 
with them
In order to more effectively target limited 
R&D funding, constructive dialogue between 
innovators, end users and stakeholders is 
required.  The nature and timing of dialogue will 
vary depending on the drivers for the research, 
its strategic importance and its distance from 
market. For example, if research is required 
to build strategic capability, the Forensic Policy 
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Group should provide appropriate leadership. 
Conversely, fundamental academic research 
is required in all disciplines to generate the 
knowledge and understanding that is essential 
for a new generation of ideas for forensic 
applications to emerge.  This fundamental 
research should not be constrained by current 
needs for policing or defence, and needs no 
approval from forensic science stakeholders. 
Whatever the nature of the innovation, 
continuing end-user input is required throughout 
the development cycle. Key requirements of 
the dialogue between innovators, end users and 
stakeholders include: 
•  Shared set of values based on supporting open 
justice and enhancing public safety
•  Segregation of market engagement from sales 
and marketing or procurement activity, to 
ensure that: 
•  end users have no commitment to buy at 
market engagement stage
•  the same information is made available to 
all groups innovating in the same field
•  the innovators’ intellectual property is 
respected 
•  Understanding the strategic and operational 
priorities of, and the pressures on, all parties, 
both public and commercial sector (see below 
for examples). 
2. Stakeholder landscape, priorities and 
pressures 
No two stakeholders have the same strategic 
priorities or pressures, so to aid effective 
communication a brief summary is given below. 
Academia
•  Priorities: High-quality and high-impact 
publications are required for the Research 
Excellence Framework; fundamental research 
as well as applied research is critical 
•  Pressures: Funding environment is very 
challenging; university business development 
offices keen to commercialise research
Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences 
•  Priorities: Accrediting university courses, 
working to promote links between academic 
researchers, liaising with funding councils
•  Pressures: Rapid expansion of forensic science 
degree courses (see Chapter 2, case study 
p30), changing forensic science landscape 
College of Policing (CoP) 
•  Priorities: As the professional body for 
policing, the CoP partnered with the 
Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) to establish the What Works Centre 
for Crime Reduction, funding academic 
research into crime reduction7
•  Pressures: Looking to establish an evidence-
based profession with tight budgets; forensic 
science is a very small part of the CoP’s remit 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and 
Courts 
•  Priorities: All researchers in this field should 
be familiar with the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors8 – novel scientific methods 
will need to pass the tests within the code. 
Researchers also need to know the principles 
of case management9 and streamlined 
forensic reporting (SFR)10, to ensure that 
any methods they develop are tailored to 
the process; CPS guidance to summarise 
requirements for FSPs should be followed11
•  Pressures: CPS restructuring and reductions 
in resource. 
Defence Science & Technology Laboratory 
(dstl) 
•  Priorities: “To maximise the impact of science 
and technology for the defence and security 
of the UK”12. Dstl manages the roughly 
£400 million Defence Science & Technology 
Programme, outsourcing where possible 
to industry and academia (about 60%) and 
internally providing capability for chemical 
and biological defence, counter-terrorism 
and counter-insurgency, as well as analysis for 
evidence-based decision making
•  Pressures: Dstl is facing challenges from the 
ongoing efficiencies and streamlining within 
the Ministry of Defence, central government 
and the wider public sector ; there are 
challenges in coping with cuts while demand 
remains strong
Forensic Service Provider (FSPs) 
•  Priorities: Quicker, cheaper, more 
discriminating, more automated tests that 
can offer a competitive advantage
•  Pressures: Intense competition, reduced 
margins, and demand for faster results have all 
increased companies’ need to show a return 
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Managing Director
he UK’s forensic science marketplace 
has undergone major changes 
in recent years, and presents 
a challenging environment for 
companies.  The market has been commoditised 
under the National Forensic Framework, with 
forensic companies competitively tendering for 
individual ‘lots’ of work. Each lot comprises a 
number of very specific ‘products’ with associated 
‘service specifications’. 
But financial cuts have placed significant pressure 
on police budgets, causing the police service to 
dictate which scientific tests are carried out rather 
than working with forensic scientists to develop 
the most appropriate strategy for the case.  There 
is pressure to carry out the minimum amount 
of work, with less interpretation of the findings 
in the context of the case.  This is compounded 
by the police’s drive to deliver work in-house. 
Consequently, developing a new technique and 
then bringing a new service to market – with all of 
the associated validation and accreditation costs – 
entails significant resource and expenditure, and a 
not inconsiderable amount of commercial risk.  
 Meanwhile, a decline in the use of traditional 
evidence types – such as fibres, paint and glass 
– along with a growing reliance on DNA and 
fingerprints, has focused companies’ research and 
development budgets on new, innovative services 
that will give them a commercial edge and generate 
financial returns.
For example, ArroGen has developed a 
technique called Fingerprint Molecular Identification 
(FMID) that relies on mass spectrometry to 
provide a molecular profile of latent fingerprints 
at a crime scene.  This allows investigators to 
combine latent fingerprint examination with 
chemical analysis, which can potentially identify illicit 
drugs, medications and their metabolites, gender, 
explosives and more. It has, however, been a 
challenge to bring the technique to market.
Companies such as ours first need to identify 
customers’ requirements for the technique, and 
understand their differing requirements around 
the world.  That requires us to spend sizeable sums 
on running and attending numerous specialist 
conferences, and gathering feedback from police 
forces and other law enforcement agencies. In 
this respect, ArroGen has benefitted from having 
operations in the United States as well as the UK.  
The technology must then be tailored to 
meet customers’ needs. In our case, ArroGen has 
developed FMID Crime Scene and FMID Slide kits, 
taking into account the standard fingerprint and 
DNA requirements. 
Forensic technology providers also need to 
validate their techniques in each of the countries 
where they will be used. Our FMID system went 
through initial proof-of-concept studies, followed 
by validation on fingerprints left by volunteers (an 
exercise that requires careful consideration of all 
the legal implications involved). We are now field-
testing the technique within a true crime scene 
environment.
The UK forensic market has seen a welcome 
focus on accreditation, the final step for any 
forensic product. We hope that FMID will achieve 
that by demonstrating appropriate peer review and 
suitability for evidential use in the Criminal Justice 
System. Meanwhile, the company is preparing 
for service delivery; we have developed a pricing 
model and e-commerce site; instrumentation is 
in place; and new staff have been recruited and 
trained.
Our work on FMID illustrates the considerable 
effort involved in bringing a new forensic 
product to market, but we believe that it offers 
real potential to provide valuable intelligence 
and corroborative evidence to support law 
enforcement agencies and the courts.
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on investment, while reducing the emphasis 
on R&D Delays in implementation have a 
major impact on business 
Forensic Science Regulator (FSR)
•  Priorities: Validation must conform to standards 
within Codes of Conduct and Practice; for a 
completely new field, quality standards will 
need to be defined 
•  Pressures: Rapidly changing and fragmented 
forensic science landscape
Funding Bodies 
•  Priorities: The UK’s seven Research Councils 
fund academic research judged to be 
excellent, and which has an impact on the 
growth, prosperity and wellbeing of the UK. 
A variety of mechanisms are used, including 
support for international collaborations, 
support for academic career development 
and development of scientific infrastructure. 
Innovate UK seeks to promote UK innovation 
and hence economic growth
•  Pressures: Maximising the impact of research 
funding is increasingly important, and 
partnerships between funding organisations 
such as the Research Councils, Innovate 
UK, the UK’s Higher Education Funding 
Councils, business, government, and charitable 
organisations have been established. 
Home Office 
•  Priorities: The Home Office is committed 
to producing a forensic science strategy by 
the end of 2015, in which 5 areas have been 
considered: legitimacy, market/supply chain, 
digital forensics, forensic futures, skills and 
knowledge
•  Pressures: Closures of the Forensic Science 
Service (FSS) and National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA); National DNA 
Database (NDNAD) now within Home Office 
Science; public sector spending cuts; reduction 
in spending on forensic science; criticism from 
House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee. 
Industry 
•  Priorities: The UK is a small and decreasing part 
of a relatively small global market in forensic 
science. Ideally, technology needs to feed more 
than one market to increase attractiveness 
e.g. by crossing over to security and counter-
terrorism markets or medical markets. Funding 
to bridge the gap from academic work is often 
required 
•  Pressures: The global downturn means that 
access to capital for investment has been 
limited. Requirement to show a return on 
investment. Delays in implementation have a 
major impact on business 
National Crime Agency (NCA) 
•  Priorities: The NCA’s goal is to tackle serious 
and organised crime, using a combination of 
approaches such as: traditional law enforcement 
methods; gathering high-quality intelligence to 
know where, when and how to strike with best 
effect; monitoring serious career criminals and 
confiscating criminals’ assets 
•  Pressures: Delivering operational priorities; 
disruption of criminal markets; systematic 
management of persons of interest involved 
in organised crime; and delivery of more law 
enforcement activity against more organised 
criminals
Police 
•  Priorities: At the highest level, the police 
service’s goal is to improve public safety, so it 
wants to know how science can make people 
safer; and when things do go wrong, how can 
it help to identify offenders and bring them to 
justice? 
•  Pressures: intense budgetary pressure; new 
Policing and Crime Commissioners; police 
reform; reform of the NPCC; closure of the 
National Policing Improvement Agency and 
establishment of the CoP
Operational counter-terrorism (CT) users
•  Priorities: The government has laid out its 
counter-terrorism strategy in CONTEST13 
•  The strategy is based on four areas of work: 
•  Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks
•  Prevent: to stop people becoming 
terrorists and supporting terrorism
 •  Protect: to strengthen our protection 
against a terrorist attack
•  Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a 
terrorist attack
Forensic science has a significant part to play in 
much of that strategy. 
ACCESSING FORENSICS AS A NEW MARKET
187
3. Ethical considerations
Use of forensic science is governed by the state 
of the science, the legislative framework, the 
policy framework (including funding), interaction 
with society (including civil society groups) and 
commercial actors.
 
This happens at two levels: 
•  Sites of operation: where forensic science is 
applied (labs, crime scenes etc) and developed 
within a case, involving interaction between 
many players
•  Sites of deliberation: where legislative and 
policy decisions are made
Social and ethical decisions arise at both levels. 
Ethical oversight is essentially a collaborative 
process, shaped by all participants in forensic 
science. Historically, ethical considerations in 
forensic science have lagged far behind ethical 
considerations in medical research. A lag in public 
engagement and debate has arguably contributed 
to challenges at the European Court of Human 
Rights14, resulting in policy changes regarding the 
retention of samples and data on the National 
DNA Database. It is therefore important that 
innovators in the forensic science field ensure 
that the social and ethical issues arising from their 
work are highlighted and debated (see ref. 1 for a 
more extensive review of ethical considerations). 
In summary, the forensic science market is 
more complicated than other sectors because 
there is a large number of stakeholders to 
interact with; a need to test a technology 
in both research and real-world scenarios; 
documentation and validation processes; and 
ethical questions to consider. 
RESOURCES TO FACILITATE MARKET 
ENTRY
Due to the diverse range of technologies that 
might offer solutions to the forensic sciences, the 
funding landscape in this area is fragmented.  The 
majority of academic funding is provided through 
the UK Research Councils (RCUK), as detailed 
below. However, RCUK’s main remit is to fund 
‘blue skies’ research, whereas forensics is a more 
applied science. Similarly, most UK funding for 
businesses goes through Innovate UK, whose 
main remit is to “work with people, companies 
and partner organisations to find and drive the 
science and technology innovations that will 
grow the UK economy”. As discussed above, 
forensic science is a relatively small market, and 
therefore not a priority for Innovate UK funding. 
Nonetheless, there are options where funding 
can be applied to the forensic sciences, as 
discussed below.
1. Research Council funding
Academic institutions and some independent 
research organisations are eligible. Beacuse the 
employment of specialist staff or staff exchanges 
between organisations are eligible as costs for 
realizing the impact of research, academics 
applying for funding should consider at the 
outset whether to budget for forensic scientist, 
police or other end-user input in their ‘Pathways 
to Impact’ proposal. 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC)
The BBSRC’s strategic priorities are food 
security, industrial biotechnology and bioscience 
underpinning health. Grant proposals in 
responsive mode will have an advantage if 
they address one of these priorities, although 
research excellence remains the overriding 
priority.
The BBSRC also prioritises building 
partnerships: proposals that include 
collaborative research with users, research to 
inform public policy or increased international 
collaboration would be well suited to forensic 
science. Schemes for new academics may also 
be of value for forensic scientists commencing 
an academic career.
THE FORENSIC SCIENCE MARKET IS 
MORE COMPLICATED THAN OTHER 
SECTORS BECAUSE THERE IS A LARGE 
NUMBER OF STAKEHOLDERS TO 
INTERACT WITH; A NEED TO TEST A 
TECHNOLOGY IN BOTH RESEARCH 
AND REAL-WORLD SCENARIOS; 
DOCUMENTATION AND VALIDATION 
PROCESSES; AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 
TO CONSIDER.
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CASE STUDY
CYBER SCIENCE AND  
CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE
T
STEPHEN HAY,  Director, Pilot Lite Ventures
he work of Lancaster University is 
a prime example of how forensic 
science research can be exploited 
to contribute to the UK economy 
in numerous ways.  The Security Lancaster re-
search centre, one of the UK’s Academic Centres
of Excellence in Cyber Security Research, has 
pioneered a new field in online child protection 
called Digital Persona Analysis (DPA). 
DPA was developed over a decade and is 
the product of interdisciplinary research that 
combines computer and behavioural science with 
linguistics – it has already delivered significant 
impact in the fields of law enforcement, education
and internet governance. It automates the process
of detecting sexual predators online by using 
comparative language algorithms. DPA analyses 
large amounts of data to identify and report 
individual personas and behaviours of concern. 
It relies on a system known as the Isis Toolkit, 
developed to detect criminals who hide behind 
multiple identities (often adults posing as children).
Live trials have been carried out with various 
UK police forces, and separate evaluations have 
shown that the Isis Toolkit can detect with 94% 
accuracy an adult masquerading as a child. 
The initial research was funded by grants 
from the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) and the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC). In 2012 a 
 
 
 
 
separate company, Relative Insight Limited, was 
spun out from the university to commercialise 
this work. While it continues to operate with 
law enforcement, it has adapted the technology 
for use in a marketing context, turning language 
into data to give brands valuable intelligence on 
consumers and competitors. Relative Insight’s 
platform allows efficient analysis of a brand’s 
messages, and the language that people use to 
talk about them.  This offers insights into overall 
consumer attitudes toward brands, as well as how 
those attitudes shift over time, allowing brands to 
accelerate their research, develop better-informed 
marketing strategies, and measure campaign 
success.    
Relative Insight Limited is currently undergoing 
its third venture capital funding round having 
received earlier backing from the North West 
Fund for Venture Capital, Lancashire’s Rosebud 
Fund, and other investors. In a little over a year it 
has developed a blue-chip client list, working with 
corporations such as Microsoft, Unilever, Twitter 
and many of the world’s leading advertising 
agencies.  The world-class marketing department 
at Lancaster University also helped to develop 
this client base by introducing Relative Insight to a 
number of key agencies and brands. In return, the 
company contributes to marketing courses run 
by the university and is already recruiting from its 
student pool as the business expands.    
 The development and exploitation of DPA 
highlights the significant commercial value 
that can be created by the translational and 
multidisciplinary approach inherent to forensic 
science. In commercial terms, forensics is the 
science of identification, and the market for its 
applications will grow rapidly with increasing 
demand for more effective solutions to the 
challenges posed by such issues as terrorism, 
food contamination, counterfeiting and data 
management and security. 
 THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION 
OF DPA HIGHLIGHTS THE SIGNIFICANT 
COMMERCIAL VALUE THAT CAN BE 
CREATED BY THE TRANSLATIONAL AND 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
INHERENT TO FORENSIC SCIENCE.
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Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council (EPSRC) 
EPSRC has a number of highly relevant themes 
for forensic science research, including: 
•  Digital economy
•  Engineering
•  Global uncertainties, including cybersecurity, 
disasters and emergencies, CBRN proliferation, 
terrorism, threats to infrastructure and 
transnational organised crime 
•  Healthcare technologies
• ICT
•  Mathematical sciences
•  Physical sciences
Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) 
ESRC’s strategic priorities are:
• Economic performance and sustainable growth
•  Influencing behaviour and informing 
interventions 
•  A vibrant and fair society
Innovative, high-quality collaborative proposals 
between social scientists and physical scientists 
may find cross-research council funding. 
Medical Research Council (MRC) 
Although medical research may be peripheral 
to forensic science, areas such as understanding 
the genetic determinants of complex traits, or 
major genetic studies, have potential forensic 
applications. Collaborative research may be 
able to demonstrate impact in both health and 
forensic applications.
Natural and Environmental Research 
Council (NERC) 
Niche areas such as development of methods 
to detect crime against endangered species may 
find funding through NERC 
2. Innovate UK
Innovate UK’s funding is aimed at industry, 
particularly SMEs, although precise eligibility 
differs between schemes.  
Collaborative R&D
Encourages businesses and researchers to work 
together on innovation 
•  Co-funds partnerships between businesses, 
and business and academia 
•  Helps create successful new products, 
processes and services
Feasibility Studies
•  A single-company or collaborative R&D grant 
scheme 
•  Lets businesses investigate the technical 
feasibility of a new idea 
•  Winners showcase and share their ideas at 
Collaboration Nation events (see Chapter 16, 
case study on p179)
Innovation vouchers
•  Encourage businesses to look outside their 
network for new knowledge 
•  Available for UK start-ups and small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
•  A £6 million fund to help stimulate innovation 
where few businesses invest. One of the 
current priority areas for innovation vouchers 
is cybersecurity
Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (KTPs)
•  KTPs let businesses work in partnership with 
academic institutions 
•  This allows businesses to access knowledge, 
technology and skills
Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI)
•  Uses the power of government procurement 
to drive innovation 
•  Lets companies engage with the public sector 
to solve problems 
•  100% of the funding is provided through a 
contract not a grant 
Smart 
•  Funding for innovation projects in high-growth-
potential SMEs 
•  Grants let you assess the commercial viability 
of a project 
•  Smart funding is available to single companies 
3. Horizon 2020
Horizon 2020 is the funding mechanism to 
realise the EU’s Europe 2020 goals. It is open 
to companies, research organisations, academic 
institutions or individuals in EU member states, 
associated countries, EU candidate countries 
and selected other countries. Innovate UK 
coordinates all Horizon 2020 activity in the UK. 
Horizon 2020 aims to ensure that more good 
SECURING THE FUTURE OF UK FORENSIC SCIENCE
190
ideas get to market, and as such will fund more 
near-to-market solutions than its predecessor, 
FP7. Its key objectives are: supporting the 
EU’s excellent science base; building industrial 
leadership in Europe; and tackling societal 
challenges for a better society. Horizon 2020 
will simplify participation by having a single set 
of rules for all participants, a single funding rate 
of 100% of eligible costs, and reduced process 
complexity. 
There have been a number of opportunities 
for funding for forensic science research under 
the Secure Societies theme. Future calls are 
also expected to contain a significant interest in 
forensics.
4. Other government funding
Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE)
CDE calls are open to a broad range of science 
and technology providers, including academia 
and SMEs, and can be applied for through two 
routes:
•  Enduring Challenge: a competition that is 
always open for applications for proof-of-
concept research funding
•  Themed competitions
Police Innovation Fund
For the past few years, the government has been 
setting aside significant amounts of money to fund 
projects aimed at transforming policing through 
innovation and collaboration. In 2014, £50 million 
was provided; this increased to £70 million in 
2015. Although this fund covers the whole of 
policing, forensics projects are included. Projects 
should be led by a UK Police Force, but can 
involve both academic and industrial partners.
Key areas of forensics and potential 
technologies for knowledge transfer 
The Knowledge Transfer Network (KTN) is 
the UK’s Innovation Network. Its remit is to 
connect people to speed up innovation, solve 
problems and find markets for new ideas.  The 
KTN exists to accelerate innovation, stimulating 
and facilitating the conversion of ideas into 
new products and services that benefit the 
UK economically, socially and environmentally. 
KTN spans all technology domains and 
applications, and connects end-user problems 
/ opportunities with people who can deliver 
solutions. 
Innovate UK established KTN through a 
grant in April 2014, following the merger of 14 
separate networks that each had a separate 
remit to address individual business and 
technology sectors that are important to the 
UK economy. Many communities represented 
by KTN could have an impact on innovation 
in the forensic sciences, but the main sectors 
offering immediate opportunities could include:
• Biotechnology
• Improved recovery of DNA
• Amplification of low copy number DNA
• More rapid production of DNA profiles
• Health
• Use of biomarkers for identification
• ICT & mathematics
•  Tools and techniques for the management of 
large datasets
•  Encryption tools for digital forensics 
applications
•  Algorithms to improve the speed and 
accuracy of identification
• Materials and chemistry
• T echniques for the analysis of materials – age, 
origin etc
• Electronics, sensors and photonics
• Biosensors for biometric analysis
•  Handheld devices for the characterisation of 
samples at the crime scene
In his review of research and development 
in forensic science in 2011 (ref. 15), Bernard 
Silverman recommended that “the Technology 
Strategy Board should consider whether 
forensic science could be facilitated through 
a Knowledge Transfer Network or similar 
A COMPANY APPROACHING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE FOR THE FIRST 
TIME NEEDS TO HAVE A STRONG 
BUSINESS CASE, IDEALLY BASED 
ON MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS, TO 
ENSURE THAT THE EFFORT WILL 
YIELD A RETURN ON INVESTMENT. 
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mechanism”.  The KTN’s Forensic Science 
Special Interest Group (FoSci SIG) was 
formed to fill this role, acting to improve 
communication and work to build a forensic 
community through collaboration with existing 
organisations.  The FoSci SIG is a focal point 
for innovation and has a remit to facilitate 
knowledge sharing across disciplines.
Even though there are options for support 
from the public purse, the diverse and 
multidisciplinary nature of the forensic sciences, 
along with its small market size, means that 
funding forensic science is not a priority for 
most agencies. Recent use of the SBRI scheme 
has seen a handful of funding calls in the 
forensic areas, but these are rare. Perhaps the 
best opportunity is to access the Horizon 2020 
Secure Societies funding calls.
Technologies from different disciplines need 
to be brought to bear on forensic science 
problems, thereby leveraging work that has 
already taken place.  The UK has a mechanism 
to do this through KTN and, in particular, the 
FoSci SIG.
CONCLUSIONS
Accessing the forensic science market is 
not straightforward.  The market is small, 
fragmented and, in many countries, the main 
customer base is the police service or other 
government agencies. A company approaching 
forensic science for the first time needs to 
have a strong business case, ideally based on 
multiple jurisdictions, to ensure that the effort 
will yield a return on investment. However, the 
UK’s Forensic Science Special Interest Group 
(FoSci SIG) has invested in mapping the key 
stakeholders involved, and detailing the process 
steps required to bring a new technology to 
market. 
Two of the main considerations are ethics 
and validation.  The rise (and projected 
increase) in the use of biometric techniques 
in the forensic sciences means that ethics and 
privacy considerations become ever more 
important. Researchers are developing DNA 
techniques that will allow them to determine 
details of a suspect’s physical characteristics 
(eye colour, ethnicity, hair colour etc), along 
with other biomarkers that could offer insights 
into areas such as health.  Thus ever more data 
on the individual will be collected, which is 
useful to the Criminal Justice System but also 
poses privacy issues.  There is much to learn 
from other areas, such as the clinical sciences, in 
the ethical management of data.
All new techniques and procedures need to 
be backed up by full, traceable and auditable 
validation studies. Documentation of these 
studies must be disclosed if the techniques are 
ever challenged in the courts. While academics 
and companies will routinely keep records of 
their research, the requirements of the Criminal 
Justice System are much more stringent 
than in other fields. Missing or inaccurate 
documentation can result in evidence being 
thrown out and confidence in a technology 
disappearing.
While there is little direct public funding 
for new forensic products, there are some 
sources from government agencies in the UK. 
Help is also on hand from the Knowledge 
Transfer Network and the FoSci SIG.  The UK is 
historically strong in both the forensic sciences 
and in the development of new technologies 
for use in other markets.  The KTN and the SIG 
can help to bring the two together, by pulling 
technologies proven in different sectors over 
to forensics, and leveraging funding that has 
already been committed from other areas.
THE RISE (AND PROJECTED 
INCREASE) IN THE USE OF BIOMETRIC 
TECHNIQUES IN THE FORENSIC 
SCIENCES MEANS THAT ETHICS 
AND PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 
BECOME EVER MORE IMPORTANT. 
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Bayes’ Theorem
Bayes’ theorem gives a rational method for updating our beliefs in the light of 
new evidence. In our example the prosecution hypothesis (H) is that the de-
fendant left the footprint, and the defence hypothesis (~H) is that someone else 
left the footprint.
The expert tells us the probability of the match evidence (E) given the defence 
hypothesis: P(E|~H) = 1/1000. The probative value of this evidence is given by 
the likelihood ratio (LR), which compares the probability of the evidence under 
the prosecution and defence hypotheses:
In our example, we assume that P(E|H) = 1. Thus the LR = 1000. In words, the 
evidence is a thousand times more likely on the prosecution rather than the 
defence hypothesis. So the evidence is positive support for the prosecution.
But what we really want to know is the probability that the defendant left the 
print given the evidence, P(H|E).  Bayes’ theorem tells us how to compute this. It 
is easiest to use the odds version:
Posterior odds = prior odds x LR
In words, our updated belief in the hypothesis given the evidence is our prior 
belief multiplied by the likelihood ratio.
The prior odds for H is simply P(H)/P(~H). In our example we assumed P(H) = 
1/10000, and thus P(~H) = 9999/10000.
Putting these values into Bayes’ theorem:
Thus after updating on the evidence, the defence hypothesis is about ten times 
more likely than the prosecution hypothesis. Converting the posterior odds to 
the posterior probability:
P(H|E)  1/11, and therefore P(~H|E)   10/11.
The prosecutor’s fallacy involves conflating P(E|~H) with P(~H|E). This is a 
logical error, and the two probabilities are very different in this example. They 
will only take approximately the same values if P(H) = P(~H); but in most cases 
P(~H)>P(H) and the fallacy will greatly underestimate P(~H|E) and thus over-
estimate P(H|E).
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